| | Okay, I got to the "beef" part of Fodor's rejection of Darwinian natural selection as a theory that explains the existence of things or features which differentially affect the reproductive success of genes. Whew! That sentence was hard to say in my mind. The neat thing about video is that you can stop it and comment before hearing how the presenter advances his solution. That's what I've done here. I've stopped the video at 10:55 to give my answer before hearing Rosenberg's.
Fodor's argument (introduced at 10 minutes into the video) is paraphrased below: ******************************************** 1) It's logical to assume that hearts are for pumping blood. 2) It's logical to assume that blood pumping is good -- that blood pumping is something that natural selection would "want" to select for (that blood pumping is that thing that we would want Darwinian processes to explain) 3) But the pumping of blood is inextricably intertwined with something that might hurt your survival: the nonquiet beating of a heart (which may give away your position to a super-astute predator). And, at the very least, it is logical to assume that the nonquiet beating of a heart does not, in-and-of-itself, have any survival advantage whatsoever. 4) Whatever you have to say about blood pumping and nonquiet, beating hearts, they always go together (because of physical laws). 5) One can imagine a scenario where hearts were able to pump blood completely quietly (without the audible beating of a heart) 6) One can also imagine a scenario where hearts beat regularly, but do not pump blood. 7) Comparing and contrasting # 5 and # 6, Darwinian processes, because they are entirely physical processes, could not be said to favor one over the other. It is possible that Darwinian processes favored blood pumping (and we got the audible heart beats as a superficial artifact of that specific, selective pressure), or, alternatively, it is possible that Darwinian processes favored audible and regular heart beats (and we got the blood pumping as a superficial artifact of that specific, selective pressure). ----------------------------------------------- 8) Therefore (because Darwinian processes can't discriminate #5 from #6), Darwinian processes have to be thrown out as an explanation for the evolved function of hearts. ********************************************
I will post again with comments regarding Rosenberg's answer (when I found out what that is), but here is my first-pass, knee-jerk answer:
Fodor seems dismayed that Darwinian processes cannot be used in order to explain definitively that, in the formulation of the heart, the exact problem that natural selection was working on was the pumping of blood, to be differentiated from a hypothetical problem where natural selection was merely first working on building a heart with regular, audible beats -- and it just so happens that that processes inexorably results in the pumping of blood. A reason that this might have been the case would be one wherein there was a survival advantage to being able to keep track of time -- and a beating heart is like a time-keeper, of sorts.
Imagine an organism in a pre-cardiovascular stage of development. For some reason, natural selection is developing a heart inside of that species (over many generations). There is no way of telling whether the final (the ultimate) purpose of the heart is the same as the initial (the proximate) purpose -- which may have been as a simple time-keeping device. Because audible heart beats and the pumping of blood always go together (because of physical laws), there is no way to tell which of these 2 things were being acted on by Darwinian processes.
Therefore, looking above to # 2, we find out that our reason for appealing to Darwinian processes in the first place, is to explain blood pumping, but it is precisely the Darwinian processes themselves that cannot do this. They cannot perform this function -- the explanation of the evolution of blood pumping -- because there is no way to tell what it is that natural selection was working on and for what reason. This seems to be an appeal to the Primacy of Consciousness (a form of idealism), where every explanation has to be one where motives are involved. But under a Primacy of Consciousness, nothing of importance ever emerges from happenstance recombinations of atoms of matter (e.g., genes, chromosomes, traits, etc).
If you say that natural selection has to have a motive -- so that it would be possible to differentiate the natural selection of a heart made for its blood pumping, from a heart made for its audible beats -- then you are, a priori, claiming that the natural selection is "unnatural" (e.g., man- or God-made). It's the fallacy of Begging the Question. Now, my answer is subject to the charge of being a straw-man. All it would take is for Fodor to come in here and say he doesn't care about motives, only processes -- and that he is merely lamenting the fact that physical processes are underdetermined genetically. I am willing to bet that Rosenberg has an even better answer than I do on this one.
Let me restart the video in order to find out ...
:-)
Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/24, 5:31pm)
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