RoR: Forum

Referring to different senses of "value," Joe Rowlands writes,

The last meaning is the general "that which you act to gain and or keep". What needs to be understood here is that this is descriptive only. It's not suggesting anything about why you choose that action. It just says that you have. Therefore, you must "value it". But don't confuse that use of the term with either of the previous two uses. The only thing it conveys is that you chose it, for whatever reason. It doesn't imply you really think it's the best choice for your rational self-interest. It doesn't mean that you desire it emotionally. It just says you chose it. In fact, I think using the phrase "you value it" is deceptive in this case, and should be avoided.

So, you're saying that Rand was remiss in defining "value" as "that which one acts to gain or keep." Perhaps she was, given her view of free will, but I think her definition of "value" is right on.

In fact, if that which one acts to gain or keep is not something one values (i.e., considers worth pursuing), then there is no reason to call it a "value." A "value" is not simply descriptive in the sense that you're implying; it doesn't simply tell you what action you took; it tells you what action you considered worth taking; in that sense, it is not simply descriptive but prescriptive.

Every choice presupposes a "for what"? For what end or goal are you choosing the action? What is it that you are seeking to gain or keep? A chosen action is that which one acts to gain or keep only because it is that which one is seeking to gain or keep. It is a value, because it is goal-directed, not simply because it is an action that one happens to choose. A choice is a means to an end; if one didn't have an interest in the end or goal (if one didn't desire it in some sense), then one would have no reason to choose the means to its achievement. One does not make choices simply for the sake of making choices; one makes them for the sake of a value.

- Bill

Post 121

Thursday, March 22, 2007 - 10:42am

Question - how many nits fit on the head of a pin?
Answer - depends on how good ye are at seeing nits.

Post 122

Thursday, March 22, 2007 - 2:00pm

Jon, I understand the time constraint. I think your comments to me at least were too vague to understand. For instance, I pointed out three definitions of value. You haven't clarified which meaning you are using, or whether you have another meaning.

Bill, I don't know why you would suggest that I am in disagreement with Rand. "That which one acts to gain or keep" exactly matches my description. If there's a disagreement, it's with you and her. You seem to want to define it as "that which you consider worth acting to gain or keep". Her definition is purely descriptive.

The problem I see here is that the world "value" is being thrown around without sufficient meaning. You seem to be implying that it is something like my definition number 1 above, a reasoned evaluation of what you think is best for you. But to suggest that your reasoned evaluation forces you to act on it is an incredibly controversial argument. It flies in the face of countless examples of people evading what they know is the right thing to do because their emotions conflict.

You use the phrase "if one didn't desire it in some sense". But what sense? By keeping this general, you're not making a meaningful statement about causation. You are only pointing out that if you acted on it, then you chose to act on it. Since you're making a statement that your choices are caused by this alleged "value", I think you need to be crystal clear.

Post 123

Thursday, March 22, 2007 - 3:03pm

Joe: "Jon, I understand the time constraint. I think your comments to me at least were too vague to understand. For instance, I pointed out three definitions of value. You haven't clarified which meaning you are using, or whether you have another meaning."

I've tried to be clear and concise, but I'll try harder here. As a noun (which I think is the case in question here), "value" is a concept meaning that which one acts to gain/keep, as Ayn Rand said. It refers to anything that a person wants enough (relative to the other things in his own value system) to cause action. This thing could be material or spiritual. It's whatever object one wants to attain or maintain in one's possession.

To concretize, imagine a woman who continues to spend much of her time with an abusive boyfriend. She obviously considers him a high value, as well as whatever spiritual results (feeling victimized, humiliated, etc.) she's getting from him. This is irrational, of course. But she will continue to see him unless she changes his value status in her value system. And no one else can do that for her.

As a verb, "value" is a concept meaning to rate as worth acting to gain/keep. Using the above example, one would say the woman values her abusive boyfriend and whatever she's getting from him--she considers him worth acting to gain/keep.

That's as clear as I can be.

(Edited by Jon Trager on 3/23, 11:00am)

Post 124

Thursday, March 22, 2007 - 4:18pm

Value-hierarchies never remain frozen (except perhaps in sub-human animals, and sub-sentient plants). They're dynamic rather than static. When they change in humans, who's responsible for that (who "caused" the changes)?

Are individuals responsible for what it is that they act to gain or keep?

Ed

[and, if that's not enough (if an answer to that question is not conclusive to this discussion), then what about the changes in the direction or intensity of one's focus (on their value hierarchy) -- like Joe mentions?]

Post 125

Friday, March 23, 2007 - 10:30am

These last few posts have been illuminating. It appears to me that each of us is focusing on a slightly different area of this topic, so our comments to one other don't necessarily end up addressing the point that the other person was making. I'm sure I'm as guilty of this as anyone and I apologize if it sometimes seems as though I missed or ignored your points. Let me summarize a few observations here.

In my case, my primary focus has been on examining the issue of agency between values and actions that I believed Bill was arguing. Everything I have written so far has been directed at trying to identify exactly what these "values" are and then examining whether they can exert some sort of control - specifically, a necessitation control - over our actions. My conclusion was that metaphysically, values reside in our mind as one specie of high-level concepts, and as such, I can not see how they could exercise direct control over our actions any more than other types of concepts. Therefore, I reject the idea of "soft" or "combatibilistic" determinism and remain a believer that all of our actions are within the direct control of our free will. I do agree that our values inform our goals and that our goals (which are another specie of concepts) contain a plan of action for achieving values. I believe that once these goals are formulated, they do motivate us, acting as a guide for our actions. But, despite having values and goals, it still remains an act of free will to actually initiate any specific action. A rational person generally does act in accordance with their values and goals so it may appear as though those value and goals "determine" the actions, but I think that there is plenty of real-world evidence of irrational action to dispel any suggestion that actions are necessitated by values and goals.

Jon is arguing that we have free will to choose our personal values; that this process is originated by us and is therefore not "determined" in any mechanistic sense. I agree. He then seems to be saying that once our values are selected, chosen, or decided upon, they then do determine our subsequent actions from which we can not deviate until we alter our values. I'm not sure if this is a position with which Bill would agree with fully or not. Later, in response to Joe, Jon states:

> [A] "value" is a concept meaning that which one acts to gain/keep, as Ayn Rand said. It's the thing that
> a person wants enough (relative to the other things in his own value system) to cause action."

Here, Jon is agreeing with me that a value is a concept. He then goes on to define it as a concept desirable enough to cause a person to act. I think Jon is focusing on a different concern then I am which is OK, but with regard to my quest to explore the agency connection between values and actions, I am not satisfied with this. First of all, the definition simply asserts that values cause actions. Therefore, no argument is possible because action proves value and inaction disproves it, QED. Secondly, nowhere in this definition is an explanation of how the value concept initiates, let alone compels ones actions.

Joe and Ed seems to be addressing another problem I am having with the use of "value" or "value hierarchy" in these discussions. Please correct me if I am wrong here, but in all of the examples Bill and Jon offer regarding the connection between value and action, the only way we ever discover with any certainty just what an individual values most highly is by way of their actions. As soon as they act in service of some goal, that goal then becomes, by definition, that individual's highest value (within their context of the moment).

Some of us are arguing that right up until the moment of action, we can exercise complete free will and change our minds about what we wish to do (we can snap our fingers or not snap our fingers, etc.). I think Jon agrees with this but I'm not really sure where Bill stands, as I'm unclear about how his soft determinism actually gets applied to the steps in the thinking/acting process and whether he believes that we have true free will anywhere in that chain. In either case, as soon as some action is initiated, by Bill's and Jon's (and they say Rand's) definition, that action was necessitated by some specific value. Well, in one sense, I'm willing to concede that for a normal, rational, conscious, human mind, most actions do have some goal associated with each action, and in this sense those actions are indeed dependent upon (i.e., influenced by) those goals. But that relationship exists because the individual freely chose to act in service of the goal (and its underlying values) and not because the existence of the goal inside someone's mind acquired a power to necessitate the action. So, I'm saying that for a rational mind, it is an act of free will which focuses on a particular goal out of many alternatives, and it is another act of free will to decide to act in service of that goal and at any time we can choose to not act, stop acting or switch our actions to another goal and abandon the previous one. Now, I don't think that either Bill or Jon is denying that we can and do act in these ways, I believe that they would simply argue that in order to change direction, a different goal (and its values) would have to first be selected. Again, I don't disagree with that; its just acknowledging that our actions are not utterly random but have a purpose - the achievement of some goal.

If this is all that is meant by "compatibilism" or "soft determinism", then I do not disagree with it. But I think more is implied. Bill has offered examples where he says that an individual who believes in a certain set of principles has "no reason" to vote for a political candidate with contrary views and is therefore necessitated by his values to vote in a particular way. I disagree. I suggest that an individual can introspect on their values, can come to know them with clarity and accuracy, and then make a conscious choice to act in contradiction to them, thus proving that none of their values necessitated their action. I'm pretty sure Bill would respond that the desire to act contrary to all of ones values had then, in fact, become that person's new highest value and was what was actually responsible for and necessitated that action. If that indeed is the argument, then I say that this is a reductio ad absurdum which tells us nothing and is self-fulfilling, since no action can escape from in its circular logic. Rational people act in service of their goals and this is what connects values to actions, but people can also lower their level of consciousness to such a degree that their actions can be divorced from reason and their values.

Rand did define value as "that which one acts to gain or keep". In a moral context this is a wonderful formulation as it distinguishes between thoughts in ones head that lie dormant and have the same moral efficacy as wishes, from those that are acted upon and thereby have the possibility of producing actual measurable benefits. But I assert again that Rand did not intend this definition to extend to the metaphysical realm and be any sort of comment on the issue of free will.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 126

Sunday, March 25, 2007 - 11:03pm

Jeff wrote,

Bill has offered examples where he says that an individual who believes in a certain set of principles has "no reason" to vote for a political candidate with contrary views and is therefore necessitated by his values to vote in a particular way. I disagree. I suggest that an individual can introspect on their values, can come to know them with clarity and accuracy, and then make a conscious choice to act in contradiction to them, thus proving that none of their values necessitated their action.

I don't see how he could do that. If those really are his values, then he cannot act in contradiction to them. I could no more vote for a communist in preference to an advocate of limited government, then I could shoot my best friend in the back. Such actions are not psychologically possible, because there is nothing motivating them.

I'm pretty sure Bill would respond that the desire to act contrary to all of ones values had then, in fact, become that person's new highest value and was what was actually responsible for and necessitated that action.

Well, I'd argue that one cannot desire to act contrary to all of one's values. If one desires to do something, then it is not contrary to all of one's values.

If that indeed is the argument, then I say that this is a reductio ad absurdum which tells us nothing and is self-fulfilling, since no action can escape from in its circular logic. Rational people act in service of their goals and this is what connects values to actions, but people can also lower their level of consciousness to such a degree that their actions can be divorced from reason and their values.

Even assuming that I could, as you say, "lower the level of my consciousness to such a degree" that I would vote for a communist in preference to an advocate of limited government (something which I would deny is possible), the choices I made under those circumstances would still reflect my value judgments, which in that case would include electing a communist. But, again, common sense should tell you that that kind of intellectual switch is not psychologically possible.

- Bill

Post 127

Monday, March 26, 2007 - 12:18am

Bill:

You keep repeating the same view over and over. I do believe that I understand what you are saying, but simply repeating it doesn't do anything to convince me further of your position. It would be very illuminating if you would define what you think values are in a metaphysical sense (I have said that they are concepts) and discuss how you think they end up able to necessitate our actions simply by coming into existence. I'm not looking for some sort of neurological explanation. I just want some clearer idea of what you mean in a different context so that we can examine it from a new angle. I honestly ask this of you because I really do not know what you think a value actually is? If you repeat the definition that it is "something that one acts to gain or keep", then what I'm asking is for you to define that "something" in general terms. Not the object of the value - but the "value" as a thing within us.

Thanks.
--
Jeff
(Edited by C. Jeffery Small
on 3/26, 2:11am)

Post 128

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 11:57pm

Jeffrey,

I don't know how else to put it, except to say that a value is something you want to acquire or preserve for whatever reason; it's what you're sufficiently interested in to pursue. I'll probably get the same answer -- that this isn't what your asking for -- but I don't know what else to say.

- Bill

Post 129

Thursday, March 29, 2007 - 1:14am

Bill:

Let's try it another way.

Do you think that all human action is determined by our values? Are we able to initiate any sort of action that is not directed by our values or is there an underlying value for every action?

If you answer that all actions are value determined, does this include motor functions such as our heart beating or blinking? Are all of the actions of all other animals also value determined? How about single-celled organisms or plants?

If you answer that not all actions are value determined, then where is the dividing line between those actions that are and those that are not?

Answering this question might help me better understand what you mean.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 130

Saturday, March 31, 2007 - 12:19pm

Rand's meaning of 'value' was more than the simple sentence ascribed as her 'definition.' If one means it as distinct from any random motivational 'want/desire', and, that it is a hierarchical 'program' set determining a rational action, please re-read what Rand wrote in Galt's speech (where the sentence/'def' came from) which follows this supposed 1-sentence 'definition.'

LLAP
J:D

Post 131

Saturday, March 31, 2007 - 4:31pm

Ed: "Are individuals responsible for what it is that they act to gain or keep?"

Of course. They're responsible because they've chosen to value whatever they're acting to gain or keep. If what they value is irrational, which you can observe by measuring their actions against a rational standard of value, they can be blamed for that (proportionally).

For example, imagine someone who pays money to phone psychic Madam Cleo because she wants serious advice about her life. That person can be blamed for valuing something irrational, which is what caused her to call and pay money.

Jeffrey: "If you answer that all actions are value determined, does this include motor functions such as our heart beating or blinking?"

Jeff, you can't be serious about this question. Ayn Rand already addressed it in "Introducing the Objectivist Ethics." Obviously, your heart beating is an automatic bodily function. But whether or not you take care of your heart through your diet and exercise routine is determined by the placement of your heart in your value system (a placement YOU'VE chosen).

I think this discussion has run its course. I'd advise anyone whose still confused about this issue to re-read "Introducing the Objectivist Ethics" as well as any of Harry Binswanger's writings on the theory of free will in Objectivism.

Post 132

Saturday, March 31, 2007 - 7:04pm

Jon Trager wrote:

> Jeff, you can't be serious about this question. Ayn Rand already addressed it in "Introducing the Objectivist
> Ethics." Obviously, your heart beating is an automatic bodily function. But whether or not you take care of your
> heart through your diet and exercise routine is determined by the placement of your heart in your value system
> (a placement YOU'VE chosen).

Jon:

My question was addressed to Bill but I would be very interested in your detailed answer as well since you also think that free will applies to value acquisition but that actions are then necessitated by these values. From Bill, I did not get a satisfactory understanding of what he considers to be a value in metaphysical terms from his post #128, so I though it would be enlightening to approach the topic from the other direction and see how he (or you or anyone who cases to comment) sees things from the action side of the equation. My question is completely serious. I am interested in understanding where the dividing line is in determining which actions can be ascribed to being determined by values and which ones (if any) are not necessitated in such a manner. If that can be made clear, then I think I might gain a deeper insight into what is actually meant by values determining actions.

I do want to make it clear that I am not trying to be intentionally obtuse here. I am really trying to understand what is meant by the suggestion that action are being determined by values, by reducing this proposition down to something that I can grasp, so I appreciate the effort you, Bill and others make in an attempt to enlighten me. If there are some actions (conscious, subconscious, involuntary) that are not determined by values and others that are, a comparison of the two categories would be extremely interesting.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 133

Saturday, March 31, 2007 - 7:41pm

Jeffrey, I think your posts are generally intelligent, well written, and sincere. But Bill and I have attempted multiple times to explain, essentially, the Objectivist position here and to answer questions. I've also pointed to where else you can look if you're really interested in the topic.

The key, as I've said before and will say again, is to grasp what Ayn Rand's definition of "free will" is.

She defined free will as "man's ability to chose either to perceive reality or to evade it," which is the choice that creates one's knowledge and value system (values being those things, material or spiritual, that an individual has decided are worth acting to gain or keep). If you want to look that up yourself, it's not difficult to find.

Ayn Rand did NOT define free will as "man's ability to chose among alternative actions, either in accordance with or in contradiction to one's values." That may be how modern philosophers frame the issue, but that's not Objectivism.

And that's why I stated when I started posting on this thread that I think this issue is one of the most misunderstood amongst self-identified Objectivists.

Post 134

Saturday, March 31, 2007 - 11:42pm

Jeff, you wrote,

Let's try it another way.

Do you think that all human action is determined by our values? Are we able to initiate any sort of action that is not directed by our values or is there an underlying value for every action?

If you answer that all actions are value determined, does this include motor functions such as our heart beating or blinking? Are all of the actions of all other animals also value determined? How about single-celled organisms or plants?

Jeff, I thought we were talking about actions that one chooses. It is my position that a chosen action is determined by a value judgment -- that our value judgments determine our choices.

However, if you want to broaden the discussion, then I would also say that the conscious actions of the lower animals are also value determined; they act to get what they want, just as human beings do.

And, according to Rand, there is an even broader sense in which all living organisms pursue values, inasmuch as their actions are goal-directed, the goal being the preservation of their lives.

Bill

Post 135

Sunday, April 1, 2007 - 12:59am

Bill wrote:

> Jeff, I thought we were talking about actions that one chooses. It is my position that a chosen action is
> determined by a value judgment -- that our value judgments determine our choices.

Bill:

I appreciate the response, but the more we talk the more confused I become. You write here about "chosen action" and "value judgments determine our choices" in the same sentence. This is the circular logic of which I have been referring. Your use of the word "chosen" is apparently not anything like what I think the word means.

From the Merriam-Websters On-line dictionary, in the context of this discussion I think the appropriate definition is:

1a: to select freely and after consideration

As you can see, the act of free will is built into the definition. Either our actions are chosen or they are determined, but they can't be both. I'm not really trying to pick apart your argument on semantic or linguistic grounds. It is just that I am not getting any new insights into the issue from that statement.

We have three positions coming out of this discussion which I will hopefully articulate here without misrepresenting anyone.

1: I assert that man has free will which extends to his actions. His values are a component of his goals which are a guide to choosing specific actions, but regardless of the values and goals he sets for himself, right up until the moment of the action itself, men retain the free will to allow themselves to be influenced by any value, goal, thought, whim or outside influence that they choose - or abdicating the responsibility of rationally and consciously choosing - that they allow. Yes, there is always some influence that propels men to act, and while for rational people it most often can be traced back to their values, it does not have to necessarily be so (assuming we define values in some concrete terms and not in some nebulous circular way).

2: Jon's position is that men exercise free will in choosing their values and goals, but that is the extent of the applicability of free will. Once a value is chosen, it then determines ineluctably the action that must be taken and no deviation from that course can be made without first choosing to change one's underlying value.

3: For Bill, it is turtles all the way down! Free will does not enter the equation. Our values determine our actions, but our circumstances determine our values.

I'm willing to leave it there and let others decide which position makes the most sense to them. I will say that, despite Jon's statement in post #133, I do not agree that his and Bill's views accurately reflect the Objectivist position on this topic of free will. As we have discussed throughout this thread, I believe that they are applying Rand's formulation of value inappropriately, taking it from its ethical context into the realm of metaphysics where I believe it was not intended.

In any event, I thank Tibor, Bill, Jon and everyone else who participated here. I have found this a very stimulating discussion that has caused me to think more deeply about the subject than I had ever done before.

Best to all.
--
Jeff

Post 136

Sunday, April 1, 2007 - 9:10am

Jeffrey: "I will say that, despite Jon's statement in post #133, I do not agree that his and Bill's views accurately reflect the Objectivist position on this topic of free will."

From Atlas Shrugged, pp. 943-944:

"THAT WHICH YOU CALL YOUR FREE WILL IS YOUR MIND'S FREEDOM TO THINK OR NOT, THE *ONLY* WILL YOU HAVE, YOUR *ONLY* FREEDOM, THE CHOICE THAT *CONTROLS* ALL THE CHOICES YOU MAKE AND *DETERMINES* YOUR LIFE AND CHARACTER."

I'll leave it to honest readers to decide who's espousing the view consistent with Ayn Rand's statement here.

And the honest people who have stated a different viewpoint on this thread can either reconsider or accept that, for whatever reason, they can't bring themselves to agree with the Objectivist position on this issue.

I'm very glad for this discussion. It's helped me to clarify in my mind the underlying reason for some of the major disagreements amongst self-identified Objectivists today. So I'd also like to thank Tibor, Joe, Ed, and anyone else who participated.

Post 137

Monday, April 2, 2007 - 9:31pm

Sorry to pop in again when the conversation looks to be about over. The computer I usually use for reading and posting on RoR is broken right now, so my opportunities are a little more limited.

I brought up three different definitions for value in the hopes of trying to get a better understanding of what people are suggesting. I think in his own way, Jeff has been trying to do the same thing.

The first two definitions I used were the two I thought might used when people are saying we have to act according to our values. One is a conceptual identification of what we should pursue. One is an emotional impulse. My problem with either of these two is that both are possible motivations, and neither sufficiently explains people's behaviors. In other words, it's possible for someone to act on their emotions, ignoring their better judgment. And it's also possible to go with their better judgment, disregarding their emotions.

Notice that this is perfectly compatible with Jon's quotes from Rand, and the Objectivist version of free will in general. Free will is the ability to focus or not. We can choose to focus on the expected results of our actions, or we can evade them and act on our desires or whims. I think this can be phrased in another way. We can choose to keep our rational evaluations in focus and act upon them, or we can ignore our value system and choose to act against it.

I brought up the third definition because it is purely descriptive, and not explanatory. It simply defines a value as that which we act to gain or keep, but doesn't identify in any way the motivation for choosing it. One problem I have in this discussion is hearing someone say that we must value it "in one way or another". If someone is going to say that we must act according to our values, they need to explain the nature of these values and why these force us to act accordingly. Why is this important? Because if you use this descriptive form of the word 'value' to define all actions as corresponding to a person's value system, then it is absolutely a no-brainer that we cannot act against our "value" system. It's true by definition.

But if you define a "value system" as a hierarchy of values, rationally measured to determine their positive contribution to your life, then it is certainly possible to violate them. Just because you think something is good for you doesn't mean you are going to act on it. Further, excusing the falsifying evidence by saying "well, he must not have really valued it" just makes it impossible to validate or invalidate the theory. Even then, I find it much more informative to say that he certainly could have sincerely believed it was the better choice, but chose to evade that knowledge. I think this last description is not only more consistent with Objectivism, but it is also a good explanation of what really happens.

If I understand Jeff's posts, I see him trying to get to the same idea that I'm trying to get at. If 'values' have some kind of controlling power, then we should be able to define the means by which they control our actions. If for instance we said they were desires, or wants, then we could understand that the theory of values controlling action is really a theory of emotions controlling actions. We could then argue the merits of that view. Similarly if we see values as our conscious evaluations of the merits of our possible choices, then we could understand that the theory is that we can't go against our best reasoning. And again, we could argue the merits. But without that kind of clarity, the statements are essentially meaningless.

Jon attempted to answer my question and to explain his use of value. He said "It refers to anything that a person wants enough (relative to the other things in his own value system) to cause action."[Emphasis mine]

Interestingly, the "wants" part seems to fit my definition based on emotions. Not that I think Jon is really suggesting that we must act according to our emotions. Instead, I think the ambiguity in the meaning of the term makes it difficult to try to show how it can cause actions.

I don't know if this post was helpful. I'm trying to show why at least I find the current definitions to be too vague and non-informative. I'm not looking for an example of a value, or a better definition. All of that would be useless until we can also get an understanding of what causal mechanism requires a human being to act according to the "value".

Post 138

Monday, April 2, 2007 - 11:34pm

Well put, Joe.

[Agreed]

;-)

Ed

Post 139

Tuesday, April 3, 2007 - 10:15am