Determinism and Free will

I've decided to move the discussion on determinism and free will from "The Argument from Intimidation" thread to this one, since the discussion no longer bears any resemblance to the original topic and is better suited to the Dissent forum. In Post 394 of that thread, Michael Moeller wrote (in reply to Roger Bissell), "How can I learn how to think, it has been determined from suckling as an infant!!!"

There seems to be some misunderstanding here. No determinist, myself included, would say that you learned to think (directly) from or by suckling as an infant, even though we would say that it was one event in a long chain of antecedent causes that eventually led to that result. I gave the suckling example only to illustrate one way in which an infant can act for the sake of a value. In any case, is it your point, Michael, that one cannot learn to think if one is determined to learn it--if the learning process is necessitated by antecedent causes? If so, I don't see the logic in your argument. Why can't learning to think be determined by antecedent causes?

You also write, "And since one's choices are determined, how are you able to pronounce 'moral crimes' on anybody? More food for thought."

More food for thought, indeed! So let's chew on this a bit. Yours is a common objection to determinism, but I think it's based on confusing determined (i.e., necessitated) behavior with compelled behavior. it is true that if you were compelled to take an action - if, for example, you were forced (like Patty Hearst) to rob a bank - you could not be held morally responsible for the action, because you didn't choose it - because it was not an expression of your moral values. But if you did it voluntarily, then you could be held morally responsible for it, even if your action were determined by your moral or political values.

Suppose, to cite another example, an Islamic militant who is plotting to bring down the "Great Satan" thinks he is doing God's work. Given his fanatical beliefs, he could not have chosen differently. Still, we'd be justified in arresting him for a terrorist conspiracy, because he knew what he was doing and would have followed through with his plans if allowed to do so.

In that respect, we do hold him responsible for his actions, even though we recognize that, given his beliefs and his religious indoctrination, he could not have acted otherwise. And we can still "blame" him for his actions, because all it means to blame someone for an evil action is to recognize that he chose it consciously and deliberately. The fact that he didn't think it was evil is irrelevant.

We don't blame or punish someone for an action that was involuntary or beyond his intentional control, because any such act would not be a reflection of his character. But this does not mean that if his choice were determined, it would not be a reflection of his character. On the contrary, only if his choice were determined by his character would that choice be a reflection of it and therefore deserving of blame and punishment.

If his choice were free, it would be free of any necessary connection to his character. But in that case, how could we justifiably blame or punish him? Since his choice would not proceed from his character, he could not be held responsible for it. Thus, far from determinism's being incompatible with moral responsibility, it is free will that is incompatible with it.

Moreover, if a criminal's choices were free of antecedent causes, it is difficult to see how punishment could be expected to affect his behavior, since his choices would then be free of any deterrent effect that the punishment could be expected to have. Punishment can thus be seen as more effective under a model of determinism than under a model of free will.

Upon deeper reflection, it appears that, despite its hallowed reputation, free will is a dangerous and subversive doctrine that could easily lead to absolving people of responsibility for their actions along with a refusal to blame or punish them for their crimes.

Comments?

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 11/14, 12:22pm)

Post 1

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 3:25pm

Hi Bill

Sorry, but I can't accept these arguments at all.

For starters, I think you are working from a flawed definition of free will. You write, "If his choice were free, it would be free of any necessary connection to his character." This is not right - if his choice were free it would still have some connection to his character, but it wouldn't have any *necessary* connection to his character. There is no such thing as a necessary choice. If it's truly necessary, its not a choice.

In your example, you write "Given his fanatical beliefs, he could not have chosen differently", which implies a necessary choice. But then you admit there is no such thing when you write "all it means to blame someone for an evil action is to recognize that he chose it consciously and deliberately".

If he could choose the action deliberately then the choice wasn't necessary and wasn't determined.

The statement that someone "could not have chosen differently" could only ever be true if the person was absolutely ignorant of all other alternatives. But that is never, ever true. Hence the statement is based on false premises.

Tim

Post 2

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 8:33pm

Hi Tim,

Thanks for your reply. I wasn't sure if anyone would be inclined to continue the discussion, since I thought that people might have gotten burned out on this issue. Anyway, you write,

"Hi Bill

"Sorry, but I can't accept these arguments at all.

"For starters, I think you are working from a flawed definition of free will. You write, 'If his choice were free, it would be free of any necessary connection to his character.' This is not right - if his choice were free it would still have some connection to his character, but it wouldn't have any *necessary* connection to his character."

Okay. Some connection but not a necessary connection. That's an interesting distinction. Do you mean that it must have some connection to his character? If so, then it does have a necessary connection to it, correct? Conversely, if it doesn't have a necessary connection to it, then it is not the case that it must have some connection to it. Is that your position?

You write, "There is no such thing as a necessary choice. If it's truly necessary, its not a choice."

Suppose I go into an ice cream parlour to buy an ice-cream cone and that I prefer vanilla over the other flavors. In that case, I must choose vanilla, because it is the only one I prefer. I cannot choose any of the other flavors, because I don't want any of the other flavors. Yet I can still be said to "choose" vanilla in preference to the alternatives. Or suppose I'm taking a multiple-choice test, and recognize one of the answers as right and the others as wrong. Since I have no interest in choosing the wrong answer, I must choose the answer that I recognize as right. My choice is necessary. Given my desire to pass the test, I cannot choose any of the other answers, but we would still say that I "chose" the right answer, wouldn't we?

You continue, "In your example, you write 'Given his fanatical beliefs, he could not have chosen differently', which implies a necessary choice. But then you admit there is no such thing when you write 'all it means to blame someone for an evil action is to recognize that he chose it consciously and deliberately'. If he could choose the action deliberately then the choice wasn't necessary and wasn't determined."

I disagree. I marked the right answer on the multiple-choice test consciously and deliberately, yet it was still a necessary choice, since I could not have chosen any of the other answers, given my desire to pass the test.

You continue, "The statement that someone 'could not have chosen differently' could only ever be true if the person was absolutely ignorant of all other alternatives. But that is never, ever true. Hence the statement is based on false premises."

Not true, for I was aware of the other alternative answers on the test. Yet I could not have chosen them, since I had no reason to.

- Bill

Post 3

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 9:46pm

How reality works
I think the first question to ask is: Is reality causal? (Is the next thing that happens and the future only dependent on the past?) I have no reason to think the universe is not causal. I'm sure we'll all agree that reality is causal.

Now, how do things behave in a causal reality? I'm pretty confident that reality can be reduced to space-time and changing charges, which all act by one simple equation, yet there is so much time, charge, and space that we would never be capable of perfectly calculating how it would all behave.

Implications on choices/determinism/free will, repeating myself in different ways
Yikes, back to the world we are familiar with. There are many possibilities of how we can act. We always end up choosing one of the possibilities. Is it possible that we could have chosen differently? That things could have happened differently? From a causal universe which behaves under one simple rule set, I doubt it, unless true random events exist. Even still, how does adding the property "true random events" to reality help the case for free will?

1. We are faced with choices/options.
2. We can: think more, choose the currently best known option, or choose randomly, or even detrimentally.

The possibilities are there, and through however reality works, we (each of our brains, bodies, consciousness) act on one of the choices in each circumstance, most likely differently, since we are never the same (not the same between individual and individual or across time) (some are more similar than others). This is not a simple process like a force=mass*acceleration on a single object. Our brains and bodies are very complex, using all sorts of modes of communication, storage, retrieval, information processing, and sensory/IO methods, to accomplish #2.

I call the process our brain & body goes through to determine the next action as "choosing". It seems to me that the resulting choice was probably inevitable. This is because it makes sense to me that the universe is causal. Maybe true random events exist, but I don't see how this makes much of a difference in anything philosophically, instead it just results in more difficulty in predicting the future and our ability to control reality.

The resulting choice may very well have been inevitable, but the process of choosing still exists. Some might say "But if it is only possible that we can end up acting on one of the options in a given circumstance, then we are not actually choosing/don't have free will." Bah, we exist, we have consciousness, we think, we go through the process of making choices. We are free to think anything within the constraints of how reality works. What we end up actually thinking is causal, and either either destined to happen or could be influenced by true random events.

Post 4

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 10:38pm

This is a reply to Post 398 by Michael Moeller in "The Argument from Intimidation" thread on the General Forum.

I wrote: "Suppose that an Objectivist candidate were running for office against a socialist candidate. One has a choice to vote for either candidate, but the choice one makes will be determined by one's political values."

Michael replied, "Bill, what do you want in order to have free will? If a person approached a situation like a blank-slate, without any other knowledge or values, then he might have free will? In each of your examples you try to smuggle in one's preexisting values (with no regard to how one arrived those values) to make a 'downstream' choice seem like fait accompli. What are those political values a result of? Do you deny that the Objectivist could evade obtaining knowledge about the respective candidates? Would deny that he could not chose to exercise his capacity to think when investigating the possible candidates? Does reality put us in situations that seem like that have fallen out of the heavens, without any requirement on the part of our capacity to think--in effect saying: 'Oh look, an Objectivist and a Socialist, please choose--from whatever values you have without regard to how you arrive at those values.'"

I'm just saying that your choice of candidates can be characterized as a determined choice, insofar as you could not have chosen otherwise, given your political values. This is true, even if you could have chosen otherwise in the process of forming your political values, since that would involve a different choice. According to Rand, the choice to think "controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character." This says that the choices which depend on the choice to think are determined by it, which means they are determined choices. According to Objectivism, free will does not pertain to a choice of actions, only to the choice to think or not to think.

You continue, "That's the whole ballgame, that life is process of self-generated and self-sustaining actions. It is not a static pool where one can automatically rely on his past judgments, he is constantly confronted with making that choice to think, with achieving new values and sustaining others."

There is a sense in which I agree that one cannot automatically rely on one's past judgments. But by the same token, one will also have no reason to doubt them, unless one is confronted with some new evidence or information that calls them into question. I do not question my belief in capitalism whenever I enter a voting booth; I rely on it in making my decisions, and there is literally no chance that I could vote for the socialist candidate, given my present knowledge and understanding.

You continue, "Granted, there can be motivators, but these are not guarantees."

I disagree. To be motivated is to be motivated to choose A over B, in which case, one cannot be motivated to choose B over A. In this respect, a motive is a guarantee - a guarantee that one will choose the action that one is motivated to choose. If one is motivated to choose A in preference to B, then one cannot choose B in preference to A.

You continue, "The fact that one has chosen to exercise his choice to think in the past is no guarantee that he will do it in the future."

I agree.

You wrote, "The quote from AR ('choice that controls all others...') is merely underscoring the choices 'downstream,' that they are the result of the primary choice to think--i.e. part of a continuum that begins with the primary choice to think (which do determine his character). AR refers to the choice to focus as a 'set'. She analogizes it to starting the motor of a car where the direction and destination are later choices, but those still depend on first turning on the car."

Yes, I understand the Objectivist argument. My point was only that, for Objectivism, there is no contradiction in referring to the downstream choices as determined, since, according to Rand, they were determined by the upstream choices.

You write, "You leave out some relevant information from LP's quote (same area--pg 59): '"Primary" here means: presupposed by all other choices and itself irreducible. The choice to throw the switch is the "root" choice on which all others depend. Nor can a primary choice be explained by anything more fundamental. By its nature, it is the first cause within a consciousness, not an effect produced by antecedent factors. It is not a product of parents or teachers, anatomy or conditioning, heredity or environment....(Bill's quote) 'For the same reason there can be no motive or value judgment which precedes consciousness and which induces a man to become conscious. The decision to perceive reality must precede value-judgments. Otherwise, values have no source in one's cognition of reality and thus become delusions. Values do not lead to consciousness; consciousness is what what leads to values.'
"This underscores the point, to be able to evaluate and make value-judgments, one must first flick the switch. To use man's 'only absolute', his means of cognition, is arbitrary? Bill, it seems like you are trying to look for a way to make the irreducible reducible."

I left out the passages you quoted, because they weren't relevant to my criticism. My point was this: how can there be a decision which precedes value judgments that is not arbitrary? Don't you have to judge the decision as worth choosing in order for it to be non-arbitrary? But in that case, the decision wouldn't precede value-judgments! Moreover, if there is no intellectual factor that even partly explains the choice to think, then why does Objectivism emphasize the importance of making that choice, since one's awareness of its importance cannot be expected to have any influence on one's choice to make it.

And as I've stated, if, according to Peikoff, "the decision to perceive reality must precede value judgments," then that decision could not be judged by its agent as a moral imperative, in which case, he could not be held morally responsible for making it. Prior to consciousness or value judgments, there is no way for a person to know that he ought to perceive reality. Nor could such an act even be viewed as as "choice" or decision," since that would imply a conscious recognition of alternatives and a prior evaluation of their relative merits.

Moreover, since, according to Rand, the choice to think "controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character," if one cannot be held morally responsible for the choice to think, then (according to Objectivism) one cannot be held morally responsible for the choices that depend on it. In that case, however, far from determinism's being incompatible with moral responsibility, it is Objectivism's view of free will that is incompatible with it.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 11/14, 10:46pm)

Post 5

Tuesday, November 15, 2005 - 2:18am

Bill:

Good idea to move this whole (never-ending!) discussion here!

Re your response to my last post to you...

"John continued, '---Even if she added that elsewhere, we all know that this consideration is definitely NOT true. Right?"

Well, if you read Who is Ayn Rand, Nathaniel Branden quotes her definition from "The Objectivist Ethics," and adds, "A value is the object of an action." (p.21) Rand was well aware of that essay, and if Branden had misrepresented her meaning, I'm sure we would have heard it by now. Moreover, I discussed this issue with Branden himself and he told me that Rand had used the term "value" in at least two different senses: as that which somone actually values --"an object of an action" -- and as that which one ought to value -- i.e., an objectively correct value."

     "Well,"...I had read it; 20 yrs ago. As you well know, it's not too available lately for re-perusing. Not that I find this relevent to *my* questions.

     More to the point: My questions had to do with what we-can-all-agree-on-re-what RAND said, not with what Nathaniel Branden or Leonard Piekoff or Elvis Presley or George Bush or...whoever-else said somewhere or to whoever-else about their thoughts re 'what Rand said to them'. --- So, I don't see how your response is any kind of answer to any questions I asked. Again, you've neither specifically agreed, nor specifically disagreed with my comments, nor clearly answered my questions; you've merely sidestepped them all with hearsay-based implications of an innuended justifiable-disagreement.

     Can we talk?

     After I delineated my view of Rand's (not Brandens', etc view of 'Rand's view) delineation of *her* meaning of 'value', you continue with your bolstering of a...quite different meaning than most O'ist's (of whatever stripe) see in the term 'value'...

The standard doesn't have to be rational in order for it to be a value in this particular sense. The pursuit of a random desire would also presuppose a standard, even if it's only hedonistic.

     I shan't ask you to clarify which 'particular sense' you're talking about, but, I never argued, nor hinted, that a 'standard' has to be rational; neither did Rand. I have no idea how this is relevent. The point is, the necessity OF a 'standard' to distinguish a 'value' from a 'whim/desire/want'. This ambiguous assertion just sounds like more red-herring stuff.

     As to "The pursuit of ...etc." Do Tell? Really? A 'random desire would presuppose a standard'? Where in the world are you getting this from? This is making no sense, Bill; c'mon! --- Clearly, I already established my view as opposite, and all you're doing here is merely asserting, not 'arguing', the contradictory. Where's your *argument* for this? What 'random desire' "presupposes a standard"? Strawberry Ice-Cream? Tyra Banks? Winning the Lottery? A cold beer? --- You have better logical-arguing acumen than that, Bill. Jeez._____ Because of THIS statement of yours, I'm going to have a question for you (specified at end-of-post) in all responses to you 'till you unequivocally, relevently, answer it.

     As regards your ending clause, "...even if it's only hedonistic." Yeah, lotta 'values' in O'ist terms there, in hedonism; r-i-g-h-t! --- C'mon Bill, you know hedonism isn't considered a 'value-oriented' view of life by O'ism, so don't try to include it as a 'valuing' philosophy (as RAND, not N.Branden, L.Piekoff, K.(or G.)Marx, B.Spears, etc 'defined' it). It seems you're twisting O'ist terms (as non-Rand others 'refine' Rand's defs) to fit your basic concern: values-determine-'choice.' You're stretching otherwise-clarified term-meanings (not to mention definitions), that Rand explicated, a bit too much, just to stay being called an "O'ist" it seems.

     Btw, all of your last paragraph is a good summary of your...generalized...views, and, I have little quibble with pretty well (ahem! 'qualifier' presumed there, of course) any statement therein. You don't have to 'explain' to me what we're born with, what motivates us, what 'focusing' means, how we can't 'choose' to go from unconciousness to consciousness, etc, etc. --- In case you've forgotten (or, not recognized), I'm familiar with your general views (not to mention treatment by others) from elsewhere. This is 'Morganis' typing. Remember me? We HAVE debated before, as I'm sure you're aware.

     It's your last 2 lines I find most relevent, however:

"So, at a lower level of awareness, you can be aware of the importance of raising your level of awareness, and value doing so. There is no vicious regress."

     As put, here I agree that there is no logical necessity for being concerned with 'vicious regress.' What we disagree on, is the nature of the 'choice' of doing-such...or NOT-doing-such. Or, maybe, rather than 'nature'...the proper way to analyze what it's all about.

     Well, I don't see the value of 'be[ing] aware of the importance of raising your level' as being a mere want...whereas, I suspect you do. Further, it's alternative (being un-aware of it's importance) IS a mere 'want.' What 'value' can be argued about the latter? And, herein, lies the place of our conflicting views re the 'choice' of one...or...the other.

     Ergo, for you, Bill, all one's talking about is a conflict of wants (or, more accurately, for you, both are called 'values'). --- I agree that where all one's talking about is a conflict of 'wants,' one can still talk about 'choices', good and/or bad: (strawberry vs. pistachio ice-cream ; that hot-broad-leaving-and-rumored-to-be-HIV vs that-new-drug-dealer-leaving-with-xtcy) without 'free will' being relevent. A desire by any other name is a want (and, your assertion to the contrary, I really don't see where 'standards' are relevent to such...AS such.) Regardless, 'choices' are to be made. --- Further, in this 'framework' of seeing all wants as 'values', I still argue, the 'choices' made imply an infinite regression in terms of 'explanatoriness' re any 1st 'choice' about doing-X or not-doing-X; to repeat: as long as one uses the term, however loosely, 'value.'

    Whereas, for me, I see a diff between a 'value' and a 'want.' (I keep thinking of Rand's charactarization of 'free will' being "Free will is a function of rationality", meaning, the less [think *0*] 'rationality' used, the less 'free will' ability [hence, the 'value' reduces to mere 'want']; ergo, want vs. want = 0 free will, though a 'choice' IS made). Indeed, the diff 'tween the two (value/desire), is precisely where I see the 'free will' locus actionable upon, and ONLY upon. --- (As an aside, as to the choice 'tween 'value' and 'value', well, as long as rationality's applied, free will is obviously used; but, if BOTH are denigratedly-viewed to the level of desire vs. desire, free will is gone [though, 'choice' isn't!])

     Where there's a 'value' (in RAND's def AND 'meaning'; not...the others) in conflict with a 'want', rationality, ergo 'free will' choices get relevent. Where there isn't, only desire-'choices' are relevent and 'free will'/'volition' is not (determined or otherwise).

     Now, my earlier mentioned question:

     Do you really believe that RAND (not others) meant 'random desire'/'want' as includable in her...meaning...of 'Value' in her def and delineation of the term in Galt's speech (and, wherever else)?
     A simple "yes" or "no" will suffice. I might even accept an "It depends on..."------- maybe. But, if not "no", I'll have a couple other questions.

     This really must be cleared up, Bill.

LLAP
J:D

Post 6

Tuesday, November 15, 2005 - 8:10am

In response to Bill Dwyer's saying about a standard of value:

The standard doesn't have to be rational in order for it to be a value in this particular sense. The pursuit of a random desire would also presuppose a standard, even if it's only hedonistic.

John Dailey aka Morganis Chamlo ("This is 'Morganis' typing. Remember me? We HAVE debated before, as I'm sure you're aware.") made a very scary threat:

Do Tell? Really? A 'random desire would presuppose a standard'? Where in the world are you getting this from? This is making no sense, Bill; c'mon!...Because of THIS statement of yours, I'm going to have a question for you (specified at end-of-post) in all responses to you 'till you unequivocally, relevently, answer it.

OK, let's not be seeing this over and over!

No, that is not what Bill said. Bill did not say that a "random desire would presuppose a standard." He said that THE PURSUIT OF a random desire would presuppose a standard. And pursuit means: acting to gain and/or keep, i.e., valuing. Bill is saying that even the pursuit of, the valuing of, the acting to gain and/or keep that which one randomly desires presupposes a standard. This makes perfect sense. It ought to be uncontroversial!

John also said that Bill's comments were irrelevant. Instead:

The point is, the necessity OF a 'standard' to distinguish a 'value' from a 'whim/desire/want'.

No, "standard" is not what distinguishes value from desire. A value is the object of an action. (Branden, approved by Rand) It is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. (Rand) A desideratum is the object of a desire. It is that which one may decide to act to gain and/or keep.

One thing is for sure, however: you cannot value (act to gain and/or keep) that which you do not desire. As Branden said (with Rand's approval):

Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to "want," in some sense, to perform the action. ("Isn't Everyone Selfish?" Objectivist Newsletter, September 1962)

And as Branden further clarifies, the crucial question is:

By what standard was the action chosen? To achieve what goal? (ibid)

And even with random desires, this is true. To again quote Bill (whom John misquoted):

The pursuit of a random desire would also presuppose a standard, even if it's only hedonistic.

Again, what is controversial about this?

REB

Post 7

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 8:39am

Roger writes:

No, "standard" is not what distinguishes value from desire. A value is the object of an action. (Branden, approved by Rand) It is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. (Rand) A desideratum is the object of a desire. It is that which one may decide to act to gain and/or keep.

Roger, your definitions of desire appear to be all over the map. This definition seems to be put in rather tortured language. What are you saying, that a desire is the object of a yet-to-be decided action? How can you say that one "may decide" if all such decisions are necessitated by antecedent factors?

Furthermore, you stated earlier that there "isn't much" difference between a value and a desire. But, according to the definitions above, there is a big difference. You also stated that a desire is "a response to that which one values" without indicating the nature of such a response except to say that it "motivates", and Bill claims that such a "motivation" is a determination. This does not mesh well with the definition above in which you say that one "may decide".

Not only that, none of this seems to coincide with the common definition of desire. Please apply the rule of fundamentality to your definition of desire, boil it down to essentials.

Regards,
Michael

Post 8

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 8:42am

Bill,

I said food for thought, not a goddamn buffet!! I will try to address this in two parts. First, I'll tackle the "suckling" comment I made and tie it in with the supposed "arbitrary choice" to focus or not. In another post, I will go on to morality.

First, I want to ask some lingering questions. You said "some values" determine the choice to think and "some values" are determined by the choice to think. Now, ignoring the obvious circularity for a moment, can you lay out ~explicitly~ what the "some values" are that determine the choice to think (in addition to the alleged one you gave on the previous thread). Also, can you explain how you came to identify these as values.

As far as the "suckling" goes, I used that to point out (tongue-in-cheek) how the series of antecedent factors--antecedent factor from antecedent factor from antecedent factor and on and on--exempted me from the non-thinking charge by Roger. My point, how could Roger blame me for not thinking--according to this I am not the causal agent of my knowledge anyway. I am merely a passive vessel floating through time blindly guided by my "values". It disregards the choice to focus as the ~first cause~ of one's knowledge.

This argument, essentially, is the argument for God applied to man's consciousness. Look at the wonderments of nature and natural order and on and on, says the theist. Why, there must be a "reason" for all of this, and that reason must be God (however defined). But by the same logic, there must be some "reason" for the wonderments of God thereby creating another God and on into infinite regress. Similarly, look at the wonderments that grow from human choice, from skyscrapers to great art, there must be some "reason" one choses to think otherwise its "arbitrary", says the determinist. The reason is that "value" drives the decision, but what explains the "value"? Why, an antecedent one and on and on into infinite regress (well, maybe finite regress to the beginning of one's life).

The mistake with the theist is that reality simply is, it does not need to be explained by anything--it is the given, an irreducible primary. Similarly, the choice to focus is the irreducible primary that cannot be reduced further, it presupposes all other choices. Consciousness is identification, and before anything can be identified, one must first focus. Bill asks about an "intellectual factor" that would explain that choice, but to ask the question Bill must have first chosen to focus. Or in LP's words "...to grasp such a [intellectual] factor, he must first be aware". He is "smuggling in" free will just as the theist "smuggles in" existence when he tries to explain the "intellectual factor" (i.e. God) that created it--i.e. reaffirmation through denial.

Bill, I aware that you understand the Objectivist position, I just wanted to lay some groundwork in the previous post. Similarly, I included more of LP's quote because it gave a wider context, not because I thought you were purposely leaving things out. Specifically, that before one can identify some aspect of reality as for or against oneself (value/disvalue), one must first chose to exercise the capacity to focus. Again, in LP's words: "Values do not lead to consciousness; consciousness is what leads to values".

Bill writes:

According to Rand, the choice to think "controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character." This says that the choices which depend on the choice to think are determined by it, which means they are determined choices.

You are misinterpreting the quote. Yes, the later choices are reducible to ("controlled by") the "upstream" choice to focus, but it does not determine what happens "downstream". I can fail to properly differentiate, I may not integrate by what is essential and so on--i.e. my ability to conceptualize is not determined, this is still "open" so to speak.

Bill writes:

There is a sense in which I agree that one cannot automatically rely on one's past judgments. But by the same token, one will also have no reason to doubt them, unless one is confronted with some new evidence or information that calls them into question. I do not question my belief in capitalism whenever I enter a voting booth; I rely on it in making my decisions, and there is literally no chance that I could vote for the socialist candidate, given my present knowledge and understanding.

I could quibble about the first 2 sentences, but for the most part I agree. The 3rd one I addressed via the process of identification in my previous response to your capitalist/socialist scenario, and I think the questions are left unanswered.

Bill writes:

I disagree. To be motivated is to be motivated to choose A over B, in which case, one cannot be motivated to choose B over A. In this respect, a motive is a guarantee - a guarantee that one will choose the action that one is motivated to choose. If one is motivated to choose A in preference to B, then one cannot choose B in preference to A.

First of all, I hesitated to use the term "motivator" in the previous post because of certain implications of the term. I prefer to use the term 'incentive'. For instance, in a capitalist society the right to the products of one's efforts is an incentive to produce (in contradistinction to a socialist society), but it is no guarantee that one will chose to do it. Whether one will chose to go out and earn a living is still the product of the primary choice to focus.

The rest of the questions you raise about the choice to focus being "arbitrary" I addressed above. I will address the morality aspect next. I probably won't have time to rebut your rebuttal because this is becoming rather long-winded and unwieldy covering a lot of topics and I am limited by time constraints.

Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/16, 11:18am)

Post 9

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 9:10am

Mr. Moeller -- very well done. I will look forward to reading your posts in the future.

- Jason

Post 10

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 10:45am

Bill, I certainly could choose the wrong answer, even assuming I wanted to pass the test, which is also a choice I will point out! Suppose I wanted to pass, but had cheated and didn't want to get 100? What if I saw a jerk looking at my paper, and wanted to put the wrong answer in while he looked even though my score would be slightly lower (or maybe I wanted to erase it later)? What a dumb-ass example.

Post 11

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 12:11pm

Thank you Jason, much appreciated.
Michael

Post 12

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 12:28pm

I previously wrote:

Michael Moeller commented:

Roger, your definitions of desire appear to be all over the map. This definition seems to be put in rather tortured language. What are you saying, that a desire is the object of a yet-to-be decided action?... You also stated that a desire is "a response to that which one values."� Not only that, none of this seems to coincide with the common definition of desire. Please apply the rule of fundamentality to your definition of desire, boil it down to essentials.

I know this is a bit confusing, but it�s not entirely my fault. :-)

Confusion lies in how both the terms "desire" and "value" are used, not just by myself, but by many Randians.

Let�s start with "desire." (That�s how it all starts, motivationally. :- ) A desire is a strong feeling of wanting to have something and/or the thing so wanted.

As a conscious action, a "desire" or "desiring" is the response to something one has positively evaluated, and which, if stronger in a given situation than any other desire, determines that one will seek to obtain the thing so evaluated. As the object of the conscious action of desiring, the thing positively evaluated and so desired is one's (object of) "desire."

Now, as a value-determinist, I am saying that our actions to gain and/or keep things are governed by our desires, specifically, by that which we most strongly desire (whether rationally or not) in a given situation. The sequence is: perception, identification, evaluation, desire (emotional response of wanting to have), decision to obtain, action to obtain. If we examine this sequence carefully, we can see how "value" is used in two different and potentially confusing ways.

First, Rand defines "value" as "that which one acts to gain and/or keep." Obviously, in this sense of the term, a value is the object of the last step in the sequence, and valuing strictly requires that one be engaged in action toward the object. Rand made it clear (and I do not have the citation handy) that a value is not just something you want, but something that you are actively seeking; to her, passively held values were a contradiction in terms. So, yes, a desire (i.e., an object of desire, a desideratum) is "the object of a yet-to-be decided action.

However, Rand also uses "value" in a sense pertaining to the object of the third step in the sequence, where valuing simply means that one has (rightly or wrongly) assessed something as a potential benefit to one. People often also refer to the objects of evaluation as "values," but I think that this has led to confusion. (For this reason, Morris and Linda Tannehill years ago, in The Market for Liberty, proposed that we use the term "evalue" for things that have been positively evaluated, but not yet acted toward.) It is in that sense that I meant "a desire is a response to that which one values." So, there is no conflict in how I was using the term "desire," nor any dueling definitions, just two different true statements about different aspects of it.

How can you say that one "may decide" if all such decisions are necessitated by antecedent factors?

I mean "may decide" in two very specific senses.

First, epistemologically, I simply mean that in a situation that is not yet clearly determinate to me as a valuer and actor, and in which I have not finished considering the options before me, something that I find myself desiring most strongly at one point in time is something that I may later, at the point of decision, find myself no longer desiring most strongly. I have evidence that I may end up choosing that thing, but I don�t yet know that I will. So, epistemologically speaking, I have reason to believe it is possible that I will choose it, I may choose it.

Secondly, metaphysically, in regard to the issue of freedom of action, let me clarify that I am not a "clockwork," Laplacean, "billiard ball," mechanistic determinist. I think that there are levels of determinism in the universe, and that living organisms (let alone conscious ones) have a different form of determinism governing their actions than do inanimate objects. What living organisms are governed by is not efficient causation, but final causation, their need to seek values, which is experienced by conscious living organisms as desiring or wanting to pursue certain things.

In conscious beings, the specific way that final causation operates deterministically is to constrain them to pursue that which, in a given situation, they most want to pursue. And, as Locke and others have pointed out, conscious beings are free to pursue that which they most want to pursue, if nothing (such as coercion or disease or the Law of Gravity) prevents them from doing so. (Locke thought it was nonsense to speak of "freedom of the will." It is human beings that are free to do that which they most want, or not free to do so, depending on the conditions of their environments and bodies.)

So, by "may decide," I do mean "is free to decide." But I do not mean you are categorically free to choose anything other than what you actually choose, as in, "I could have chosen x rather than y, period," but conditionally, as in, "I could have chosen x rather than y, if I had wanted x more than I wanted y." The former is how Peikoff and other Objectivists present the idea of free will: you could have done otherwise than you did, presumably even if you hadn�t wanted to, whereas I am arguing that you could have done otherwise only if you had wanted to more than what you did.

For instance, you may decide to have vanilla ice cream, if you are (existentially) free to do so, and if it turns out that you want to have vanilla ice cream more than you want anything else that conflicts with it. In other words, if you are not under coercion, and if vanilla ice cream is your strongest desire, vanilla ice cream is what you will have.

It may seem that this is just a tautology, and that I am defining "strongest desire" in terms of what you end up choosing. However, I think that we are in the presence of an axiom of human action. If as Branden said in "Isn't Everyone Selfish?," it is a "truism" that all behavior is motivated, and we always in some sense "want" to do what we do, I don't see how you can escape the conclusion that what you did is what you most wanted to do -- not what you "would like to have done, if things had been different," but what you did want to do, given the way things were.

Let me expand on the ice cream example just a bit more to show the axiomatic nature of action being based on one�s strongest desire. Suppose I offer Michael a choice of vanilla or chocolate ice cream. Normally, he might just blurt out, vanilla (which, let�s say, is his favorite). But to make it interesting, let's consider the case where I've just told him that, by my theory of human choice and action, he has to pick vanilla, because that is what he most prefers. Michael, not liking my value-determinism notions one little bit (!), decides to be contrary and instead select chocolate, just to show me that I don't know a whole lot about free will. :-)

I then point out to him that he is still choosing what he most strongly prefers, but now, instead of choosing vanilla rather than chocolate, he most prefers choosing to choose against his flavor preference rather to choose in accordance with his flavor preference. It's on a meta-level of choice, but it is still what he most wants to do in this situation. Upon reflection, I realize that I was too specific in what I told him that choosing vanilla was what he "had to" do, because the situation changed, once the option of flouting my value determinism theory reared its ugly head. Michael still did what he "had to" do, but it was on the higher level of his choice preference, rather than his flavor preference.

So, in each case�and I maintain, in any case you can dream up (and yes, that is a challenge!) -- the antecedent condition that determines human choice is the strongest operative desire, whether it is in fact rational and life-serving or not. Barring coercion, incapacitating disease, etc., you can and will choose the thing you most desire, unless conditions change and you then desire something else more strongly -- such as choosing less-preferred chocolate ice cream out of an overriding desire for "variety" or "defying Roger�s value-determinist claims." :-)

Furthermore, you stated earlier that there "isn't much" difference between a value and a desire. But, according to the definitions above, there is a big difference.

Ay-yi-yi. Yes, in the respect you are referring to, there is a big difference. To repeat: As a conscious action, a "desire" or "desiring" is the response to something one has positively evaluated, and which, if stronger in a given situation than any other desire, determines that one will seek to obtain the thing so evaluated. As the object of the conscious action of desiring, the thing positively evaluated and so desired is one's (object of) "desire."

Now, here is the difference, which I think stands out most clearly when we regard value in parallel with desire. As a conscious action, a "value" or "valuing" is the acting to obtain that which is most desired in a given situation. (Remember: Rand did not endorse passive valuing.). As the object of the conscious action of valuing, the thing positively evaluated and desired most strongly and sought is one's (object of) "value." Clearly, desire and value, whether as actions or objects, are not the same thing -- though they can coincide as objects, of course.

However, what I meant is better expressed by saying that there is no big divide between them. There are irrationally based values and irrationally based desires, and there are rationally based values and rationally based desires. Contrary to some Objectivists, the term "value" covers the gamut from evil, life-destroying objects of action to good, life-promoting ones -- just as is the case for "desire."

It has caused enormous chaos in ethical discussions, in and out of Objectivist circles, to have two definitions of "value" floating around, where one is Rand's well-known, crystal clear definition: "that which one acts to gain and/or keep." It clearly pertains to all objects of action, whether good or evil.

The other usage of "value" is utterly fallacious and leads to great confusion, and Leonard Peikoff's recent lecture "Two Definitions" did not resolve this mess in the least. Speaking of "value" as "that which one ought to gain and/or keep," or as synonymous with "rational, life-serving value" is a prime example of what Rand referred to as the Fallacy of the Frozen Abstraction. (See "Collectivized Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness.) It is what I like to call "conceptual chauvinism" or "misguided epistemic fastidiousness." I invite all Randians, Objectivists, Neo-Objectivists, Paleo-Objectivists, Students of Objectivism, Randian True-Believers, Randian Loyalists, Subjectivists, Intrinsicists, Superjectivists, and Extrinsicists to begin today to strip this usage of "value" from their speech and writing! (Those curious about the basis for this rant are welcome to peruse my essay on the Fallacy of the Floating Abstraction, which has a link at: http://members.aol.com/REBissell/indexmm.html . And/or stay tuned for my forthcoming book!)

You also stated that a desire is "a response to that which one values" without indicating the nature of such a response except to say that it "motivates", and Bill claims that such a "motivation" is a determination. This does not mesh well with the definition above in which you say that one "may decide".

Oh, Bill, here�s another fine mesh you�ve gotten us into. :-)

Seriously, I am claiming that one�s strongest operative desire is the motivation of one�s action, and that it does indeed determine one�s action. And again, by "may decide," I meant (see above for the detailed treatment): is epistemically possible, but not certain, and is metaphysically possible, if one desires differently.

Best regards,

Roger Bissell

Post 13

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 1:14pm

Bill Dwyer wrote:

Or suppose I'm taking a multiple-choice test, and recognize one of the answers as right and the others as wrong. Since I have no interest in choosing the wrong answer, I must choose the answer that I recognize as right. My choice is necessary. Given my desire to pass the test, I cannot choose any of the other answers, but we would still say that I "chose" the right answer, wouldn't we?

Kurt Eichert commented:

Bill, I certainly could choose the wrong answer, even assuming I wanted to pass the test, which is also a choice I will point out! Suppose I wanted to pass, but had cheated and didn't want to get 100? What if I saw a jerk looking at my paper, and wanted to put the wrong answer in while he looked even though my score would be slightly lower (or maybe I wanted to erase it later)? What a dumb-ass example.

Wow, one little (apparent) logical slip, and Bill (or his example) is a "dumb-ass"? Let's let ARI wallow in the personalities, and let's stick to ideas, OK? I mean, what kind of lame-brained comment was that to make, anyway? :-)

Anyway, now is the perfect opportunity to start test-driving my value-determinist theory that one's actions are always based on one's strongest desire!

Bill, in his desire to present clear, simple examples, appears to have goofed a bit. But note: he was stipulating ("since," "given that ") that he has "no desire to choose the wrong answer." And given those stipulations, i.e., the conditions, of Bill's example, then it is absolutely true that he could not have chosen other than he did.

But let's humor Kurt a bit, because he has suggested some interesting variations on Bill's simple case.

1. Suppose Kurt wanted to pass, but had cheated and didn't want to get 100?

In this case, Kurt wants to pass by cheating and not (likely) get caught more than he wants to get 100 by cheating and (more likely) get caught (let alone, more than he wants to do the test without cheating at all) -- and he sees that the way to get what he wants most is to miss one or more of the questions. By Bill's thinking, and by my value-determinist theory, Kurt has to choose some wrong answers, because doing so is the means to obtaining what he desires. His desire determines that he will miss some of the questions, though not so many that he would fail.

2. What if Kurt saw a jerk looking at his paper, and wanted to put the wrong answer in while he (the jerk) looked even though Kurt's score would be slightly lower?

In this case, Kurt wants to pass in a way that causes him to get a lower grade than he could but which also punishes the jerk, more than he wants to pass in a way that lets him get the highest grade he can and which ignores the jerk (let alone, more than he wants to fail) -- and he sees that the way to get what he wants most is to miss one or more of the questions. Again, Kurt's desire determines that he will miss some of the questions, though again not so many that he would fail.

2a. What if Kurt saw a jerk loking at his paper, and wanted to put the wrong answer in while he (the jerk) looked, and Kurt intended to erase it later?

Same basic analysis. In all cases, Kurt's desire determines that he will miss some of the questions, but in no case so many that he would fail the exam.

Throughout all of this, there is the possibility that the conditions will change. In the cheating situation, Kurt might have a pang of conscience or see another student looking disapprovingly at him and decide not to cheat at all, in order to avoid those unpleasant feelings (their absence being what he desires more than getting an undeserved passing grade through cheating). In the jerk situation, another idea may occur to Kurt. He might impulsively blurt out: "Stop looking at my exam, you jerk" and ask for another chair. Or, the professor might spot the jerk cheating and intervene, thus relieving Kurt of having to employ any of these strategies of getting what he most desires, which then reduces to the more simple case that Bill stipulated.

All of these possible scenarios and more show that reality and human choice and action are more complex than Bill's example. But the principle of human choice and action operates in the same way for the complex cases that it does for the simple, and that is why Bill's example is so useful and clarifying. I for one appreciate Bill's taking the responsibility to apply his sharp intellect to devising helpful illustrations of his points. Our responsibility is to recognize that Bill indeed has identified the principle behind human action, and to apply that principle to the more complicated cases -- not to quibble with his stipulations and call him (or his example) names!

Best regards,
Roger Bissell

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 11/16, 1:16pm)

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 11/16, 1:18pm)

Post 14

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 1:20pm

I just wanted to say "dumb-ass"

I am in a snarky mood. Sorry - I didn't really mean it, please forgive me :)

Post 15

Wednesday, November 16, 2005 - 3:10pm

Hah - in this forum?

Thursday, November 17, 2005 - 12:48pm

Michael, you wrote,

"First, I want to ask some lingering questions. You said 'some values' determine the choice to think and 'some values' are determined by the choice to think. Now, ignoring the obvious circularity for a moment, can you lay out ~explicitly~ what the 'some values' are that determine the choice to think (in addition to the alleged one you gave on the previous thread). Also, can you explain how you came to identify these as values."

Well, I wouldn't say there's any circularity here. When I said that some values determine the choice to think and some are determined by the choice to think, I meant "value" in the sense of a purpose or a goal, viz., an object of an action. It is my view that every choice is made for the sake of a achieving a desired end or goal. That's WHY one chooses: one wants to achieve something BY MEANS of the choice. A choice is essentially a means to an end. It is an answer to the question: "How can I best get what I want? In this respect, a choice always presupposes an antecedent value or goal for the sake of which one is making the choice. One chooses to think--to raise one's level of awareness--to sharpen one's mental focus--in order to understand something, to grasp it more clearly. But the desire to improve one's understanding has to be there initially; otherwise, one will see no point in making the choice. In other words, choice presupposes purpose; purpose does not presuppose choice. Where does the desire to understand come from? From one's nature as a being whose survival depends upon knowledge of its environment. All higher mammals have a natural curiosity about their environment, a natural interest in learning about the world in which they live. This is especially true of human beings for whom acquired knowledge plays a central role in their survival .

Now I said that just as some values or goals determine the choice to think, other values or goals are determined by it. The reason for this is that as one's knowledge expands, one becomes aware of others goals that serve one's interests and are identified as worth pursuing. For example, a child may discover in learning arithmetic that he or she loves it better than any other subject, and this love of arithmetic may lead the child to choose math as a major in a college and eventually to become a mathematician. What explains the child's love of math? Perhaps he or she has a natural aptitude for it and enjoys the process of solving quantitative problems.

You ask, "[H]ow could Roger blame me for not thinking...I am not the causal agent of my knowledge anyway. I am merely a passive vessel floating through time blindly guided by my 'values'. [Determinism] disregards the choice to focus as the ~first cause~ of one's knowledge."

Being determined by your purposes or values does not mean being guided "blindly" by them. Nor does it mean that you are merely a "passive vessel," a term which implies that you are an agent of someone else's goals or values, not your own. You say that the choice to focus is the ~first cause~ of one's knowledge. But clearly in order to choose to focus, you must already know what that choice consists of and that it is worth taking. A choice implies an awareness of the alternatives and a conscious selection of one and rejection of the other. Without an already existing context of knowledge, no choice is possible. Choice presupposes knowledge; knowledge does not presuppose choice, even though the choices one makes can certainly expand one's knowledge.

How can Roger "blame" you for not thinking? Well, to "blame" someone simply means to identify the person as having done something wrong or inappropriate. And doing something wrong or inappropriate for an egoist means acting against his self-interest. So, Roger could "blame" you for not thinking, if thinking were something that (in a given situation) served your interest better than not thinking. If, for example, you were stranded in the wilderness and instead of trying rationally to think of the best means of finding your way home, you fell to your knees and prayed for someone to come and rescue you, then Roger could blame you for not thinking, because thinking of how to extricate yourself would have served you better than praying for someone to rescue you.

You write, "This [determinist] argument, essentially, is the argument for God applied to man's consciousness. Look at the wonderments of nature and natural order and on and on, says the theist. Why, there must be a 'reason' for all of this, and that reason must be God (however defined). But by the same logic, there must be some 'reason' for the wonderments of God thereby creating another God and on into infinite regress. Similarly, look at the wonderments that grow from human choice, from skyscrapers to great art, there must be some 'reason' one choses to think otherwise its 'arbitrary', says the determinist. The reason is that 'value' drives the decision, but what explains the 'value'? Why, an antecedent one and on and on into infinite regress (well, maybe finite regress to the beginning of one's life)."

This is a false analogy. It is true that existence does not require a cause, because a cause requires existence, the existence of something to act as the cause, which is why you get a vicious regress if you demand a cause for all of existence. But that doesn't mean that an action does not require a cause. It does not mean that if a person chooses an action, we cannot ask why he chose it. Every chosen action requires a final cause, which is the purpose for which the action was taken. Just as causality presupposes existence instead of existence presupposing causality, so choice presupposes value instead of value presupposing choice.

Michael continues, "The mistake with the theist is that reality simply is, it does not need to be explained by anything--it is the given, an irreducible primary."

True.

"Similarly, the choice to focus is the irreducible primary that cannot be reduced further, it presupposes all other choices."

I think you said something here that you didn't intend. You meant to say that all other choices presuppose the choice to focus, not that the choice to focus presupposes all other choices, correct? In any case, I disagree with your point that the choice to focus is an irreducible primary that requires no causal explanation. It does indeed require a causal explanation--an explanation in terms of final causation.

You continue, "Consciousness is identification, and before anything can be identified, one must first focus. Bill asks about an 'intellectual factor' that would explain that choice, but to ask the question Bill must have first chosen to focus. Or in LP's words '...to grasp such a [intellectual] factor, he must first be aware'.

The problem here may be the term "intellectual factor." I took it to mean any conscious factor, but that may not be how Peikoff is using it. However, if he is indeed using it to mean any conscious factor (as he seems to be), then I don't see how what he is saying can be correct, because before you can choose an alternative, you must first identify what it is that you are choosing; otherwise, what you are engaged in is not a choice but a blind, unconscious action.

Michael wrote, "Bill, I am aware that you understand the Objectivist position, I just wanted to lay some groundwork in the previous post. Similarly, I included more of LP's quote because it gave a wider context, not because I thought you were purposely leaving things out. Specifically, that before one can identify some aspect of reality as for or against oneself (value/disvalue), one must first chose to exercise the capacity to focus. Again, in LP's words: "Values do not lead to consciousness; consciousness is what leads to values".

Understood.

I wrote, "According to Rand, the choice to think 'controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character.' This says that the choices which depend on the choice to think are determined by it, which means they are determined choices."

Michael replied, "You are misinterpreting the quote. Yes, the later choices are reducible to ("controlled by") the "upstream" choice to focus, but it does not determine what happens "downstream". I can fail to properly differentiate, I may not integrate by what is essential and so on--i.e. my ability to conceptualize is not determined, this is still "open" so to speak."

Really? I should think that if the upstream choice "controls" what happens downstream, then it "determines" what happens downstream. Moreover, if your interpretation is correct, why does Rand say that that choice "controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character?

I wrote, "To be motivated is to be motivated to choose A over B, in which case, one cannot be motivated to choose B over A. In this respect, a motive is a guarantee - a guarantee that one will choose the action that one is motivated to choose. If one is motivated to choose A in preference to B, then one cannot choose B in preference to A.

Michael replied, "First of all, I hesitated to use the term 'motivator' in the previous post because of certain implications of the term. I prefer to use the term 'incentive'. For instance, in a capitalist society the right to the products of one's efforts is an incentive to produce (in contradistinction to a socialist society), but it is no guarantee that one will chose to do it. Whether one will chose to go out and earn a living is still the product of the primary choice to focus."

Okay. Would you say that one has an incentive to focus? And if not, then once having chosen to focus, what determines the incentive to produce under capitalism? More to the point, why do human beings have incentives in the first place? In my view, incentives are the wellspring of human action and underlie all of our choices, including the choice to focus. But you disagree with that analysis, so what is your understanding of the role of incentives in human action?

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 11/17, 1:07pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 11/17, 1:11pm)

Post 17

Friday, November 18, 2005 - 12:53am

In Post 2, I wrote, "Suppose I'm taking a multiple-choice test, and recognize one of the answers as right and the others as wrong. Since I have no interest in choosing the wrong answer, I must choose the answer that I recognize as right. My choice is necessary. Given my desire to pass the test, I cannot choose any of the other answers, but we would still say that I "chose" the right answer, wouldn't we?:

In Post 10, Kurt Eichert replied, Bill, I certainly could choose the wrong answer, even assuming I wanted to pass the test, which is also a choice I will point out! Suppose I wanted to pass, but had cheated and didn't want to get 100? What if I saw a jerk looking at my paper, and wanted to put the wrong answer in while he looked even though my score would be slightly lower (or maybe I wanted to erase it later)? What a dumb-ass example."

I guess I was a little sloppy in formulating the example. What I should have said is, "Given my desire to get 100 or to get the highest possible score, I cannot choose any of the answers I recognize as wrong. I was assuming the normal situation in which the test taker is interested in doing as well as possible, but I suppose I should have made that explicit instead of counting on the reader to fill it in.

- Bill

Post 18

Sunday, November 20, 2005 - 4:38pm

Bill,

Ok, back to morality. If a choice was inescapable, if it was truly "necessitated by antecedent factors", then on what grounds can you blame or praise somebody? The person merely had to, it wipes away any alternative course of action. Remember what I said when this is a "frontal assault" on values? There is an implicit (and sometimes explicit) claim to innate values, so how can one person lay blame on another if the other person was driven to that action? The best you can say is: "Oh well, that happened".

Worse yet, such a position denies praise to those who chose to pursue life, who create value. Imagine that you told AR that Atlas Shrugged was not a product of her volition, what do you think her response would have been? It is helpful here to remember AR's definition of morality: "Morality is a code of values accepted by choice" (Italics mine). Also, AR writes: "Morality pertains only to the sphere of man's free will--only to those actions which are open to his choice" (Italics mine).. Its hard for me to believe that some people believe that they can take volition out of the equation and still think its consistent with AR's ethical framework. Man as a volitional being lies at the base of this framework.

There is no essential difference here with necessitated behavior and compelled behavior. If somebody puts a gun to your head and compels you to rob a bank or some other action, it is clear they are inhibiting your choice. In law, this provides the excuse of *duress*, which means somebody's free will has been denied. This contrasts with the militant Islamist who is NOT simply "given his fanatical beliefs", but rather those beliefs are chosen and maintained by dedicated irrationality; thus resulting in his nihilistic actions. If these beliefs were merely the "given", then it would be awfully difficult to explain the other people who grow up in the same circumstances and do not become a fanatical Islamist or do not murder on these fanatical beliefs. Those same people did act otherwise. Determinism is precisely what the advocates of "compassion" rely on when they try to excuse the actions of criminals (see George Soros)--it is truly anathema to the rule of objective law.

Bill write:

If his choice were free, it would be free of any necessary connection to his character. But in that case, how could we justifiably blame or punish him? Since his choice would not proceed from his character, he could not be held responsible for it. Thus, far from determinism's being incompatible with moral responsibility, it is free will that is incompatible with it.

Free does not mean free from the constraints of reality. When somebody acts contrary to life, or in pursuit of death, we can condemn them because they are not acting in accordance with their nature as a volitional and rational being. You have it in exact reverse, character is not the given, it proceeds from his choice. Choice determines one's character--character does not exist apart from the choices one makes to direct the course of his life. The reason you end up at this position is your call to innate values--no such thing applies to man who is a being of volitional consciousness. Man has to chose between the fundamental alternative of life and death.

Bill writes:

Moreover, if a criminal's choices were free of antecedent causes, it is difficult to see how punishment could be expected to affect his behavior, since his choices would then be free of any deterrent effect that the punishment could be expected to have.

First, as an aside, be careful about assuming that *deterrence* is the goal of punishment, in the philosophy of law this is a very bad idea. If deterrence were the goal, then chopping people's heads off for petty crimes would be the proper method of punishment. Secondly, because such a violator is "free", at any given point in time this means the violator can change his course of action---he can chose to be rational--thereby reclaiming his moral character. It is determinism which says he can't do otherwise, so it is determinism, not free will, that is inconsistent with a rational code of morality.

Regards,

Michael

Post 19

Sunday, November 20, 2005 - 4:40pm