Determinism and Free will

Bill,
It will be some time before I can respond at length. In the interim, I have a question for you. I take it that, in accordance with your viewpoint, akrasia is either literally impossible or has some explanation other than the usual one. (Oh, yes go to town on that -- I just mean the common definition: Literally, "bad mixture," the Greek term for the character flaw of incontinence or weakness of the will, the condition in which an agent is unwilling to perform actions that are known to the agent to be right.)

Post 81

Saturday, December 17, 2005 - 8:49pm

Jeff wrote,

Bill,
It will be some time before I can respond at length. In the interim, I have a question for you. I take it that, in accordance with your viewpoint, akrasia is either literally impossible or has some explanation other than the usual one. (Oh, yes go to town on that -- I just mean the common definition: Literally, "bad mixture," the Greek term for the character flaw of incontinence or weakness of the will, the condition in which an agent is unwilling to perform actions that are known to the agent to be right.)

Oh yeah! I had forgotten about that. I'm surprised no one has raised that particular objection in all of the preceding discussions. Of course, there aren't too many professional philosophers onboard. But that's a pretty strong objection. So all you volitionists out there, you'll definitely want to add that to your arsenal! :-)

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have other matters to attend to, which if I ignore, I'll feel guilty about neglecting. [Exists stage left]

[Is jerked back on stage with a long cane wielded by Jeff Perren. Stumbles around in a somewhat confused and agitated state before regaining his composure.]

"Ahem! [Clears throat] Now what was that objection again? Oh, yeah, something about akrasia. Now that's a very interesting term, which I'm sure is the precursor of our word "crazy." A person who acts in an irrational manner against his better judgment is often referred to as "crazy," which in some ways is similar to someone who exhibits serious moral incontinence. I've also heard that moral incontinence becomes worse as you get older...

[Jeff interrupts] "Ah, Bill, I believe the objection was...

[Bill] "Oh, yes...I guess I got a little sidetracked there. Now what was it you were saying?" (Psst, Roger, are you out there? I could use a little help here!)

[To be continued] ;-)

Post 82

Saturday, December 17, 2005 - 11:27pm

Okay, after channeling my mentor Socrates, who believed that no one knowingly does wrong, I have arrived at an analysis of moral incontinence or akrasia. Let's start with a simple example: Suppose that you go on a diet (say it's the Atkins Diet, which doesn't allow any sweets), and someone offers you a piece of lemon meringue pie, which is your favorite desert. Your mouth is watering, your senses are aroused; you hesitate, waver and finally give in. Afterwards, you feel a twinge of guilt. Did you knowingly do something wrong; did you act against your better judgment? That depends on what is meant by "wrong" or "better judgment" in this context. What in fact transpired in this decision process, according to which you were tempted and went off your diet?

Well, it was a process of reassessment, wasn't it? You asked yourself, in effect, if it is worth it to say on the diet if you can't ever have your favorite desert? What you did, in other words, was weigh the long-term value of the diet against the short-term pleasure of eating the pie, and decided in favor of the pie. Now it is certainly possible for you to feel guilty afterwards, if in retrospect, you feel that you "should" have abstained. But all this means is that you regretted your decision. Perhaps you weren't thinking too clearly and didn't realize that the exception you allowed yourself was not made on principle and that were the same situation to arise again, you would have no reason not to make the same choice, in which case, your diet can no longer be considered anything more than an idle fantasy. Suppose that instead of quickly yielding to temptation, you were able to summon the process of reasoning which demonstrates that to give up the diet in this kind of situation is to give it up on principle and that it is either/or: either you forgo the desert or you forgo the diet. In that case, you would choose the pie only if you had little if any interest in staying on the diet; otherwise, you would choose to stay on the diet, despite your desire for the pie.

As Rand puts it in her essay, "Causality versus Duty":

In a rational ethics, it is causality--not "duty"--that serves as the guiding principle in considering, evaluating and choosing one's actions, particularly those necessary to achieve a long-range goal. Following this principle, a man does not act without knowing the purpose of his action. In choosing a goal, he considers the means required to achieve it, he weighs the value of the goal against the difficulties of the means and against the full, hierarchical context of all his other values and goals. He does not demand the impossible of himself, and he does not decide too easily which things are impossible. He never drops the context of the knowledge available to him, and never evades reality, realizing fully that his goal will not be granted to him by any power other than his own action, and, should he evade, it is not some Kantian authority that he would be cheating, but himself.

If he becomes discouraged by difficulties, he reminds himself of the goal that requires them, knowing that he is fully free to reconsider--to ask: "Is it worth it?"--and that no punishment is involved except the renunciation of the value he desires. (One seldom gives up in such cases, unless one finds it is rationally necessary.) (Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 119)

If one understands fully what Rand is saying here, one will act accordingly; if one doesn't, one may not. Thus, it is one's knowledge and understanding that determine one's decision to stay committed to one's long-range values, and a failure of such understanding that determines one's failure to adhere to them. Socrates was right, after all.

- Bill

Post 83

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 1:30am

Jeff Perren wrote and Bill Dwyer commented:

Your theory must either say that all evaluation (and wants/desires/willing/etc) is necessitated -- in which case you really are a determinist, or you must (in logic and fact) acknowledge that free will exists. You and Roger can not have it both ways.
EXCUUUZZE ME, Jeff! Where did I EVER say that I wasn't a determinist or that I believed in (libertarian) free will! Never did. In fact, I'll bet you one hundred smackeroos that you can't find one place in any of my writings either here or on SOLO HQ where I said any such thing. Oh, sure, others have dubbed me a free-willist in determinist clothing, most notably Ellen Stuttle, and if I'm not mistaken, even you suggested this, when you accused me of misusing the word "determinist" to describe what I believe in. But, if you recall, I quickly disabused you of that notion in a subsequent reply. So don't go saying that I can't have it both ways. I'm not trying to have it both ways, nor have I ever tried to have it both ways. (Not that there's anything wrong with that! ;-))

I have been referring to free will, but I never have advocated free will of the libertarian sort. This is what I have been calling "categorical free will." It is similar to Kant's categorical imperatives, where he says that you should do X just because, and not for the sake of some purpose. Categorical free will is the Objectivist view that you could have done other than you did just because, even if you didn't want to do other than you did. Kant's shoulds (musts) and Rand's coulds (cans) are cut from the same cloth..

Instead, just as Rand advocates conditional necessity, where you should do X if you want Y, I advocate conditional freedom, where you could have done X if you had wanted to. After some further thought, I have come to the conclusion that it is a category error to use the term "free will," just as it's a category error to refer to "causal efficacy of mind."

Mind, as Objectivists have defined it, is a power of human beings to engage in certain actions. The causal efficacy of something is the power of that thing to engage in certain actions. So, to speak of "causal efficacy of mind" or of the mind "having" causal efficacy is to speak of a "power having a power." This is nonsense. Entities have powers. Human beings have minds (powers), and human beings have causal efficacy (powers). This has been my position for many years (at least since 1974).

Similarly, after reading Locke, I have come to the conclusion that the term "free will" is nonsense. (I will post the quotes from Locke that back up my claim that he held this view, too, but not in this thread. I will start another thread, once I finish the piece I'm working on called "Locke on free will.")

Will is the power of human beings to control their choices and actions. Freedom is the power of human beings to engage in certain actions free from constraint. So, to speak of "freedom of the will" or of the will "having" freedom is again to speak of "a power having a power," which again is nonsense. Human beings have wills (powers), and human beings have freedom (power).

For this reason, I no longer am going to speak of free will even of the conditional sort. Instead, I am going to refer to "human freedom" or "freedom of human beings." It is not the will's freedom, but human freedom, that exists and is conditonal. Our wills are determined to make certain choices by our strongest values/desires, and we are free (as individual human beings) to pursue what we most strongly value/desire. This is teleological (or value-)determinism.

As a teleological determinist (and I do not equate myself with theistic variants or this, nor the ancient Stoic version), I do not think the entire universe is governed by one initial predetermining event (the Big Bang), as do the mechanistic determinists, any more than I think that human action is governed by efficient causation. Instead, I think that we are governed by final causation, i.e., by values/desires, and that this process was set in motion in us at birth (or earlier).

Unlike Jeff and others, I don't think that advocating human freedom and teleological necessity is a contradiction in terms. However, I do think that the term "free will" is literally nonsense and misleading nonsense, for it entices us to view the will as a kind of thing that has a certain power to act in the absence of constraint, when the entity that actually has that power is the human being.

So, rather than holding the categorical or libertarian form of human freedom -- in which humans could have done otherwise than they did, period -- I hold the conditional form of human freedom, in which humans can only have done otherwise than they did, if they had wanted to. (As noted previously, I am convinced that this is an axiom of human choice and action; I'll post soon giving it the axiom treatment, in order to back up this claim.)

REB

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/18, 1:33am)

Post 84

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 4:22am

Well, it was a process of reassessment, wasn't it?

Why the reassessment - if it was an inevitable following a deliberate choosing?

Post 85

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 6:55am

Roger,

LOL. Are you ever going to tire of playing "the same old song" about free will and determinism? Are you ever going to tire of the same old word games and straw men?

Categorical free will is the Objectivist view that you could have done other than you did just because, even if you didn't want to do other than you did. Kant's shoulds (musts) and Rand's coulds (cans) are cut from the same cloth.

That's a straw man. In OPAR Peikoff did say that free will is the power to have chosen otherwise. (To the best of my knowledge, Rand never cast volition in the past tense.) However, he did not add "even if the person didn't want to." He might even agree with adding "if the person wanted to". If so, he might say, like me, it adds nothing to the analysis (except confusion). You cannot drive a wedge between wanting and choosing, as I have explained on this website more than once.

"Could have chosen otherwise" isn't a good way of portraying free will -- folks like you will misinterpret it. However, it makes sense from the time perspective I gave here:
http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1302_2.shtml#58
It's patently clear that deliberating about choices takes time. Still you continue to portray choice ignoring this crucial element. At the start of deliberation, the future choice is not pre-determined. Yet that is how you portray it.

So, to speak of "causal efficacy of mind" or of the mind "having" causal efficacy is to speak of a "power having a power." This is nonsense. Entities have powers. Human beings have minds (powers), and human beings have causal efficacy (powers).

Literally, I agree. But do you know the meaning of "metonymy"? It has some relevance here. Indeed, you used one as follows. So it must be nonsense. :-)

Our wills are determined to make certain choices by our strongest values/desires, and we are free (as individual human beings) to pursue what we most strongly value/desire.

Post 86

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 8:57am

Well, it was a process of reassessment, wasn't it?
Why the reassessment - if it was an inevitable following a deliberate choosing?

I'm not sure I understand your question, Robert. The reassessment precedes the choice. You choose differently than you had originally intended, because of the reassessment. Of course, the reassessment was inevitable, on the determinist premise, but that doesn't mean that it isn't a reassessment. I know you like being pithy, but sometimes with pithy, things get lost in translation. There's something to be said for elaboration and explanation. :-)

Roger wrote,

Categorical free will is the Objectivist view that you could have done other than you did just because, even if you didn't want to do other than you did. Kant's shoulds (musts) and Rand's coulds (cans) are cut from the same cloth.

To which Merlin replied,

That's a straw man. In OPAR Peikoff did say that free will is the power to have chosen otherwise. (To the best of my knowledge, Rand never cast volition in the past tense.) However, he did not add "even if the person didn't want to." He might even agree with adding "if the person wanted to". If so, he might say, like me, it adds nothing to the analysis (except confusion). You cannot drive a wedge between wanting and choosing, as I have explained on this website more than once.

Merlin, I don't understand your reply to Roger. Assume that you have an alternative--choosing to think or choosing not to think. Either you value the former alternative over the latter, the latter over the former, or neither over the other. Those are the only possibilities, correct? So, are you saying that if you value the former over the latter, then you must choose the former, and cannot choose the latter, because there is no wedge between valuing and choosing? If so, wouldn't that imply determinism? Or are you saying that you don't value either alternative over the other and are therefore able to choose either one in preference to the other? If so, what would be your motive for the choice? Don't you have to have some reason for making the choice--for choosing one alternative in preference to the other?

I'm not trying to take Roger's side here. I'm just trying to understand your argument.

- Bill

Post 87

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 10:09am

Bill Dwyer wrote:

Merlin, I don't understand your reply to Roger. Assume that you have an alternative--choosing to think or choosing not to think. Either you value the former alternative over the latter, the latter over the former, or neither over the other. Those are the only possibilities, correct? So, are you saying that if you value the former over the latter, then you must choose the former, and cannot choose the latter, because there is no wedge between valuing and choosing? If so, wouldn't that imply determinism?

Before I wrote and posted #85, I had a choice -- to reply to Roger or not. I chose to reply, but "must choose the former" did not apply. Before I thought about, it was indeterminate. Obviously I wanted to reply more than not -- after I thought about it. (The two times are T0 and T1, as I used them here: http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1302_2.shtml#58) So I gave it some thought and then decided -- determined my choice -- to reply. My reasons in favor of replying outweighed those in favor of not replying. No, that does not imply determinism, meaning having no choice in the matter. No, I am not saying what you attributed to me.

Post 88

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 10:34am

Bill Dwyer wrote:

Merlin, I don't understand your reply to Roger. Assume that you have an alternative--choosing to think or choosing not to think. Either you value the former alternative over the latter, the latter over the former, or neither over the other. Those are the only possibilities, correct? So, are you saying that if you value the former over the latter, then you must choose the former, and cannot choose the latter, because there is no wedge between valuing and choosing? If so, wouldn't that imply determinism?

Merlin Jetton replied:

Before I wrote and posted #85, I had a choice -- to reply to Roger or not. I chose to reply, but "must choose the former" did not apply. Before I thought about, it was indeterminate. Obviously I wanted to reply more than not -- after I thought about it. (The two times are T0 and T1, as I used them here: http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1302_2.shtml#58) So I gave it some thought and then decided -- determined my choice -- to reply. My reasons in favor of replying outweighed those in favor of not replying. No, that does not imply determinism, meaning having no choice in the matter. No, I am not saying what you attributed to me.

Merlin, I didn't understand your reply to me either, and I still don't. You think that this T0, T1 business avoids the difficulties in the standard free will position, and in particular our challenge to it, but it doesn't. Instead, it validates our position.

Here is my understanding of what you say above. Your choice at T0 was to reply or not. At that time, you chose to not reply, because at T0, you wanted to not reply more than you wanted to reply. At T0, you also had the choice to deliberate about whether to reply or to not deliberate. You chose to deliberate (you "gave it some thought"), because you wanted to deliberate more than you wanted to not deliberate. After some amount of deliberating, your relative wants changed, so that at T1, you wanted to reply more than you wanted not to reply, so you chose to reply.

In all of this, you always chose what you wanted most at that time. In fact, it was unavoidable that you would do so at each step along the way, which is why we say it was determined. And at every step along the way, there was nothing to prevent you from acting differently if and when you felt differently -- as witness the fact that you chose not to reply at T0 when you felt one way, and to reply at T1 when you felt differently.

The Law of Contradiction operates throughout all of this. You cannot choose x and not choose x at the same time and in the same respect, but you can not choose x and choose x at different times and in different respects -- viz., before deliberating vs. after deliberating, when you don't most want to vs. when you do most want to. Your failure to see this, and your attempt insead to argue around it with your T0 and T1 approach, results in a fallacy of equivocation.

To me, this entire discussion shows yet again that Bill's and my understanding of human choice and action (you always choose what you most want at a given time and in a given respect) amounts to an axiom of human choice and action. At T0, you wanted more not to reply, so you did not reply; and at T1, you wanted more to reply, so you replied. This seems self-evident -- and another reason why it appears to be an axiom -- and a good indication of why some of our opponents want to deride it as a "tautology"!

REB

Post 89

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 11:37am

Roger wrote:

Here is my understanding of what you say above. Your choice at T0 was to reply or not. At that time, you chose to not reply, because at T0, you wanted to not reply more than you wanted to reply. At T0, you also had the choice to deliberate about whether to reply or to not deliberate. You chose to deliberate (you "gave it some thought"), because you wanted to deliberate more than you wanted to not deliberate. After some amount of deliberating, your relative wants changed, so that at T1, you wanted to reply more than you wanted not to reply, so you chose to reply.

It is clear you don't understand. The 3rd sentence is wrong. At T0 my choice is indeterminate, like I said in #87. T0 marks the start of deliberation only. T1 marks the end of deliberation and acting on the decision. The three paragraphs that follow (in your post #88) what I quote above could hardly be more wrong. It was not a situation of deciding (and acting) more than once, but deciding (and acting) only once, at T1.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 12/18, 11:46am)

Post 90

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 1:52pm

I wrote to Merlin Jetton:

Here is my understanding of what you say above. Your choice at T0 was to reply or not. At that time, you chose to not reply, because at T0, you wanted to not reply more than you wanted to reply. At T0, you also had the choice to deliberate about whether to reply or to not deliberate. You chose to deliberate (you "gave it some thought"), because you wanted to deliberate more than you wanted to not deliberate. After some amount of deliberating, your relative wants changed, so that at T1, you wanted to reply more than you wanted not to reply, so you chose to reply.

Merlin replied:

It is clear you don't understand. The 3rd sentence is wrong. At T0 my choice is indeterminate, like I said in #87. T0 marks the start of deliberation only. T1 marks the end of deliberation and acting on the decision. The three paragraphs that follow (in your post #88) what I quote above could hardly be more wrong. It was not a situation of deciding (and acting) more than once, but deciding (and acting) only once, at T1.

It's hard to know what to say in reply to someone who tells me not only that I'm wrong, but that I "could hardly be more wrong," when it's crystal clear to me that I am correct! My third sentence reads, "At T0, you also had the choice to deliberate about whether to reply or to not deliberate." To deliberate (about whether to reply) -- or not to deliberate. Looks like a choice to me -- not something that just happens automatically. And yet, Merlin now appears to be objecting that he had no such choice as to whether or not to deliberate -- that he just began to deliberate! (??)

Contra Merlin, because at T0 he chose to deliberate rather than reply, that means that he chose not to reply at T0. What could be "indeterminate" about that? Merlin may respond, "Well, it's indeterminate, because I decided to suspend my judgment about replying until I had deliberated." In my book, which is not a very complicated one, suspending one's judgment means: "I have decided not to reply at this time, but instead to think about whether to reply at a later time."

Two more notes:

(1) I will, for the benefit of those who are curious about what Locke really did say, honor Merlin's previous request and post soon a piece detailing, with voluminous quotes from the original, how Locke argued that the notion of "freedom of the will" is absurd and that our choices are determined by our desires -- and that we are nonetheless free, as human beings, as long as we are able to act or not, think or not, as we prefer (Locke's words).

(2) Merlin correctly pointed out that I committed a category error (he referred to it as a "metonymy") in post 83. I wrote:

I no longer am going to speak of free will even of the conditional sort. Instead, I am going to refer to "human freedom" or "freedom of human beings." It is not the will's freedom, but human freedom, that exists and is conditonal. Our wills are determined to make certain choices by our strongest values/desires, and we are free (as individual human beings) to pursue what we most strongly value/desire. This is teleological (or value-)determinism.

That's what happens when I work two days straight, 15 hours a day, and get about 4 hours of sleep a night. <sigh> The third and fourth sentences should have read:

We are determined to make certain choices by our strongest values/desires, and we are free to pursue what we most strongly value/desire. This is teleological (or value-)determinism and conditional freedom, respectively, and together they are the basis for Compatibilism.

REB

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/18, 2:38pm)

Post 91

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 2:28pm

[See my correction in a post below -- originally I
thought that it was Roger who had written
the quoted passage. I would still like a
definite yes or no answer from Roger.]

[Bill] wrote to Jeff Perren:

"Oh, sure, others have dubbed me a free-willist in determinist
clothing, most notably Ellen Stuttle, and if I'm not mistaken,
even you suggested this, when you accused me of misusing the
word 'determinist' to describe what I believe in. But, if you
recall, I quickly disabused you of that notion in a subsequent
reply."

Correction, I've dubbed you a volitionist (not a "free-willist")
in determinist clothing. And, yes, Jeff did say that you're
misusing the word "determinist." I of course remain un-disabused
as to the misuse of that term by you and Bill. The two of you
are defining the term in a way which isn't the way it's thought
of in scientific usage, hence in a way which makes communication
very -- and quite needlessly -- difficult, I thought and continue
to think.

Question, Roger. We've been over this before, but please answer
again. You recall that example I gave in our off-list discussion
of whether I'd take one route or the other of two possible (while
walking on streets, i.e., without cutting through people's yards)
ways -- basically around alternate paths from one vertex of a
rectangle to the opposite-along-a-diagonal vertex. I'd be
starting from the same place on either route and ending at
the same place, but the in-between course would be different.
I asked if it was your view that already at some t_0 before
earth even formed it was physically necessitated which path
I'd take. At first you said yes, then you changed it to no.
IMO, whether or not you truly are a determinist is entailed
in whether your answer is "yes" or "no."

Ellen S.

___
(Edited by Ellen Stuttle
on 12/18, 2:36pm)

Post 92

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 2:33pm

Sorry, I posted my previous rapidly, having only a few minutes for looking at list mail, and I misread who was saying what. It was Bill who wrote the material quoted not Roger.

It appears that Roger is now pretty clearly denying mechanistic determinism -- but what teleological determinism could properly mean, I still don't know.

I'll try to catch up to the posts later.

ES

Post 93

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 3:22pm

Roger Bissell wrote:

It's hard to know what to say in reply to someone who tells me not only that I'm wrong, but that I "could hardly be more wrong," when it's crystal clear to me that I am correct. If at T0, Merlin chose to deliberate rather than reply, that means that he chose not to reply at T0. Contra Merlin, because at T0 he chose to deliberate rather than reply, that means that he chose not to reply at T0.

It's crystal clear to me that Roger is wrong again. :-) If I had decided not to reply at T0 -- more exactly, T1 -- then further deliberating about it would have been unnecessary. T0 does not mark when a choice is made.

Post 94

Sunday, December 18, 2005 - 5:15pm

Roger Bissell wrote: "It's hard to know what to say in reply to someone who tells me not only that I'm wrong, but that I "could hardly be more wrong," when it's crystal clear to me that I am correct. If at T0, Merlin chose to deliberate rather than reply, that means that he chose not to reply at T0. Contra Merlin, because at T0 he chose to deliberate rather than reply, that means that he chose not to reply at T0."

And Merlin replied, "It's crystal clear to me that Roger is wrong again. :-) If I had decided not to reply at T0 -- more exactly, T1 -- then further deliberating about it would have been unnecessary. T0 does not mark when a choice is made."

What we have here is an argument at cross purposes, due to a curious misinterpretation. Roger says that because at T0, Merlin chose to deliberate rather than reply, he chose not to reply at T0 -- meaning that Merlin chose not to do the following: to reply at Time 0.

Merlin says that Roger is wrong, because he, Merlin, did not chose not to reply at T0 -- meaning that he did not at Time 0 choose to do the following: not reply (once and for all).

Of course, both Roger and Merlin are correct, because each is referring to a different choice. Roger is referring to Merlin's choice at T0 to postpone choosing whether or not to reply (which would include the choice not to reply at that time). And Merlin is referring to the absence of any choice at T0 not to reply (once and for all).

So, Merlin, now that you understand what Roger is saying, do you agree with him that you chose to postpone your decision (to reply or not to reply) at T0 and therefore chose not-to-reply-at-that-time?

- Bill

Post 95

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 5:19am

Bill Dwyer wrote:

So, Merlin, now that you understand what Roger is saying, do you agree with him that you chose to postpone your decision (to reply or not to reply) at T0 and therefore chose not-to-reply-at-that-time?

No. Like I said in #93, to which you replied: "T0 does not mark when a choice is made." You did what Roger did -- misuse T0 as when a choice is made. At T0 I began considering or deliberating about replying or not replying. At no time did I consciously choose not to reply. If you wish to hold that I implicitly chose not to reply by choosing to deliberate, then that was before T0 (a T1').
(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 12/19, 5:27am)

Post 96

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 8:29am

Merlin,
I haven't thought this through, but something in your post contributed to causing me to have this thought. I wonder if one of the implications of Roger and Bill's view is that every single (conscious ?) action we do (or don't do) is considered by them to be a choice? Wouldn't that be an interesting standing their view on its head!? (I say this 'out loud' so they can prepare for the next assault... :)

Post 97

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 10:00am

Hi Jeff,

Yes, it is ironic that "determinists" Roger and Bill describe me making choices that I'm not aware of at the time. It must be that it's not me, but my mind via "value determinism" making choices for me implicitly and outside my control. :-)

A few minutes ago I reached with my hand to grab a glass to drink some water. I recall consciously choosing to reach for the glass, but don't recall choosing to move my elbow or not bend my knee. It seems my mind chose them, implicitly and outside my control. :-)

Will you be making that assault?

Post 98

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 10:08am

[Man the barracades - the war's coming to the homefront!!] ;-)

Post 99

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 11:21am