Coase v. Rand

Michael quotes me as follows: "In other words, my point was that this moral obligation exists regardless of whether or not anyone recognizes or respects it." And replies: "That statement is about the closest I have seen anybody come to defining Kant's theory of moral duty without mentioning either Kant or duty."

I don't know how you could have gotten that interpretation, Michael, unless you got sidetracked by the word "obligation," by which I simply meant "that which you ought morally to do." I was not referring to "duty" in the Kantian sense of the term. As I took such pains to point out, a moral "obligation" is conditional, not categorical. You "ought" to do X only "if" you want Y.

I was using the term "obligation" in essentially the same sense as Rand was when she stated: "The only 'obligation' involved in individual rights is an obligation imposed, not by the state, but by the nature of reality (i.e., by the law of identity): ~consistency~, which, in this case, means the obligation to respect the rights of others, if one wishes one's own rights to be recognized and protected." ("The Wreckage of the Consensus," in CUI, p. 226). Hence, my point that the obligation exists regardless of whether or not anyone recognizes or respects it, because it is based on the nature of reality rather than on a law imposed by the state.

- Bill

Post 281

Monday, October 17, 2005 - 10:26pm

Bill,

You "ought" to do X only "if" you want Y.

(Whew! Wonderful! Get thee behind me, Immanuel!)

I keep harping on this because it is precisely what gets lost in the rinse with this line of vocabulary and using the same word for two different meanings.

I think that "obligation" is so restricted a term that it should be discarded in a general context for the meaning you are stating and used only in specific concrete instances.

I prefer law of causality instead.

Still, in your "ought" there is more than causality. There is volition. One cannot choose the elements of the law of causality. One can choose whether one includes them in ones values and principles. That is why the whole field of ethics (as a conceptual category of philosophy) exists.

Michael

Post 282

Tuesday, October 18, 2005 - 7:29pm

Michael, in response to Bill you said:

Still, in your "ought" there is more than causality. There is volition.

I'm having trouble with this distinction, because of the oft-murky relation of volition to causality (ie. because volition is a "kind" of causality -- or causation, if you will). Holding firm to what is in those parentheses then, there is nothing "more than causality" in Bill's "ought." Now, I may be making a category mistake** here -- so I'm counting on you to raise a red flag, if so.

Ed

==============
**Example of a "category mistake":

Since mind can only mean �what it is like to be me� or �your experience of the world�, it is a distortion of language to make it mean �a distinct mental substance� - as Descartes attempts to. Such an attempt is called by Ryle a �category mistake�.

source:
http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_behaviourism_category.htm

Post 283

Tuesday, October 18, 2005 - 7:31pm

On category mistakes, Wikipedia says it better:

A category mistake is a semantic or ontological error by which a property (or some category of being) is incorrectly ascribed to a particular ontological type or token in a proposition and therefore is meaningless or nonsense. For example, the statement "the business of the book sleeps eternally" is syntactically correct, but it is meaningless or nonsense because it incorrectly ascribes the property, sleeps eternally, to business, and incorrectly ascribes the property, business, to the token, the book.

Post 284

Tuesday, October 18, 2005 - 8:41pm

Ed,

The category mistake comes with cognitive and normative concepts.

In the cognitive sense, Bill's "ought" merely means a condition based on causality. In the normative sense, you can choose that result or not based on how you evaluate it (evaluate reality, usually).

What I see during this whole discussion is an attempt to blend the cognitive and normative concepts into one and call it absolute - which produces something akin to a categorical imperative - which is what I am bitching so much about.

Here are Ayn Rand's comments on the two types of concepts, from "Art and Moral Treason, in The Romantic Manifesto:

The process of a child's development consists of acquiring knowledge, which requires the development of his capacity to grasp and deal with an ever-widening range of abstractions. This involves the growth of two interrelated but different chains of abstractions, two hierarchical structures of concepts, which should be integrated, but seldom are: the cognitive and the normative. The first deals with knowledge of the facts of reality�the second, with the evaluation of these facts. The first forms the epistemological foundation of science�the second, of morality and of art.

Now, apply these concepts to rights. In the cognitive sense, a right is a category of philosophy that links ethics to politics. This includes all kinds of rights, depending on the philosophy.

In the normative sense, a right will be based on a metaphysical premise and judged to be true or false, good or evil, exist or not exist. In the case you argue, the metaphysical premise of rationally derived axioms is the only truth, thus only rights derived from that premise will be true - or exist, if you will.

There's the rub. Rand uses the same word (rights) for both concepts. Most people, also, mix these up.

I argue for greater clarity - always using qualification for which concept is being employed - so that actual convincing of others can occur, instead of arguments about the rational equivalent of the sex of Angels. Or worse. A stolen concept (metaphysical essence) from the dark side creeping into rational discourse.

Michael

Post 285

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 8:58am

Michael,

So let me get this straight. There are always & only 2 mental processes going on in man: cognitive (knowledge acquisition) & normative (evaluation of knowledge by a standard of value).

Previous (primitive) 'moralities' WERE normative, but had cognitive 'deficiencies' (or, perhaps, a deficient integration of an "is" with an "ought" -- if you will). In this sense, and for a real life example: When the African Witch Doctor declares "Mengee" (because a recently born child's first tooth came out on the bottom jaw, instead of the top) -- then the child is "thrown-away" (left in the jungle to die) because there IS a normative concept in the minds of those in the tribe [Mengee = bad; and human life is less important than Mengee].

The problem is cognitive deficiency. There are no facts of reality which this real-life Witch Doctor can refer to -- when "declaring" Mengee (ie. declaring that children should be murdered). There IS a "moral" code, but it ISN'T based on the facts of reality. This "morality" is anti-life, but it is still a form of ethics (in this case, a morality of death). Even though it is as much a code to die by -- as it is a code to live by -- it deserves integration into the "field" of ethics. The cognitive deficiency needs to be fixed, before we go arguing about -- and comparing -- different ethics and norms.

Is this what you are saying?

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 10/19, 9:00am)

Post 286

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 9:42am

Ed,

Absolutely correct.

How on earth are you going to correct anybody's normative deficiencies if you deny that the cognitive category to be evaluated exists? (Well... maybe not completely accurate. Your term "cognitive deficiency needs to be fixed" should read "cognitive concept needs to be identified and used.")

I am confused by your term "integration into the field of ethics." Cognitively, a principle is merely acknowledged as being ethics or not, that does not mean being integrated. Mengee happens to be an ethical principle - a horrible one in fact. As it is not based on properly identified facts of reality (metaphysics, or identity, if you will), the result of adopting it is death.

Notice that "adopting" it means choosing it. Back to volition.

(You can go easy on the scare quotes now.)

btw - One other slight problem with precision. You wrote: "There are always & only 2 mental processes going on in man: cognitive (knowledge acquisition) & normative (evaluation of knowledge by a standard of value)."

Two words were missing. It should have read: "There are always & only 2 rational volitional mental processes going on in man: cognitive (knowledge acquisition) & normative (evaluation of knowledge by a standard of value)."

There are oodles of mental processes that are not chosen (i.e., they are automatic) and not rational.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/19, 9:46am)

Post 287

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 10:14am

Michael, I pretty much agree with your criticisms. I do have one, devil's advocate nit to pick, however. When you say:

============
Mengee happens to be an ethical principle - a horrible one in fact.
============

... then you are evaluating the Mengee principle with a degree of certainty which I would describe as: finality. Now, the only way to get to a finality, is to have integrated the relevant facts of reality without contradiction. This process occurs all the time in subjects such as mathematics. It also occurs, at times, in many other subjects (e.g. ethics).

I guess my issue is that there ARE superior (and inferior) ethics out there, that there IS a method to use in order to discover this aspect of reality, and that that DOES seem to make the field of ethics akin to a science. I guess it's just the universalizability of Objectivist ethics (the fact that it's good for all folks everywhere -- because of the kind of creature they are) which has just kept me so glossy-eyed that I couldn't see the fine details.

The subtlety that you're outlining, brings the psychological aspect of man into the ethical realm. It's less about the right answer, as it is about the right WAY to ethical answers (the right way to go about thinking and talking about ethics).

Ed

Post 288

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 10:21am

I wrote, "As I took such pains to point out, a moral 'obligation' is conditional, not categorical. You 'ought' to do X only 'if' you want Y."

Michael replied, "I think that 'obligation' is so restricted a term that it should be discarded in a general context for the meaning you are stating and used only in specific concrete instances. I prefer law of causality instead."

The term "obligation" is simply the nominal (or noun) form of the verbal auxiliary "ought." If I ought to do X, then I have a(n) ________ to do X. What word would you insert in the blank? You can't insert "law of causality." The only options are "obligation" or "duty." So, if I "ought" to respect the rights of others, then I have an "obligation" (or "duty") to respect the rights of others. The fact that, under the corrupting influence of Immanuel Kant, the term has been imbued with a categorical or unconditional meaning does not alter the fact that it is grammatically indispensable in normal discourse.

This is why Rand uses it, despite her opposition to Kant, when she states: "The only 'obligation' involved in individual rights is an obligation imposed, not by the state, but by the nature of reality (i.e., by the law of identity): ~consistency~, which, in this case, means the obligation to respect the rights of others, if one wishes one's own rights to be recognized and protected."

You wrote, "Still, in your 'ought' there is more than causality. There is volition. One cannot choose the elements of the law of causality. One can choose whether one includes them in ones values and principles. That is why the whole field of ethics (as a conceptual category of philosophy) exists."

Of course, I agree. A point that I made in a previous post (and one which you continue to ignore) is that to say that "If you want X, then you ought (or are obligated) to do Y," is simply another way of saying that "If you want X, then you ought to ~choose~ Y." "Ought" refers implicitly to choice, and makes no sense outside that context. What you ought to ~do~ is what you ought to ~choose~.

Still, I can say that you ought to choose X, even if you are not aware (or do not believe) that you ought to. For example, I can say that a government official ought to (choose to) respect my property, even if he believes otherwise. He needn't have adopted the principle of property rights in order to be morally bound by it.

- Bill

Post 289

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 10:53am

Ed,

I think I see your mistake in reasoning, but I am not sure I can communicate it correctly "in your language."

You wrote: "Now, the only way to get to a finality, is to have integrated the relevant facts of reality without contradiction."

There goes the cognitive/normative blender chugging again. The relevant "fact of reality without contradiction" for a cognitive concept of ethics is that a principle for guiding human action based on values is called ethics. What those values are is beside the point.

You mix up the actual individual principle with the general concept "principle."

So yes, I can get to the "finality" of saying that Mengee is an ethical principal because the relevant fact in reality is that it is (1) a principle, (2) a guide to human action, and (3) based on a value (an unreal religious-metaphysical one in this case, but still a value).

I hope that I got through this time. If not, I will try another angle.

For the normative concept, we are in complete agreement that there are superior and inferior ethics. I would say good and evil ones also.

I don't see the psychological aspect, though. I would call it more epistemological - as it deals with method of reasoning. The whole division between cognitive and normative concepts is pure epistemology.

Bill,

Your use of "ought" is as a synonym for "must," as I see. How does this sound? "If you want X, then you must choose Y to get it."

That would be imposed by reality.

In using your logic, however, I do not see how respecting the rights of others is automatically going to get them to respect my rights. We have to agree on what rights are going to be respected - and then enforce it.

Volition once again.

Michael

Post 290

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 5:23pm

Michael,

==========
You mix up the actual individual principle with the general concept "principle."
==========

Bingo. I've been doin' it for so long -- I didn't realize I was even doin' it! It's almost as if I was reading benevolence into every damned thing. In this manner, bad principles were thought of (by myself) as non-principles (once the contradiction is uncovered -- the principle's supposed to just disappear, right??). Talk about a benevolent universe premise (on steroids!), huh?! In MY own little world, ONLY the good existed! I didn't (fully) acknowledge the existence of evil -- on this 3rd planet from the sun.

Wwwwwwwwake-up calllllll!

Ed

Post 291

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 6:07pm

Michael wrote, "Bill,

Your use of "ought" is as a synonym for "must," as I see. How does this sound? "If you want X, then you must choose Y to get it."

It sounds fine, because it means exactly the same thing. Whether you say "ought" or "should" or "must," it's the same idea. Suppose you asked me, "How do I get from my house to yours?" I could say something like, "You should take Elm Street to Rosebud Avenue, turn right and go one block until you see the red house with the blue polka dots." Saying that you "should" take Elm Street, etc., if you want to get to my house is no different than saying that you "must" take Elm Street to get there. To say, as Rand does, that you "have an obligation" to respect the rights of others if you want your own rights to be recognized is no different than saying that you "ought" to respect the rights of others if you want your own to be recognized.

"That would be imposed by reality."

Exactly!

You wrote, "In using your logic, however, I do not see how respecting the rights of others is automatically going to get them to respect my rights. We have to agree on what rights are going to be respected - and then enforce it."

Well, of course, it's not going to get them to automatically respect my rights. I never said it did. My only point was that I have rights that deserve to be respected, even if others don't believe in respecting them. There's no guarantee that even if you you pass a law and proceed to enforce it, everyone will necessarily abide by it.

You add, "Volition once again."

Of course! Why do you keep emphasizing this?? I've already granted time and again that I recognize volition in this context. I've stated repeatedly that if people have rights, then others ought to ~choose~ to respect them. So what else is new?! :-)

- Bill

Post 292

Wednesday, October 19, 2005 - 7:00pm

Dayaamm!!!

You guys are agreeing with me?

You want to make me toast to that. Let me go get a cup of lemon grass tea.

I hope you have a good wine or a fine old whiskey.

Cheers!

Michael

Post 293

Monday, March 21, 2011 - 9:47am

The Coase conundrum would be partially solved by competing private defense providers. It would not be fully solved, because there is no full solution to it possible to man. The conundrum goes away -- instead of being accepted as something that requires solutions -- under a conventional Objectivist system of justice (COSJ).

Ed

Post 294

Monday, March 21, 2011 - 10:21am