Determinism and Free will

I previously wrote:

Now, as a value-determinist, I am saying that our actions to gain and/or keep things are governed by our desires, specifically, by that which we most strongly desire (whether rationally or not) in a given situation. The sequence is: perception, identification, evaluation, desire (emotional response of wanting to have), decision to obtain, action to obtain.

Michael Moeller commented:

Although I do not agree with your sequence, please look at the beginning of your own sequence!! How does one identify and evaluate without first exercising the choice to think? In order to get down to the end of your sequence ("action to obtain"), one must first exercise the capacity to focus.

And how does one exercise a capacity that one does not already want to exercise? In other words, how can you undertake any action, including focusing, without already valuing and wanting to undertake that action?

Secondly, "final causation" refers to one choosing one's goals, then subsequently the means by which to attain them. But in order to do this, it obviously relies first on the choice focus. Those "wants", or more appropriately those ends, are evaluated according to the hierarchy of values, which, in order to be evaluated, must first rely on the choice to focus--this is the *first cause* of one's knowledge.

You cannot choose to focus without first wanting to focus. If focus is the prerequisite of knowledge, and wanting to focus is the prerequisite of focusing, then that makes wanting to focus the first cause of one's knowledge. Or, at least, more of a first cause than focusing! Which is the chicken and which is the egg here? (The answer is: neither.)

Yes, there is a regress involved. However, if you go back far enough, you will find a state of awareness that you did not choose, but which instead simply happened to you as it does to other animals -- and the most likely candidate for this is becoming awake in the morning. As your body rises up out of sleep, you become spontaneously aware that you are waking up, you decide that you want to wake up and be fully aware more than you want to continue sleeping or lolling about half-awake, and so you choose to focus and then focus your awareness on waking up. From that point on, there is a reciprocal relationship between your focusing and your wants.

But choosing to focus is not the "first cause" of all this. It is "perception" (i.e., awareness that you are waking), followed by the valuing or wanting to be more awake and focused. (If you wish to challenge the sequence I laid out, you should do that. Your present approach, accepting the sequence and arguing for the primacy of focus, simply doesn't work.)

To put it in concrete terms, if I want to chose a destination and map out the best way to arrive, I must first start the engine. No matter how many times I have started the engine before or how many destinations I have been to, I have to start it again in order to pursue a course of action to the desired destination.

Yes, indeed, and I start my engine every morning, much the same way as described above. No "first-cause focusing." Instead, it's first-cause perception (awareness) of becoming awake, evaluating wakefulness as being better than non-wakefulness, wanting wakefulness, and then choosing to pursue wakefulness, which requires focus. Every subsequent focus depends upon this specific sequence.

Every subsequent focus also depends upon some value alternative requiring focused attention coming to my awareness, being evaluated, and desired (wanted). A lot precedes a given act of focus. A "first-cause" is the last thing that focusing is! It is the means of pursuing something you want -- namely, solving of a conflict that has arisen, etc.

REB

Post 21

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 1:48am

Roger,

There is a simple emotion - i.e., subconscious value judgment prompting action - that I traced in another place (my article on addiction).

Once a human organism becomes dehydrated, an automatic discomfort, thirst, is generated that transforms into an urge to seek water, which even becomes an emotion unto itself that drastically interferes with all rational thought if the thirst is not quenched.

I don't believe all this strong desire for water is preceded by a choice to think. It is more automatic than that. Yet obtaining water is definitely a human value.

Michael

Post 22

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 9:56am

Roger writes:

Yes, indeed, and I start my engine every morning, much the same way as described above. No "first-cause focusing." Instead, it's first-cause perception (awareness) of becoming awake, evaluating wakefulness as being better than non-wakefulness, wanting wakefulness, and then choosing to pursue wakefulness, which requires focus. Every subsequent focus depends upon this specific sequence.

Roger, how in any sense can you be said to "evaluate wakefulness as being better than non-wakefulness" without the choice to focus? Any ~evaluation~ presupposes the choice to focus. How, in any meaningful sense, can you be said to *evaluate* without first choosing to focus? There is no such thing as an unfocused evaluation. I wonder if you understand the choice to focus the same way AR does when she speaks of it as a "set". We would agree that we are given the evidence of the senses (perception), after that it is one's mental approach to that evidence--do I float by in a haze or do I raise my level of awareness to attempt to identify the evidence that is given? Beyond the perceptual, nothing is automatic or given in terms of man's volitional conceptual ability--the identification/evaluation has to be done by choice.

Regards,
Michael

Post 23

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 10:55am

Hi Michael,

You wrote, "Ok, back to morality. If a choice was inescapable, if it was truly 'necessitated by antecedent factors', then on what grounds can you blame or praise somebody? The person merely had to, it wipes away any alternative course of action. Remember what I said when this is a 'frontal assault' on values? There is an implicit (and sometimes explicit) claim to innate values, so how can one person lay blame on another if the other person was driven to that action? The best you can say is: 'Oh well, that happened'."

First, you continue to equate determined values with innate values. But these are not the same. Innate values are values that one is born with, not values that one acquires in the process of living one�s life. Values can be determined without being innate.

Second, determinism does not �wipe away� any alternative course of action, nor does it invalidate praise and blame. Alternatives exist wherever choice exists, even when the choice is determined by one's antecedent values, and wherever choice exists, praise or blame is relevant. Consider a judge who votes to overturn Roe v. Wade. Even though he could not have done otherwise, given his belief that abortion is murder, I can still �blame� him for voting the wrong way. Similarly, if a judge votes to preserve Roe v. Wade, then even though she could not have done otherwise, given her belief in the right to abortion, I can still �praise� her for voting the right way. Both judges faced the alternative of voting for or against the right to abortion, even though their votes were determined by their political values. So, alternatives do not presuppose free will.

Finally, just as alternatives are not restricted to free will, so they are not restricted to human action, but pertain to all living organisms. As Rand observes, "There is only one alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence--and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death." ("The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15)

You write, "Worse yet, [determinism] denies praise to those who chose to pursue life, who create value. Imagine that you told AR that Atlas Shrugged was not a product of her volition, what do you think her response would have been?�

It was a product of her choice, to be sure, but are you telling me that given her intense interest in writing that novel, she could just as well have chosen not to write it--that she was free (psychologically) to abandon one of the most vital interests of her career?!

You continue, �It is helpful here to remember AR's definition of morality: "Morality is a code of values accepted by choice" (Italics mine)."

Well, it's accepted "by choice" only if one uses the term "choice" in a somewhat loose or figurative sense. Strictly speaking, a code of values is no more accepted by choice than my belief in Catholicism was accepted by choice. I was brought up with a religious code of values and accepted it only because I was indoctrinated into believing it, not because I "chose" to believe it. And I stopped believing it only when I realized it was false, not because I chose to stop believing it. One chooses one's actions, not one's beliefs.

You continue, "Also, AR writes: 'Morality pertains only to the sphere of man's free will--only to those actions which are open to his choice' (Italics mine). Its hard for me to believe that some people believe that they can take volition out of the equation and still think its consistent with AR's ethical framework. Man as a volitional being lies at the base of this framework."

I wouldn't say that determinism is consistent with AR's entire ethical framework! That would be self-contradictory, because free will is part of that framework, to be sure. But I do think that determinism is consistent with morality�with the obligation to adhere to a rational code of values. Rand equates free will with "actions which are open to [man's] choice," but as I noted in previous posts, one can have choice without free will. Even Rand herself recognizes the existence of choices that are not free, but are themselves controlled by the choice to think.

You write, "There is no essential difference here with necessitated behavior and compelled behavior. If somebody puts a gun to your head and compels you to rob a bank or some other action, it is clear they are inhibiting your choice."

On the contrary, there is an essential difference between compelled behavior and necessitated behavior. If my behavior is compelled, I am forced to act in accordance with someone else's values and against my own. If my behavior is necessitated (by my values), I am acting in accordance with my values, not against them.

You continue, "In law, this provides the excuse of *duress*, which means somebody's free will has been denied."

It doesn't mean that someone's free will has been denied; it means, as John Locke observed, that someone�s freedom to act in accordance with his will has been denied. There is an important difference here. Even if it is assumed that the person would necessarily have chosen an alternative course of action, he is still absolved of responsibility for the action that he was compelled to take because the action was not a reflection of his own values. For example, there is literally no chance that I would ever rob a bank, because of my belief in property rights. But suppose that I am forced at gunpoint to commit such a robbery. Am I absolved of responsibility for the crime only because, in the absence of such coercion, I would have freely chosen a different action? No, I am absolved of responsibility for it, because the action I was compelled to take was not a reflection of my values, even if those values would have necessitated a different course of action. In fact, it could be argued that it is only because, in the absence of being compelled, I would necessarily have chosen to abstain from the robbery that I can be absolved of responsibility for it.

You continue, "This contrasts with the militant Islamist who is NOT simply 'given his fanatical beliefs', but rather those beliefs are chosen and maintained by dedicated irrationality; thus resulting in his nihilistic actions. If these beliefs were merely the "given", then it would be awfully difficult to explain the other people who grow up in the same circumstances and do not become a fanatical Islamist or do not murder on these fanatical beliefs. Those same people did act otherwise.�

Once again, a person does not �choose� his beliefs. My belief in the religion I grew up with was not something I chose. I believed it, because that�s what I was taught. In other words, I believed it because I didn't know any better. As for the difference in the actions of people who grew up in the same circumstances, it doesn't follow that in the absence of free will they must all necessarily possess exactly the same beliefs. Some may be more intelligent and more inclined to question what they are taught, or they may have parents who are less fundamentalist and less dogmatic, or they may not have been exposed to the same militant ideas, or even if they were, they may not be as inclined to violence or as willing to put their lives on the line. There could be any number of reasons, short of free will, as to why they don�t all possess exactly the same beliefs and values.

You wrote, "Determinism is precisely what the advocates of 'compassion' rely on when they try to excuse the actions of criminals (see George Soros)--it is truly anathema to the rule of objective law."

I am aware of that, but it is a non-sequitur to infer that a determined individual is not responsible for his actions. In fact, as I argued previously, "If his choice were free, it would be free of any necessary connection to his character. But in that case, how could we justifiably blame or punish him? Since his choice would not proceed from his character, he could not be held responsible for it. Thus, far from determinism's being incompatible with moral responsibility, it is free will that is incompatible with it."

You replied, "Free does not mean free from the constraints of reality. When somebody acts contrary to life, or in pursuit of death, we can condemn them because they are not acting in accordance with their nature as a volitional and rational being. You have it in exact reverse, character is not the given, it proceeds from his choice. Choice determines one's character--character does not exist apart from the choices one makes to direct the course of his life."

It is true that one's choices reflect one's character, which I would define the same way Rand defines "soul�--as "the mind and its values." But in this sense of the term, character does indeed determine choice. One�s moral character or moral values determine what choices one will make. For example, since I value respecting the rights of others, I will choose my actions based on that value. It is true that character does not exist apart from the choices one makes, because those choices are linked to one's character and are a reflection of it. But it is still one's character (or soul) that comprises one's values, and one's values that determines one's choices.

You continue, "The reason you end up at this position is your call to innate values--no such thing applies to man who is a being of volitional consciousness. Man has to chose between the fundamental alternative of life and death."

Again, I don't believe in innate values; I thought I made that clear. As for choosing between the fundamental alternative of life or death, I don't have a problem with that, as long as it�s clear what that choice involves. However, I don't regard that choice as implying free will, for all the reasons that I�ve stated previously.

I wrote, "Moreover, if a criminal's choices were free of antecedent causes, it is difficult to see how punishment could be expected to affect his behavior, since his choices would then be free of any deterrent effect that the punishment could be expected to have."

You replied, "First, as an aside, be careful about assuming that *deterrence* is the goal of punishment, in the philosophy of law this is a very bad idea. If deterrence were the goal, then chopping people's heads off for petty crimes would be the proper method of punishment."

Deterrence is the goal of punishment consistent with a respect for individual rights. Chopping people�s heads off for petty crimes is not consistent with that standard for two reasons: First, capital punishment raises the possibility of convicting an innocent man; life in prison allows him the possibility of redress should new evidence arise to overturn his conviction. Second, even if capital punishment were justified, it wouldn't be justified for petty crimes, because it would encourage petty criminals to commit even more heinous crimes in order to cover their tracks and avoid being apprehended, since they would have nothing to lose by doing so. If deterrence is the goal, that goal is best served by reserving harsh punishment for serious offenses. Conversely, if punishment provided no deterrence to crime, it would be an exercise in pointless brutality.

You continue, "Secondly, because such a violator is 'free', at any given point in time this means the violator can change his course of action---he can chose to be rational--thereby reclaiming his moral character."

Not if he doesn't believe that he is acting irrationally. Yes, he can change his course of action, but only if he has reason to believe that it is worth changing.

You add, "It is determinism which says he can't do otherwise, so it is determinism, not free will, that is inconsistent with a rational code of morality."

Determinism says that a criminal can't do otherwise unless he values doing otherwise. A rational code of morality is a code of values which, if he accepts it, will cause him to change his values, and that in turn will cause him to change his behavior. So, a rational code of morality is perfectly consistent with determinism. If you want people to act differently, then you must get them to think differently, which is why philosophy and the battle for the right ideas are so important.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 11/21, 10:57am)

Post 24

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 12:35pm

Bill,

I realize that you did not explicitly endorse automatic values, but like I said at the very beginning, this is what your position reduces to. Remember when I said that you would always respond with: "Yeah, but the person must value making that choice", which is precisely what you keep doing. I rejected this about 10 posts ago as it an arbitrary construct of determinism. On the level of man's consciousness, there is not some Platonic ideal of character apart from the choices one makes, or, in your words, "choices that reflect one's character". NO!!! One's choices shape one's character. Morality is the code of values accepted by choice.

Regarding deterrence, consequentialism does NOT have a connection to individual rights. The theory claims that the goal of punishment is to have a general deterrent effect upon society--there is no real connection with individual rights. And the greatest deterrent effect is to impose severe punishment--the proportionality principle is thrown out the window. I agree with your arguments about capital punishment, but your making a connection that consequentialism does NOT hold. Furthermore, just look at the society's who impose cutting off hands for the crime of theft, this DOES result in less theft crimes (AND they have less crime rates for more severe crimes as well). So the argument does not hold water when you look at the evidence. And it begs the question, if there is greater deterrence with chopping off somebody's hand and if deterrence is the goal, then why would you see this as unjust?

Under an individual rights theory, the primary role of punishment is to protect those individuals who do not infringe on upon the individuals rights of another --who chose to live as rational beings (specifically the individual who had his rights violated). Punishment exists to protect the freedom of action of law-abiding citizens; once somebody has infringed on another's rights, then they have forfeited their own freedom of action (to the degree of the crime). From this derives the proportionality principle of law--i.e. "where the punishment fits the crime". Whatever the deterrent effects (both specific and general), they are a secondary consequence. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in consequentialism is the concept that "society" is the benefactor or malfactor of a given action, it breaks the connection with individual actors.

Bill, I appreciate the lengthy responses, but again we seem to be retracing the same circle. We seem to be going through lengthy responses to end up right back at the same place. Can we go further?

Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/21, 12:41pm)

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/21, 12:43pm)

EDIT: I changed "innate values" to "automatic values" as you maybe happier with that characterization, although I think they reduce to the same thing.

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/22, 6:51am)

Post 25

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 1:37pm

I previously wrote::

Yes, indeed, and I start my engine every morning, much the same way as described above. No "first-cause focusing." Instead, it's first-cause perception (awareness) of becoming awake, evaluating wakefulness as being better than non-wakefulness, wanting wakefulness, and then choosing to pursue wakefulness, which requires focus. Every subsequent focus depends upon this specific sequence.

Michael Moeller commented:

Roger, how in any sense can you be said to "evaluate wakefulness as being better than non-wakefulness" without the choice to focus? Any ~evaluation~ presupposes the choice to focus. How, in any meaningful sense, can you be said to *evaluate* without first choosing to focus? There is no such thing as an unfocused evaluation. I wonder if you understand the choice to focus the same way AR does when she speaks of it as a "set". We would agree that we are given the evidence of the senses (perception), after that it is one's mental approach to that evidence--do I float by in a haze or do I raise my level of awareness to attempt to identify the evidence that is given? Beyond the perceptual, nothing is automatic or given in terms of man's volitional conceptual ability--the identification/evaluation has to be done by choice.

It's really not that difficult! As I lie in bed, gradually becoming aware that I am waking up, it suddenly occurs to me that I need to be at work early today, and I make an immediate evaluation that staying in bed any longer is a bad idea and that getting up is a must, and I do so. There is no focus involved. No decision to turn up my level of awareness to review what is on tap for today. Just a blinding, immediate, spontaneous realization that I had better get moving! That's how I usually start my day. How do you start yours? :-)

Seriously, I do focus a lot. But it is not the "first cause" of my awareness. I don't see how a person can choose to focus unless they first want to focus. How can you choose anything that you do not first want? Explain this, and I will join you in the Sacred Land of Libertarian Free Will.

REB

Post 26

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 1:53pm

Roger writes:

It's really not that difficult! As I lie in bed, gradually becoming aware that I am waking up, it suddenly occurs to me that I need to be at work early today, and I make an immediate evaluation that staying in bed any longer is a bad idea and that getting up is a must, and I do so. There is no focus involved. No decision to turn up my level of awareness to review what is on tap for today. Just a blinding, immediate, spontaneous realization that I had better get moving! That's how I usually start my day. How do you start yours? :-)

Seriously, I do focus a lot. But it is not the "first cause" of my awareness. I don't see how a person can choose to focus unless they first want to focus. How can you choose anything that you do not first want? Explain this, and I will join you in the Sacred Land of Libertarian Free Will.

Please, PLEASE, do not put me anywhere in the vicinity of the Big "L" world as it is anything but sacred. You should realize by now that I am much more of an orthodox Objectivist. My day? I wake up and see what I need to do, which requires focus on my part--not like problem-solving, but a lower level focus which is still nonetheless focus (Yes, there are different levels, but still contingent on that primary "set"). Remember AR's concept is a "set", specifically concentrating is a more specific "tuning". Really, Roger, I don't get why determinists have to perform an "end-around" by saying that somebody must have a "reason" to focus--this is nothing more than an assumption with no proof and contradicts the self-evident fact of free will. Of all the things to haggle with in AR's philosophy, this seems to be among the least controversial. Furthermore, the way she lays out her philosophical structure, denying free will has a significant reverberating effect on the hierarchy, and morality in particular.

Best Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/21, 1:56pm)

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/21, 2:02pm)

Post 27

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 6:55pm

Michael,

Just a quick note to inform you that "libertarian free will" does not refer to political libertarianism, but to volitional libertarianism. I can tell you're not a philosophy major. :-) "Libertarian" free will refers to the kind of free will Objectivism advocates as distinct from compatibilist free will. That's all Roger meant by the "Sacred Land of Libertarian Free Will."

- Bill

Post 28

Monday, November 21, 2005 - 7:47pm

Bill,

Touche, Bill. I've actually seen the term many times before in debates with determinists, but I was unaware of the connection to philosophical history as it was not my major (currently law by way of engineering).

Regards,
Michael

Post 29

Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 1:49am

Michael Moeller wrote,

"I realize that you did not explicitly endorse automatic values, but like I said at the very beginning, this is what your position reduces to."

It is not my position that values are "automatic." "Automatic" means acting in a mechanical fashion, like an automatic pistol or machine. To deny that values arise solely from the choice to think does not imply that they are automatic. Values can have different causes, e.g., one's nature as a certain kind of living organism, one's experience, one's education and, of course, one's choice to think, to reason, and to evaluate the information that one acquires.

You continue, "Remember when I said that you would always respond with: 'Yeah, but the person must value making that choice', which is precisely what you keep doing. I rejected this about 10 posts ago as it an arbitrary construct of determinism."

I don't think it's the least bit arbitrary, for it seems to me that you must want in some sense to perform the action that you choose, otherwise there would be no purpose in your making the choice.

You continue, "On the level of man's consciousness, there is not some Platonic ideal of character apart from the choices one makes, or, in your words, "choices that reflect one's character". NO!!! One's choices shape one's character. Morality is the code of values accepted by choice."

I don't know where you got the idea of a "Platonic ideal." What does that have to do with the fact that what you value is a reflection of your soul or character? Remember, I defined "character" as the mind and its values. Values are acquired. You are not born with them after the manner of Plato's innate ideas.

You write, "Regarding deterrence, consequentialism does NOT have a connection to individual rights. The theory claims that the goal of punishment is to have a general deterrent effect upon society--there is no real connection with individual rights."

I didn't use the word "consequentialism." I simply said that punishment would not be an effective deterrent if one were indifferent to it--if one were free of any effect that it might have on one's behavior. Nor did I suggest or imply that it is permissible to violate someone's rights if doing so will deter criminal behavior. I would not, for example, advocate a compulsory curfew for young men between the age of 18 and 25, even if that would deter criminal activity, for it would also violate their rights. After all, if protecting people's rights is the purpose of deterring crime (which it certainly is), then any punishment done for the purpose of deterrence cannot logically involve a violation of those selfsame rights.

You continue, "And the greatest deterrent effect is to impose severe punishment--the proportionality principle is thrown out the window. I agree with your arguments about capital punishment, but your making a connection that consequentialism does NOT hold. Furthermore, just look at the society's who impose cutting off hands for the crime of theft, this DOES result in less theft crimes (AND they have less crime rates for more severe crimes as well). So the argument does not hold water when you look at the evidence. And it begs the question, if there is greater deterrence with chopping off somebody's hand and if deterrence is the goal, then why would you see this as unjust?"

You are dropping context--the context of protecting and preserving people's rights, which is the purpose of punishment. If its purpose is to deter a violation of rights, then the punishment cannot involve a violation of those rights, which a disregard of proportionality would entail. That doesn't mean that deterring a violation of rights cannot be the purpose of punishment. What other purpose could there be? The goal of punishing the guilty is to protect the innocent--to prevent and discourage the criminally inclined from violating their rights.

You continue, "Under an individual rights theory, the primary role of punishment is to protect those individuals who do not infringe on upon the individuals rights of another --who chose to live as rational beings (specifically the individual who had his rights violated). Punishment exists to protect the freedom of action of law-abiding citizens; once somebody has infringed on another's rights, then they have forfeited their own freedom of action (to the degree of the crime). From this derives the proportionality principle of law--i.e. 'where the punishment fits the crime'. Whatever the deterrent effects (both specific and general), they are a secondary consequence. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in consequentialism is the concept that 'society' is the benefactor or malfactor of a given action, it breaks the connection with individual actors."

And how does punishment protect those individuals who do not infringe on the individual rights of another, if not by preventing and discouraging criminals or potential criminals from violating their rights?

You wrote, "Bill, I appreciate the lengthy responses, but again we seem to be retracing the same circle. We seem to be going through lengthy responses to end up right back at the same place. Can we go further?"

Perhaps. Let me ask you a few questions in order to see if we can establish some agreement on basic premises. Do you agree with the following--yes or no?

1) In order to choose an action, one must be aware of the choice that one is making. (Yes or no.)

2) If your answer to 1) is no, then how do you choose an alternative that you're not aware of?

3) In order to choose an action, one must do so for the sake of an end or goal. For example, in order to choose to focus, one must do so for the sake of increasing one's level of awareness. (Yes or no.)

4) If your answer to 3) is no, then how can you be held morally responsible for making the right choices, since in that case, your choices would not be made for the sake of a morally desirable end or goal?

Based on your answers to these questions, perhaps we can make some progress.

- Bill

Post 30

Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 8:29am

Bill,

Ok, let me first start with deterrence because I think our wires got crossed.

You are dropping context--the context of protecting and preserving people's rights, which is the purpose of punishment. If its purpose is to deter a violation of rights, then the punishment cannot involve a violation of those rights, which a disregard of proportionality would entail. That doesn't mean that deterring a violation of rights cannot be the purpose of punishment. What other purpose could there be? The goal of punishing the guilty is to protect the innocent--to prevent and discourage the criminally inclined from violating their rights.

That's what I am saying, Bill, the purpose is not to deter. The primary purpose is to impose punishment for harm done to another individual, whether or not this has a deterrent effect on the criminal's future actions. Do you see the difference? Deterrence is focused on the future actions of the criminal--i.e. what he will do as a result of the punishment. The tie to individual rights is severed--i.e. one individual's actions harming the rights of another individual-- which is the basis for justice. Whether or not a person is deterred in the future, they should be punished for the harm already done to an individual--this is the primary purpose, Bill. You are providing a very mixed bag here.

I am not sure you are familiar with the different schools of punishment, but the deterrence school of punishment (in law) is referred to as "consequentialism" or "utilitarian". One the greatest problems with this school of thought is free will. Criminals are free to ignore the consequences of their actions and they usually do. Generally, criminals are a relatively small minority falling in an age range between late teen's and thirty, and when they are out of prison, commit something like 15 crimes/year, and then go right back to prison. Why? Because criminals act on whim, the future has no meaning to them--they want it and they want it now. Without getting into it too deeply, the deterrence school advocates all kinds of crazy punishment schemes, which are a result of severing the tie to the harm done to the individual. THIS is what you need to keep in focus when talking about individual rights and punishment, Bill, not the future effects upon a criminal's actions--punishment may have an effect, but usually does not. And the punishment stands in proportion to the harm done to another individual, NOT in accordance with the impact punishment will have on the criminal's future actions (i.e. deterrence).

Bill writes:

It is not my position that values are "automatic." "Automatic" means acting in a mechanical fashion, like an automatic pistol or machine. To deny that values arise solely from the choice to think does not imply that they are automatic. Values can have different causes, e.g., one's nature as a certain kind of living organism, one's experience, one's education and, of course, one's choice to think, to reason, and to evaluate the information that one acquires.

That's what I am saying, you mix in what I would call "automatic values". That is, whatever one's education or environment thrusts into one's head--i.e. those without the choice to think. I am saying on the human level, values-judgments are the product of choice. You said in the earlier post that one does not "chose one's beliefs". Really? How do they get there? Osmosis?

You used the example of your experience with Catholicism, which you have to remember was while you were still developing "the rudiments of reason". But even on this level, you have to identify what those beliefs are and say "these are mine". Even if your reasoning capabilities are still underdeveloped and the context of your knowledge is low, there still is this fundamental focus (even though it is not fully developed yet). Later, when evidence expands, it is your choice whether your current beliefs are consistent with the evidence and you are free to ignore the new evidence or to change your beliefs--this is your choice. Your previous knowledge does not apply automatically to the new evidence, you have chose to exercise your volitional, rational capacity. You have to identify and integrate, which is strictly the product of volition.

Bill writes:

I don't know where you got the idea of a "Platonic ideal." What does that have to do with the fact that what you value is a reflection of your soul or character? Remember, I defined "character" as the mind and its values. Values are acquired. You are not born with them after the manner of Plato's innate ideas.

True about the "Platonic ideal", I misapplied it to your position. However, it does not change my essential argument, that there is no "...and values" without the choice to think. You are stating that the values are there prior to the choice to think, I am rejecting this, which is where we are getting "hung up". Character does not spit out actions, one's actions shapes one's character. To me this is obvious.

And we are getting hung up on #3 in your questions. You and Roger keep saying that one must have a "reason to focus" or "want to focus" or some such variant. I am saying that in any attempt to explain the "intellectual factor", one must have chosen to focus. You are "smuggling in" the choice to focus. This is an irreducible primary, it is the "first cause" of one's knowledge. In contrast, Roger is saying that one can perform identification/evaluation without the choice to focus, which, in part, I think is the result of differences in what the choice to focus entails. I said on the previous thread that is precisely what the argument will boil down to--so we are left with the "seez you, SEEZ I" type of argument. In the end, people can look at the arguments, introspect, and decide for themselves. Does one identify/evaluate prior to the choice to focus? Is the choice to think driven by one's values or does the choice to think stand at the base of discovering one's values? And so on.

In answer to your question #4, one must ~discover~ the code of values, one must chose the morally desirable end or goals, which is based on the primary choice to focus. A morally desirable goal is not handed down to man, he must first focus and subsequently chose among the alternatives that reality offers. As AR stated, morality only applies to the "sphere of free will".

Best Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/23, 8:39am)

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/23, 9:29am)

Post 31

Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 7:12pm

Michael, I'm going to address the portion of your reply devoted to crime and punishment in a separate thread under the not too surprising title "Crime and Punishment" in the General forum, if that's all right. So look for it there. Okay?

I wrote, "It is not my position that values are 'automatic.' 'Automatic' means acting in a mechanical fashion, like an automatic pistol or machine. To deny that values arise solely from the choice to think does not imply that they are automatic. Values can have different causes, e.g., one's nature as a certain kind of living organism, one's experience, one's education and, of course, one's choice to think, to reason, and to evaluate the information that one acquires."

You reply, "That's what I am saying, you mix in what I would call 'automatic values'. That is, whatever one's education or environment thrusts into one's head--i.e. those without the choice to think. I am saying on the human level, value-judgments are the product of choice.

I'm not saying that education takes place without the choice to think. I'm saying that there are many different factors that contribute to one's values, besides the choice to think, e.g., the environment one grows up in, the education one receives, etc. You cannot reasonably expect that a 12-year old child raised in the Middle East by Muslim parents to hate Americans could become an Objectivist simply by "choosing to think."

You continue, "You said in the earlier post that one does not 'chose one's beliefs'. Really? How do they get there? Osmosis?"

No, one's beliefs are a product of one's conclusions, which are determined by such things as one's choice to think, the soundness of one's reasoning, the accuracy of one's information, one's context of knowledge, one's level of education, etc.

You write, "You used the example of your experience with Catholicism, which you have to remember was while you were still developing "the rudiments of reason". But even on this level, you have to identify what those beliefs are and say 'these are mine'."

Of course! Who is denying that?!

You continue, "Even if your reasoning capabilities are still underdeveloped and the context of your knowledge is low, there still is this fundamental focus (even though it is not fully developed yet)."

I don't know what you mean by "not fully developed yet." As I understand Objectivism, the choice to focus is not something one "develops" in stages, like the ability to reason; you either have the freedom to focus or you don't.

You continue, "Later, when evidence expands, it is your choice whether your current beliefs are consistent with the evidence and you are free to ignore the new evidence or to change your beliefs--this is your choice."

But if you are aware of the new evidence--if you recognize it as evidence against your beliefs--then how can you "ignore" it, and believe otherwise? For example, when I became aware of the evidence against theism, I could no more ignore that evidence and "choose" to believe in God than I can now ignore the evidence for capitalism and "choose" to believe in socialism.

You wrote, "Your previous knowledge does not apply automatically to the new evidence, you have chose to exercise your volitional, rational capacity. You have to identify and integrate, which is strictly the product of volition."

You don't choose to identify something, any more than you choose to recognize it. If you see the evidence for it, then you will identify it; if you do not, then you won't. For example, I don't choose to identify that egoism is true and altruism false; if I did, then I could just as well choose to identify that altruism is true and egoism is false, which I obviously cannot do. It is true that you can choose to integrate the evidence provided by your senses, but only insofar as you consider it worth doing.

You wrote that "we are getting hung up on #3 in your questions. You and Roger keep saying that one must have a 'reason to focus' or 'want to focus' or some such variant. I am saying that in any attempt to explain the "intellectual factor", one must have chosen to focus."

So you're saying that one does not choose to focus for the sake of increasing one's level of awareness. One just chooses to focus period, with no end or goal in mind? Michael, this doesn't make any sense!

You write, "In answer to your question #4, one must ~discover~ the code of values, one must chose the morally desirable end or goals, which is based on the primary choice to focus. A morally desirable goal is not handed down to man, he must first focus and subsequently chose among the alternatives that reality offers. As AR stated, morality only applies to the 'sphere of free will'.

And as I understand Objectivism, the sphere of free will is confined to the choice to focus. So would you say that choosing to focus is morally desirable? And if it isn't, then how can you be held morally responsible for making that choice? That's question #4, which you still haven't answered.

In closing, let me return to each of my questions, and see if I understand your answers to them, since you didn't address them systematically as I had hoped; nor did you give an explicit answer to each one. I had asked:

"1) In order to choose an action, one must be aware of the choice that one is making. (Yes or no.)" I take it that your answer is "no."

"2) If your answer to 1) is no, then how do you choose an alternative that you're not aware of?" I don't think you answered this one. Do you mind doing so? Thanks.

"3) In order to choose an action, one must do so for the sake of an end or goal. For example, in order to choose to focus, one must do so for the sake of increasing one's level of awareness. (Yes or no.)" Here, as I understand it, your answer is "no."

"4) If your answer to 3) is no, then how can you be held morally responsible for making the right choices, since in that case, your choices would not be made for the sake of a morally desirable end or goal?" As I indicated, you didn't actually answer this question either. So if you wouldn't mind... Thanks. :)

- Bill

Post 32

Wednesday, November 23, 2005 - 10:38pm

HOLY ARGUMENTS, CompatibilistMAN!

All this...verbiage...from Roger and Bill...over a simple 'challenge' I made regarding the distinction between what *I* specified as a 'random desire' and a 'value' in the O'ist framework has become a bit...mind-boggling; especially, since my question re the distinction was never clearly answered in all those wordy posts.

     An aside:
     Roger:
         You said...

"John Dailey aka Morganis Chamlo ("this is 'Morganis' typing. Remember me? We HAVE debated before, as I'm sure you're aware.") made a very scary threat:
Do Tell? Really? A 'random desire would presuppose a standard'? Where in the world are you getting this from? This is making no sense, Bill; c'mon!...Because of THIS statement of yours, I'm going to have a question for you (specified at end-of-post) in all responses to you 'till you unequivocally, relevently, answer it.
OK, let's not be seeing this over and over!"

I don't know what was supposedly so 'scary' about reminding Bill that this subject has been debated amongst he and I, and SEVERAL others (including you, Rog), since ATL-days, hence that he needn't 'remind' me about certain basics he carefully, though pointlessly, spelled out as though to a novice (though we haven't debated down the particular path of THIS thread).--- Re the 'threat': Well, Rog, wishing doesn't do as much as actions, right? 'Answer it' in the terms I gave, and we won't '...be seeing this over and over'. Unfortunately, neither you nor Bill did so. Ergo...

     To the point:

     Yes, you argue that Bill stressed THE PURSUIT OF..etc. I don't see what this distinction has to do with my original point. What is it with all these tangential 'lawyeresque' arguments and terminology compatibilists need to bring up re-'explaining' what they already supposedly clarified? One 'distinction' necessitates another, until the new argument becomes who's doing the really pointless 'hair-splitting' regarding the latest-used terminology/definitions? Talk about 'slip-sliding away' from the original subject!

     ...And, re-phrased, my repeated question:

     In the O'ist framework, do either of you see a worthwhile-calling 'difference' between the terms 'desire' and 'Value'? This is a simple question, really. You do, or, you don't. If so, what is the dif? (In which case, is there any dif from 'whim'?) If not...well...NOW you got reason to make a long post 'explaining' how one can say one's an O'ist while believing there's no dif in the terms questioned about.

LLAP
J:D

P.S: I do suspect that 'compatibalists' require that there be little 'distinction' of worth between the concepts of 'Value' and random-'desire'. This is starting to stand out in all arguments.

PPS: Rog, your posts really don't need to be all that...well...'bold'. They are understandable without such.

(Edited by John Dailey on 11/23, 10:40pm)

Post 33

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 1:31pm

In Post 9 of Ayn Rand and "Honest" Misinterpretation on the Objectivism Q&A forum, Robert Malcom replied to me as follows:

It's deterministic anyway, isn't it - so what's the difference................;-)

This suggests that things wouldn't make a difference to people whose actions are necessitated by antecedent factors, which is false. The fact that a person's choices are necessitated by his value judgments doesn't mean that it makes no difference to him whether he achieves his values or fails to achieve them. On the contrary, it makes all the difference in the world, which is why he chooses one course of action rather than another. His choices are necessitated by his recognition of that difference.

- Bill

Post 34

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 2:14pm

Question for the Value-Determinizers in this thread:

What is it then, when I (or anyone) uses free will to choose to sacrifice a higher value for a lower one? Like when I, back in high school, choose to thwart that which I desired above all other desires (her name was Laura), by choosing not to enter into the required verbal interaction that she had seemed receptive to?

Sacrifice can be willfully chosen, but that contradicts value-determinism. Doesn't it?

Ed

Post 35

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 2:23pm

Also, I respectfully request the Value-Determinists to integrate their view with the following:

... the good is neither an attribute of "things in themselves" nor of man's emotional states, but AN EVALUATION of the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard of value ... validated by a process of reason ... THE GOOD IS AN ASPECT OF REALITY IN RELATION TO MAN ... it must be discovered, not invented, by man.

... man's capacity to recognize the good, i.e. his capacity to value.

It would seem that "objective good recognition" is what it means to humanly value something. I don't equate a value with subjective, oft-whimsical desires. Values are always good to gain or keep, desires aren't. And I'd appreciate feedback on this.

Ed

Post 36

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 2:58pm

LOL - I love it when sarcasm is taken for straight..........;-)

Post 37

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 3:34pm

Ed Thompson wrote:

Question for the Value-Determinizers in this thread:

What is it then, when I (or anyone) uses free will to choose to sacrifice a higher value for a lower one? Like when I, back in high school, choose to thwart that which I desired above all other desires (her name was Laura), by choosing not to enter into the required verbal interaction that she had seemed receptive to?

Sacrifice can be willfully chosen, but that contradicts value-determinism. Doesn't it?

No. In fact, what we call "sacrifice" never involves giving up a higher value for a lower one. Never. It is metaphysically impossible for any living being to do this, even human beings.

Your example: you valued more to refrain from the "required verbal interaction" than you did to have a relationship with Laura, and you chose accordingly. Had you really desired the relationship above all other desires -- including the desire to refrain from "required verbal interactions" -- you would have chosen Laura instead.

It's been a while since we've had a good Objectivist dogpile. I invite any and all comers to suggest a situation in which you could really give up a higher value for a lower one. I'm sure it can't be done. But I will be happy to provide an analysis of any and all examples where you think otherwise.

Now, I know some are going to say that people give up their professed or espoused higher values all the time, in the interest of tranquillity, pleasing others, being contrary, etc. But before suggesting these kinds of examples, bear in mind that these other things are the actual higher values that one surrenders one's professed or espoused higher values for. If one didn't value being contrary more than having one's favorite flavor of ice cream, vanilla, for instance, one wouldn't choose chocolate instead just to be contrary.

Got the premise? OK, go. Anyone?

REB

Post 38

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 4:22pm

Roger,
"It's been a while since we've had a good Objectivist dogpile. I invite any and all comers to suggest a situation in which you could really give up a higher value for a lower one. I'm sure it can't be done. But I will be happy to provide an analysis of any and all examples where you think otherwise."

I wouldn't even try. No matter what example anyone offered, you would interpret or analyze it thus:
"Had you really desired"

This is a method, older, but made popular by the Freudians -- or at least a caricature of them. "Oh, you deny you want to sleep with your mother. But that just means you really do want to sleep with her."

Monty Python comes to mind. "Well, what chance does that give me! Ok, I am the messiah."

Nothing would count as falsifying your theory, Roger, no matter what facts or arguments are presented.

Post 39

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 6:33pm