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Post 140

Sunday, April 8, 2007 - 12:01pmSanction this postReply
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In Post 35, Jeff writes,
I appreciate the response, but the more we talk the more confused I become. You write here about "chosen action" and "value judgments determine our choices" in the same sentence. This is the circular logic of which I have been referring. Your use of the word "chosen" is apparently not anything like what I think the word means.

From the Merriam-Websters On-line dictionary, in the context of this discussion I think the appropriate definition is:

1a: to select freely and after consideration
Right, but the word "freely" in this definition is not restricted to metaphysical freedom; it can be understood to include physical freedom, namely, freedom from external constraints. E.g., I "chose" to vote for the pro-capitalist candidate over the pro-socialist one, because I could have chosen to vote for the latter, if I had wanted to -- if I had valued his candidacy enough to favor him over the capitalist. In other words, I wasn't forced to vote for the capitalist candidate.
As you can see, the act of free will is built into the definition. Either our actions are chosen or they are determined, but they can't be both.
Yes they can. A choice does not require metaphysical freedom; it does not require the freedom to choose another alternative under the same (internal and external conditions); all it requires is the freedom to choose another alternative, if one values it enough to make that choice.

Here's another example of a determined choice -- i.e., one that is not metaphysically free. Say that you are taking a multiple-choice test (e.g., the GRE) and that scoring well on the test is a precondition for getting into graduate school. And suppose that one of the questions is:

The area of a circle is defined as:

a) 2πr
b) πr2
c) πr3
d) None of the above.

Since you know that the correct answer is b), you "choose" it in preference to the other three answers. Could you have chosen any of the others? Only if you didn't know that the correct answer is b). Knowing that the correct answer is b) and given your desire to do as well as possible on the test, you could not have chosen any other answer, since you had absolutely no reason to. You had to choose b) under the circumstances. We call your answer a "choice," because you could have chosen differently, if you had wanted to, i.e., if you had thought that another answer is correct.

Jeff, I have never said that my view on the issue of free will versus determinism is the Objectivist one. It clearly is not, but neither is the view that you're defending. In my opinion, Jon Trager's view best expresses the Objectivist position on this issue. You can confirm this if you want, by going back and reading the relevant issues of The Objectivist Newsletter, in which the Objectivist view of free will is clearly and succinctly enunciated. If you do, you'll see that it is not the one that you're defending.

- Bill



Post 141

Sunday, April 8, 2007 - 2:13pmSanction this postReply
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Joe Rowlands writes,
I brought up three different definitions for value in the hopes of trying to get a better understanding of what people are suggesting. I think in his own way, Jeff has been trying to do the same thing.

The first two definitions I used were the two I thought might used when people are saying we have to act according to our values. One is a conceptual identification of what we should pursue. One is an emotional impulse. My problem with either of these two is that both are possible motivations, and neither sufficiently explains people's behaviors. In other words, it's possible for someone to act on their emotions, ignoring their better judgment. And it's also possible to go with their better judgment, disregarding their emotions.
A conceptual identification of what we "should" pursue pertains to the means of pursuing some end or goal that we want to achieve. We "should" pursue it for the sake of achieving the end or goal. That's what "should" means in this context. It means "should" if you want the end. If you want the end, then you "should" take the means.

Consider the example of a person who is on a diet and is tempted to eat a piece of chocolate cake. He experiences an emotional impulse or desire to eat the cake, but his "better judgment" says that he "should" remain on the diet -- "should" remain on the diet for the sake of what end or goal? -- for the sake of losing weight. Now, let's suppose that he decides instead to the eat the cake. Has he acted against his "better judgment" -- against what he believes that he "should" be doing? Well, observe that in choosing to eat the cake, he has reevaluated his priorities. He has decided that remaining on the diet isn't "worth" the price of having to forgo the cake. God said, "Take what you want but pay for it." So, he has decided that he would prefer to pay the price of carrying some extra weight in exchange for the pleasure of eating the cake, rather than pay the price of forgoing that pleasure for the sake of losing weight. Everything has its costs and benefits, which must be weighed in deciding what choices to make. So, has he really acted against his better judgment, or has he simply changed his mind and revised his judgment?

Now, it may be that after eating the cake, he feels a sense of guilt or remorse, because he wishes that he had remained on the diet. But observe that this evaluation is retrospective. He wishes that he had not valued the cake over remaining on the diet. But the fact is that he did value it, which is why he made the choice.
Notice that this is perfectly compatible with Jon's quotes from Rand, and the Objectivist version of free will in general. Free will is the ability to focus or not. We can choose to focus on the expected results of our actions, or we can evade them and act on our desires or whims. I think this can be phrased in another way. We can choose to keep our rational evaluations in focus and act upon them, or we can ignore our value system and choose to act against it.
Choose to act against our value system?? For the sake of what value? To gain and keep what you don't value? That doesn't make sense. If you act to gain or keep something, then you must have considered the action worth taking; otherwise you wouldn't have chosen it.
I brought up the third definition because it is purely descriptive, and not explanatory. It simply defines a value as that which we act to gain or keep, but doesn't identify in any way the motivation for choosing it. One problem I have in this discussion is hearing someone say that we must value it "in one way or another". If someone is going to say that we must act according to our values, they need to explain the nature of these values and why these force us to act accordingly.
They don't "force" us to act accordingly. They motivate us to act accordingly. A person is "forced" to act against his values, not for them.
Why is this important? Because if you use this descriptive form of the word 'value' to define all actions as corresponding to a person's value system, then it is absolutely a no-brainer that we cannot act against our "value" system. It's true by definition.
Yes! It is true "by definition." You cannot act against your values. A value is an object of an action.
But if you define a "value system" as a hierarchy of values, rationally measured to determine their positive contribution to your life, then it is certainly possible to violate them.
It's possible to act against a previously defined hierachy of values, but not while you still regard it as reflecting your values. If you still valued that system, you would act in accordance with it.
Just because you think something is good for you doesn't mean you are going to act on it.
What do you mean by "good for you"? Do you mean "pro-life"? Granted, just because you think that an action is pro-life doesn't mean that you're going to act on it, because you may not value pro-life actions. However, if you do value them, then you will act accordingly.
Further, excusing the falsifying evidence by saying "well, he must not have really valued it" just makes it impossible to validate or invalidate the theory.
No, it doesn't! The fact that a theory happens to be valid doesn't mean that any given person will recognize it as valid or value it as such. You're confusing the validity of an idea with the recognition of its validity.
Even then, I find it much more informative to say that he certainly could have sincerely believed it was the better choice, but chose to evade that knowledge.
If he sincerely believed it was the better choice, then what would motivate him to evade that knowledge? Why would he choose the alternative? Peikoff's answer is: You can't ask that question. The person just chose it; that is all, which ignores the obvious fact that all action is goal directed. We don't choose an action for no reason whatsoever. We choose it for the sake of a value. To me, this is so obvious, it is incomprehensible how Objectivists could deny it. But deny it they do!
If I understand Jeff's posts, I see him trying to get to the same idea that I'm trying to get at. If 'values' have some kind of controlling power, then we should be able to define the means by which they control our actions.
They don't "control" our actions; they motivate our actions. We control our actions. The sense in which our values can be said to "cause" our actions is one of final not efficient causation.
Jon attempted to answer my question and to explain his use of value. He said "It refers to anything that a person wants enough (relative to the other things in his own value system) to cause action."[Emphasis mine]

Interestingly, the "wants" part seems to fit my definition based on emotions. Not that I think Jon is really suggesting that we must act according to our emotions. Instead, I think the ambiguity in the meaning of the term makes it difficult to try to show how it can cause actions.
"Wants" in this context doesn't refer simply to an emotional inclination or desire; it refers to the fact that the person has an interest in achieving the value. That interest can be based on any number of causes; it doesn't have to be emotion driven. But a person has to have some reason for choosing one alternative in preference to another. We don't choose an action arbitrarily for no reason at all. There has to be something motivating the choice, and that motivating factor we call a person's "valuation."
I don't know if this post was helpful. I'm trying to show why at least I find the current definitions to be too vague and non-informative. I'm not looking for an example of a value, or a better definition. All of that would be useless until we can also get an understanding of what causal mechanism requires a human being to act according to the "value".
A value IS what a person is seeking to gain or keep, and the person is motivated to seek it because he or she "values" it, i.e., regards it as worth pursuing in preference to the alternatives.

- Bill


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Post 142

Sunday, April 8, 2007 - 6:03pmSanction this postReply
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Bill:

I had been thinking more deeply about all of the exchanges that have occurred on this topic and one observation I had was that I was fairly sure that the terms "values", "determined", "influenced" and "motivated" were being used in significantly different ways among the participants, despite various attempts to define them. As I was formulating another response, your post #141 arrived and it contained the following incredible quote:

> They [values] don't "control" our actions; they motivate our actions. We control our actions.
> The sense in which our values can be said to "cause" our actions is one of final not efficient causation.

Well, knock me over! This seems to be agreeing with one of the points I have been trying to make all along, but I'm sure I must be wrong about that! :-) So, before I go any further, could you please explain in more detail what you mean by "We control our actions" in this passage. It seems to me that this is saying that we retain free-will with regard to the initiation of our actions while those actions are motivated by our values. You will also have to explain exactly what you mean by "motivated" here? Do you mean "causally necessitated", "casually influenced", or something else altogether?

Up to this point, it has been my understanding of your position that you believe that our actions are determined in a causally necessitated way by our values, such that a person who integrates a certain value which is in play in a specific context, is compelled (i.e., compatibilistically determined) to act in a certain way with no other recourse. I do not see how to reconcile this view with the quoted statement above. Please guide me to a better understanding, and then I may have some new insights to offer.

Regards,
--
Jeff


Post 143

Monday, April 9, 2007 - 12:07pmSanction this postReply
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Great last post, Bill. As usual, your writing is lucid and concise.

I'd like to comment regarding my point about a value being something someone wants enough--relative to other things in his value system--to cause action.

Joe Rowlands associated my use of the term "wants" with whim, though he added he didn't believe I was saying we should act on whim (which of course I wasn't). But Bill correctly pointed out that "wants" in this context just "refers to the fact that the person has an interest in achieving the value. That interest can be based on any number of causes; it doesn't have to be emotion driven."

That's true. A man's values may be set according to whim or according to reason (ie, by identifying and integrating objective facts about reality, including facts about his own nature). I was using "wants" to refer to only to a man's interest in gaining/keeping a particular value.



(Edited by Jon Trager
on 4/09, 6:46pm)


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Post 144

Monday, April 9, 2007 - 3:33pmSanction this postReply
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In post #143 Jon says:

> A man's values may be set according to blind whim or according to reason

Jon:

This quote highlights why we are having such difficulty coming to any sort of meeting of the minds on this issue. I am convinced that it is because we are all using the terms "value", "determined", "necessitated", "influenced" and "motivated" in significantly different ways and therefore coming to quite different conclusions.

For me, it is ludicrous to say that a man's "values" can be set by blind whim. If this is true, it strips the term "value" of all significant cognitive meaning and allows it to be a catch-all for the arbitrary. With this approach, literally anything can be classified as a value.

Now I understand why, when you start with Rand's formulation that "a value is that which one acts to gain or keep", you are willing to say that whatever motivates a person to act, regardless of its source, is a value. It is a value for you by definition, because there is no other criteria to defining something as a value other than that it motivated an individual to act.

As I've said repeatedly, I think this definition of value is perfectly suitable in a higher-level ethical context, but it doesn't offer us any guidance when we wish to examine the metaphysical nature of free-will or volition, which is what this particular thread is all about. I have other thoughts that I want to share sometime in the future, but I just don't have the time today. And I would like to wait for Bills response to my last request before plunging forward.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 145

Monday, April 9, 2007 - 7:21pmSanction this postReply
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One should make a distinction here - there are values and then there are viable values..... it is the viable values which require thought and understanding as to why they should be values - and by inference, why others may be desired [valued] but are not viable for the survival of the being, let alone the flourishing of the person....
(Edited by robert malcom on 4/09, 7:21pm)


Post 146

Tuesday, April 10, 2007 - 10:31pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote, "They [values] don't 'control' our actions; they motivate our actions. We control our actions. The sense in which our values can be said to 'cause' our actions is one of final not efficient causation." Jeff replied,
Well, knock me over! This seems to be agreeing with one of the points I have been trying to make all along, but I'm sure I must be wrong about that! :-) So, before I go any further, could you please explain in more detail what you mean by "We control our actions" in this passage. It seems to me that this is saying that we retain free-will with regard to the initiation of our actions while those actions are motivated by our values.
To say that "we" control our actions simply means that we choose them according to our own values, interests and goals, which is to say that no one else is forcing us to act against our value judgments. It does not, however, mean that we could have chosen otherwise. In voting for the capitalist over the socialist, I control my vote; I cause it; I'm responsible for it, because it is chosen in accordance with my own values, and is not dictated by someone else. But that doesn't mean that given my values, I could have voted for the socialist candidate. My voting for the capitalist was necessary, given my political principles.
You will also have to explain exactly what you mean by "motivated" here? Do you mean "causally necessitated", "casually influenced", or something else altogether?
I mean that I made the choice for the sake of something I wanted -- some end or goal that I was seeking to achieve. Given my interest in achieving that end or goal, my choice was causally necessitated, but the causation was final, not efficient. Given my valuation of that end or goal, I could not have chosen otherwise.
Up to this point, it has been my understanding of your position that you believe that our actions are determined in a causally necessitated way by our values, such that a person who integrates a certain value which is in play in a specific context, is compelled (i.e., compatibilistically determined) to act in a certain way with no other recourse.
Not exactly. I don't equate "compelled" with "compatibilistically determined." Even though I could not have chosen otherwise, my choice to vote for the capitalist was not "compelled." One is compelled to act against one's values, not for them. In voting for the capitalist, I was acting for my values, not against them.

Consequently, it won't do to say that because my choice was necessitated, given my values, it was therefore "compelled." If I were forced to vote for the socialist against my will, then my choice would be compelled. But if I am voting in accordance with my will, there is no compulsion! I am exercising my freedom of choice. "Freedom of choice" in this context simply means that I could have voted for the socialist candidate if I had wanted to. It doesn't mean that I could have voted for the socialist candidate even though I preferred the capitalist. Obviously, I could not have voted in opposition to my political values. Such a choice would have been impossible intellectually and psychologically.

To make this point even clearer, recall my example of choosing the correct answer on a multiple-choice test. If you know the correct answer and desire to pass the test, you cannot choose an answer that you recognize as wrong. You must choose the one you regard as correct. Does that mean that you are "compelled" to choose the right answer? No, of course not. No one is putting a gun to your head and forcing you to choose the answer you view as correct. You select the answer freely and voluntarily in accordance with your own will and choice, but you do so for the sake of your academic goals and interests, which are the factors governing your choice.

Does this make more sense?

Regards,

Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 4/10, 11:01pm)


Post 147

Wednesday, April 11, 2007 - 8:14amSanction this postReply
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Jeffrey: "For me, it is ludicrous to say that a man's "values" can be set by blind whim. If this is true, it strips the term "value" of all significant cognitive meaning and allows it to be a catch-all for the arbitrary. With this approach, literally anything can be classified as a value."

Well, yes. Anything material or spiritual can potentially be a value to a person. However, not everything can be a rational value (one chosen based on the facts of reality and human nature). I don't know why you think that's ludicrous. That's the reason why Ayn Rand termed her ethics rational egoism, as opposed to just egoism.

Jeffrey: "As I've said repeatedly, I think this definition of value is perfectly suitable in a higher-level ethical context, but it doesn't offer us any guidance when we wish to examine the metaphysical nature of free-will or volition, which is what this particular thread is all about."

But the concept of value is ethical--not metaphysical. The only thing to be said about free will metaphysically is that it exists as the power to focus one's mind and grasp facts of reality--or to unfocus and evade it. This natural capacity of man qua man can be known by simple introspection, or by observing the actions of others. There's nothing else about the metaphysical nature of free will to be known.


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Post 148

Thursday, April 12, 2007 - 11:33pmSanction this postReply
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Here are a few more thoughts on the subject:

First I want to make it absolutely clear that I believe that there are no causeless (i.e., unmotivated) actions, and it is my belief that for man to initiate any conscious action, that action must be motivated by something. Recapping, I believe that as humans, we develop hierarchies of values which are concepts of varying complexity that embody our understanding of what is good and bad for us. We then establish goals which are another specie of concept that unite one or more of the previously integrated values with a plan of action for the achievement of the value(s). We can then consult these goals and, at a given point in time, select one or more of them to function as the motive in a decision to initiate action. Are our actions now casually necessitated and unavoidable as a consequence of our values and goals, or do we still retain the complete exercise of free-will over our actions under all circumstances? In other words, right up until the moment of actually initiating action, regardless of the conceptual content of our value hierarchy and despite having formulated one or more goals, do we retain control in deciding whether or not to act? My answer is yes. Values, by way of goals, may motivate, but are insufficient to initiate action. It still requires a conscious act of will to translate a goal into an action; to traverse the gulf between intention and enterprise.

The form that this free-will takes is by way of choice. We decide whether or not to act in service of a particular goal and we do that by selecting between a variety of possible goals (e.g., motives). Take Bill's example of a dieter who is faced with the choice of eating a piece of cake. I agree with Bill that there are multiple possible goals in play, two of which are: (A) remain on the diet and achieve the health benefits of reducing one's weight or (B) eat the cake and enjoy the eating experience. Each possible course of action has desirable benefits (values) at the expense of others not then achieved. Before the dieter can act, he must choose which of the goals he prefers at that moment, selecting one which will act as the motive for his actions - or as Bill says, the dieter may "reevaluate his priorities". There is nothing in the value of healthy dieting or in the value of tasty satisfaction that determines which action will be taken. That remains a matter of free choice. The same analysis applies to Bill's example of the applicant for graduate school facing a multiple-choice test question, knowing that B is the correct answer. Bill says that you cannot choose another answer given your desire to do as well as possible on the test. But what if you choose instead to be contrary and always select a wrong answer - possibly because you want to make a point about having free will! Then you will select any answer other than B. Getting into graduate school may be an important goal, but it is not the only possible goal, and a choice is available. Of course, Bill will likely respond that this is all well and good, but given a specific set of circumstances leading up to the moment when we are faced with the choice of which goal to pursue, we will be causally determined by those preceding circumstances to always make the same choice - so the appearance of choice is actually only an illusion. I am going to skip past this for a moment, but will return to it below.

In post #147 Jon says:

> The only thing to be said about free will metaphysically is that it exists as the
> power to focus one's mind and grasp facts of reality--or to unfocus and evade it.

I disagree. While the free choice to focus or defocus is the most basic or fundamental choice available to us, it is certainly not the only one. As we see in Bill's examples, selecting between a variety of goals in order to decide which course of action to take is also free and it is an evaluative process that can (and should) be made in the context of full mental focus and clarity. No matter how closely you look at the options available to the dieter, there is nothing to be found in the values or the goals of the two possibilities that explains how the final action of eating or not eating the cake occurred. That is because the free choice is a condition outside of, and in addition to, the goals themselves. Previously, when I spoke of the ability to act against or contrary to one's values, I was being imprecise. What I meant was that in a situation where multiple choices are possible, then it is possible to choose to act against any particular value one my have by selecting another goal in support of a different value which will then act as a motivator for an action which could be seen as contrary to the initial value.

So yes, ultimately, when we act, we do so by choosing to act in service of some particular goal, and I agree that there is a linkage between the underlying value, the intermediate goal and the resulting action that is undeniable. Therefore, I agree with much of what both Bill and Jon have been saying. But I do believe that both of them make a mistake in not acknowledging the nature of choice as an act of free-will, and the roll it plays in conscious human action.

Additionally, I think there is too much focus on the issue of focus! For the moment, leaving behind the question of how the focusing mechanism operates in our pre-conceptual state shortly after birth, I think that the same process that I describe above applies to our most basic decision to focus our awareness. I believe that, in the most general case, men develop a value (to varying degrees) of desiring "to understand" things. Then a related goal is established which encompasses the knowledge that in order to achieve the "understanding", we must act by "thinking" which entails the need to "focus". Evasion is the desire to not understand, which of course leads to the act of defocusing. This goal of "focusing in order to think in order to understand" can then motivate us in deciding to act to increase our level of awareness. So, while focusing may be the most fundamental action we can take, there is nothing particularly special about it. We choose to focus ultimately to gain understanding, just as we choose to diet in order to become or remain healthy.

While thinking about this entire discussion I had one other observation regarding the term "value" which I found extremely intriguing. Often, when we speak of values as I have been doing above, we are talking about a mental concepts that represent some aspect of reality. However, when we consider Rand's formulation that "a value is that which one acts to gain or keep", here "value" is not referring to the concept, but to the reality which that concept represents. For example, we don't act to gain or keep our concept of health, we act to gain or keep our actual health. Often, this distinction is irrelevant as there should be a one-to-one correspondence between the mental construct and that which it represents, but in a discussion such as this one, the distinction is very meaningful because the thing that we act to gain or keep is not the same thing that motivates us!

Animals that operate on the perceptual level of consciousness react directly with the external world and are directly motivated by it. When an animal see a predator, there is no intervening concept of "predator" to contemplate, no resulting goal formulated and no process of selecting between a variety of goals in deciding how to act. The animal simply gauges the perceptual facts available to it and reacts to them with a response. If Bill's idea about actions ultimately being casually necessitated by preceding circumstances turned out to be true, then it might apply to animals operating on the perceptual level.

Humans, on the other hand, operate on a conceptual level and do create a mental representation of reality upon which they can reflect. Because of this, we garner the opportunity to consider possible scenarios, project different courses of action with different possible outcomes, and thereby construct goals which can motivate us. It is the conceptual nature of human consciousness that gives rise to free will. Without having the scientific background to construct a real theory of this process, I nevertheless conjecture that it is the immaterial nature of conceptual thought as a part of our consciousness, that gives rise to our capacity of free will, freeing it from the bonds of determinism. With the rise of the ability to think about cause, effect, the future and oneself, without regard to direct external circumstances, man's mind gains the ability to set it's own course. Therefore, I believe that were it possible to place a human in the same set of circumstances on multiple occasions, there is no guarantee that they would necessarily act identically in each case, because the internal functioning of their consciousness is not determined by those circumstances.

Regards,
--
Jeff


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Post 149

Friday, April 13, 2007 - 7:26pmSanction this postReply
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I have been thinking all day about the final two paragraphs of my previous post, and it now seems to me that free-will may actually be nothing more than an attribute of imagination.

Once an entity acquires the mental equipment necessary to fantasize about themselves and their place in the world, it becomes possible, as I previously said, to project various scenarios, making goal definition possible. Once two or more goals have been identified, then a choice becomes possible. I have always operated on the premise that the essence of free-will lay in the ability to make choices with regard to our actions, but now I am considering the possibility that there is nothing particularly remarkable about making a choice when confronted by multiple possibilities. It is the ability to formulate those multiple possibilities that is the "magic" that makes free-will possible. Once we began to imagine, free-will was automatically a possibility.

For those of you that believe we do possess free-will, I would be curious to hear your comments. Is this an interesting or merely a pedestrian observation?

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Post 150

Saturday, April 14, 2007 - 8:26amSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

I largely agree. I like to use "volition" to cover both "free choice" and "free will". Free choice is the mental aspect of volition. Free will is the physical aspect, implementing choices. Free choice requires imagining the available alternatives. Often not much imagination is required. When you come to a fork in the road, it doesn't take much to recognize the choices. Yet, there is a little imagining -- to take one path or the other.

I wouldn't say like you "free-will ["volition" in the above] may actually be nothing more than an attribute of imagination", but imagination is an essential part, which accords with your second paragraph.

Some apparently very complicated problems turn out to be quite simple -- after you have the answer. :-)


Post 151

Tuesday, April 24, 2007 - 7:23pmSanction this postReply
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"This is the key problem in the arguments against free will, they try to redefine the rules by negating the function of free will, which as I defined prior. Every time I hear someone say I cannot think otherwise, I ask them then why can anyone imagine a world differently? Why can one compose modal logic so easily? Why can one imagine how the world might be if Bush lost the '04 election and Kerry won? Or if Hitler won against Russia and stayed back the the Allied Forces in Europe? And so on. These examples imply free will in the strongest sense of the term of this ability to think otherwise [*to learn*]." - Bridget Armozel

Merlin, Jeffery, may I note that after 150 posts, you have returned to the thesis with which Bridget began this thread?

Ted

Post 152

Tuesday, April 24, 2007 - 9:00pmSanction this postReply
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Ted Keer wrote:

> may I note that after 150 posts, you have returned to the thesis with which Bridget began this thread?

I guess some of us are just slow learners! :-)
--
Jeff


Post 153

Thursday, April 26, 2007 - 12:46pmSanction this postReply
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My implication was rather that it was both an interesting coincidence and perhaps a demonstration of the validity of the idea.  How quick of a learner anyone is never matters, but rather, how conscientious and careful.  If we check our math, we should all get the same results in the end no matter how long it takes to do the calculations.

Ted


Post 154

Thursday, April 26, 2007 - 2:31pmSanction this postReply
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That's a good point Ted.
--
Jeff

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