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Post 40

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 9:12amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

Because "un" means "not," and because I want to discern unimaginable from non-imaginable, I've been trying to think of another word for non-imaginable. The best I can think of would be a-imaginable, which works quite nicely because "a" means "without." I know it sounds ugly, but let's use a-imaginable in place of non-imaginable.

Jordan


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Post 41

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 11:48amSanction this postReply
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Like trying to split a hairless hair...

Post 42

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 1:28pmSanction this postReply
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That, Robert, would be unimaginable, hence impossible. :-)

Jordan


Post 43

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 3:01pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

To instantiate Robert's idea now -- in concrete form (Attack of the Tiger Stripes!) ...

We cannot imagine a thing not being itself. What we can imagine is a thing not being actual.
Yeah-but ... when existence is not actual, it is not itself.

;-)

Santa, unicorns, 10 foot tall  ... are all existential ...
Disagreed. A useful definition of existential (m-w.com):

"grounded in existence"

"having being in time and space"
Only by convoluted conflation of the mental with extra-mental reality could one say that a unicorn is "existential."

To exist is to have properties (or identity), but to be actual is for those properties to exist in the now.
And to be actual is for those properties to be extra-mental, not just contemporarily expressed. There are no real unicorns, only imaginary ones.

I can't imagine the actress, Maga Beleeve, as being 10 feet tell because I have no knowledge of Maga Beleeve.
Right! All imaginability, stems from experiencing actuality. There is no Kantian Pure Imagination. There are no "floating possibilities."

Looks like you're trying to smuggle likelihood back into possibility. The question is: Can you imagine snow last Thursday?
Shaheesh! What you're saying is that likelihood (ie. probability) has naught to do with possibility! C'monnn. P = 1.0 and P = 0.0 have everything to do with possibility (one is the actual, the other is a universal negation). I can imagine flying and spitting fire -- of course I can imagine snow last Thurdsay. There was some non-zero likelihood (some possibility) of snow up until Thursday. But, on days after Thursday, likelihoods become moot, possibilities are, forever, extinguished (though imaginability continues).

The trick is to stay agent-relative when talking about all this. For agents existing after Thursday -- there are no possibilities of (last) Thursday snow. Another way to say this is that it is possible -- for them --to become aware of the impossibility of snow (now that that day has come and gone).

Yes, the likelihood is zero, but the imaginability is 100%.
And the possibility is zero, too (my whole point here).

Ed


Post 44

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 5:07pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I think you're getting caught up on words at the expense of concepts.
Yeah-but ... when existence is not actual, it is not itself.
Existence and actual are different in this context. Again, "existential" here means having identity or properties. "Actual" means existing now. Your m-w.com definition of "existence" won't change that the aforementioned definitions are the relevant ones for this discussion. Perhaps I can humor you as I did with "C" and refer to this stuff with words that'll make you more comfortable.
There are no real unicorns, only imaginary ones.
Here it looks like your use of "real" equates to my use of "actual." Do imaginary unicorns exist? In my terms, yes they do because they have identity or properties; they are just not actually. Similarly, tomorrow and yesterday both exist but are non-actual.
All imaginability, stems from experiencing actuality. There is no Kantian Pure Imagination.
I never said otherwise.
What you're saying is that likelihood (ie. probability) has naught to do with possibility!
The "possibility" in modal logic is categorically different from the "possibility" of statistics. Ignoring this contextual difference is causing you trouble. Until you accept that C and possible worlds deal with the former context, you will probably not understand or appreciate C or possible worlds.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 11/02, 5:07pm)


Post 45

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 8:09pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

=========
Until you accept that C and possible worlds deal with the former context, you will probably not understand or appreciate C or possible worlds.
=========

Jordan, I think it is time for you to give up on me (as I don't even acknowledge a "logic" divorced from experience -- as you seem to).

Ed

Post 46

Wednesday, November 2, 2005 - 9:35pmSanction this postReply
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Ed, you just wrote:
... I don't even acknowledge a "logic" divorced from experience...
Oh my... that would be counterfactual...

(Did I just have a Robert Malcolm moment?)

Michael


Post 47

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 7:40amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I disagree with some of the above posts regarding the "value of counterfactuals".  Let me give you my own take: they are extremely value when used to isolate one aspect of reality, thereby giving you greater clarity.

Let me give a few examples.  From a personal context, say I posed the following hypothetical: what if I could wave a wand and eliminate the mundane activities of my life, such as laundry, taking a shower, taking out the garbage, what would I then do with my time?  Now, of course I have deal with all these things, but the question helps me clarify my hierarchy of values.  The hypothetical helps me to focus on a certain aspect of reality.

How about another one regarding ethics.  What if everybody I dealt with on a certain day acted irrationally, what would my response be?  Of course, everybody I interact with does not act irrationally in everything, but this may help clarify my actions when I am confronted with overwhelming and blatant irrationality.

In summary, the "value" is using your imagination--your ability to project--to clarify some aspects of reality in order to reach conclusions about those aspects.

Regards,
Michael


Post 48

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 8:00amSanction this postReply
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Ok, Ed. Upon your suggestion, I give up on you. Perhaps Mr Moeller will be more persuasive for you.

Best,
Jordan


Post 49

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 10:56amSanction this postReply
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Michael M.,

I see the logic inherent to your examples. When we abstract, we are doing things with our minds, things that aren't happening out in extra-mental reality. But if you equate abstraction with counterfactuals, then we don't have the same issue (as abstraction is key to thinking straight). I'm worried about equating counterfactuals with abstraction. The professional philosophic uses of counterfactuals haven't looked like proper epistemological abstraction to me (they seem to be differentiating, but without the requisite integration with reality -- that ought to always follow).

I'm not saying counterfactuals don't ever come up or have a purpose for something. Michael K. had summed them up thusly (and I did agree with him):

============
Conclusion. Counterfactuals are good for education, speculation and entertainment/art.
============

My main beef is whether or not counterfactuals are of use in an objective epistemology (not in ethics, or esthetics, etc). Jordan says yay, I say nay. I'm with Peikoff on this one -- counterfactuals lead folks away from actuality, epistemological is supposed to lead them toward it.

Question (Jordan, feel free to answer, too):
Can you come to know something unique about extra-mental reality, by using a counterfactual? If so, how?

You can know your inner reality better (e.g. your hierarchy of values example), but can counterfactuals help you to know outer reality better? I say nay.

Ed

Post 50

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 1:24pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,
Can you come to know something unique about extra-mental reality, by using a counterfactual? If so, how?
By asking for something unique, I'll assume you want something that only counterfactuals enable us to know. I'm not sure why you want such exclusivity; shouldn't it be enough that they are at least sometimes aa handy cognitive tool for coming to extra-mental reality? Anyway, I'm unsure why my post 11 doesn't answer your question. It gives example of counterfactuals helping us with causation, action, ontology, and freedom. Please revisit that post. If the volitional aspects in the examples in post 11 bug you, just change them to nonvolitional aspects. With the exception of example 5, that should be pretty easy to do.

Jordan


Post 51

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 1:38pmSanction this postReply
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I deleted the post that was here for various reasons, one of which is so Moeller's post gets more attention.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 11/03, 5:49pm)


Post 52

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 2:09pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I think the heart of the issue IS abstraction.  This is what makes counterfactuals (properly conceived) valid from an Objectivist epistemological point of view.  I think Jordan gave a good summary in post #18, but I want to translate that into Randian terms.

Let's backup to the unicorn example.  What has been done here is that you have *abstracted* parts from *reality* (a horse, a horn, a lion's tail, etc.) and reintegrated them to serve an artistic purpose.  You still have the *differentiation*  and *integration*.  Reality still provides the *content*.  This is perfectly valid as long as you don't treat the unicorn as a real entity.  If you do, then you are ~dropping the context~ by which you arrived at the concept 'unicorn'.

This is where the prior confusion came in regarding art.  It must be recognized that art has a different *cognitive role*, it provides a concrete way of *experiencing values*, or as AR put it, art selectively illustrates "what aspects of his experience are to be regarded as essential, significant, important.". 

However, this does not mean the it is only valid in art.  This same type method is used in the normal cognitive role of concepts by bringing a greater focus to man's limited consciousness (see ITOE--Cognitive Role of Concepts).  This process helps to isolate some important aspect of reality and bring it within his range of awareness.  A good example of this is on the "Argument from Intimidation" thread where a quote from Peikoff was provided ("My Thirty Years With Ayn Rand: An Intellectual Memoir"):

 I am not a Kantian. I do not believe that we can know Ayn Rand only as she appeared to somebody or other. But if I were to grant that premise for a split second, if I were to agree that we all construe reality according to our own personal preferences, then I would still draw a fundamental moral distinction between two kinds of preferences: between those of the muckrakers and those of the hero-worshipers. It is the distinction between the people who, confronted by a genius, are seized with a passion to ferret out flaws, real or imaginary, i.e., to find feet of clay so as to justify their own blighted lives—as against the people who, desperate to feel admiration, want to dismiss any flaw as trivial because nothing matters to them in such a context but the sight of the human greatness that inspires and awes them. In this kind of clash, I am sure, you recognize where I stand
Notice here, he is not saying the Kantian premise is true, but rather he is granting an "if" so that he can distinguish two types of people: (1) one who focuses petty flaws of a genius versus (2) one who focuses on the great achievements of a genius.  Now, this does not run the gamut of personal "preferences", but you can see it is an effective epistemological method of isolating these to types for comparison.

I think the earlier quote of Peikoff was taken out of context and misconstrued.  I think he was taking aim at the "anything is possible" way of thinking.  In effect, what he was saying is that what is *possible* flows from identity.  In other words, a car cannot spontaneously spring into a tree--that is NOT possible. 

In summary, YES, this is proper method of thinking as long as you do NOT drop the context of how you arrived at the concept (like treating the unicorn as a real entity).  And yes, reality still provides the content and, using this method, you are economizing a lot of information so that you can readily grasp it within your consciousness.

Regards,
Michael


Post 53

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 8:35pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

As the one who supposedly took this Peikoff quote "out of context and misconstrued" it, I would like to state that - within the context of counterfactuals - you basically stated the same thing that I did.

Cognitively, the Kantian supposition was a counterfactual.

Normatively, Peikoff made his value judgments based on reality (according to his premises).

This last is the context of how he arrived at the concept - which he did not drop.

Where did I misconstrue that? Or are you talking about another issue that perhaps you do not agree with?

Michael


Post 54

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 8:59pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

Actually, the 2nd Peikoff quote to which I thought was taken "out of context and misconstrued" was the quote given in post #22 .  That is what I meant by "earlier Peikoff quote".  Sorry if that was not clear, I figured those following the thread would understand.

Where, exactly, in the quote  you give from Peikoff, does he *drop the context*?  Please read the language more closely.  He uses the language  "if I were to grant" in order to isolate two alternatives, and then at the end of the quote, he says "in this kind of clash".  Clearly, he was referring to the two different attitudes. You're missing the fact that when he grants the Kantian wish, he is abstracting parts from reality.  There is NO lingering assumption that what is real is our minds imposing our "preferences" on the facts. 

He is using the "if" to narrow the field to bring two moral particulars within the range of awareness, where exactly does he state that this is all that exists (ie. ~dropping the context~)? 

I will post this over on the other thread as an alternative to your analysis.

Regards,
Michael


Post 55

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 9:17pmSanction this postReply
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Michael,

LOLOLOLOLOL...

You just wrote:
Where, exactly, in the quote  you give from Peikoff, does he *drop the context*? 
I never said he did.

I wrote:
This last is the context of how he arrived at the concept - which he did not drop.
I think we essentially agree here.

//;-)

Michael



Edit - Sorry about misunderstanding about the "other" Peikoff quote.

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 11/03, 9:22pm)


Post 56

Thursday, November 3, 2005 - 9:46pmSanction this postReply
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MSK,

Touche, my mind ran over the 'NOT' part of "did NOT drop the context".

However, I did not glean the same ideas from your analysis (on the other thread).  I found it rather "muddy", no offense.  Plus, we seemed to have reached separate conclusions, as you stated there he had a "muck/hero dichotomy" and that Peikoff was saying that such a "dichotomy exists in reality". 

I am saying that is not what he did.  He abstracted and isolated certain aspects to bring greater clairification.  Pure and simple.  There is no justification in the language that he treats the Kantian wish as if it were true or that those "preferences" run the gamut.

 But, perhaps, I misconstrued what you wrote.

Regards,
Michael


Post 57

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 8:19pmSanction this postReply
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From "blogic" a drill and practice tutorial in Logic, by David Velleman of NYU:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
The counterfactuals considered thus far have had simple antecedents and consequents, consisting of single propositional variables. Of course, counterfactuals can have compound statements as their antecedents or consequents. For example:
If Saddam Hussein had been ousted in 1991, then the U.S. would have invaded Iraq in 2003 only if his successor was just as bad.
Let the variables p, q, and r have these values:
p =Saddam Hussein was ousted in 1991.
q =Saddam was succeeded by someone just as bad.
r =The U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003.

The statement thus has the form p?(r>q).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(By Velleman's symbology, that reads: "If p would have been, then r only if q.")

What follows in the "blogic" program is a graphic of "checkers" on a board. Each circle is quartered into p, q, r, s.  At the center is our world where p is false, q is false and r is true.  At some distance in every direction is some other world where these different conditions have different states.

For this statement to be true in some possible world, first the antecedent must be true in that world.  Then, by the rules of logic, r>q (r only if q) has this table
 r             q               r>q
T             T               T
F             T               T
T             F               F
F             F               T

So, we could accept all possible worlds except those where r is True and q is False, i.e., where Saddam was not succeeded by someone just as bad, but the US invaded anyway, assuming that he was ousted in 1991.
p must be true  (Saddam was ousted)
r cannot be true if q is false (the US invaded though the successor was not as bad)

The next question is, how far from the center (our world) do we place each of the circles?

This came up here on SOLO with a similar problem: dropping the atomic bombs on Japan.  Conjecture: If the US had not dropped the bombs, then millions of lives would have been lost.  If ~p then q.  Stated as a counterfactual ~p?q.

To say that we need not consider the unreal is to negate morality.  In other words, the dropping of the bombs is a fact.  It is metaphysical. It is immutable.  The bombs were dropped.  So, why bother discussing the morality of the act? 

If history is immutable, then you cannot say "Anti-trust laws have cost this nation $14.5 billion over the last eight years" because that is a counterfactual and you have no metaphysical basis for making the judgment.  A similar criticism is the fallacy of the unreal.  You cannot say, "If Lincoln had not been shot, then Reconstruction would not have been as harsh, and there would have been no Jim Crow laws."  You cannot even answer the question, "What if Lincoln had not been shot?" because you know only the world in which he was.

Yet, we make such judgments all the time.  I believe that counterfactuals are valid because we gain knowledge by seeking to understand how things could be different than they are.

One of the problems that David Lewis sought to answer with counterfactuals was, "What do we mean when we say that something is nearly correct?"


Post 58

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 9:40amSanction this postReply
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... that said, go back and read Rick Giles's Post 6.  The problem with these "counterfactuals" is that they open the door to the primacy of consciousness and worse.  It is one thing for an objectivist to say, "what if..." as when John Galt asked a basic question about the laws of physics.  However, speaking of the laws of physics, in particular, here is this week's malarky in my Logic class (from Velleman's "blogic" program):

Possibility and Necessity (continued)

The expressions "It is possible that ..." and "It is necessary that ..." are ambiguous, as is illustrated by these statements:
It isn't possible for a circle to be square.
It isn't possible for a mass to move at the speed of light.
Although there are no possible worlds in which a circle is square, there may be possible worlds in which a mass can move faster than the speed of light, because there may be worlds where the laws of physics are different from those which govern our world. If so, then the second statement would appear to be false, according to our definition of "Possibly...".
Clearly, however, the second statement is meant to include an unspoken qualification. If that qualification were made explicit, the statement would say "It isn't physically possible for a mass to move at the speed of light", where "physically possible" means "possible under the laws of physics". The first statement includes no such qualification. It denies, not just the physical possibility of a square circle, but any possibility whatsoever.
Once we include the qualification on the second statement, we can see that it is true, but only because it uses the word "possible" in a different sense from the first.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Any objectivist -- and most Greek philosophers -- knows that the laws of physics are as universal as the laws of geometry.  It is only our understanding of them that changes.  However, the rationalist error is that synthetic proofs from (arbitrary) axioms are valid, but gross reality is not to be trusted.  Why, the laws of physics might be different in a different world! 

And this abandonment of reality is the danger that Rick Giles warned about in Post 6.  I find it wholly inappropriate to introduce this material in an undergraduate introductory course in Logic.  It might make a nice appendix or special study.  Realize that I am in a class that has never discussed XOR, and here we are doubting the laws of physics.

Ah, the intellectual bankruptcy of our age... 


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