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Post 100

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 12:02pmSanction this postReply
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Bill, you're no help!

Merlin, I really want to understand what you're saying about the scenario you described.

You are saying that when you began to think about replying, you did not "consciously choose not to reply," you just "began considering or deliberating about replying or not replying."

All right -- did you consciously choose to begin "considering or deliberating about replying or not replying"? Either answer here presents problems that should be dealt with.

If you did not consciously choose (at T' prior to T0) to begin deliberating, but instead just began deliberating, what do you think is the status of that act of deliberation in regard to volition? In general, do you think that volition operates even when we don't make choices? Surely you don't mean to say that there are times we engage in thinking that are not the result of a choice to think (vs. to not think), do you?

But if you did consciously choose to begin deliberating, how can that not be also a conscious choice to not reply until after you have deliberated? Aren't you confusing here the difference between what is conscious and what is explicit?

If I consciously choose to go left, that logically excludes going right -- so even though I didn't explicitly choose not to go right, I did consciously choose not to go right by virtue of consciously choosing to go left. Similarly, if you consciously chose to deliberate about whether to reply to me, that logically excludes replying to me until after you have done some deliberating -- so even though you didn't explicitly choose not to reply to me until after deliberating, you did consciously choose not to reply to me until after deliberating.

REB


Post 101

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 12:03pmSanction this postReply
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Merlin, you wrote:
At T0 I began considering or deliberating about replying or not replying. At no time did I consciously choose not to reply. If you wish to hold that I implicitly chose not to reply by choosing to deliberate, then that was before T0 (a T1').
Just by way of clarification, are you saying here that you chose to deliberate at T0 or before T0 (at T1')? You seem to be saying that you chose to deliberate at T0, since you state that you began considering or deliberating at that time, but you also say that you implicitly chose not to reply by choosing to deliberate before T0 (at T1'). So, at what point did you choose to deliberate--at T0 or at T1'?

- Bill


Post 102

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 12:18pmSanction this postReply
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Some more defn's (...

Intellect = that human power of knowing facts

Will = that human power of evaluating facts against a standard (power of valuation)

Emotion = that adjunctive constituent, shared by all of sentient life, that can increase a motivation arrived at by the 2 human powers
Whatcha' think?

Ed


Post 103

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 1:10pmSanction this postReply
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Ed, my only quibble would be your definition of "will." As I understand the term, it refers to the power of intention or the power of choice. I did it willingly means I did it intentionally or voluntarily.

- Bill


Post 104

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 3:12pmSanction this postReply
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Bill, I'd like to think that I can recognize an improvement on myself or products of my mind when I see one. That said:

Will = intention

Thanks!
Ed


Post 105

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 5:27pmSanction this postReply
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Hi!
First of all my greatest respect to roger for being able to defend his position like king kong defended the white woman:-) thank's for the insights....

Still being a rookie of Objectivism I always got that little idea in mind that comes to the surface every time the discussion comes to free will vs. determinism. Quantum mechanics. As far as I know physicists say that the world of those smallest particles is chaotic and the attempt to locate a certain particle at a certain time is impossible.
(Something like that at least. ;-) )

Not being a physicist myself, I only have a vague notion of the idea of quantum mechanics but it is important to me not to ignore a potentially important piece of data and maybe one of you can explain if this conflicts with the idea roger has of determinism (or should it be called Compatibilism?).

Tok


Post 106

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 7:14pmSanction this postReply
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Roger Bissell wrote:
Merlin, I really want to understand what you're saying about the scenario you described.

You are saying that when you began to think about replying, you did not "consciously choose not to reply," you just "began considering or deliberating about replying or not replying." All right -- did you consciously choose to begin "considering or deliberating about replying or not replying"? Either answer here presents problems that should be dealt with.

Obviously I did in retrospect. But it happened very fast, and I don't remember deliberating that choice. When faced with a choice, we sometimes choose very quickly, so quickly we are barely aware of it at the time. It can be very quick when it's made by habit or it's a very easy choice.
If you did not consciously choose (at T' prior to T0) to begin deliberating, but instead just began deliberating, what do you think is the status of that act of deliberation in regard to volition? In general, do you think that volition operates even when we don't make choices?
No, since an essential part of volition in my view is making choices.

Surely you don't mean to say that there are times we engage in thinking that are not the result of a choice to think (vs. to not think), do you?
I'm more confident in claiming that young children engage in thinking without explicitly choosing to think. Objects or events in the environment trigger it. I'm inclined to think it happens with adults, too, but proportionately less often. While running  a few weeks ago I heard a loud noise behind me. Instantaneously I decided it sounded like a car crash, I turned around to look, and there was a car crash. I don't recall deliberating about whether or not it was a car crash, or whether to turn around and look or not. I just did both, which were easy and near reflexive reactions. At other times, of course, I am very aware of deciding to think about something.

 But if you did consciously choose to begin deliberating, how can that not be also a conscious choice to not reply until after you have deliberated? Aren't you confusing here the difference between what is conscious and what is explicit?
Like I replied to Bill in #95, not replying was an implicit choice, not an explicit one.

If I consciously choose to go left, that logically excludes going right -- so even though I didn't explicitly choose not to go right, I did consciously choose not to go right by virtue of consciously choosing to go left.
I'm puzzled, since "didn't explicitly choose" and "consciously choose" seem quite different. Was it an easy or habitual decision to go left or a very conscious one?

Similarly, if you consciously chose to deliberate about whether to reply to me, that logically excludes replying to me until after you have done some deliberating -- so even though you didn't explicitly choose not to reply to me until after deliberating, you did consciously choose not to reply to me until after deliberating.
I'm again puzzled, for the same reason.

P.S. There is another difference between the above alternatives. Turning left or right ("A1") is mutually exclusive. Deliberating or not replying ("A2") is not as mutually exclusive, since one of the alternatives in deliberating is deciding to not reply later. So it seems reasonable to view the rejected alternative in A1 as explicit but in A2 as implicit.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 12/20, 3:56am)


Post 107

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 7:15pmSanction this postReply
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In post #101 Bill Dwyer asked me:
So, at what point did you choose to deliberate--at T0 or at T1'?
It would be T1'. However, like I said to Roger in #106, I don't recall deliberating that choice since it happenened so quickly.


Post 108

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 7:30pmSanction this postReply
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Tok,
As one trained and educated in both Philosophy and Physics, I can assure you that Quantum Mechanics (the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in particular to which you allude here) has absolutely no relevance whatever to any discussion of volition vs determinism.

That we can only measure simultaneously the position and momentum of a given particle at a given time to within a certain limit says nothing about what humans and other living organisms can or can't do with their mental faculties. (In particular, h ~ dx dp, where h is Planck's contstant, and dx the uncertainty in position, dp the uncertainty in momentum. I.e. it's the their product that is always h or larger, therefore as you measure one more precisely, the uncertainty in the value of the other grows. But this is already undoubtedly far more than anyone wants to know.) 

I hope even Bill and Roger would acknowledge this so we don't go off on any tangents.

(Edited by Jeff Perren on 12/19, 7:37pm)


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Post 109

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 7:53pmSanction this postReply
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Tok, thank you for the encouraging words. :-)

Also, I agree completely with Jeff that quantum mechanics has absolutely no relevance to the free will vs. determinism issue.

REB


Post 110

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 4:35pmSanction this postReply
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I have identified the essentials of my reply to Roger and William, but I won't post it at this time. Online debates cause me personal stress, so I'll put this off until I have more free time and "psychic strength."

The only reason I am posting this is so that it will not seem that I have changed my mind.

Note to self: See RoR message to self with subject "NTS: free will."


Post 111

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 9:17pmSanction this postReply
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Rodney,

I look forward to it. No need to feel stressed; post whenever you feel comfortable. We are in this together, our shared goal being the pursuit of truth and mutual understanding.

Cheers,

Bill


Post 112

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 9:57amSanction this postReply
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Jeff P.,

I agree with your post 108, though I haven't always agreed. Those who would say that quantum mechanics does have something to do with the establishment of free will need to make some sort of plausibility argument about how quantum perturbation "bubbles up" to cause a system of top-level control in the brain.

In the case of the brain, the causative mechanisms for neural function: neurotransmitters, neural dark currents etc. occur on scales much too large to be affected by quantum phenomena in any way that is anything other than random.

However, there are complex chemical systems that are nondeterministic that are affected by quantum perturbation. Ilya Prigogine speaks of these in his book with the unfortunate title "The End of Certainty". He gave an example of a chemical system that oscillates in color based on quantum perturbation. He also gives examples of complex, far from equilibrium chemical systems that are based on irreversible branched "trees" that are affected by quantum perturbation. 

However, there are macroscopic systems in chaos theory that exhibit soft-causality, i.e. you can identify causes but you can't predict the effects. There are many chaotic systems represented by mathematical equations that exhibit Lyapunov instability or fractal character that simply cannot be predicted. I believe the brain to contain chaotic phenomena that has soft causality and is irreducible.

Lyman Hazelton touched on many of these topics in his talk on Chaos and Randomness at the TOC Summer Seminar.

Jim

(Edited by James Heaps-Nelson on 12/22, 10:00am)


Post 113

Sunday, January 22, 2006 - 12:35amSanction this postReply
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Fundamentally, I think there's two divergent arguments about how actions develop within us humans, and I'll only address one of them.
 
One assumes the principle of will, which seems plausible since more often the principle of will is more about the aspect of human consciousness which is to evaluate a situation based on memory, conceptions, and etc[?]. [That's if I'm representing that part of the argument correctly...]
 
What that would lead is that thought processes evolve through two stages. The first stage would be the integration of a percept which we have received. Now, the person in a given set of possibilities has to integrate them in such fashion as to examine the quality of each possibility. The second stage is to formulate an action based on pre-existent concepts that lead the person to make a choice based on values. But it must be prefaced that although a choice seems easily determined, the value that leads to the choice cannot be determined for the simple fact that values evolve over time not from intrinsic forms, rather they evolve from the simple drive to live.
 
That means concept-values can evolve in many ways. Thus, this argument based on the principle will isn't inaccurate when you consider that it does not presuppose that causality goes out the window either. It just means that humans develop their values based on the will to live, either implicitely or explicitely. It means that the events that precede a choice only are the result of the formation of concept-values themselves. Essentially, we humans experiment with particular values which we either decide work to our advantage or not. In some instances, a person will take upon a value without considering the consequences of the given value, such as seen with teenagers trying to fit in with their peers, leading to issues of violence, drug abuse, and etc. Fundamentally, in such cases, a person is not truly choosing to act free of the will or whims of others, but rather they chose to devest themselves of their own will to live, becoming a puppet or toy of another. Some could say, such a person has chosen to give up living for themselves, but what is really going on is that one has resigned themselves to not act on their own means to will, becoming a slave to causality rather than a locus for causality.
 
But back to the issue of how concept-values develop. Basically, a concept-value occurs from that need to experiment with particular ideas or concepts to form the values which best address our need to live, especially our need to live at our optimal capacities. For example, a hunter chooses to learn his/her trade especially well so s/he will not have to hunt everyday. But a hunter could choose to learn how to develop better tools for hunting rather than just technique, thus a hunter can choose to now develop better concept-values to improve his/her life in a quantative fashion. Because not every person wants to be a hunter, a person can experiment with different ideas and concepts to see which seems best to them and to their optimal capacities to live. Which is why some become scientists, others become athletes, and still some ply the trade of their parents and their parents's parents. What does free will or principle of will have to do with this? Very simply, if values drive our choices, then they must evolve from the very beginning from our will or want to live. And that means since not every person or animal is identical to each other their choices will differentiate by default just on the basis of biology alone, but that doesn't end the whole story.

What else evolves is that values can branch out to other possibily values or principles, which in themselves lead to others or to consequences not readily apparent once a concept-value is formed and accepted. Which makes concept-values closer to our 'soul' than our memories or other sorts of knowledge. Our concept-values define our identity, they make us what we are, and defines what we are not. In that view, concept-values are two-fold in their being for a human. First, we develop them from our basic will to live. They are our own little mental experiments in our own mental laboratory, seeing what works and what does not; seeing what fits and what does not. Yet in turn, each new concept-value we accept or feel has its mettle tested, leads to other conclusions which we must further experiment and test, seeing how the total logical relations fit with each other. Not every concept-value is held forever, and not every concept-value is exorcised from our mind, but that is the hallmark of 'free will'; the freedom to choose to think and to accept particular logical conclusions or not, to find alternatives and to experiment.
 
-- Bridget


Post 114

Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 10:17pmSanction this postReply
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     Jeezuz-F***in'-Buddha! This subject just will not die, will it? May Ishtar's mammaries flow the milk of wisdom forth to all of us on this subject someday. Kee-ripes!

     If I may add a...hopefully quite different...perspective (though within the same framework as my previous posts on the subject), let me try this view on all (of whomever may still be reading this far on this subject-thread.)

     I think that a lot of discombobulation occurs with using the term 'choice' (or 'choose'). Strictly speaking, this means nothing different in my readings of all so far from the term 'will.'
Think about the term 'free will' for a moment. Does the alternative idea 'un-free will' or 'non-free will' mean anything to anyone? Zombies don't count; there's no 'will' there worth talking about (I'll not touch 'hypnosis' here). Does/Can anyone have their will exercised (note the way I phrased that)...non-freely? Well, that depends on just exactly what one means by 'free' re one's will, non?

     One comment by Rand I remember (damn if I can remember the source; a Q&A maybe?) is when she made a distinction (though methinks it was in a political rather than psychological context; ntl, methinks the point applies here) about the use of the term 'freedom': she stressed that the more important aspect to consider was not in terms of 'freedom'-FROM (whatever) so much as 'freedom'-TO (or -FOR). Her orientation wasn't on 'freedom' from (driving?) forces, so much as 'freedom' from (restricting?) constraints, so that one was 'free'-TO do (whatever)...apparently regardless of concerns about 'motivations.' --- A word later about 'motivations' per se.

     The subject of deterministic motivations to 'explain' a...choice  (exercise of/by the 'will')...is definitely self-hemmed in on the forces concern. When the action/process/occurrence of a choice/will manifests, then there just MUST be 'something' that produces it, hmmm? Believe it or not, I sympathize with all R. Bissell's and W. Dwyer's attempts at dealing with this concern and find L. Piekoff's explanatory-answers...lacking. Yet, I have to agree with LP.

     The 'bottom line' concern is with the...decision/will/choice...to increase-one's-attention-or-not (ie:'focus.') on subject 'X'. Not to start the 'focus', but to change it (increase, or decrease).

     1st off, lets consider the 'push-pull' conflict of competing 'wants/desires', whether casual-interest ones (strawberry vs spumoni ice cream?) or intense-interest ones (make-a-move-on-her...or on him?) Any 'choice/decision/will-to-action' here is a motivation stemming from emotions. We are not 'using' our will, so much as we are allowing our feelings to use/direct/drive/decide/will/choose it. Yes, we are free to allow such; we are not free to call it 'free will' use. To 'use' something is to not allow something else to use/drive it. 'Using'/steering a car...or a kite...is not the same as allowing other forces (or people) to do it. Need I point out: vice-versa? A decision/choice to get spumoni (or, go for her) is not, properly, a 'free-will' action (much less a ratiocinated 'decision'), so much as a free-from-restriction desire-based action. ---'Desire-based' is not necessarily 'value-based' (if 'value' has any kind of special meaning); 'desire' may (and usually, though not always) coincide with 'value', but, as a base...nope: it's one or the other.

    2nd, let's consider the 'push-pull' conflict of competing 'needs'-of-the-moment (nothing 'casual' here), such as a non-crisis-of-the-moment 'forced-choice' between message-machine msg #1) having-to-be-at-the-auto-shop-in-15-mins-for-an-engine-problem-check (next appt: 2wks) vs message-machine msg #2) from-significant-other-"Please pick me up at work now; I need to get home fast." --- Unlike the ice cream 'alternatives', one has to ratiocinate (use logic to evaluate priority-'needs') about just what to do NOW (call him/her back, counting on getting a reply? call from the auto-shop?) Here, of course, is where the term 'Value' applies, unlike the 1st example of ...alternatives. Alternatives that, on the surface, can't be both met, yet, one's aware that a value, not a mere want/desire, can be lost; hence, one has to ratiocinate about which is the worse risk-of-loss...and avoid it (unless one shifts back to 'wants' and sees all as I'll-deal-with-this vs I'll-go-to-"The T&A club"...a variation on the ice cream example.)

     3rd, (which '2nd' touches on, at the end), the 'push-pull' conflict of competition between a 'need'/Value (sticking to one's diet) and an intense desire (one piece, JUST *1* PIECE of that fudge-frosted devil's-food-cake!). --- In this type of 'alternatives'-set, one takes control, or, one allows control to other...forces. One purposefully ('teleologically', if you wish) uses/steers one's will (hence, the real meaning of 'free'), or, one passes on it, and allows one's momentary-desire to 'decide'/'choose' between the alternatives. As in many things, one has 'freedom' to abdicate one's use of it; but then, one is thence not (as) 'free'...by any definition of the term. The 'choice' (if ratiocinated, here, then, therefore rationalized) to ignore the freedom to do what's best (usually exerting effort...or avoiding it) is the choice/decision to make it harder for one to keep doing so. Inevitably, with enough decisions/choices/'preferences' made this way, one does become a 'child of clay', a 'product of their environment', a...pre-determined being.

     This 3rd set of alternative-types is where Rand (or O'ism)...focuses...the idea of volition as spelled out in her writings; the other 'choice'/alternative-types are irrelevent. So, to merely argue (so belaboredly, so far,) about 'choices'/'decisions'/'alternatives'/'could-have-chosen's/etc, without spelling out this fulcrum territory, is to raise (accidentally no doubt, ntl, confusingly) smoke-and-mirrors. The choice/decision to think/focus or not (re one's self-perceived 'needs', contrasting Value with Whim) is where it's all at in O'ism. All else is straw man arguing and slip-sliding elsewhere.

     Now, I've argued the difference re 'want' and 'Value' as conceived in O'ism, so I shan't repeat such here. However, I will do a refrain about Rand's pointing out that regardless that all decisions are motivated, that "...one can pick one's motivations."

     Here is the crux of Determinists vs O'ists (yes, they definitely do NOT overlap).

     A Determinist (of whatever variety, including Compatibilists) would argue that the motivation (even that of picking one's motivation) must, necessarily, be value-based (or, at least desire-based). I am, to repeat, in sympathy with this view. Problem is: no Determinist has explained (for all the...arguing given) just exactly what (surely not 'who')...determines...which (re 'Value' vs 'Desire') produces the 'decision'/'choice'/'will-to-action' in a competing conflict of them! And a lot of discussion has occurred over this; yet...

     A Determinist seems to boil 'Value' down to merely another 'Want' (which a decision-maker CAN allow to happen, no argument), ergo, the conflict falls under my example #1, resulting in a conflict of wants, and the winning-want-of-the-moment takes all.

     In a certain sense, I can see 'Value' as being almost basically an other 'want', b-u-t, we really can't call it a mere 'want.' True, one can argue a perceived Need ('value') as being a long-range 'want' which a rational person would go by (as in: go-to-the-Dentist-today vs cancel-the-appt) in conflict with a lethargic/fear/whatever 'avoidance'-want, but this is conflating desires with values; not a good idea in O'ist clarity. --- Ntl, the basic prob remains: is rational-perception-of-'needs'/Values vs desire-of-the-moment a choice/decision/will-to/alternative-set that can really be 'explained' by pointing to some more basic...force? I think not, especially when one considers that a perception (hence Value) can change with one little addition of informational data (but, without such, in a rational person, it wouldn't)...such as...the Dentist is on TV as a suspected serial-killer.

     Ah, well, that's the best I can do for a 'different' (from my previous arguings) perspective.

LLAP
J:D


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Post 115

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 12:07amSanction this postReply
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John Dailey wrote: 

Jeezuz-F***in'-Buddha! This subject just will not die, will it? May Ishtar's mammaries flow the milk of wisdom forth to all of us on this subject someday. Kee-ripes!


Yes, and how about a few donuts of common sense to dunk in Ishtar’s milk of wisdom. Krime-a-nettly!   :-)

 

 

John shares his impression of how Rand thought that "'freedom'-FROM (whatever)" was not as important as "'freedom'-TO (or-FOR)," and that she was concerned not so much with "'freedom' from (driving?) forces" as with "'freedom' from (restricting?) constraints, so that one was 'free'-TO-do (whatever)." (I hope I haven't lost his meaning by editing around his rather tricking punctuation.) He says that:   

The subject of deterministic motivations to 'explain' a...choice (exercise of/by the 'will')...is definitely self-hemmed in on the forces concern. When the action/process/occurrence of a choice/will manifests, then there just MUST be 'something' that produces it…The 'bottom line' concern is with the...decision/will/choice...to increase-one's-attention-or-not (ie:'focus.') on subject 'X'. Not to start the 'focus', but to change it (increase, or decrease).

Well, I thought that choice between alternatives was a power of conscious living beings. Even animals have to deal with alternatives, like fight or flight; they just can’t deliberate about their choices like we can. They can’t say, “I’d better get the heck out of here…no, wait, I’m mad, I’m going to fight.” (Although they might, as they get ready to flee, notice that the predator has fallen into a hole, and is helpless to harm them, so they stay instead. They just change their actions, when conditions warrant, automatically instead of deliberately.)

 

So, what produces the choice? I don’t think it’s any kind of “driving force,” as John seems to be searching for. Instead, since choice is the power to act of a person or animal, I’d say the person or animal produces the choice, according to what desire most strongly moves them to act. We have the great advantage of being able to reason about, or reflect over, what is moving us to act in a certain way. We can notice and monitor and decide whether we want to go with our strongest desire, or to think about it and maybe do something else.

 

But even our uniquely human ability of self-monitoring follows the same principle. If we desire to reflect and consider more strongly than we want to plunge on into action, then that is what we will do! It seems inescapable. But then who would want to escape from that? What else would you want to do, other than what you most wanted to do? Isn't what you most want in a given situation precisely what the choosing-and-valuing you is? Isn't that the biological mechanism by which we make our choices?

A Determinist (of whatever variety, including Compatibilists) would argue that the motivation (even that of picking one's motivation) must, necessarily, be value-based (or, at least desire-based). I am, to repeat, in sympathy with this view. Problem is: no Determinist has explained (for all the...arguing given) just exactly what (surely not 'who')...determines...which (re 'Value' vs 'Desire') produces the 'decision'/'choice'/'will-to-action' in a competing conflict of them!

Determinists won’t get any argument from me on this point. It makes perfect sense to me that, after all is said and done, even focusing is chosen (over evasion) because it’s what we more strongly desire to do. Why would I focus, how could I focus, if it wasn’t what I most wanted to do? And if I do indeed act to gain and/or keep a state of (increased) focus, then I am valuing that state.

A Determinist seems to boil 'Value' down to merely another 'Want' (which a decision-maker CAN allow to happen, no argument), ergo, the conflict falls under my example #1, resulting in a conflict of wants, and the winning-want-of-the-moment takes all.

Well, if that’s true, then Ayn Rand was the champion Determinist of all time! She said value is “that which one acts to gain and/or keep,” and what possible instance of that could not involve one’s wanting it? Why would you, and how could you, act to gain and/or keep something you didn’t want, in some respect?

 

Rand also realized that people can and do want – and act to gain and/or keep – things that are not good for them, even things that they know are not good for them, but that, in the moment, at least, they want more than something else. Her concern was to start her inquiry into ethics by first formulating a broad, catch-all concept and definition of “value,” and then to narrow it down to rational, objective values, things we should act to gain and/or keep (by the standard of man’s life).

 

John’s concern about “boiling value down to want” thus seems to be misplaced. Pursued wants are exactly what values are. To lead a good life, all we really need to avoid is replacing rational value with “mere want.” We need to make sure that we pursue not “mere wants” but rational wants, i.e., things we want that are also good for us. And if that is what we most want to do – rather than pursuing “mere wants” – then that is what we will do! Why would we, and how could we, do anything else?

 

And now, folks, how about some milk and donuts! By Ishtar, they're good! :-)

 


Artie


Post 116

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 7:13amSanction this postReply
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And that's what Tara Smith was emphasizing in her book - Viable Values...

Post 117

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 6:10pmSanction this postReply
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Robert:

     I've certainly run across enough references to that book; by Jiminy I will have to add it to my list...after I finish Fox's Alexander the Great and Valliant's PARC.

Artie:

     Agreed, my punctuation style IS 'tricky'. I'm really trying to get away from side-thought parentheticals. I tell ya, girl: for me, it's difficult! However, on to the points you made...

      I'm NOT 'searching' for any driving-force. I merely put that idea in, in a parenthetical, to contrast the difference of perspective by many compatibilists compared to the contrary-mentioned next idea. Clearly, I should have quoted Rand re her stress on the idea of 'freedom-TO' and its affecting constraints. I know that she wrote about it, but don't remember where. B-u-t, I shall quote Rand from here on.

     Then, you ask
...what possible instance of  [value] could not involve one's wanting it?
     I thought I pointed out a few examples quite clearly that showed 'value' and 'want' are NOT necessarily synonomous, or maybe even, depending on how much one stretches the meaning of 'want' or 'desire' to include any motivated 'choice' one makes,  may both be like 'blondes' and 'females.' Not many 'want' to go to the dentist, as...I...pointed...out, regardless that they see a 'value' in it.

     You ask
...how could you, act to gain/or keep something you didn't want, in some respect?

     That little addition "...in some respect" is an interesting qualifier. How many 'respects' might there be, do you think, and, might there be any pertinent, relevent, 'difference' amongst them, maybe? --- I do believe that I actually covered this in my 3 distinctions re desire-want, value-value, and the most important 3rd which I consider Rand to have been primarily concerned with: want-value. It seems that your critique of my points have...glossed over...this set of 'respects' that I covered.

     Also, interesting addition of the 'or' which wasn't in Galt's speech.

     Ntl, you stress, like so many, Rand's original 'definition' of  "Value" as  "that for which one acts to gain and keep" as implying the 'want'/'value' terms as being synonomous. If Rand meant 'value' as identical to 'want', she clearly would have said so without bothering to make it sound like an ivory-towerish but simplistic 'definition'. --- Further, most who keep sticking to this implied (but never explicated) argument that this def equates 'want' with 'value' chronically ignore what she had Galt immediately clarify  in the very next 2 sentences where she DELINEATES her meaning...indeed...her 'definition'...further: " 'Value' presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?" Notice the last two words. To see the total difference re what I've been arguing, add in her next, and final aspect of her definition: "Value' presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative."

     A '...for what'? A 'standard'? A 'purpose'? A 'necessity'? Indeed, 'presuppositions'?    All this specialized concern for a mere....'want'?

     I...really...don't...think...so.

     "...necessity of action in the face of an alternative" is talking about perceived/conceived needs, not mere 'wants'-whims-etc,...as I've already spelled out in this post...and elsewhere. Interesting that others avoid debating this point.

     Re your use of the term 'choice' and 'deliberation', I'll just comment that some  2/3-yr old humans who've learned how to properly use the word 'NO'...and, some animals...do show something worth calling 'deliberation' in some of their 'choice' situations, though not in your exampled adrenaline-filled one such as fight-or-flight. Most mature humans don't 'deliberate' in such; they just act according to their training or lack of it. --- Unless of course, by 'deliberation' you mean syllogistic or hypo-conditional routine use of linguistic-logic. In this latter case we agree; otherwise, well, a child doesn't need to learn Russel-Whitehead's Principia Mathematica or Aristotle's Organon to be 'rational' or 'deliberative' in their 'choice'/decision/will-to-action. They use merely a 'prioritizing-of-values' according to what degree they have of mental-awareness of consequences. True, you never mentioned children, just animals, so, I see the same characteristic in dogs, and 'higher' animals re the 'prioritizing-of-values' and awareness of consequences. As I see such non-linguistic beings, such are not merely triggered by whatever's the strongest environmental stimuli. They are triggered by it, but only within the 1st 'alternative' setup I spelled out in my last post: 'want' vs 'want.'

     Otherwise, I guess that we agree on everything, non?

LLAP
J:D

P.S: Hey! No parentheses !  H-o-l-y  Shi...va.

(Edited by John Dailey on 2/02, 6:21pm)

(Edited by John Dailey on 2/02, 6:36pm)


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Post 118

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 10:29pmSanction this postReply
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Thanks, John Dailey, for the clarifications. I have one or two to offer, as well.

I originally wrote:
...how could you, act to gain/or keep something you didn't want, in some respect?
and you commented:
...interesting addition of the 'or' which wasn't in Galt's speech. Ntl, you stress, like so many, Rand's original 'definition' of  "Value" as  "that for which one acts to gain and keep"...
Actually, what I wrote was a typo. I don't know precisely how she expressed her definition of "value" in Galt's speech. I was trying to quote from Rand's definition in "The Objectivist Ethics," which says "to gain and/or keep." (I left out the "and.")

You had more to say, though:
Ntl, you stress, like so many, Rand's original 'definition' of  "Value" as  "that for which one acts to gain and keep" as implying the 'want'/'value' terms as being synonomous. If Rand meant 'value' as identical to 'want', she clearly would have said so without bothering to make it sound like an ivory-towerish but simplistic 'definition'.
I don't view "value" as identical to "want," and I'm not saying that Rand did either. Instead, I think it's clear that she viewed values as pursued wants -- i.e., as things we want to gain and/or keep and act to gain and/or keep.

You raise an interesting point about "ivory tower" definitions of "value." I think that something that really raised Rand's hackles was the kind of person who said they valued something, but took no action to gain and/or keep it. As if to say, "I am my good intentions. Don't judge me by my actions, just by my values." In other words, for a person like this, "values" are really just ideals held as passive yearnings.

Rand did not recognize the existence of "passive values." Values were entirely an active phenomenon of reality for her. If Rand wanted to know what someone's real values were, she wouldn't ask them what they would like to have, she would observe what they in fact pursue. And that, it seems clear to me, is what motivated her hard-nosed definition of "value."

As for wants and values -- I do realize that there are various levels of wants, not just "mere wants." For instance, if I am offered red wine or white wine, and my favorite is red wine, I will normally want to have red wine rather than white wine. That might be a "mere want." However, I might be feeling a bit overweight and want to avoid the extra calories, I would want to decline having wine at all rather than having my preferred kind, red wine. That presumably would not be a "mere want."

But it seems to me that in each case of choosing, I am choosing what I most want, in that context. Granted that my context can change. I might be ready to reach for that glass of red wine, and any number of things might trigger my reconsideration (and realization that I want something else more instead). But whether I act according to a "mere want" or a "deliberately considered want," I am choosing what I most want. I don't see how you can get around our values -- the things we act to gain and/or keep -- being the things we most want in a given context.

Artie


Post 119

Friday, February 3, 2006 - 6:17pmSanction this postReply
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Artie:

     I was never trying to 'get around' that wants are relevent in some way to any values; though, I do leave that open to argument re certain  perceived 'values'. Nevertheless, no one's yet argued in terms of  my 'dentist' example that such decisions are based on nothing more than a mere conflict of  2 'wants' as thereby being 2 'values'. One's a 'want'; the other isn't. A 'motivation' per se is not inherently a 'want' though it may have been created by one.

     One may be in a situation to think "I suspect that I really need to start getting over that next mountain to avoid the killer chasing me; but man, I really want to rest for an hour." Now, one can boil the conflicting motivations down to mere 'wants', if one...wants...to. But a perceived 'need', though a motivation, is not inherently a 'want.' --- Re-elucidated: a motivation, per se, is not inherently a mere 'want', nor is a perceived 'need'.

     I clearly was stressing and pointing out that a 'value' is MORE than a mere 'want,' in the O'ist framework, anyway; ergo, to talk about a 'value' in-terms-of-nothing-other-than-a-mere-'want' is to 'blank-out' Rand's actual, complete, definition of 'Value.'

LLAP
J:D

P.S: Methinks that any more discussion on this will just be (as so much previous had been amongst others) a repetitious re-phrasing of the same perspectives with merely different 'scenarios'/'examples.' You see my argument as acceptable, by now; or, you don't. --- Elsewise (as I've seen elsewhere), you are one thought-provoking discusser.     :)

(Edited by John Dailey on 2/03, 6:21pm)


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