RoR: Forum

Jon said,

"Once a person has accepted certain beliefs and values, however, that person MUST act accordingly..."

It's not that simple. Which value? It is true that there will always be some value that can be pointed to that explains an act. But people frequently hold different values - sometimes at different levels of the hierarchy, sometimes conflicting values, sometimes contradictory values, sometimes one is conscious and the other is held in a foggy state of subconsciousness. It is an act of free will that enables a person to choose which value to act on. A person can't act without a value, but that isn't saying very much because our minds are capable of crafting a value almost instantly.

There is the case of the priest who was walking down the church aisle to give a sermon and fainted. It turned out that he held the conviction that it was a terrible sin for him to even have sexual thoughts or feelings. Yet, given the power of the sex drive, he would see the shapely leg of a parishoner and feel aroused. His subconscious came up with the 'value' of going blank - fainting - 'to save his soul' ;-)

In Jeffery's example, lowering his level of focus at certain times and just "winging it" would be a value that exists in opposition to the value of staying at a maximum level of focus at all times. He would need to make a choice of which value will hold sway for a particular instance and the chosen value will explain the act (but the cause will be the free will exercise in choosing).

Values are like destinations when we travel. It explains the trip: "I went to Paris". But I had to choose the destination. And there were a lot of destinations to choose from. I need to posit some destination or I can't start the trip. Once I have chosen Paris as a destination, and chosen to take the trip, then I must act accordingly - unless I decide to go to Rome, or to put the trip off, or....

Post 101

Monday, March 19, 2007 - 2:25pm

Thanks for the response, Steve. As an aside, I liked some of your recent comments on cognitive psychology. I thought some of your statements in this last post were confusing though.

Steve, in a case in which values conflict, the value HIGHER in one's hierarchy is the one that causes the resulting action. A person's values are already in a hierarchy, and the relative placement of the values determines the outcome in a given situation.

Again, this is NOT determinism in the philosophical sense, because the values were initially selected and placed by HIM. And one retains the ability to change the position of a value through cognitive means, or to eliminate it. Of course, some values require less effort to change than others do.

In the example you cite from Jeff, one value is arranged higher than the other one in his hierarchy. Which one is higher? That would only be able to be observed by him through honest introspection or by others through his actions.

To concretize, consider a married man who's having a sexual affair unbeknownst to his wife. That man may still value his marriage--but clearly LESS than he values having the affair with the other woman, since he knows it could end his marriage if his wife finds out. If he valued his marriage more, he would be acting differently.

(Edited by Jon Trager on 3/20, 7:52am)

Post 102

Monday, March 19, 2007 - 4:39pm

Jon:

You last two posts #99 and #101 have been very helpful in clarifying a couple of points. Thanks. I believe that I understand your distinction in allowing free will to apply to the acquisition of ideas, beliefs and values while saying that our actions are then determined by our values. But nevertheless, I have to strongly disagree with this view.

It seems to me that both you and Bill have an interesting concept of what values are that differs radically from what this term means to me. In my previous post #61, I described a value as:

"[A] simple shorthand that allows us to conceptualize a vast amount of prior thinking about the "goodness" or "badness" of something in relation to ourselves."

For me, a value is simply a high-level concept that integrates a body of knowledge and wisdom that has been accumulated over time. By conceptualizing this into a unit, we can use these value-concepts to help us make proper decisions in real time without having to revisit the entire chain of thinking and analysis that was initially done in the process of the concept's formation. And as a concept, a "value" has no more direct motive power on our actions than any other concept. When I spoke earlier about values being passive mental constructs, I was referring to their nature as concepts. If you want to convince me otherwise, you will have to explain how my value-concept for "rational thought" propels me into physical action in a way that my concepts of "democracy" or the number "34,591" do not. How does a concept come to have this sort of power? Alternatively, you may think that values are something else entirely, in which case I would appreciate it if you could define them so that I would more properly understand your position.

During this discussion there has been a lot of talk about "value hierarchies" which I have come to see as being somewhat fuzzy. I agree that we all do have an ordinal ranking of values, whether held explicitly (consciously) or implicitly (subconsciously). I think that we all have the ability to introspect and be consciously aware of our values if we choose to do the work. As I believe that values are just concepts, this process is no different from introspecting for any other type of knowledge we possess. There have been many examples offered during this discussion where it appears that for some, our value hierarchy is in a constant state of turmoil. Will I snap my fingers or not! My god, what's my highest value?! What will motivate me at this moment - no wait now this moment?! Do I want to see if I can do it? Which of my values has become the highest and now motivate me in that case? Do I want to make a philosophical point? If so, did my value hierarchy just change? Will I be stubborn and not do it to spite Bill and Jon? Has my value hierarchy fallen so low - and in such a short time? Ouch! This is all senseless. Our values are relatively stable and usually require a considerable amount of work and time to change. We can see this in the stability of our emotional responses which are physiological response generated as our subconscious evaluates aspects of reality in relation to our value hierarchy. Now, here is a an example where our values do produce an automatic physical result - something not (at least typically) within our conscious control. So if our value hierarchy is not shifting around from moment to moment, what accounts for the variability of our behavior under similar circumstances? Bill (and maybe Jon?) argues that even though the circumstances appear similar, there must be enough difference between them to trigger distinct values within us which then produce different actions. To me, none of this makes any sense.

Let me suggest an alternative explanation. If values do not "determine" a person's actions, what then is the source of those actions? My answer is freely chosen goals. Humans have the ability to reflect on their circumstances and decide upon specific courses of action in service of achieving a specific goal - and it is the goal that is the motivating factor that propels one into action. So how do we arrive at our goals? We reflect upon our circumstance and our needs and identify alternate possible paths leading to alternate possible results. We analyze these options in many ways. We gage the likelihood of success. We estimate the effort required. We evaluate (by applying our values to the projected path and outcome) the hazards and benefits to ourselves of each possible path. There are many other types of though process we might bring to bear depending upon the subject at hand. The end result of the process is the identification of one specific goal out of many possible ones with a (hopefully) realistic idea of how to achieve it. Only at the end of this chain of analysis is a goal selected and are we then able to act. The goal provides the destination and the analytic thought process defines the path to that destination. Our values are simply a tool of analysis used in the process of selecting one goal from many and deciding upon a specific path for achieving it. And I contend that this entire process is ultimately free willed. We can freely choose to think about our circumstances or not. We can freely choose to look broadly for alternative goals or just latch on to the first one that somehow pops into our awareness. We can freely perform a detailed or a cursory analysis of how to achieve our goal. And so on. We draw upon our values to help us in these steps, just as we draw upon all of our other knowledge, but there is nothing magical about our values. We can freely pay attention to them or ignore them and suffer the consequences.

But it would actually be as wrong to say that our goals determine or motivate our actions as it is to say that about our values, for what is a goal really? It is just another higher-level concept that embodies all of the thought and analysis that I describe in the previous paragraph. Yep, just another fancy-pants concept; one that now embodies an analysis of our needs, our desires, our value hierarchy and a plan of action among other things. And just like all other concepts, it doesn't somehow acquire a new magic property that empowers it to control our actions. Our goals, just like our values, inform our actions but they do not necessitate them. We all know many people who have professed goals, but do not act to achieve them.

So where does that leave us? In order to act, it requires an act of will! And what is that? Right now we don't really know. All we can say is that it is clear that our conscious mind is able to observe, conceptualize, analyze and form higher and higher level concepts, and this conceptual content of our mind can be consulted in the process of making a decision as to how to act. But the final push from thought into action is a mystery. I would like an answer as much as Bill or Jon, but what I have tried to show here is that it doesn't make sense to simply say our values or our goals propel us into action unless you can explain how these concepts differ in kind from all other non-necessitating concepts in our minds.

Damn, I though I was done with this discussion back in post #94!

Regards,
--
Jeff
(Edited by C. Jeffery Small
on 3/20, 12:11am)

Post 103

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 9:11am

I didn't expect you to agree with me on the spot, Jeffrey. These kinds of discussions rarely conclude with agreement--a truth that's lost on those who often allow themselves to get frustrated and annoyed on Internet forums.

Of course there's no "magic property" that allows values to cause our actions. I thave no idea why you think there's anything mystical about what I've said. Your values are chosen by YOU and can be changed by YOU by conscious cognitive means. But as long as you hold the values you now hold, you will act accordingly. And any action that seemingly contradicts your values only proves that you really valued something else more.

You say, "We all know many people who have professed goals, but do not act to achieve them." Sure. For example, I know people who say they'd like to write a novel. However, they never do anything about it. What does that prove? It proves they don't value writing their novel MORE than whatever else they have going on. Otherwise, they'd be doing it.

I will conclude by saying the view articulated by Bill and myself here is also the one espoused by Ayn Rand. Of course, you're free to disagree with her view while agreeing with other ideas she held. But it still WAS her view.

(Edited by Jon Trager on 3/20, 1:21pm)

Post 104

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 11:08am

Jon:

In your post #103 you haven't addressed the primary question from my previous post. How are you defining "value"? Do you agree with me that values are concepts or are they something else?

You say:

> Your values are chosen by YOU and can be changed by YOU.
> But as long as you hold the values you now hold, you will act accordingly.

Can you explain why you believe that we have free will to think and choose our values, but we cannot use that same free will to direct our actions, even in contradiction of our values?

If thinking and choosing are free, why not also our actions? I am arguing that our values, ultimately by way of our goals, do heavily influence our actions and our actions are indeed often an indicator of our values - because people are rational and typically want to achieve the goals they have set. But I am still not convinced that a value or goal necessitates an action. If it did, then each time we set a goal we would turn into robots necessitated to head off in service of that goal. Of course, you will likely answer that if we do not do so, it proves we didn't really have that goal (and its underlying values) to begin with. Well, there is no way to address that type of statement as it is, as I have previously pointed out, circular. So I am asking you to explain how values/goals necessitate actions rather than simply assert it.

> I will conclude by saying that the view articulated by Bill and myself
> here is also the one espoused by Ayn Rand. Of course, you're free to
> disagree with her view while agreeing with other ideas she held. But it still WAS her view.

Please provide passages to back this up. You are making a metaphysical claim here and I am not aware of any statement by Rand that applies in that context, but I am certainly open to being enlightened.

Do other Objectivists believe that it was Rand's position that our actions are necessitated by our values? I think it is time to weigh in on this very important issue.

Regards,
--
Jeff

P.S. Bill, I'm curious to know if you agree with Jon that we have free will to choose our values which then constrain our actions as you describe, or whether you have a different view of how values are acquired which doesn't posit free will?
(Edited by C. Jeffery Small
on 3/20, 11:16am)

Post 105

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 12:13pm

C. Jeffery Small asks:

Do other Objectivists believe that it was Rand's position that our actions are necessitated by our values? I think it is time to weigh in on this very important issue.

I wouldn't be surprised if she never answered that head-on. In my opinion, she would opt for something weaker, like "based on."

Of course, action is dependent on external circumstances as well.

Post 106

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 1:14pm

Our intended changes in our own value hierarchies, ARE our free will in operation.
But don't these changes take place because the moral agent values them? For example, suppose I value religious observance, but later discover that my belief in God is false. As a result of my discovery, I no longer value religious observance, but only because I valued the truth to begin with, a value which led me to give up my religious values.

Bill, it's true that -- in retrospect -- we can always explain someone's choices by their "frozen" value hierarchy (at the time). I don't have issue with that. It's also true that if you value truth, that you'll be making changes to your value hierarchy -- because of the improbability of having a perfect value hierarchy from the outset (or one that stays perfectly suited to you as you change and grow).

My issue is that there's change and growth in folks. That they "begin" to value new things (as they grow wise). You can always go back and say that folks' "valued" growing wise -- and I will not be able to counter that. My point is that it doesn't matter (to the discussion of the freedom of the will). Take determinism. Determinism says that you could not have chosen otherwise. As we look to our past it seems that we've been determined to do all (or most) of the things that we've ever done. This is so because we can explain (as you do) -- by appealing to our momentary value hierarchy at the time -- why we did everything (or most everything) we've ever done.

Just because you can -- in retrospect -- "explain" or "understand" the behavior of a rational agent, does not mean that you can call them determined. Instead, their behavior is "understandable" -- but it is not "determined" (for them). When you show how -- in retrospect -- we can explain another's behavior (via reference to their momentary value hierarchy at the time), you aren't showing some kind of power to predict their future choices (as they change and grow).

What I'm trying to say is that, when you can explain some being's past behavior, you aren't saying something pivotal about Free Will. Understanding Free Will requires something more than being able to understand another's choices -- given their momentary value hierarchy. It requires being able to understand the chosen "changes" in their value hierarchy (not the "implementation" of it within their life choices).

Ed

Post 107

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 1:28pm

If you roll dice, a competent physicist will be able to explain why any given roll came out the way it did.

However, this ability to explain how past events turned out (and why) doesn't say anything about the next roll (of dice shaken in someone's hand). Just because we can explain the physics behind why an outcome has occurred doesn't mean that we're in a position to predict future outcome (omniscience about the past doesn't lead to omniscience about the future -- especially about the future choices of growing rational agents).

Ed

Post 108

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 1:35pm

Knowing how physics manifests itself in real world outcomes, doesn't sufficiently afford omniscience about future outcomes (especially with growing rational agents).

Something more is needed beyond being able to explain why it is that things turned out a given way. That's my point.

Ed

Post 109

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 2:01pm

Bill (from way back in post 17),

All that is required to hold him liable for the crime is that he deliberately chose it. That he could not have chosen otherwise, because he saw no reason to is not enough to get him off the hook. The rationale of punishment is deterrence; its purpose is to send a message to the criminal and others like him that if one commits the crime, then one will suffer the consequences. Thus, punishment is motivational; its goal is to provide a would-be criminal with a sufficient reason not to do what he would otherwise have a reason to do in the absence of the punishment.

I disagree. The rationale of punishment isn't simple deterrence. There are many options regarding social engineering that would be justifiable if it were. I think it was Mill who dealt with the situation of harshly punishing an innocent man because of the wide range of social good that could come from that kind of deterrance.

The rationale of punishment is retribution (folks getting what's coming to them). Justice means "just dessert." ...

... judge all men as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects ...

... every man must be judged for what he is and treated accordingly ...

... to place any value higher than justice, is to devaluate your moral currency ... only the good can lose by a default of justice ... only the evil can profit ...

... (If one values human life, one cannot value its destroyers.) ...

Post 110

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 2:10pm

Jeffrey: "How are you defining "value"? Do you agree with me that values are concepts or are they something else?"

I'm defining "value" the same way that Ayn Rand defined it. A "value" is something that one acts to gain/keep. A value may be one's self-esteem, for example, or it may be a car. Values are the ends toward which our actions are directed.

Jeffrey: "Can you explain why you believe that we have free will to think and choose our values, but we cannot use that same free will to direct our actions, even in contradiction of our values?"

Better than Bill already has on this thread, you mean? I don't think so. I'll have to think about it.

Jeffrey: "But I am still not convinced that a value or goal necessitates an action. If it did, then each time we set a goal we would turn into robots necessitated to head off in service of that goal."

No. Robots can't set goals or form values. Humans can set goals and then program machines to execute them. Only volitionally living things can have values.

"Of course, you will likely answer that if we do not do so, it proves we didn't really have that goal (and its underlying values) to begin with."

No. It proves that goal wasn't MORE important to us (ie, higher in our personal hierarchy) at the time than what we chose to do otherwise.

Jeffrey: "Please provide passages to back this up. You are making a metaphysical claim here and I am not aware of any statement by Rand that applies in that context, but I am certainly open to being enlightened."

Well, I don't have any exact quotes at my fingertips at this moment. I'll give some evidence later. I won't spend much time on it, though, because I don't think it will change your mind on the issue, and I have higher priorities right now.

Jeffrey: "Do other Objectivists believe that it was Rand's position that our actions are necessitated by our values?"

In my view, saying otherwise amounts to endorsing a mind-body split. Man is an integrated being, and saying his actions are caused by the values and beliefs he chooses to accept follows from that. Whether a particular man's highest values are rational (products of reason) or irrational (products of whim) is another issue.

Post 111

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 2:35pm

Bill,

It is my position that your position on "determinism" necessarily leads you to hold deterrance as the one rationale for punishment.

And I think you're wrong on these 2 things ...

;-)

Ed

Post 112

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 2:52pm

Jon writes in post #110:

> I'm defining "value" the same way that Ayn Rand defined it. A "value" is something that one acts to gain/keep.
> A value may be one's self-esteem, for example, or it may be a car. Values are the ends toward which our actions are directed.

I agree with this as an epistemological definition, but what I was actually asking is what are values metaphysically? In other words, what is the nature of a value and where does it reside with respect to its holder? My answer is that it is a high-level concept that integrates a body of knowledge and analysis. Do you agree?

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 113

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 3:07pm

Jeff,

I know I'm intruding (on your debate with Jon) -- but I can't help it. I view values in the simplest terms possible (things acted for). Values are things acted for. They're the things that give rise to action from animate beings. Rand seemed to mean the same thing.

Ed

Post 114

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 5:31pm

Hi Ed:

I happily invite you and everyone else to jump in anytime.

I believe that you and Bill and Jon are saying that values are "things acted for" and they "give rise to action from animated beings". In one sense I do not disagree with this. The question among us is not whether values are motivational in regard to our actions. I think we all agree that they indeed are. The question is whether the values determine or necessitate those actions, removing our actions from the category of free will. If something has the power to compel my actions, I am then asking you, Bill or Jon to identify for me exactly what that thing is in metaphysical terms.

In an abstract sense values are things that we desire, but we have to grasp those things in our minds as, what I will call, subject-concepts and as we evaluate those subject-concepts we formulate value-concepts which represent our analyzes of the "goodness" or "badness" of those subjects in relationship to ourselves. What I am saying is that, in metaphysical terms, our values are actually a subset of our mental concepts and I am then asking how these particular concepts in our mind end up having a power to control our actions when concepts in general do not have this power. This is what I meant when I spoke of "magical powers" in a previous post. My positions is that concepts cannot act in this way and therefore values cannot necessitate our actions. If you agree, then great. If not, then I am asking for either an explanation of how concepts can drive actions or else, provide another definition of what values are, so that I can better understand what we are talking about here.

I hope that I am making myself clear. If not, please let me know what you find confusing.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 115

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 9:23pm

Jeff, I'm in more agreement with you than Bill (and that's a deliberate double entendre`).

;-)

I also find disconcerting the idea that there are things in our heads -- what I have called a momentarily-frozen hierarchy of value -- that have the "magical powers" to generate our choices for us. There seems to be no agency in that. Yet, whenever I introspect, I notice agency. Now, either I have to find some way to explain-away this 'notice of agency' with perhaps some elaborate argument about how it is that I've been fooled all my life into "clinging" to the notion that I ever had agency -- or I can accept my introspection at face-value and move on to issues of more import. One wonders whether my mere pondering of -- and "struggle" with -- this can be taken as evidence of agency!

You can lead a horse to water, but -- with man -- you can make him think.

The fact that some of us will think about some of what we've done on this planet, and begin to do things differently than we ever had before -- seems to be proof of some kind of agency. And Bill's counter to this -- that everybody who's ever changed, first wanted to -- doesn't seem to do justice to the concept at hand (the freedom of the will). That's what I've been trying to say. It's like Bill is making a category mistake or something. In order to have proof that behavior is determined -- rather than free -- you need more than a mechanistic explanation of a growing, rational agent's past choices. This is, admittedly, hard to understand (let alone to communicate).

In order to say that folks will, neccessarily, make a choice over other alternatives -- one requires a kind of psychological omniscience over them; regarding not only their value hierarchy, but their moment-by-moment focus. And this all seems to me to be absurd and utterly irrelevant to the discussion of the freedom of the will.

When social engineers study the reasons why folks make the choices that they do, they don't ever get into the position to "puppeteer" us with their new knowledge of our choice-making process. The reason that this has always been true -- and is likely to always remain true -- is because of their incorrect dismissal of agency (though Bill might claim it's merely because they couldn't understand our momentarily-frozen value hierarchies at the time that such understanding was needed for prediction of our behavior).

Ed

Post 116

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 - 10:14pm

This is an interesting conversation. Thanks to Tibor for starting it. I'm going to try to submit an article which discusses some of my own thoughts, trying to come at this from a different angle. But I wanted to say a few things with respect to this angle. I find myself mostly in agreement with Jeff Small who's made some very informative posts. But here is my own two cents.

I think there's a problem that the word "value" has at least three different meanings, many of them used in this conversation. Let me see if I can identify them more clearly here.

1.) One's reasoned evaluation of various choices. If you consider option A or option B, you can do some kind of evaluation about what is most in your self-interest, and by how much. It's purely an intellectual classification, and doesn't necessarily mean you'll practice it. That's why we have the idea of evasion. Even if you know you should do something, you can stop thinking about it, go with your emotions, rationalize, over-emphasize the value of the other options, etc.

2.) Desire. You can feel that you want to pursue some goal, or maybe just that you want that goal. It's purely an emotional reaction. This also doesn't mean you'll do anything about it. There are many times where we want something, and we may want it a lot, but we don't pursue it. An example is a sexual encounter while you're already in a romantic relationship. At that moment, you may desire that sexual encounter in a powerful way, but you aren't forced to accept it. If you have a good reason to not do it, you can choose to go with your reasoning mind, and suppress or ignore the emotion. Some may argue that you must then really desire not doing it more, but I think that's inaccurate. If we're talking about your emotional reaction, you can clearly say that you are able to feel very strongly one way or another, and still choose to avoid it.

3.) The last meaning is the general "that which you act to gain and or keep". What needs to be understood here is that this is descriptive only. It's not suggesting anything about why you choose that action. It just says that you have. Therefore, you must "value it". But don't confuse that use of the term with either of the previous two uses. The only thing it conveys is that you chose it, for whatever reason. It doesn't imply you really think it's the best choice for your rational self-interest. It doesn't mean that you desire it emotionally. It just says you chose it. In fact, I think using the phrase "you value it" is deceptive in this case, and should be avoided.

It should be clear that I reject determinism and support free will. I think to argue for determinism by "value", only a version of the second definition would work. The argument would have to be that even if we have an overwhelming desire to have a sexual encounter, if we don't do it, then we must have an even greater desire to not have it. Thus, any act of will would be simply redefined as an emotional reaction (instead of as a willful action). Then every choice could be seen as a product of an emotion.

I also want to point out that once this kind of "value determinism" is accepted, it doesn't make sense to talk about programming your values as the outlet for free will. Every action, including analysis and making value-judgments, would have to be "value determined". There couldn't be a special exception for free will to come into the picture for determining your values because even that would be determined. I disagree with this whole notion of value determinism (or any other kind of determinism), but the half and half argument doesn't make any more sense.

I hope that brings more clarity to the topic, even if it doesn't provide resolution.

(Edited by Joseph Rowlands on 3/20, 11:28pm)

Post 117

Wednesday, March 21, 2007 - 9:34am

As Joe says, quoting Rand:

The last meaning is the general "that which you act to gain and/or keep."

It must be noted that AR specifically worded it this way--descriptively only--as a preliminary to identifying the is-ought connection. (Something at which she succeeded.) She wanted to purge the definition of all traces of "ought" connotations.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 3/21, 9:37am)

Post 118

Wednesday, March 21, 2007 - 10:22am

In post #116 Joe writes:

> The last meaning is the general "that which you act to gain and or keep". What needs to be
> understood here is that this is descriptive only. It's not suggesting anything about why you
> choose that action. It just says that you have.

I just have one small observation here. When Joe says "It just says that you have [chosen the action]" this implies that the act of choosing precedes the classification of the choice as a value and not the other way around. I would agree with this. It's a bit like the relationship between CO2 and temperature which is discussed in the recent "Swindle" video. From a great distance it may appear that CO2 levels effect temperature or that this type of values effect actions, but when you look more closely, it turns out to be just the opposite.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 119

Wednesday, March 21, 2007 - 10:45am