About
Content
Store
Forum

Rebirth of Reason
War
People
Archives
Objectivism

Post to this threadMark all messages in this thread as readMark all messages in this thread as unreadPage 0Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Forward one pageLast Page


Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Post 0

Monday, June 19, 2006 - 6:50amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit


the belief in an objective reality

Is it a belief or is it a recognition of reality, a knowledge.. if a belief, then you're in the Socratic falacy of everything being beliefs, only some are beliefs with certainty - which, in actuality, gives it away and removes knowledge from being possible.....


Post 1

Monday, June 19, 2006 - 8:23amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit

Knowledge is truth believed with justification.

Joel Català


Post 2

Monday, June 19, 2006 - 11:54pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Knowledge is truth known (because how it is known,  is known).

Ed


Post 3

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 1:36amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed, realize that yours is a circular definition, e.g., as "knowledge is known truth"; namely, before stating that something is known, you need to define what knowledge is.

Knowledge (of a truth) requires justification and belief --how could you know a truth without believing it?.

Uncertainty in what we purport to be knowledge is an unavoidable fact of reality, because absolute knowledge of a thing would require omniscience.

The human ego feels much more uncomfortable with uncertainty than with inaccuracy, but honesty requires coping with it.

Joel Català


(Edited by Joel Català on 6/20, 9:11am)


Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Post 4

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 9:57amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
"Knowledge is truth believed with justification." - Joel Català
This is the "classical" definition of knowledge, and one that is generally accepted by philosophers with certain key exceptions, notably Edmund Gettier, who wrote a famous paper in 1963 criticizing it. See http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html. Jimmy Wales summarizes Gettier's criticism as follows: "In a Gettier example, we have justification for believing something that is true, and we do believe it is true, and it is true. But it turns out to be true for altogether different reasons than we supposed." But then, contrary to Gettier, we aren't really justified in believing it, if it turns out to be true for altogether different reasons than we supposed -- not in the sense of "justified" that is relevant to the classical definition. "Justified," in that definition, means "true for the reasons we believe." I read Gettier's paper, and was not impressed.

That doesn't mean, however, that I agree with the classical definition. I too think that it comes up short, but for altogether different reasons! Knowledge is not "justified, true belief," because, for one thing, knowledge is not belief. The objects of knowledge are facts, and one does not "believe in" facts; one believes in propositions or ideas, whereas one knows facts. For another thing, knowledge is not true. To say that knowledge -- the apprehension of facts -- is true implies that it is the kind of thing that could be false. But to say that the apprehension of facts is false is a self-contradiction. Only propositions, ideas or beliefs can be true or false. Therefore, truth cannot be a property of knowledge any more than belief can.

At the risk of sounding like a true believer, let me say that the only proper definition of knowledge is the one found in Objectivism. :-) In ITOE (p. 35), Rand refers to "knowledge" as "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation." The Glossary of Objectivist Definitions published by Second Renaissance Books, an ARI affiliate, refers to this statement as her "definition" of knowledge. Unfortunately, Rand's statement, which includes only the distinguishing characteristics of the concept of knowledge, was not intended as a definition, since the latter requires both genus and differentia.

However, since Rand regards knowledge as a product of a psychological process (ITOE, 35), a good definition from her perspective, would be something like the following: "knowledge is a product of a psychological process involving a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation."

This is not to suggest that all belief is irrational or a matter of blind faith, for one can believe in true propositions for eminently rational reasons, nor is it to suggest that a belief that is both justified and true does not represent knowledge. But it is still propositions that one "believes in" and facts that one "knows."

- Bill

Post 5

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 10:10amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Well said, Bill.

Ed


Post 6

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 10:54amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
William Dwyer & Ed,

To briefly reassert that I find the English definition of knowledge I introduced in post #1 as the most accurate.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/20, 11:02am)


Post 7

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 1:51pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Joel wrote,
Knowledge (of a truth) requires justification and belief --how could you know a truth without believing it?.
A "truth" in this context refers to a true proposition. So let's consider an example. Take the true proposition, "The earth is round." Since knowledge is knowledge of a fact, you cannot have knowledge of the fact that the earth is round without believing in or assenting to the proposition that the earth is round. That much is true. But your belief in the proposition that the earth is round (however justified) is not itself knowledge, because the object of knowledge is a fact, not a proposition (even though the fact itself can pertain to a proposition).
Uncertainty in what we purport to be knowledge is an unavoidable fact of reality, because absolute knowledge of a thing would require omniscience.
This cannot be correct, because knowledge precludes uncertainty, by definition. For example, if I know that two plus two equal four, then I am certain that two plus two equal four. By the same token, if I am uncertain that the defendant is guilty, then I don't know that he is guilty. "Absolute knowledge" is redundant; knowledge is the apprehension of a fact. Either the apprehension exists or it doesn't. If it does, it is "absolute." If it doesn't, then it isn't knowledge. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see: http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1687_35.shtml.
The human ego feels much more uncomfortable with uncertainty than with inaccuracy, but honesty requires coping with it.
Are you sure? ;-)

- Bill

Post 8

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 2:21pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
From Merrium Webster online...

================
Knowledge
c : the circumstance or condition of apprehending truth or fact through reasoning
================

I agree with this definition, except that I'd add (to "reasoning") "evidence-based reasoning".

Ed


Post 9

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 3:48pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
I was wondering when someone was going to pick up the ball on this [thanks, Bill], as too many assert the false definition that Joel proclaims.... indeed, it is often used in Objectivist statements, where 'knowing' should be properly used instead of 'believing', since as implied in the first post, if all is a kind of believing, then there is no real knowing....

Post 10

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 4:09pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Bill, when I copy/pasted your link (http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1687_35.shtml)
 
... I got this funny page about Existence Existing, but the web-page that this link points to NOT existing! hehe! Were you trying to be funny though, like when you wrote THIS? ...
 
===================
The human ego feels much more uncomfortable with uncertainty than with inaccuracy, but honesty requires coping with it.
Are you sure? ;-)
===================
 
Good one, Bill (and yes, I'm "sure" of that)!
 
;-)
 
Ed


Post 11

Tuesday, June 20, 2006 - 9:48pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed, sorry about the non-existence of the web page. No, I wasn't trying to be funny. Apparently, it's those damn cyber-gremlins playing jokes on me again. :-P Here, try this:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1687_1.shtml

and go to post 35.

- Bill (bedeviled by metaphysical mischief)


Post 12

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 7:56amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Robert Malcom stated:
if all is a kind of believing, then there is no real knowing
Yes, I know that the word belief bothers almost all Objectivists. 

Of course there is real knowing; the trick is that you can't absolutely know what is "real knowing." To know a thing absolutely --namely, to know it with total certainty, to know all the 'whats', 'hows' and 'whys'--, you would need absolute knowledge of what the totality of reality is; that requires omniscience, a human impossibility. That's why they say that truth is infinite.

That's why, to approach truth, justified belief is always needed. When that justified belief happens to be true --and you can't be 100% sure about that--, that's genuine knowledge.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/21, 8:32am)


Post 13

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 8:14amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit

  Mr. Dwyer, perhaps half-jokingly, wrote: 
The human ego feels much more uncomfortable with uncertainty than with inaccuracy, but honesty requires coping with it.
Are you sure? ;-)
believe it is true, and believe it with justification.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/21, 8:16am)


Post 14

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 9:14amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Joel,

===============
When that justified belief happens to be true --and you can't be 100% sure about that--, that's genuine knowledge.
===============

What you are saying is that you are never sure that you have any genuine knowledge.

Listen to yourself.

Ed


Sanction: 4, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 4, No Sanction: 0
Post 15

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 9:47amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed,

What I mean is that you may have genuine knowledge, but you are never "100% sure" wether it is *real* knowledge.

Knowledge is tricky stuff, and the human language has limits --just think about defining all the existing words without falling into an infinite regression, namely, avoiding the logical necessity for defining all terms (without falling into circularity). That would amount to asking for infinite definition. That is a logical impossibility.

So some words cannot be defined by means of others. 

At the same time, definitions must be both minimal and aesthetic. That's why I advocate for the classical definition of knowledge.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/21, 10:26am)


Post 16

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 10:27amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Joel, we have axiomatic concepts (which can only be defined ostensively), from which all other concepts are derived. There is no infinite circularity.

Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Post 17

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 10:38amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Joel wrote:
The human ego feels much more uncomfortable with uncertainty than with inaccuracy, but honesty requires coping with it.
I responded, "Are you sure? ;-)" To which he replied,
I believe it is true, and believe it with justification.
Okay. I think I see what you're saying. You're saying that even though you're not absolutely sure, you nevertheless believe it is true, and you're justified in believing it, because it's the best conclusion you could come to under the circumstances (given man's fallible nature).

But here you're using a different sense of "believe" that is relevant to the classical definition of knowledge. The sense of "believe" that is relevant to the classical definition is one that is incompatible with doubt or uncertainty, because knowledge is incompatible with uncertainty. To cite an example I gave in an earlier post (Post 7), if I know that two plus two equal four, then I am certain that two plus two equal four. By the same token, if I am uncertain that the defendant is guilty, then I don't know that he is guilty.

Now it could be that I believe that the defendant is guilty and that I'm justified in believing it because of the preponderance of the evidence, but it wouldn't follow from that that I know that he's guilty, because I don't believe it beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the sense of "believe" that you are using, but it's one that is incompatible with knowledge, and therefore with the classical definition of knowledge. The sense of "believe" that pertains to the classical definition implies full assent and is therefore incompatible with doubt or uncertainty. In other words, according to the classical defintion, I "know" that the defendant is guilty if:

i) it's true that he's guilty,
ii) I'm convinced that he's guilty, and
iii) My conviction that he's guilty is justified.

But if there's any doubt or uncertainty in my mind that he is guilty, then I'm not convinced that he's guilty, and according to the classical definition, I don't know that he's guilty.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 6/21, 10:42am)


Post 18

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 10:41amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Right Joel, it's of course an easy rhetorical trick to point out an apparent contradiction in such a statement, but it would be far too much trouble to formulate every statement with sufficient qualifiers to make it logically airtight, that's good for a mathematical journal or a journal of formal logic, but not for an informal discussion forum. Such logic chopping tricks are nice to score points, but they don't adress the real issues.

Post 19

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 - 10:45amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Jonathan, I know that Objectivism deals with "axiomatic concepts." 

But be aware that this poses a big problem to Objectivism, as those "axiomatic concepts" are inimical to the Objectivist tabula rasa mind --also known as "blank slate."

By the way, up to my knowledge, neither Ayn Rand, nor any other Objectivist, ever tried to provide details of how come a tabula rasa mind could "choose to think."

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/21, 11:02am)


Post to this threadPage 0Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Forward one pageLast Page


User ID Password or create a free account.