RoR: Forum

Hi Bill:

In post #79 you responded:

> Try to put yourself in his position. Say that you're a legislator who believes
> in the legality of gay marriage (which I assume you do) and are voting on it.
> Wouldn't you vote to make it legal? Of course, you would. It's not something
> you'd think twice about. Could you, under those circumstances, vote to make
> it illegal? No, because you'd have no reason to.

Well, some people might not think about it twice, but they could and I would. For example, I think that recreational drug use is bad for you and therefore immoral. However that belief doesn't necessitate me to vote for or support restrictive drug laws. Having said that, you will then counter that the reason I wouldn't vote for these laws is because I value something else higher such as individual freedom. And down the rabbit hole we go...

> One's moral beliefs are not just passive thoughts inside one's head; they
> motivate one's choices and actions.

As I've said before, I agree that they motivate as in influence but not in the sense that they necessitate. Do you mean something else here by the term "motivate"?

> Decisions based on what?? People don't choose their actions independently
> of their convictions. If they did, their convictions would be irrelevant to
> their daily lives, an idle set of beliefs, with no practical import.

I agree. Actions are not independent of convictions, they are informed by them, but not necessitate by them. What you are describing here is the obvious fact that humans typically operate using goal-directed decision making. Their actions are not simply random and no one, especially me, is suggesting that they are.

> you can still object to his action -- you can still judge it as immoral
>
> It means that the person is violating an objective standard of moral
> value, even if he is not aware of it and doesn't know any better.
>
> And, yes, "should" implies "can"; it implies that they "can" respect the
> principle once they understand its merits.

You are describing evasion (not aware of it) and/or ignorance (doesn't know any better). I don't understand what these have to do with determined actions. Are you saying that the subject could have made themselves aware or could have better educated themselves relative to the moral issue and thereby altered the course of their action? That seems to be the implication of the final quoted sentence. If so, are you saying that they have free will in taking these actions or is this just an academic exercise and were they determined to be in their current state so that, in fact, there was no possibility of their avoiding their "moral" breach? If they couldn't avoid it, how can they be held accountable for their actions? If they could avoid it, by what mechanism other than exercising their free will to propel themselves in a new intellectual direction?

I think we agree that as humans, we have the capacity to observe and conceptualize about ourselves, the world and our relationship to it. I also think there is agreement that we have the ability to analyze that relationship, make judgments and ultimately formulate moral values that act to guide our lives. And finally, I think we agree that individuals are capable of setting goals for themselves. So, getting back to the point of contention, assume, just for a moment, that humans do indeed have free will. If that were true, can not all of your examples be explained by the fact that individuals decide and act the way they do by performing an analysis of the facts under consideration, validating against their values and then making a free choice to pursue a particular goal; a goal chosen not because they are necessitated to choose the way they did because they are determined by their values, but a choice made in concert with their values because they are intelligent rational beings that actually want to achieve their goals rather than act self-destructively?

If you don't agree that free will is at least a plausible possibility, then I have to ask again, what is it about your deterministic view of necessitated actions in the face of personal values that produces a different result from a free-willed, goal-directed, rational individual? If there is no discernible difference, then what facts of reality lead you to determinism rather than free will?

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 81

Thursday, March 15, 2007 - 9:48am

In post #73, Ted wrote:

Higher animals do have will, or volition - they do act in ways that are not strictly determined by their circumstances. That is, a dog can stay lying on the couch, can go look for its master, or can scratch at the door to be left out, none of which is absolutely determined by anything external to the dog (other than his awareness of the master, the door, etc). The dog does not use higher-level concepts to deliberate about the options, but the option chosen is caused internally by the dog - unlike, again, the tropisms of plants and bacteria where no volition is involved, only responses to external stimuli. Hence, higher animals, as the cause of their own optional actions, are volitional beings. They have will, but not free will.

For discussion of the distinction between will and free will, in the writings of Ayn Rand, the interested reader might want to see this thread.

Concerning the volitions of higher animals and humans, I wanted to mention that there is a wonderful little essay on this topic in which the findings are expressly integrated with Rand's philosophy. That essay is John Enright's "Ascent to Volitional Consciousness." It was published in Objectivity in 1991.

ABSTRACT

“Ascent to Volitional Consciousness” by John Enright
                Volume 1, Number 2, Pages 47–65
            Enright assembles our best understanding of the degrees of conscious control in higher animals. By comparison with these capabilities, the nature of human volitional consciousness is brought into richer relief.
            The following theses are defended: Animals have a kind of awareness, which guides their actions, particularly their locomotion. An animal’s actions are limited by its range of awareness. Higher animals contemplate possibilities. The conceptual faculty of humans opens a vast set of possibilities for them. Humans are far more self-aware than any other animal. One’s understanding of one’s own habits allows one to control them and hence control the development of one’s own character. The choice to think has enormous ramifications in human existence.

Post 82

Thursday, March 15, 2007 - 12:28pm

Jeff, excellent post (80)! ...

Value Determinism and a Frozen Hierarchy of Value

One of the things that I think Bill is guilty of (in championing "Value Determinism"), is the same thing that indirect perceptionists are guilty of ... of postulating a static "picture" of things "inside" for one single moment, and then taking that moment's "picture" of things, to be everything that can be "on your mind."

Indirect perceptionists postulate an internal, still-picture slide-show, and a subsequent reaction to the slide-show AS IF it is reality. Bill postulates a frozen (for the millisecond that it takes for us to make each of our choices) hierarchy of values, internally governing each choice we make. The hierarchy could be changing over time (as we grow wise), but Bill still views it in isolation (to every other moment in our life) as frozen -- for each choice we make. The frozen hierarchy is then set up as the prime mover in every action.

To say that what you had instantaneously valued at a given point in time, is what it is that made you act in a certain way -- isn't decisive to the discussion of the freedom of the will. For instance, taking Bill's momentarily-frozen hierarchy as a given, one sees that it is only the freedom of the will that could allow for a change in the hierarchy. Unless Bill is prepared to postulate that value hierarchies change "of THEIR OWN will" -- then Bill's argument is an argument AGAINST determinism of any kind.

We either "see" better value hierarchies (and then "make" the appropriate changes), or our value hierarchies "change themselves" (arbitrarily?). Which is it?

Ed

Post 83

Thursday, March 15, 2007 - 2:22pm

Thanks Ed.
--
Jeff

Thursday, March 15, 2007 - 2:49pm

Jeff writes in #80 that one's values and moral beliefs "motivate as in influence but not in the sense that they necessitate."

Leibniz concurs in Theodicy, writing of "inclinations, or reasons, which contribute towards causing determination by the will" (367). He adds that

The determination of the soul does not come solely from the cooperation of all the causes distinct from the soul, but also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations which mingle with the impressions of the senses, strengthening or weakening them. Now all of the internal and external causes taken together bring it about that the soul is determined certainly, but not of necessity: for no contradiction would be implied if the soul were to be determined differently, it being possible for the will to be inclined, but not possible for it to be compelled by necessity. (371)

The model is of an inclined, aware, and reason-embracing agent being a free cause, which together with all the deterministic external and internal causes entering into the choice, makes the determinate choice. Such a choice is free.

I think we can know that we are free in this sense without special information from modern science. However, the more we know of the relevant science and the more we integrate it into a single coherent understanding of the brain operations through which we execute our choices, the fuller and more precise understanding we will have of our freedom.

Post 85

Thursday, March 15, 2007 - 11:29pm

I wrote, "One's moral beliefs are not just passive thoughts inside one's head; they motivate one's choices and actions." Jeff replied,

As I've said before, I agree that they motivate as in influence but not in the sense that they necessitate. Do you mean something else here by the term "motivate"?

No, I mean "motivate" in the normal, garden variety sense of the term. But if I am motivated to choose A instead of non-A, then I cannot just as well choose non-A instead of A, since I have no reason to, which means that I must, of necessity, choose A. If we are talking about a motive for choosing A over non-A, then it makes no sense to say that a motive "influences" but does not "necessitate." In what sense could it possibly influence, if it does not necessitate? If the will is truly free, then it is free of any influences. To say that it is free but influenced by our motives is a contradiction.

I wrote, "Decisions based on what?? People don't choose their actions independently of their convictions. If they did, their convictions would be irrelevant to their daily lives, an idle set of beliefs, with no practical import."

I agree. Actions are not independent of convictions, they are informed by them, but not necessitated by them.

I don't know what it means to say that one's decisions are "informed" by one's convictions but not necessitated by them. A conviction does more than simply "inform" a particular choice; it prescribes the choice, by declaring, in effect, that it is better than the alternative. Well, if you think that a particular choice is better than the alternative, then you have no reason to choose the alternative; nor will you, if you are convinced that it is an inferior choice.

I wrote, "you can still object to his action -- you can still judge it as immoral . . . It means that the person is violating an objective standard of moral value, even if he is not aware of it and doesn't know any better . . . And, yes, 'should' implies 'can'; it implies that they 'can' respect the principle once they understand its merits."

You are describing evasion (not aware of it) and/or ignorance (doesn't know any better). I don't understand what these have to do with determined actions. Are you saying that the subject could have made themselves aware or could have better educated themselves relative to the moral issue and thereby altered the course of their action?

Not necessarily. All I'm saying is that however the person becomes aware of the fact that he "should" respect the principle, once he does become aware of it, he "can" respect it. If he couldn't respect it even when he wanted to, then it would make no sense to say that he "ought" to respect it.

If they couldn't avoid it, how can they be held accountable for their actions?

They can be held accountable for an action, if they chose the action with full knowledge of what they were doing. They don't have to believe that the action is morally wrong or have a motive for not choosing it in order to be held accountable for it. Suppose an animal-rights activist sabotages a research facility, because he believes that the researchers are violating the rights of the animals they're experimenting on. Even if he had no reason to refrain from sabotaging the clinic, given his belief in animal rights, he can still be held accountable for his action, because the action is a reflection of his value judgments.

Granted, he cannot be held accountable for it if he couldn't avoid it even if he wanted to, because in that case, he'd be forced to take the action. I.e., the action would be against his will. But if the action is in accordance with his will, even though necessitated by his value judgments, then it is a reflection of his values, and he can therefore be held responsible for it.

I think we agree that as humans, we have the capacity to observe and conceptualize about ourselves, the world and our relationship to it. I also think there is agreement that we have the ability to analyze that relationship, make judgments and ultimately formulate moral values that act to guide our lives.
Right.
And finally, I think we agree that individuals are capable of setting goals for themselves.
True, but the goals they set for themselves are based on their previous goals. For example, let's say that my goal is to become an economics professor and that getting a Ph.D. in the subject is the best way to accomplish that goal. I will set for myself the goal of getting a Ph.D. because it is a means to the goal of becoming an econ professor.
So, getting back to the point of contention, assume, just for a moment, that humans do indeed have free will. If that were true, can not all of your examples be explained by the fact that individuals decide and act the way they do by performing an analysis of the facts under consideration, validating against their values and then making a free choice to pursue a particular goal; a goal chosen not because they are necessitated to choose the way they did because they are determined by their values, but a choice made in concert with their values because they are intelligent rational beings that actually want to achieve their goals rather than act self-destructively?

Well, I don't see any difference between these two scenarios, other than your modifying the word "choice" with the adjective "free." If they want to achieve their goals rather than act self-destructively, then they WILL act to achieve their goals rather than act self-destructively. Their valuing the achievement of the goals will determine their actions.

If you don't agree that free will is at least a plausible possibility, then I have to ask again, what is it about your deterministic view of necessitated actions in the face of personal values that produces a different result from a free-willed, goal-directed, rational individual? If there is no discernible difference, then what facts of reality lead you to determinism rather than free will?

The observation that our actions are goal-directed, with the goals determining our choices. I don't see how one's action can be goal directed, if the perceived goals don't necessitate one's choices. What sense does it make to say that one's action is goal DIRECTED, if one could just as well choose NOT to pursue the goal? Yet, that is what free will is saying -- that one can choose to act against one's goals, against one's value-judgments.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/15, 11:47pm)

Post 86

Friday, March 16, 2007 - 6:23am

Bill, you write in #85 that "if the will is truly free, then it is free of any influences. To say that it is free but influenced by our motives is a contradiction."

No it isn't. An act of free will is an act one could have chosen or chosen not in the circumstances. Free will as meant by its proponents here is not freedom from identity, such as with Sartre. The sense of free will meant here is well captured by Yves Simon when he writes.

In the language of moral psychology, indetermination is termed irresolution or perplexity. To apprehend the true relation of freedom to causality, it is helpful to ask this simple question: "where do we find the most unmistakable examples of whatever we call freedom, free choice, free will, liberty?" Do we find these distinguished examples in perplexed, irresolute, weak-willed and highly suggestible people? Or should we consider as the most certain exemplifications of the free man persons in firm control of their images and emotions, persons who know what they want and who will not be deterred from their goals by accidents of imagination or affectivity, pressure or lure, disease or poverty; persons who, at the summit of human energy, hold that death itself is an accident which cannot affect their relation to the really important ends of human life? (Freedom of Choice, 1969)

Post 87

Friday, March 16, 2007 - 7:47am

In post #86 Stephen hits the important issue from Bill's post #85. Quoting the important line again, Bill writes:

> If the will is truly free, then it is free of any influences.

This is the crux of the problem and is the reason why we can never come to a meeting of the minds on this issue. Bill, you have defined free will as a capacity to act (think) outside of all influences. Therefore, for "free will" to exist for you, it would have to operate outside of existence (a contradiction in itself) for as soon as "free will" was "aware" of anything, including itself, it would be "influenced" and would immediately become "constrained" by that awareness and thus "determined". If you are being consistent, then you should be arguing that humans are not just determined by their values - they are determined by their sensations, since these are the source of all awareness of one's relationship to the world and are the ultimate source of all influences.

As Stephen points out, this is not what others of us mean by free will. So, unless we can first arrive at a mutually agreed definition of what free will is, there is no point in dissecting the remainder of the arguments.

Back in post #72, Ed Thompson gave a simple concrete example of a person's ability to make snap decisions (pun intended) in real time.

To summarize, it is my position that humans have the capacity to ponder, decide upon and set self-generated goals and that they similarly have the capacity to make decisions with regard to these goals which ultimately result in actions. I agree that this process is not done in a vacuum, but takes place in the context of an awareness of many aspects of a complex external world and an awareness of one's own nature including one's inner state (knowledge, beliefs, desires, values, emotions, etc.). I believe that, as Rand pointed out, we have the ability to raise or lower our level of focus and the higher we raise it, the more consciously aware we become of these many factors which we can then use as influences to help in these decision-making processes. I also believe, based upon a lifetime of experiences, that we have the capacity to think consciously about each of these influences and make a decision as to if and how we will factor it into our final decision. This is the process of free will. I agree that no decision can be made free of influences. But, to the degree that we choose to focus, we control what and how we are influenced.

Regards,
--
Jeff

(Edited by C. Jeffery Small
on 3/16, 7:50am)

Post 88

Saturday, March 17, 2007 - 10:30am

I have more I would like to say on this topic, but am in the midst of some personal matters which I explain on the Witch-Doctor thread.

Ted Keer

Post 89

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 12:44am

Gentlemen,

You say that our will is free, but is nevertheless influenced by other factors. I have two comments:

First, a quote from Galt's speech, which I believe supports my position:

Do not hide behind the cowardly evasion that man is born with free will but with a "tendency" to evil. A free will saddled with a tendency is like a game with loaded dice. It forces man to struggle through the effort of playing, to bear responsibility and pay for the game, but the decision is weighted in favor of a tendency that he had no power to escape. If the tendency is . . . not of his choice, his will is not free.

Just substitute "influence" for "tendency" in this passage, and you get the same result.

My second comment is this: Suppose I am faced with two alternatives, A and B, and choose A. You would say that I was "influenced" to choose A instead of B but that I could nevertheless have chosen B. Suppose I choose B. You would then say that I was influenced to choose B instead of A but that I could nevertheless have chosen A, correct?

But what sense does it make to say that I was "influenced" to choose A instead of B and simultaneously B instead of A? Isn't that a contradiction? If I am influenced to choose one alternative over the other, then I cannot be influenced to choose the other over the first, in which case, it follows that whichever one I choose, I am determined to choose it -- determined by the factors influencing my choice.

- Bill

Post 90

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 4:10am

Bill,

What a great response! It really highlights what it is that you mean here. Still, my argument (in post 82), says something that side-steps this criticism of yours. It says that current "influences" don't matter to the discussion of the freedom of the will. It says that "will freedom" is something to be viewed, not in any momentary decision (with a momentary, and frozen, value-hierarchy), but over a lifetime of ever-changing value-hierarchies.

Our intended changes in our own value hierarchies, ARE our free will in operation. Or, as I said, our hierarchies are simply things that "change themselves." It is one or the other.

Ed

Post 91

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 12:13pm

In post #89, Bill quotes Ayn Rand:

> If the tendency is ... not of his choice, his will is not free.

Bill, I think your quote is quite provocative, but the last sentence, which I quote above, is the key to the issue. The point I was making in my last two posts is that the influences which I speak of are within the choice of the individual. In her passage, Rand is talking about the concept of "original sin" when she speaks of the unchosen "tendency" to evil. She is rejecting the notion that there is any sort of innate influence or tendency within man's nature; there is no cognitive "biological imperative" which is outside of mans control - at least potentially, so long as he is willing to focus and think. Rand is NOT arguing against free will here. Just the opposite. She is defending it from the exact type of error you are making of assuming that there are cognitive tendencies or influences that are outside of man's control.

> But what sense does it make to say that I was "influenced" to choose A instead of B and simultaneously B instead of A? Isn't that a contradiction?

In your second comment you are still puzzled by the idea that a person can make a free choice between A and B. There is no contradiction in choosing A over B or choosing B over A, because there is no "simultaneity" in those two different choices. An individual weighs all the evidence at hand, and makes a choice which is often the result of a very complex analysis of many things including their goals. The problem you seem to have is that people do, ultimately, make a choice! As I said before, your "definition" of free will places it outside existence. An implication of this is that for you, free will precludes the ability to make any decision (i.e., a choice). So if I do make a decision, it has to be determined, simply by definition, without need for any further reference to facts of reality.

If you want to say that the results of our mental processes are determined by the factors weighing into it, well go ahead and say that. But this is not what anyone else means by the term "determined". I will grant you that the fine details of the mechanism for the emergent property we call "free will" or "free choice" are not fully understood and require much additional study, and I'm as interested as the next person in knowing what these are. But that lack of ultimate understanding doesn't stop us from going ahead and making decisions all the time, any more than an ignorance of basic biology stopped our ancestors from thinking or walking. I make a constant stream of decisions that direct my behavior and I have the self-awareness to be able to observe my mental process in service of those decisions. Right now I can either snap my fingers (A) or not snap them (B). As I contemplate the choice I can freely decide what I will allow to influence my decision. Will it be the desire to see if I can actually do it? Will it be a random roll of the dice? Will it be to make a point about free will? I get to decide what will influence my decision. I'm free to decide, and then yes, after snapping my fingers (or not) my decision will actually have been determined by the factors that led to the choice I make. But there was no "tendency" or "influence" in the decision-making process that could not be controlled by me. So long as I was willing to focus on and contemplate it, I have the ability to freely decide how I will allow each influence to affect the outcome.
--
Jeff

Post 92

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 12:18pm

Bill Dwyer,

Try this example instead. Suppose there are 4 choices. B is good, and A is slightly better. C is bad. D is worse than C.

Galt's "tendency to choose evil" would be to choose C or D. There remains the choice between A and B. You could surely be influenced to choose B, but you choose A because it's better.

You wrote:

But what sense does it make to say that I was "influenced" to choose A instead of B and simultaneously B instead of A? Isn't that a contradiction?

No, not in the 4 choices above.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 3/18, 12:20pm)

Post 93

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 8:16pm

Ed, you wrote,

What a great response! It really highlights what it is that you mean here.
Thanks, Ed!
Still, my argument (in post 82), says something that side-steps this criticism of yours. It says that current "influences" don't matter to the discussion of the freedom of the will. It says that "will freedom" is something to be viewed, not in any momentary decision (with a momentary, and frozen, value-hierarchy), but over a lifetime of ever-changing value-hierarchies.

Ed, I haven't replied to your other posts on this topic, because I didn't understand them. I'm having the same problem with your current post.

Our intended changes in our own value hierarchies, ARE our free will in operation.

But don't these changes take place because the moral agent values them? For example, suppose I value religious observance, but later discover that my belief in God is false. As a result of my discovery, I no longer value religious observance, but only because I valued the truth to begin with, a value which led me to give up my religious values.

Citing the last sentence from my Rand quote -- "If the tendency is ... not of his choice, his will is not free." -- Jeff replied,

Bill, I think your quote is quite provocative, but the last sentence, which I quote above, is the key to the issue. The point I was making in my last two posts is that the influences which I speak of are within the choice of the individual. In her passage, Rand is talking about the concept of "original sin" when she speaks of the unchosen "tendency" to evil. She is rejecting the notion that there is any sort of innate influence or tendency within man's nature; there is no cognitive "biological imperative" which is outside of mans control - at least potentially, so long as he is willing to focus and think. Rand is NOT arguing against free will here.
I know that. I just thought that her remarks lent a kind of unintentional support to my argument.
Just the opposite. She is defending it from the exact type of error you are making of assuming that there are cognitive tendencies or influences that are outside of man's control.

But I thought you were agreeing with me that our choices depend on antecedent influences, not that the antecedent influences depend on our choices. For if our choices depend on antecedent influences, then the influences cannot themselves be a product of our choices. Since there must be a reason for making the choice, every choice depends on factors that influence it. And since these influences motivate the choice, they can be said to determine it.

I wrote, "But what sense does it make to say that I was 'influenced' to choose A instead of B and simultaneously B instead of A? Isn't that a contradiction?" Jeff replied,

In your second comment you are still puzzled by the idea that a person can make a free choice between A and B. There is no contradiction in choosing A over B or choosing B over A, because there is no "simultaneity" in those two different choices. An individual weighs all the evidence at hand, and makes a choice which is often the result of a very complex analysis of many things including their goals.

True, but the choice he makes is the necessary result of his evaluation of the evidence. His evaluation determines the choice.

The problem you seem to have is that people do, ultimately, make a choice! As I said before, your "definition" of free will places it outside existence. An implication of this is that for you, free will precludes the ability to make any decision (i.e., a choice). So if I do make a decision, it has to be determined, simply by definition, without need for any further reference to facts of reality.

But it is by reference to the facts of reality that I arrive at the view that a choice is determined by one's values. Since human beings are goal directed, they must make their choices for the sake of an end or goal, which is the value they are seeking to gain or keep.

If you want to say that the results of our mental processes are determined by the factors weighing into it, well go ahead and say that. But this is not what anyone else means by the term "determined".

It is, if the person is an advocate of soft-determinism or compatibilism, for those mental processes are, in turn, determined by the antecedent values that motive them.

I make a constant stream of decisions that direct my behavior and I have the self-awareness to be able to observe my mental process in service of those decisions. Right now I can either snap my fingers (A) or not snap them (B).

You can snap your fingers only if you see a purpose in doing so, e.g., to demonstrate your ability to do so. But if you saw no purpose in such an action, you could not perform it.

As I contemplate the choice I can freely decide what I will allow to influence my decision.

Then what influences your decision to allow something to influence your decision? Ultimately, there must be an influence that is independent of your will; otherwise, you would be making a choice with nothing influencing it -- without any reason for the choice. Nor does it make sense to say that you "choose" your influences. An influence is something that operates independently of your choice -- something which "influences" the choice itself.

Merlin (the Magician) asks me to:

Try this example instead. Suppose there are 4 choices. B is good, and A is slightly better. C is bad. D is worse than C.

Galt's "tendency to choose evil" would be to choose C or D. There remains the choice between A and B. You could surely be influenced to choose B, but you choose A because it's better.

How could I be influenced to choose B (over any of the other choices), if I chose A instead? If I chose A, wouldn't I have been influenced to choose A instead of B, C or D?

Moreover, what sense does it make to say that I was influenced to choose B if I didn't choose B to begin with? For example, I can say, "Your choice to go to college was influenced by your parents willingness to pay your tuition." But suppose that you chose not to go to college. Could I still say that your choice to go to college was influenced by your parents willingness to pay your tuition? No, because you didn't choose to go to college.

I wrote, "But what sense does it make to say that I was 'influenced' to choose A instead of B and simultaneously B instead of A? Isn't that a contradiction?" Merlin replied,

No, not in the 4 choices above.

But in the choices listed above, I would have been influenced -- or motivated-- to choose A over the other three choices if I viewed it as the best of the four choices and actually chose it. In that case, I could not simultaneously have had a motive to choose any of the other three choices in preference to it. In the statement you quoted, B was simply a stand-in for any other choice. Perhaps, instead of B, I should have said non-A. Viz., what sense does it make to say that I was 'influenced' to choose A instead of non-A and simultaneously non-A instead of A? Isn't that a contradiction? I'd say it is.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/18, 8:18pm)

Post 94

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 10:26pm

Bill:

I'm afraid I've run out of things to say on the subject. I appreciate your considered responses to my points, but I don't see any new arguments being offered in post #93 than I haven't seen in previous posts and I just don't know how else to tackle this topic. It appears that we will both have to remain unconvinced of each other's position. I guess it is clear that that outcome was predetermined. :-)

Regards,
--
Jeff
(Edited by C. Jeffery Small
on 3/18, 10:28pm)

Post 95

Sunday, March 18, 2007 - 11:24pm

Bill Dwyer wrote:

How could I be influenced to choose B (over any of the other choices), if I chose A instead? If I chose A, wouldn't I have been influenced to choose A instead of B, C or D?

I think you confound "influence" with "choose." All options considered influence a decision. Just because an option is not chosen does not mean it had no influence. Rankings are relative.

Moreover, what sense does it make to say that I was influenced to choose B if I didn't choose B to begin with? For example, I can say, "Your choice to go to college was influenced by your parents willingness to pay your tuition." But suppose that you chose not to go to college. Could I still say that your choice to go to college was influenced by your parents willingness to pay your tuition? No, because you didn't choose to go to college.

I wouldn't say you were "influenced to choose B." I would say the conditions of B influenced your choice. If P chooses not to go to college, then clearly P's parents willingness to pay P's tuition was not enough to get P to go. But I'd say the willingness probably influenced P's decision-making process, making going to college more attractive and making it harder to choose not to.

Many options we face have multiple aspects, some favorable and some not, and both in degrees. Does that mean that whenever option A is chosen the favorable aspects of A were influential but the unfavorable ones were not? It seems your position implies 'yes.' Does that mean that whenever option B is rejected the favorable aspects of B were not influential but the unfavorable ones were?

Post 96

Monday, March 19, 2007 - 7:33am

I think the issue of free will is one of the most misunderstood concepts amongst Objectivists.

It's crucial to understand that Objectivism's view of free will is unprecedented in philosophy. This is because O'ism views the issue as essentially metaphysical and epistemic--NOT ethical. Free will in O'ism refers to the ability to focus one's mind or not (ie, to choose to grasp facts of reality, regardless of one's wishes, rather than to avoid them or to pretend they're something else that justifies one's whims, aka rationalization). This is what distinguishes humans from lower animals, which instinctively grasp facts of reality (though not conceptually) and act to promote their own lives.

Though AR recognized that people face different incentives about whether or not to focus their minds--particularly in childhood--the ability to use one's mind to grasp objective facts or to evade them is STILL one's own. No one forces another person to NOT identify reality. Of course, there are sometimes social or legal penalities for acting according to one's knowledge.

Once a person has accepted certain beliefs and values, however, that person MUST act accordingly (until that person changes those beliefs and values). A person's actions always reveal what his highest values are, according to O'ism.

Nothing I've said in this post should be shocking to O'ists; it's a basic part of the philosophy. While AR didn't write a lengthy treatise on free will, she did write enough about it to understand how her essential view fits into her overall system.

Harry Binswanger also addressed the issue in his series in The Objectivist on the six pivotal breakthroughs of Objectivism.

(Edited by Jon Trager on 3/19, 9:54am)

Post 97

Monday, March 19, 2007 - 9:34am

Jon Trager writes:

> Once a person has accepted certain beliefs and values, however, that person MUST act accordingly ...

So Jon, you are saying that once a person has a belief or value, they CAN NOT act in opposition to that value (unless they later change it). Therefore, if I decide that it is my highest value that I bring the maximum level of focus to bear at all times in my life, then I CAN NOT just be lazy or sloppy and lower my level of focus at certain times and just "wing it", thereby acting against my value in a particular instance? Or is that, in and of itself, just proof that I actually value "winging it" more highly than I do staying in mental focus? I guess that is so because you say:

> A person's actions always reveal what his highest values are, according to O'ism.

So you are saying that Rand agrees with Bill's compatibilist view of determinism. Can you point me to some specific passages that support this? Do other people following this discussion agree with this?

I agree with you that Objectivism views the issue of determinism in metaphysical and epistemological terms, but I assert that when Rand spoke of people's actions revealing their highest values, she was speaking about a very broad moral principal that spoke to the connection between values and actions in general. She was not making a metaphysical statement about how men's minds work and how that working relates to values. I believe that her position was that men did have free will in the metaphysical sense that they were ultimately the prime mover of their inner process to focus and therefore to think. This is also my position.

I also object to all of these examples that simply assert that a person's actions, in every instance, are proof of that person's underlying values. This is circular reasoning. You cannot first hypothesize that all of our actions are determined by our values and then turn around and say that each action is clear proof of the driving underlying value. You must demonstrate the connection between the value and the action in some other way in order to build a case for your position.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 98

Monday, March 19, 2007 - 9:48am

Hear, Hear!!

Monday, March 19, 2007 - 10:54am