Chris C,
OK, the Ayn Rand Institute is pulling in $6.5 mil a year. If we believe their own promotion, this number will grow substantially. If they're being overoptimistic, it won't. It's a fair chunk of change either way.
But what are they spending it on? Is it worthwhile? Up this thread a piece, at
http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/NewsDiscussions/1398_1.shtml#31
you described ARI's mission as follows:
Advancing Objectivism is a pretty straightforward idea, I think. I think it means presenting the best and strongest defenses of Objectivism -- not as interpreted by ARI, but as interpreted objectively. And, yes, it does mean advancing Objectivism which, in essence, is Ayn Rand's own philosophy. Actually, I'm not an "expert" on all aspects of Objectivism, so I don't know whether it basically gets all the right answers on epistemology. On methodology, it does. On ethics, it does. Where I think I have a solid understanding, it's fundamentally right because it's fundamentally a radical updating of Aristotelianism. Properly advocated and defined, any neo-Aristotelianism is worth advancing -- hence why I advocate reading the Dougs' work, even if they don't claim to be Objectivists.
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Some of ARI's mission is fulfilled by putting out unpublished work by Rand. We can argue whether she would have wanted it published—we can certainly argue whether their manner of editing, or controlling access to the archives, passes muster—but there's obvious positive value in such a project. On the other hand, they're going to run out of material one of these days.
How about “Objectivist philosophy”--what goes beyond the canonical writings of Rand and others she approved, but does so without violating any of the tenets of “Objectivism,” the closed system?
First question: Is ARI interested in any defense of Objectivism that diverges from the interpretations put forward by Peikoff, Binswanger, Smith, Ghate, et al.? (Smith's new book diverges from Peikoff just twice on ethical matters, and maybe shows a little less enthusiasm than Peikoff for Rand's doctrine of emotions as based on “premises.” It discusses self-esteem at some length, but never cites a single publication by Nathaniel Branden.)
(Meanwhile, we know that ARI treats anyone who offers a critique of Objectivism, even a sympathetic one, as an enemy.)
As a psychologist, I am interested in Objectivist epistemology. I find it to be gap-ridden. The ARIans partly admit the gaps; they can hardly deny some of them, when Rand said that it was important to formulate a philosophy of science, but, no, she hadn't come up with one. Yet the unadmitted gaps, for instance, the lack of a theory of skill, are just as bad if not worse than those that Rand acknowledged.
Even worse, I find parts of the Objectivist epistemology to be false.
The doctrine of tabula rasa is not sustainable; neither is Rand's belief that newborn babies experience pure sensations. (There is no way to correct either of them without drawing on the findings of biology and psychology, which according to Rand's later view of philosophical method should never be done!) Nor is there any way to square the doctrine that sensations and percepts are never in error with the errors that animals (who, according to Objectivism, form no concepts) actually commit.
Peikoff demands that every concept be “reduced” to the perceptual data that it subsumes, retracing along the way the chain of concepts by which it was (logically? psychologically?) arrived at, but of course neither he nor anyone else has actually provided such a reduction for the vast majority of the concepts that he and other Objectivists regard as legitimate.
Peikoff has put forward a doctrine of the arbitrary assertion, according to which such assertions are literally meaningless. With his apparent encouragement, his followers brand a wide swath of views as arbitrary when in fact many of them are just plain false, and some of them may be true.
I have a lot less trouble with the Objectivist ethics, but there's a stubborn structural weakness in the foundations (the “premoral choice to live”) and a further problem posed by Rand's retention of old notions of “the unity of the virtues”and of moral perfection. By contrast, I wonder what happened to the old notion of practical wisdom, as Objectivism is the only significant neo-Aristotelian philosophy to try to function without it.
Another way of putting the question would be: does anyone in a position of authority at ARI agree with you that neo-Aristotelianism is worth advancing in general? If it were so regarded, wouldn't Doug Den Uyl and Doug Rasmussen and Tibor Machan and Fred Miller and Eric Mack and Roderick Long and Aeon Skoble and Neera Badhwar and Jonathan Jacobs and Julia Annas—hell, even David Kelley and Chris Matthew Sciabarra—be drawing multiple invites to ARI functions? Wouldn't ARI even be steering a little of its largess in their direction?
Au contraire, if Peikoff, Binswanger, Schwartz, Brook, Ridpath, Mayhew, and the rest could reliably get people not to read anything by Den Uyl or the others abovementioned — say, at a cost of $1 mil a year — would they reject the proposal out of hand and commit the money to other projects? Or would they jump to invest in pulling academics and/or the general public away from the work of unapproved authors?
Robert Campbell
(Edited by Robert Campbell on 6/13, 5:39pm)
(Edited by Robert Campbell on 6/13, 5:42pm)
(Edited by Robert Campbell on 6/14, 4:30pm)
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