| | I wrote, “But the universe does not inhere in space-time; space-time inheres in the universe. Space and time refer to relationships among entities within the universe, not to the universe as a whole.” GWL replied, But this is just false. I don't want to go into the physics of it, but contemporary cosmology has shown that space-time actually is something. It's a 3+1dimensional substratum of sorts, and string theorists conjecture that it may be broken down into calabi-yao manifolds-- little bundles of 6 dimensional space-time. Define your terms. What is time? It is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes bodies that move. If nothing existed, there would be no time. Since time depends on things that already exist, time is a property of the universe, and exists within the universe. The universe does not exist within time. What is space? It is a relationship between bodies. If nothing existed, there would be no space. Since space depends on things that already exist, space is a property of the universe, and exists within the universe. The universe does not exist within space.
I wrote, “What is expanding are things in the universe, not the universe itself, since there is nothing in relation to which the universe itself could be seen as getting larger. What a person sees through the Hubble telescope, he sees in relation to himself, as a relatively stationary observer.” People often act as though the redshift perceived by the Hubble only shows a relative expansion. This is a common misconception. I don't have the time to explain it, but I'm sure there are ample resources available on the Internet which can clear the matter up for you. Is it your view that the idea of relative motion is a common misconception? Unless it is, I don't see how you can say that the entire universe is expanding. For the question then arises: what is it expanding in relation to?
I wrote, “The universe as a whole is neither changing nor static, since both these concepts presuppose a relationship between entities, and there is nothing outside the universe to which it could bear any such relationship.” I just don't see how this can be. If the 'universe', for example, began as just one uninflated balloon, and then began to expand (as if it were being blown up) an observer on the surface would notice a steadily decreasing curvature contiguous with the expansion, and therefrom would be able to deduce the expansion of his 'universe' itself. But in that case, the balloon on which you are situated would be expanding relative to you, the observer. For suppose that you were expanding at the same rate as the balloon. In that case, you would notice no difference in the balloon’s curvature. Remember, the universe is the totality of existence, not just part of it, in which case, you as an observer must be included.
I wrote, “I am using the term ‘universe’ to refer to the totality of existence. If God exists, then he is part of the universe; if he is not part of the universe, then he does not exist." By all means, use the nomenclature you see fit. I would just point out that theists make a distinction between the universe and God in order to highlight what they believe to be the ontological dissimilarity of the two: God is uncreated, the universe is created. But it’s an arbitrary distinction. Why include within the universe everything in existence except for one other thing, especially when the term “universe” refers to what is universal, i.e., to everything?
Furthermore, if God can be uncreated, why can’t the universe be uncreated? If God can be considered a “necessary” being, then why can’t the universe be considered a necessary being? On the other hand, if the universe requires a creator, why doesn’t God require one? The ontological distinction that you make between God and the universe is arbitrary. Besides, as I stated earlier, even if it did make sense to talk of the entire universe as being created, the creator could not possibly have been a pure spirit or a pure consciousness, since a pure consciousness would have no means of awareness, no form of awareness and nothing to be aware of prior to its supposed act of creation.
In fact, the science of biology indicates that rather than existing at the so-called beginning of the universe, consciousness could only have arisen at the end of a long chain of evolutionary development.
I wrote, “the fundamental constituents of the natural world are ‘necessary beings.’” GLW replied, This doesn't make sense to me, since it would impute necessity to all events.
Consider the factual historical proposition: Leibniz was given a tour of the Roman crypt by the secretary to the Pope.
Would you call an historical event of this sort necessary? By “necessary beings” in this context, I was referring not to the evolutionary forms that these fundamental constituents take, but to the fact that there was no alternative to the existence of the constituents themselves. They were necessary beings in that sense of the term – i.e., in the same sense that you consider God a necessary being. I do believe, however, that the evolutionary forms are themselves a necessary consequence of the antecedent conditions that gave rise to them.
I wrote, “If I understand him correctly, Aristotle is saying that being is more universal than motion, because there are things that move and things that don’t. So being – i.e., existence – is, in Aristotle’s terminology, a higher 'cause' than motion, because it is more universal than motion. Not everything can be said to move, but everything can be said to exist.“ GWL replied, I think you interpret him correctly. I continued, “Now, Aristotle can call this higher cause ‘God’ if he wishes, but, in that case, wouldn’t ‘God’ simply be another name for being or existence? And if not, then what does Aristotle mean by ‘God’? GWL replied, Yes, for Aristotle, God would be a kind of Supreme Being, the highest form of Life, and the Unmoved Mover of the universe. This is similar to the Christian God, but certainly not the same. But, you see, I don’t agree with this interpretation. My understanding of Aristotle’s God is simply existence, whatever its form. I don’t see him as implying that it must be a life form or a living entity.
Aquinas wrote: "Succession is proper to movement. But creation is not movement. Therefore there is in it no succession." I responded: “Not true. Creation involves change, and change is a kind of movement.” St. Thomas is referring to creatio ex nihilo, i.e. the creation of being from non-being. He rightly says that there can be no intermediate productive stage between non-being and being. Okay, but I don’t see that kind of creation – creatio ex nihilo – as being a possibility. Nihilo ex nihilo --- from nothing comes nothing. To create something, you need the material out of which to make it. You can’t make something out of nothing.
Aquinas wrote: "In every making, in which there is succession, the process of being made is before the state of achieved completion. But this cannot happen in creation, because, for the process of being made to precede the achieved completion of the creature, there would be required some subject in which the process might take place. Such a subject cannot be the creature itself, of whose creation we are speaking, because that creature is not till the state of its achieved completion is realised. Nor can it be the Maker, because to be in movement is an actuality, not of mover, but of moved. And as for the process of being made having for its subject any pre-existing material, that is against the very idea of creation. Thus succession is impossible in the act of creation."
GWL commented, All Aquinas is doing is tracing out the implications of creatio ex nihilo. In any case, I responded, "This entire argument ignores the fact that creation presupposes existence; existence does not presuppose creation. What we have here is another exercise in floating abstractions -- abstractions removed from their base in concrete reality." Aquinas isn't writing this "ex nihilo", as it were. ;) In his mind, he's already proved that God exists in the opening chapters of the Summa. And, for Aquinas, it is not existence itself that presupposes a creator, but rather the nature of existence that our universe embodies. (Aquinas obviously thinks God exists, and that He doesn't need a creator.) Fair enough, but the nature of existence that our universe embodies is sufficiently explained by the existential conditions that preceded it. No God is required.
I wrote, “The concept of ‘creation’ is grasped from observing its occurrence in reality. Creation occurs within a context of things that already exist.” Aquinas would agree. I continued, “There is no such thing as creation out of nothing, nor could there be. The concept makes no sense, because creation of any kind requires pre-existing material out of which the creation is made.” Aquinas agrees that there can be no creatio ex nihilo within the created order, under that created order's "own steam", as it were. But his contention is that God, who is Perfect Being, possesses the power to impute being "from the ground up". But his contention is inconsistent with our understanding of the nature of the creative process. What it means for something to be created is for it to be created out of something. It doesn’t make any sense to say that something can be created out of nothing.
I wrote, “Yes, there has to be something there to start with – something that was not itself created - but it doesn’t have to be a Christian God.” True. The Christian God can only be known through revelation. Philosophers just hold that we can arrive at the conclusion of a 'natural' or 'philosophical' God through reason and experience. But I wouldn’t call the prime material “God.” The prime material is the fundamental constituents out of which everything else is composed.
I wrote, “The principle of parsimony? But the fact that a single ummoved mover is more parsimonious than multiple unmoved movers does not imply that there must therefore BE a single unmoved mover.” Right, but it is more in conformity with right reason to assume that there is only one. Why? It seems to me entirely arbitrary to assume that there is only one. I reproduced a section of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and Bill replied: Interesting. Aristotle’s rationalism was never more apparent than in this passage. I won’t repeat my arguments against a pure consciousness, but they are certainly relevant here. ? (See below.) ... what I am arguing is that they [i.e. creation from nothing and annihilation] are logically impossible, because the acts of creation and destruction presuppose a cause, which precedes the creation and succeeds the destruction. Right, and this cause is God. I was referring to a material cause, whereas you are evidently referring to an efficient cause. What I am saying is that you can’t have creation without a material cause; an efficient cause is not enough, because the creator must rearrange matter to effect the creation.
I wrote, “My objection is twofold: First, a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms; before it could identify itself as consciousness, it would have to be conscious of something other than itself; otherwise, it wouldn’t be conscious to begin with, and therefore couldn’t identify itself as a consciousness.”
GWL replied, OK, this is getting tiresome. In any event, though I believe I can defend the notion of God's consciousness from your criticism, I also believe I can circumvent your objection by invoking the Christian God, which is Triune: three Persons in one Divine Substance, and they are mutually aware of one another. This interrelationship of consciousness and mutual exchange of love between the Persons accounts for the consciousness of the Godhead. Nice try, but I don’t think that will work. To simplify matters, let’s assume that there are only two consciousnesses, A and B. Before A could exist (as a consciousness), it would have to be conscious of something. You say it could be conscious of B. But, by the same token, before B could exist to be conscious of, it would have to be conscious of A. Thus, A could exist only if B already existed, and B could exist only if A already existed, which means that neither could exist. In the absence of an external world – without an object of awareness - no consciousness is possible.
Besides, no mind can be aware of another mind, except inferentially via its physical manifestations. The only consciousness it can be aware of directly is its own through a process of introspection. So, since there is no physical form by which these three "divine persons" could be aware of each other inferentially, they could only be conscious if they were aware of an external world, which means that in the absence of such a world, they could not exist to create it.
Furthermore, what does it mean to say that there are “Three Persons in one Divine Substance?” The Catholic Encyclopedia says that “these Three Persons are truly distinct from one another.” If so, then there are three gods instead of one, which makes Catholicism a polytheistic religion. Besides, to say that there are three distinct persons in one substance doesn’t make sense. If they are three separate and distinct persons, then how could they be one substance?
I continued, “Second, a consciousness has to have a means of awareness and a form of awareness.” More anthopomorphism. As I already explained in an earlier reply, this is not anthropomorphism. Once again, I am not saying that in order for an entity to be conscious, it has to be human. Obviously, there are non-human forms of consciousness. I am saying that in order for an entity to be conscious, it has to be conscious in a particular way and by a particular means, because such is the nature of consciousness. A formless consciousness is a contradiction in terms. Perhaps an analogy will help. Communication doesn’t have to be in one particular language, like English, but it does have to be in some particular language. Communication is impossible without a method of communication. Similarly, a plain figure can be any shape, but it must be some shape. You cannot have a shapeless plain figure. In the same way, perception is impossible without a means and a form of perception. An entity perceives reality in a particular form by means of its sensory receptor(s), which is true of any consciousness, human or non-human.
I wrote, “The point I was making is that possibility depends on existence (not the other way around) in the sense that what is possible to an entity depends on its nature or identity.” Right, it depends upon the kind of existence: possible or necessary. No, you're missing the point. It depends on the kind of entity it is: what is possible to a man is not possible to a bird; what is possible to a bird is not possible to a cat, etc.
I wrote, “It's determined by the character of the things that already exist.” Only if you assume the necessity of the universe. (An assumption which you nowhere support.) I thought I did support it in a previous reply. At any rate, let me make the argument here. There is a sense in which it is possible for me not to have existed – e.g., if my parents choose not to conceive a child. But what would it mean to say that it’s possible for the universe not to have existed? I can only say that it’s possible for the universe not to have existed, if a certain condition had not been fulfilled. But what condition could that possibly be? There is nothing on which the non-existence of the universe could depend, since the universe is all there is.
I wrote, “By ‘contingent,’ I assume that you mean dependent on something else. However, the fundamental constituents of existence, out of which everything else is composed, are not dependent on anything else, in which case, they are not contingent, but necessary." Let me use the reductio ad adsurdum. If this is the case (that everything is necessary), all events are necessary. And I'm not sure you're prepared to accept this (since it's absurd). With respect, I think you’re missing the point. To say that the fundamental constituents of existence out of which everything else is composed are not dependent on anything else is not to say that all events are necessary; it’s only to say that the fundamental constituents themselves could not have been otherwise.
However, you say it is absurd that all events should be necessary. Why? Because it denies free will? It denies libertarian free will, to be sure, but it does not deny compatibilist free will. A person’s choices can still be necessitated by his value judgments, which in turn can depend on his heredity and environment. Does that mean that he cannot be held responsible for his actions? No. To hold someone responsible for his actions is simply to recognize that they are based on his conscious choices.
For example, we can properly imprison someone for stealing a car, even if he didn’t think it was morally wrong and saw no reason to avoid doing it. All that needs to be established is that he knew what he was doing and deliberately chose the action. Putting him in prison is a way of protecting others and of sending a message to him and to others like him that if they commit such an act, they will suffer the consequences. Punishment is thus a form of deterrence; it does not require libertarian free will.
Just as there is no absurdity in the idea that the fundamental constituents of the universe exist necessarily, so there is no absurdity in the idea that all events occur necessarily.
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/08, 10:05am)
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