RoR: Forum

The "two definitions" idea as applied to the concept "value" sounds quite important, and it sounds like Peikoff was onto something. "Value" as that which one acts to gain and/or keep is what we may term "value" without its normative application to human beings. It's simply, that which is life-promoting. The life-promotingness is what unites it with the other definition as applied to human beings, that which one ought rationally to gain and/or keep. Indeed, the life-promotingness is what accounts for the is-ought unity. Life-promotingness is what accounts for there being values to begin with; a being responsive to reasons and deliberating on the matter will be responsive to those ends which are life-promoting.

Indeed, we can determine whether we can speak of a coherent set of true ends that could be anything other than life-promoting, i.e., if it's not life-promoting, then we will have too difficult a time unpacking its meaning as an alleged end.

Anyway, "value as that which one ought rationally to gain and/or keep" is value in the context of human life. From the standpoint of human life, of rational deliberators responsive to reasons about the ends that they have, there will not be a distinction between the two senses of "value."

At least, I think this is more or less where the two-definitions discussion is going to lead. From Roger's reporting, I think Peikoff touched on some fruitful ground.

Post 61

Friday, June 16, 2006 - 8:50am

A little bit of expansion, which is quite nearly fully explicit in my above posting: The two definitions of "value" are, I think, reducible to something common: "value" is that which is life-promoting, in either sense.

The reason for two definitions, each with valid applicability, is that in the one case, we are speaking of value without specific application to a rational human life. It's value defined in terms of the standpoint of life (of the requirements of life). In the other case, it's value defined in terms of the standpoint of reason (the requirements of reason).

But yeah, I would say that making a full accounting for the sources of these two definitions is crucial to an understanding of the grounds for fact-value unity. Acting to gain and/or keep things is a fact about the world. Acting to gain and/or keep things as a rational being is a fact with normative dimensions.

(Notice also that there might be two definitions of "rational." One refers to possessing the faculty or capicity or potentiaility for rationality. The other refers to the exercise or actualization of that capacity. "Man is a rational animal" has two distinct expressions, such that in one case, you are speaking of possessing capacities that are unique to man, and insofar as you exercise it, you manage to live out a life that would be distinctive to human functioning. But achieving full actuality as-man refers to the second case, where one consistently integrates principles of reason into one's life and actions. In the world of Atlas Shrugged, there is a dramatized struggle between the two perspectives -- between those who seek to live as human life requires but face conflicts and contradictions in their values, implicitly or openly seeking to have their cake and eat it too [the villains doing so quite consciously and viciously, knowing their continued existence is one of parasitism of the good, the rest of society more passive in this, implicitly yearning for the right guidance to living well and independently, but having accepted bad premises], and those [the Strikers] who have consistently followed through with what it means to live rationally.)

Post 62

Friday, June 16, 2006 - 12:29pm

Robert, I completely agree that being creative and using proven marketing tools and techniques can help make groups or individuals more successful activists. Any organization with poor salesmanship probably isn't going to be successful at changing a culture--no mattter how much money it has.

But I never claimed that anyone would argue that "having oodles of cash is a bad thing." What I claimed is that some activists think it's not *necessary* for a group to be flush with cash in order to change a culture--ALL that matters are the ideas and the presentation. This is simply wrong. An organization without a large warchest can be successful at reaching out to more individuals and recruiting some of them to the cause. That's a far cry, however, from actually *changing* our country's dominant philosophical premises.

Post 63

Friday, June 16, 2006 - 11:00pm

I think Objectivism is something that can't be held for long by any one organization. ARI has its mark on the memories of those old enough to remember when Rand was alive, but the larger world has yet to hear of either TOC/AS, ARI, RoR, and etc. And as such, Objectivism, despite its roots in numerous older philosophical propositions/views is 'new' to the world at large. Unfortunately, the PoMos have had the long legs of government money to make their presence nearly permanent in the intellectual community of philosophers, artists, and so forth. Thus, our cause to keep the 'fires of reason' alive is far more strife-ridden than before. I think because of this complication, one ought not to solely rely on one organization to promote Objectivism. What is needed is the overall promotion of Objectivist values. Oddly, I've heard folks claim that Objectivism is for 'teenagers' and 'idealists'. Yet, the funny thing is that I've seen more hardnosed so-called pragmatic individuals espouse Objectivism or atleast agree in part with Rand's propositions than anything else in my brief walk on this planet. Essentially, this name change is cute, but it won't help promote Objectivism or rational thinking/living at all. That takes action, not mere words.

-- Bridget

Post 64

Saturday, June 17, 2006 - 9:46am

I was telling people about the "two definitions" in the 1970s. I guess I should write more!

Post 65

Saturday, June 17, 2006 - 11:29am

--Epistemology: How Root Concepts and Derivative Concepts are Related--

> Notice also that there might be two definitions of "rational." One refers to possessing the faculty or capicity or potentiaility for rationality. The other refers to the exercise or actualization of that capacity... [Chris Cathcart]

This is more than a "might be" and there are more than two legitimately used senses of the word 'rational'. While Objectivism has its own restricted senses, the dictionary reflects all the multiple epistemologically useful senses of important or heavily used words. Different, albeit related or derivative concepts falling under the same word:

1. "having its source in or based on X"
2. "being guided by X"
3. "using X"
4. "consistent with or in accord with X"
5. "relating to X"

...where X is "reason" in this case. If the word were "emotional", X would be "emotion."

There are thousands of words in the English language where the above five variant senses of the word's meaning exist. Many ethical concepts (including the word 'ethical' itself!) follow this pattern. Usually the words range along an axis of distance from the root concept X in terms of degree of connection or alignment with the root.

Aristotelian would be in another example where X is Aristotle. People can legitimately mean the term to be used tightly or loosely with one of the above seven senses. Rand uses metaphysical in (at least) the sense of falling within the science of metaphysics and in sense 1.

Notice that 5 is the loosest or vaguest sense. I think Rand also used this at least once in referring to a sense of metaphysical dread, if I recall.

-----

I think the above relates to this point: "Peikoff admitted that in one sense, the two definitions did not refer to the same concept, since they didn't refer to the same units. (In other words, using Rand's definition of "concept," the two definitions must be of two different concepts that happen to be using the same word -- generic value and rational objective value both using the term "value.") On the other hand (he hedged), in a sense (huh?) they were referring to the same concept, since they referred to the same fact (valuing), but from a different perspective." [Roger]

One way to untangle this is by considering a root concept and derivative concepts. In Rand's sense it's not the same concept, but in Peikoff's sense it's certainly not an entirely new or unrelated concept - it's based on, derived, from or an "extension" of or at a certain remove from the basic one.

This is how languages work etymologically. Usually the root or basic concept is something very concrete in the old English or Latin (fundamental coming from the idea of a foundation which may have been something very physical like laying down a base of rocks or pilings for a road or a house) and then being extended first by analogy to more abstract applications.

(Edited by Philip Coates
on 6/17, 11:47am)

Post 66

Sunday, June 18, 2006 - 3:38pm

You know, one reason I don't post more or on philosophically important topics is that when I make a substantive intellectual post like the above, no one posts a substantive....or any!...response (whether to disagree or to support it and build on it and integrate to other issues). People have suggested to me over the last month, that I not waste time on "lightweight issues" like Diana Hsieh and her attacks, but when I do something which reflects my -real- areas of interest and a great deal of knowledge -- epistemology, thinking skills, psychology, persuasion, intellectual history -- I get bupkus. [Bupkus is a technical term in epistemology which I intend to write a seven hundred page book about.] I appreciate the atlas statuettes but I appreciate it more when I kick the ball deep downfield if someone picks it up and runs with it.

Post 67

Monday, June 19, 2006 - 10:39am

Patience, please, Phil! I am not yet recovered from a very busy weekend, during which my desktop computer also "decided" to melt down on me. I fully intend to comment on your post, for I have much more to say on the topic.

For now, I'll just note that Peikoff's "Two Definitions" lecture was specifically about the tendency to conflate a generic concept with a normatively favored sub-category of that concept. This relates directly to Rand's 1964 identification of the Fallacy of the Frozen Abstraction. Her example there was of the altruist who equated his specific morality with morality in general, and then regarded egoism is outside the category of morality and "isn't really" a morality. The same error occurs in the other direction, of course. E.g., someone saying that non-rational values "aren't really" values.

This, by the way, is the basis for a great deal of bigoted rhetoric, from Objectivists and non-Objectivists, alike. It's well and good to have your point of view -- even better to have the correct one! -- but that does not epistemologically or morally entitle you to do violence to the hierarchical structure of concepts. Which means that you do not get to conceptually "ostracize" the values, moralities, virtues, standards of values, philosophies, philosophers, etc. that you disagree with and conflate the general concept that would include them with your specific point of view.

("You" does not mean you, Phil -- unless the shoe fits, of course. :-)

Your other comments are well taken, but I was specifically noting the focus in Peikoff's "two definitions" lecture, which was on the tendency to confuse generic and specific concepts to the point of using the same word for them.

REB

Post 68

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 8:46am