| | Tom,
I have little to dispute in your descriptions of positive moral behavior, and doubt that you would have substantive disagreements with my own descriptions of what a moral life would look like. I would bet that the same could be said about Adam, Phil, Shayne and others who may have disputed aspects of my essay. (When asked what I think an exemplary life would look like, I point to the fictional model of Francisco d'Anconia, my own favorite among Rand's characters.) We are disagreeing, I think, only about details of the philosophical rationale for such a life, rather than its substance.
Let me begin by saying that I found no cheap shots or acrimony in your post. Let me also stress that I neither feel nor intend any toward you in this response, which is far too brief to address all your points. As to the reasons for its brevity, let me explain by citing a single example from your critique. You wrote:
It is evidently your belief that if anyone explains the reasons for a judgment with which you disagree, their explanation must be a rationalization. Some of these rationalizations (which ones we are not told) “soar to awesome rhetorical heights, buttressed by plenty of arcane (?) philosophical language and familiar Objectivist code words…convincing themselves (no one else?) of things (what?) that ordinary non-intellectuals, exercising nothing but common sense, know to be utterly stupid and morally appalling.” Know? By common sense? Well, OK, what is this thing called common sense? How does it operate? What makes these things (whatever they are) stupid (whatever that is)? What are these Objectivist code words? Are you claiming that they don’t refer to anything, or that they shouldn’t be used?
What you ask for here is not a reply comment, or even an essay, or even a book, but volumes. Which would not convince you anyway -- and I don't mean that in any insulting way. Here's why it's hopeless:
I recall that Rand once said something, in an interview, I think, concerning her views of masculinitiy and femininity. She made a few bald generalizations, then added something to the effect, "I could try to prove all this, but you would not believe me anyway." I remember laughing and being struck by that at the time. Now why would she say such a thing? Because she was discussing certain kinds of romantic feelings between certain men and women -- feelings she regarded as exalted, self-justifying, but also not universal. Those who had never felt such things wouldn't have a clue as to what she was talking about.
In writing any essay, some consideration must be given to the target audience. Not everyone is a target for every essay. The reason is that to some extent, your target audience is self-defined by some common reservoir of knowledge and experiences. The reason for this is simple: You simply can't prove every assertion within an essay or article from scratch. You have to take for granted that your readers understand and have experienced certain things, so that you don't have to prove them.
My essay was written for those in the Objectivist audience who have had a fairly extensive shared level of experiences within the organized movement. It was not -- let me repeat this -- it was not meant to try to convince those lacking that common base of experiences. Why not? Because such an attempt would be impossible. It would have required that I provide an exhaustive account of an exhaustive number of individual examples and encounters, specifying names and places; that I try to re-create each one in sufficient detail to illustrate each point I was trying to make; and that I then analytically dissect each episode, proving that no conceivable explanation other than the one I was positing could be valid, and why.
That is what would be required to address each question posed in the passage cited above; and in the rest of your essay you add many, many more questions and challenges. This, I submit, is an impossible undertaking, and of course "getting down to cases" would mean leveling accusations, by name, against many individuals -- something that would be grossly inappropriate. So I trust no one will yell "Evasion!" or "Cop out!" simply because I refuse to take the first step on what would become an ugly and never-ending journey. My essay was intended as a commentary, not a legal indictment.
For those readers who found themselves nodding at my descriptions of platonism and moral hypocrisy within the movement, the essay had two basic objectives.
First, it was meant to repudiate those in the movement who have falsely put themselves forth as moral exemplars of the philosophy. They aren't, and if the movement is to earn public credibility, any idolatry about them should stop. Rand's own grandiose public claims about her own personal character and that of various associates over the years have been the source of endless ridicule. Telling the world that Objectivism (a) demands moral perfection, (b) offers living examples of perfect people, but (c) bases these claims upon a creative definition of "perfect" which excludes one's past moral record -- that, Tom, is a recipe for perpetuating the public ridicule forever.
Second, the article was meant to warn against having an obsessive, self-absorbed, inward focus on the moral status of one's "character," rather than directing one's attention toward the active moral pursuit of rational values in the world. I pointed out that the "standard" of platonic perfectionism was a false one; that one reason "nobody's perfect" is because the goal of moral perfection of character is simply too vague and abstract (as these discussions underscore); that we do need a standard of morality, however; and that a practical, rationally appropriate standard of morality must help people set reasonable self-expectations in applying the virtues to specific life situations.
There are a few things I can clarify.
Contrary to your conclusion, I do not assume that those who dispute my description are all "rationalizing" or "evading." They may not have had such encounters or, as is more likely, interpret them totally differently. But from the "comments" and "sanctions" to my essay, I conclude that many readers did recognize and agree with my description (and interpretation) of the rampant platonic perfectionism and moral inconsistency within the Objectivist movement. By rampant moral inconsistency, I meant such things as chasms between words and deeds, promises and execution, principles and practice, stated ideals and private behavior...and frequently, creative (often "philosophical") excuse-making whenever such matters came to light. I also said that I had yet to find someone in the movement totally immune from such "moral errors." Those conclusions were based upon direct personal interactions over time with many Objectivists, and in a few cases, upon their own public admissions or publicly available evidence of their moral inconsistencies and hypocrisy.
In a related vein, you ask:
Doesn’t what you say here lead to the assumption that anyone who claims moral perfection by Objectivist standards has to end up rationalizing? Not if the claim is truly made "by Objectivist standards." If so, I'd love to meet them. But I don't think most people claiming "moral perfection" have a clue as to what that means by Objectivist standards: If they were truly following Objectivist standards, they wouldn't be dwelling on, let alone proclaiming, their moral perfection. They wouldn't be thinking about morality in that way. Those who would make such claims could do so for many reasons -- misunderstanding Objectivism would be one; it wouldn't have to be "rationalizing."
You ask...
Do you really mean, as you seem to be saying at the end of post #20, that one can pursue one’s productive purposes without the moral compass of a rational contact with reality? Or that if one pursues one’s productive purposes rational contact with reality will take care of itself? Answer: no. I'm talking about a fixation on the moral compass, rather than the destination. A traveler consults a compass; he doesn't obsess about it.
Elsewhere I used the metaphor of a road map to describe the proper use of ethics. The subjectivist driver tosses the map out the window, thinking he needs no guidance to reach a goal, that he can do so by picking any arbitrary direction. The intrinsicist tapes the map across his windshield, stares at it, wonders if he can live up to its requirements...and forgets his purpose, which is to put the car in gear and get moving toward some goal. The Objectivist realizes that his purpose is to drive somewhere; he picks a destination and then, in motion, consults the map when he needs guidance. He neither dispenses with the map, nor sits still, passively contemplating the map. The Objectivist knows what a map is for...and doesn't substitute the map for the journey.
Does that make sense to you?
In your example of the smoking friend, who is fully aware of the destructive consequences, you say:
By your account, I believe you would conclude that your friend was evading and therefore irrational and therefore immoral, but that’s OK because one must be tolerant because we mustn’t “saddle anyone with moral perfectionism.” Wrong. I would conclude that my friend was evading reality. I would conclude that in this respect -- and perhaps in only this respect in his life -- he is acting irrationally, and immorally. I would not declare his whole person, his whole character (i.e., what he does characteristically) to be "immoral"; I would not call him "an irrationalist." And I completely disagree that "one must be tolerant because we mustn't 'saddle anyone with moral perfectionism.'" If the context presented itself, I would make it clear that I regard his smoking as foolish and self-destructive and (for an Objectivist) therefore hypocritical. In that regard, I would be less tolerant than you apparently would be, in that I would regard it as a moral flaw. I would not dismiss his ongoing self-destructive behavior with the lame excuse that "he's not ready" to quit being a fool. As to what I would do about that negative judgment, well, that's a matter of context. If the friend were simply his own victim, I'd probably let him continue to be his own victim. If he tried to rationalize his smoking to me, I'd tell him what I thought. If he were to publicly advocate smoking, I'd probably publicly challenge him.
If that's "toleration," make the most of it.
Finally, that reference to being "tolerant" leads me to something you mentioned in passing at the opening of your remarks. Nothing in my essay or in this discussion has a thing to do with "the fundamental difference between ARI and TOC." Once again, for the record, I am no longer on the TOC staff, I'm not a spokesman for TOC and I haven't a clue as to whether anyone there would agree with a single word I've said. (In some cases, probably not.) They can speak for themselves on these issues, if they choose. My own view about the essential ARI-TOC differences pertains to other issues, well beyond the scope of this discussion.
Tom, I hope this message explains why I can't provide you with all the "evidence" you and others would like, but also provides a clearer statement of my aims in writing the essay. I appreciate your tone of civility throughout. I apologize to you and others if my occasional impatience and exasperation may have given some of my comments an edge I should have kept sheathed.
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