Counterfactuals: To be AND not to be? Viable Objectivist question?

Ed,

You didn't really respond to my analogy of concepts to counterfactuals, nor did you address my examples from post 11. But you did say "good response," so thank you.

Anyway, let me persuade you that metaphysical counterfactuals are okay. Consider the metaphysical counterfactual, "if the battery had died, the car wouldn't have started." We preserve the law of identity here by accepting as true that in the this world, the battery didn't die. The counterfactual would not make sense had the battery died or had it both died and not died in this world.

But in a possible world, could the battery have died? Now David Lewis caused a good deal of trouble with his bit on possible worlds -- that they are real worlds but just physically inaccessible to us (very Platonic indeed!). But to be sure, his bit doesn't violate the law of identity. He's not saying that this world could be other than it is, nor that any other worlds could be other than they are. He's saying that other worlds could be other than this one, and he's exploring what it would be like if we were in those worlds. Positing other worlds is very handy because often those worlds strongly resemble this world, and exploring them prepares us here for their likes.

So in the above counterfactual, we're exploring a world that is not ours but is exactly like ours save a dead battery (and, some philosophers would add, whatever different metaphysical constraints are needed for that dead battery).

Plenty of philosophers, myself included, disagree with Lewis that possible worlds are real worlds. I don't understand why he was so keen on this view. I find it much more palatable to treat possible worlds as imaginary worlds, worlds we invent by mentally recombining and seperating stuff from this world.

How bout it?
Jordan

Post 21

Friday, October 28, 2005 - 5:54pm

Positing other worlds is very handy because often those worlds strongly resemble this world, and exploring them prepares us here for their likes.

That's a lot of crap - fantasy is fantasy, and the only aspect of it which is instructive is that aspect which is NOT fantasy, which means there is no validity in involving it... fiction, on the other hand involves "coulds", and as such can be instructive...

If this was a discussion about literature, perhaps the statement might have some merit - but when discussing serious matters dealing with issues of reality, it is fatally flawed...

(Edited by robert malcom on 10/28, 6:11pm)

Post 22

Friday, October 28, 2005 - 8:02pm

Jordan,

The only metaphysical counterfactuals that are epistemologically okay, are those pertaining to method (e.g. computations), not content (e.g. entities)

In ITOE (p 304), Rand was asked to comment on imaginary numbers -- ie. counterfactual numbers (there are no real numbers that, when squared, equal -1). But even though imaginary numbers don't correspond to any metaphysical actuality, they can still serve a purpose -- for us -- as mathematical devices to solve problems involving electrical circuits (as given in the book).

So imaginary numbers aren't real, but they can -- as devices of computation -- help us to solve real problems. They don't (can't) measure anything really existing (or serve as a standard by which to measure any actuality), but they have an operational value as devices of computation.

Here's LP (OPAR) on the matter (caps for italics):

p 28 -- "meaning"
===========
Leaving aside the man-made, NOTHING IS POSSIBLE, EXCEPT WHAT IS ACTUAL.

... The result is an entire profession, today's philosophers, who routinely degrade the actual, calling it a realm of mere "brute" or "contingent"--i.e., unintelligible and rewritable--facts. The lesson such philosophers teach their students is not to adhere to reality, but to brush it aside and fantasize alternatives.

... Respect for reality doesn't not necessarily guarantee success in every endeavor ... But such respect is a necessary condition of successful action ...
===========

p 29 -- "consequence"
===========
In this sense, the basis of the theory [of a mind-body conflict] is not reality, but a human error: the error of turning away from reality, of refusing to accept the absolutism of the metaphysically given.
===========

Special plead:
Jordan, I admit to shying away from your concrete examples (for the moment). I feel like I'm on the stand and you're pressing me (unintentionally, mind you!) with leading questions, and instructions to limit my answers. Good people (and good ideas) often fry -- in those circumstances.

My plead: Why don't we start signifying counterfactuals with the phrase "conditionals with false antecedents" okay? I think that that would clear up some of the already-obvious potential for talking past each other.

Whadda' say, hmm?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 10/28, 8:04pm)

Post 23

Friday, October 28, 2005 - 9:56pm

Hey Ed,

So you don't want to address my examples or respond to my analogy to concepts. Okay. I won't press you; I won't even acuse you of evading :P, but I might return to the examples and the analogy later.

Why don't we start signifying counterfactuals with the phrase "conditionals with false antecedents" okay?

Well, if you want to be precise, the antecedents of counterfactuals are antecedents that are known to be false. For example, "if it did not rain here Saturday, then it rained here Sunday." This is an indicative conditional, not a counterfactual because we don't know whether the antecedent is false, even though it might actually be false. Counterfactuals are conditionals with antecedents known to be false and are (exclusively, I think) subjunctive. So I guess I can humor you and signify counterfactuals (perhaps a bit redundantly) as "subjunctive conditionals with antecedents known to be false," but man that's a mouthful! Let's just say "C," shall we?

Next, Peikoff.

NOTHING IS POSSIBLE, EXCEPT WHAT IS ACTUAL

I think of "possible" as "imaginable," and clearly not every imaginable thing is actual (e.g., santa, unicorns), so Peikoff's assertion doesn't work for me. But maybe Peikoff is using "possible" differently. I worry he's using "possible" to mean "actual," which really kills the meaning of "possible" or "actual." The following elaborates on this point:

There is a wide-spread conservative view on objects, which says that any object is an actual object. In other words, the adjective �actual� is redundant, for it excludes no object. From this it follows that non-actual possible objects are not objects, that is, they are nothing. Thus on this view, the adjective �possible� is equivalent to �actual� when applied to objects and [it is false that not every possible object is an actual object; that is, it is false that some possible object is a non-actual object]. This makes the notion of a possible object, or equivalently the notion of an actual object, uninteresting. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-objects/#1 .

What do you think possible means, Ed?

Next, I don't know whether imaginary numbers count as C. I don't see how they're subjunctive, conditional, or even known to be false. So I'm not yet willing to extend or limit C to method (i.e., computation), at least not where imaginary numbers are at play. Relatedly, C seems to work fine for substance (i.e., entities). Example: (a) If the ball were made of glass, it would have shattered. (b) if I were shorter than my girlfriend, she'd be taller than me. (c) if there were no sun, the earth would not continue on this trajectory.

(d) If wishes were horses, beggars would ride,
Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 10/29, 7:38am)

Post 24

Friday, October 28, 2005 - 9:59pm

Robert,

I refer you to my post 11. Explain why those counterfactual statements are useless. I'm getting a strong picture that you're not familiar with the study of counterfactuals.

Jordan

Post 25

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 7:56am

Only in a rudimentary way... more as it pertains to aesthetics, as am firstly an artist and secondly a studier of philosophy...

Post 26

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 9:13am

Jordan,

==========
... I won't even acuse you of evading :P
==========

Thanks Jordan. :-P

==========
... if you want to be precise, the antecedents of counterfactuals are�antecedents that are known to be false.
==========

Precisely!

==========
Let's just say "C," shall we?
==========

:-P

==========
What do you think possible means, Ed?
==========

Here is what I think (best read from bottom up) ...

==========
-certain = its opposite is impossible

-probable = is known to be likely (known that its probability is greater than P = 0.5)

-plausible = is not only possible, but viable (has a known, non-contradictory means for occurrence)

-possible = its opposite is not certain

-impossible = its opposite is certain
==========

So Jordan, the possible is merely that, the opposite of which, is not a certainty.

Ed

p.s. Fixing the erroneous, posthumous modification of Aristotle's square of opposition may help here ...

O (Aristotle):
Not all S are P. [doesn't imply any untoward existence]

O (Philosophers, who may've sought a passkey from the absolutism of the metaphysically given):
Some S are not P. [implies untoward existence (implies that there really ARE "Some S" that exist, but that aren't P)]

Post 27

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 10:56am

http://www.nyu.edu/classes/velleman/blogic/

Counterfactuals

[PICTURE]	[PICTURE]	[PICTURE]
If kangaroos ....	had no tails ...	they would fall over.

This statement uses the English connective "if ... then ...", which is often equivalent to the symbolic connective >.* In this case, however, "if ... then ..." cannot be equivalent to >. Here is why.
According to the truth table for the connective >, statements formed with it are true (by default) whenever their antecedents are false. So the statement "If kangaroos had no tails, then they would fall over" should be true in any world where kangaroos do have tails, if its connective is equivalent to >. But here is a world in which kangaroos have tails and yet the statement is false:

[PICTURE]

In these worlds, kangaroos have straighter posture than they do in the actual world, and so they wouldn't fall over if they had no tails, because their centers of gravity would then be directly over their feet. Since the clause "If kangaroos had no tails ... " is false in the worlds pictured here, the statement "If kangaroos had no tails, then they would fall over" should be true in these worlds -- that is, if its connective were equivalent to >. But as we have seen, the statement is false. Hence it must use a different connective.

*The example used here is borrowed from the book Counterfactuals, by David K. Lewis.

from

(I am using this online tutorial as the textbook in a Logic class (Phil 250) at Washtenaw Community College. blogic includes quizzes, so that saves someone from grading papers and makes 3 hours one night a week worth $43 per hour for someone.)

Anyway, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher) for more detail about Lewis. Counterfactuals are interesting. However, in a study that suffers from almost termina unreality, there are many other topics to consider. We have done very little with plain language or "material logic." In this particular case, the fact that some symbologies like the v for "or") because it reminds them of the inclusive or of Latin, vel, never comes up. We have only one or in English and it leads to ambiguities and this lets someone say that languages are not logical.

Post 28

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 11:17am

Thanks for the post and the links, Michael. I'll try to read through them soon.

Jordan, I'd like to add to my previous distinction between the merely 'possible' and the 'plausible': That which is merely possible is arbitrary (it has no known, non-contradictory means for occurrence). So, that which is merely possible -- has no ties to metaphysical actuality.

Ed

Post 29

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 1:40pm

Robert,

I didn't know you were an artist. Have you shared your art on SOLO? If so, mind providing some links? If not, mind sharing?

Michael,

I'd love to see those pictures if you can figure out how to get them to show.

Ed,

That which is merely possible is arbitrary (it has no known, non-contradictory means for occurrence). So, that which is merely possible -- has no ties to metaphysical actuality.

Not sure what you mean by "means for occurrence" nor "ties to metaphysical actuality." You're welcome to clarify. Nevertheless, If I were to guess, I'd say your view precludes actualities from being possibilities, which translates into the unworkable, "If a thing actually is, then it could not possibly be actual." In my view, every actuality is a possibility, or: "if a thing actually is, then it actually could be." But not every possibility is an actuality (e.g., santa and unicorns).

Also, I should clarify -- when I say that "imaginable" equates to "possible," I mean logically (or noncontradictorily) possible. So I can imagine a 10 foot tall bachelor (logically possible) but not a married bachelor (not logically possible).

Jordan

Post 30

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 1:55pm

www.visioneerwindows.blogspot.com

and yes, a few of my works have been shown here...

(Edited by robert malcom on 10/29, 1:57pm)

Post 31

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 5:01pm

Thanks, I'll check it out.

Post 32

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 5:31pm

Jordan,

========
I'd say your view precludes actualities from being possibilities,�which�translates into�the unworkable, "If a thing actually is, then it could not possibly be actual."
========

I see ambiguity with the word "possibly" here. There are 2 senses of "possibly": one as an enabling term -- one pretty synonomous with "potentiality"; and the other as a limiting term -- synonomous with only that which is the non-actual. So, to preclude actualities from being possibilities -- is to maintain conceptual clarity (maintaining the distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality"--something that is required here, in order to think straight about the matter). The sentence above then becomes:

"If a thing actually is, then it could not [merely] possibly be actual." [ie. It is "actually" actual, not possibly so]

========
In my view, every actuality is a possibility, or: "if a thing actually is, then it actually could be." But not every possibility is an actuality (e.g., santa and unicorns).
========

Substituting the word potentiality affords clarity (for me, at least). Though I trust you'll let me know if I'm putting words in your mouth, your view then reads: "every actuality is a [potentiality]" -- which is, with appropriate qualification, contradictory. An actuality is not ever a potentiality -- at the same time, and in the same respect.

In a sense though, there is some objective truth to your view: all potentiality is existentially dependent on the current actuality that exists.

Harking back to Aristotle's square of opposition (and viewing your last sentence above) -- you did choose the correct wording: Not all S (possibilities) are P (actualities). And worded in this manner, there need be no presumption of "floating possibilities" that currently have "something less" than actuality.

However, had you not been so correct in your method of communication, then you may have stated: Some S (possibilities) are not P (actualities) -- which assumes some sort of ineffable existence of S ("floating possibilities") which currently have "something less" than actuality (ie. that they "exist" -- without any "actuality" to them). That is an example of wrong reasoning.

Ed

Post 33

Saturday, October 29, 2005 - 10:33pm

Ed,

I just skimmed over this thread and I would like to address your original question:

"Do counterfactuals have ANY place in Objectivist epistemology?"

I will take counterfactuals to mean logically impossible things (I don't feel like engaging the definition argument that has been running).

The first place is the obvious place of serving as an example of the impossible for correctly illustrating and learning logic.

The second place for me is for sensory speculation. Objectivist epistemology is based on the five senses, however there is no guarantee that reality boils down only to five senses. Even among these five senses there are extremely different manners of using the input data, depending on the creature.

Take smell, for instance. A human being is limited and a dog is advanced. A noxious odor will cause a human being to vomit, whereas a dog will actively smell the thing with the horrible odor until it is satisfied that the thing is properly identified (on its own limited perceptual level). Then the dog will simply move on, even wagging its tail.

One thing is for sure. As it stands right now, we only get five senses worth of reality, but that is enough to survive and thrive as living beings.

Things that we cannot perceive directly, we either intensify or diminish until they fall within our sense limitations (for example, telescope and microscope for sight). We also transfer the data of one sense into the data of another, for example a sound spectrum analyzer changing sound waves into visual images.

I see a speculative possibility of there being parts of reality that we have no sense organs for perceiving. However, as technology advances, notions of such things start becoming possible because of some kind of overlap with things we can perceive. The whole thing about the bewildering behavior of subatomic particles is a case in point.

So in this capacity, a well thought-out counterfactual is a good tool for speculating on this. Unless we grow another sense organ, the only way we will be able to be aware of an aspect of reality we have no sense organ for will be to transform its attributes into a form that we can perceive, similar to the spectrum analyzer.

One of the good things for this possibility is that many entities in reality are perceivable by more than one sense. Thus an apparent contradiction could point toward something that actually can be borne out in reality through this new type of "stuff" that needs a new sense organ to perceive.

Obviously if such sense organ came into being, or such transfer of data to another sense were made possible, the principle of integrating sense data into percepts, then concepts would continue unaltered, just as it presently is for the five senses.

Ayn Rand once made an interesting comment in this respect (in The Romantic Manifesto). She said that the basic art forms are fixed because we have only five senses. To get a truly new art form, we would have to grow a new sense organ. So even she might have entertained something of this nature, albeit it in another manner.

All this is pure speculation, I know. But so is a counterfactual.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/29, 10:39pm)

Post 34

Sunday, October 30, 2005 - 6:30am

Michael,

=========
The first place is the obvious place of serving as an example of the impossible for correctly illustrating and learning logic.
=========

Okay sure, reductio ad absurdum -- I get it!

=========
The second place for me is for sensory speculation. Objectivist epistemology is based on the five senses ...
=========

Well okay, but now I'm not so sure (despite your examples). For one, human perceptual awareness is based on around 10 (not 5) "senses." For instance, in the inner ear are 3 semi-circular canals with fluid and calcium rocks (otoliths) inside. When you turn your head, this stuff moves. When this stuff moves, it bends tiny sense-organ based hairs there -- and you sense that your head is what is moving -- not the world.

This is why it is possible to read this while shaking your head back and forth (your eyes automatically adjust), but it is impossible to read a book while shaking IT back and forth! Try this now, to note how we perceive our own motion (with respect to the world) differentially from motion in the world.

For another instance, there are also kinesthetic receptors inside the tissue in your joints -- which tell you your position and posture, even if your eyes are closed. Cops give sobriety tests where you have to touch your nose with both hands while your eyes are closed. Sober folks pass (because of this seventh sense, the kinesthetic sense), drunk folks may fail due to dumbed-down feedback. Being able to sense what position we are in, in relation to the world, affords yet another perceptual awareness.

JJ Gibson was the premier psychologist behind direct perception (ie. Objectivist epistemology). All this stuff relates to his take on how reality is perceived by man. Telescopes and microscopes extend already-existing senses (they aren't 'new' senses). So too, spectrum analyzers merely juxtapose already-existing senses. Speculative postulation of evolutionarily-new senses is arbitrary, and fails to integrate man's identity. Millions of years of adapting to reality have left us with what we have -- that is what we can work with, and sensibly talk about.

I'm not going to wait another couple million years to see 'another' human sense evolve (or to see one decay). I'm gonna' live life now -- with the senses I have, and can sensibly talk about. It's nonsensical to talk about new senses -- just like it is with most counterfactuals. Reductio ad absurdum is a valid use of counterfactuals (this we agree on). However, I think sensory speculation is invalid. It smacks of voodoo epistemology (Alice in Wonderland stuff). It is counterfactual without plausibility, and I find that that makes it rationally unusable. There is no known, non-contradictory means for new human senses (in our lifetimes).

Ed

Post 35

Sunday, October 30, 2005 - 7:44am

Hey Ed,

Our exchange has indeed highlighted the ambiguities of "possible." :-)

I wouldn't equate possible with potential because I don't equate imaginable with potential, and as you'll recall, I do equate possible with imaginable. Again, I think all actualities are possible, which is to say they're all imaginable. I bet you agree that all actualities are imaginable, yes?

Going down the rabbit hole, I also think lots of non-actualities are possible. I'll bet you do to (perhaps even with different definitions of possible???). Consider: what'll the whether be next Thursday? Rainy? Cloudy? Sunny? All are imaginable, yes? But certainly not all will be actual, at least not at the same time and place. You can press me here by asking whether snow, sleet, and hail are also possible next Thursday. At least in my neck of the woods, they're highly unlikely, but possibility, in this context, doesn't deal with likelihood. It deals just with imaginability. Because snow, sleet, and hail next Thursday are imaginable, we say they are possible. They just might not be very useful possibilities.

To be sure, discussing next Thursday's weather doesn't place us in the land of C because we don't know the truth or falsity about what next Thursday's weather is. In the previous paragraph, I discussed possibility outside of C just to help elucidate how possibility works, but possibilities work the same way in C as they do above. You just have to remember that possible means imaginable. Like when I say, "had it snowed last Thursday..." you might be tempted to say it's impossible that it snowed last Thursday -- i.e., the likelihood of the snow is zero -- because we know it didn't. But can we imagine that it snowed last Thursday? Sure. So in the context of C, it's possible. Snow last Thursday is a non-actual (and never-to-be-actual) possibility. To use a C, I think logicians would've avoided lots of trouble had they used "imaginable" instead of "possible." Que sara, sara.

Jordan

PS Judging from your post 32, you might be concerned with whether non-actual possibilities exist. If non-actual possibilities exist, that means existence can be non-actual, which might seem weird to you because we're so used to equating existence with actuality. I'd rather leave this question aside for now, as it would probably bring us too far afield. But just so it's clear, examples of non-actual possibilities include unicorns, santa, 10 foot tall bachelors, rain last Thursday, and even rain this Thursday. The question of whether unicorns exist gets so silly sometimes. Let's reserve that silliness for another time.

(Edited by Jordan on 10/30, 4:37pm)

Post 36

Sunday, October 30, 2005 - 8:01am

Ed,

I said it was just speculation.

Basically - in essentials - you said the same thing as I did (and you did that in an extremely obvious manner for some reason about the telescopes, etc., being extensions of existing senses, stating that is if I had stated the contrary - strange).

You extended the five senses to ten, but both examples you gave were merely internal regulators of the organism itself based on perceiving gravity, which would be touch - if you stretch it a bit, but still not much that I see that could be integrated into percepts (maybe a little in terms of direction, but that is about all).

We disagree on the value of speculation. This is probably because I am a creative artist, where such speculation is part of my daily fare (when I create).

And then there's those damn subatomic particles that just won't act right...

And all those unexplained coincidences and happenings out there that occur all the time...

But I should have mentioned two other rational uses for counterfactuals (both in the entertainment/art realm):

One is humor. Cartoons are a prime example. Even kids who are still learning about reality have no problem with the exaggerations they see and laugh up a storm without accepting this as what reality actually is (my favorite has always been Wiley Coyote running off the edge of a cliff, staying suspended in midair a moment until he looks down, looking back at the camera with the "uh oh" expression and waving goodbye, long fall with a descending whistle and a distant "poof" - and I am laughing as I write this).

Another is artistic creation. Even Rand's motor that converts static energy into electrical energy is a counterfactual, so they are extremely useful even in serious art.

I still hold that we only get our senses worth of reality. We don't get more because we don't have more. This is based on my own conclusion that reality is bigger and more complex than I am.

That certainly does not mean that I endorse those who would posit that they "know" what else is out there by some method that is not conceptual integration or other reason-based human mind process, like some "other" realm (noumenal and so forth), and then go on to describe it.

Anything new has to meet the same integration criteria that we now use. Build on it. Not negate it.

Conclusion. Counterfactuals are good for education, speculation and entertainment/art.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/30, 8:04am)

Post 37

Sunday, October 30, 2005 - 3:08pm

Dammit Jordan (boy are you ever a tough nut to crack!).

Here's my estimated response time:
The way I see it, it's gonna' take me several days of reflection -- in order to formulate a response to that last post of yours. Man, that was a doozie! Interested onlookers are welcome to chime in ...

===========

Michael, the reason my response seemed strange -- is that I misunderstood you. Rather, it seems that you and I are in FULL agreement on THIS matter (especially the comedy-is-counterfactual part -- bravo for highlighting that!)!

Ed

Post 38

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 12:00am

Okay Jordan, here goes ...

====================
I wouldn't equate possible with potential because I don't equate imaginable with potential, and as you'll recall, I do equate possible with imaginable.
====================

You say that: imaginable = possible. Yet I can imagine existence not existing (say, tomorrow, for example). But this is not even possible -- as it is not possible for existence to cease existing. Existence just is, and all possibility springs out from existing existence (not from consciousness alone -- without existence). You speak here with a primacy of consciousness view -- and that is rationally indefensible. For an unimagining earthworm -- on this view -- nothing would be possible. In short, you'd have to construct a fence around what it is that humans can imagine -- and arbitrarily call that "the possible" -- in order for your view to float.

====================
I bet you agree that all actualities are imaginable, yes?
====================

Daaarn tutin' (though irrelevant to the point at hand). The reason actualities are imaginable, is because reality is one way -- and not other ways. If reality was different, then different actualities would be imaginable (not the self-same ones). Reality is the standard, the fountainhead, of what it is that is possible, or even imaginable (to us).

====================
Going down the rabbit hole, I also think lots of non-actualities are possible.�I'll bet you do to ...
====================

Actualities are actual (more than merely possible), ONLY non-actualities are (merely) possible. Distinction ought be made about what it is that is actual (because actuality is very important), and what it is that is (merely) possible. As I said before, this is necessary for thinking straight on this matter. We can imagine existence not existing -- but that doesn't make it possible. We can even imagine OURSELVES not existing, a truly contradictory (ie. impossible) notion.

====================
... you might be tempted to say it's impossible�that it snowed last Thursday -- i.e., the likelihood of the snow is zero --�because we know it didn't. But can we imagine that it�snowed last Thursday? Sure.
====================

Gotcha. Anything with a likelihood of zero is impossible (true by definition) -- even if imaginable. Therefore, imaginability can not (as you had argued above) equate to possibility.

====================
To use a C, I think logicians would've avoided lots of trouble had they used "imaginable" instead of "possible."
====================

True, but irrelevant. If "logicians" used their imaginations more explicitly, then they would have avoided one type of trouble only by adopting a second type of trouble (a bifurcation of themselves from reality).

====================
Let's reserve that silliness for another time.
====================

Rain-check accepted.

Ed

Post 39

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 8:24am