| | GWL wrote, I never said that one must posit a God in order to avoid an infinite regress. (I actually don't (personally) think that kind of cosmological argument works; I much prefer the cosmological argument which employs the concepts of contingency and necessity.) And I would say that necessity applies to the ultimate constituents of the world itself; one does not need to posit a god in order for necessity to exist. Yes, the world is “contingent” in the sense that things in the world can change and evolve, but their ultimate constituents – the material or fundamental building blocks of which everything is composed -- are themselves necessary, basic and irreducible. However, since you have already stated that you don't believe there can be actual infinities (in the sense of extension or number), then it seems you might be committed to the idea of a first cause, which means you might fall prey to the kalam cosmological argument. But I'll leave that discussion to B. Lenardos. :) I agree with Aristotle that number or extension is only potentially infinite, not actually infinite. According to Aristotle, there cannot be an actual infinity of coexisting things. His reasoning is as follows:
“Either the number of actually coexisting things is definite or indefinite. If it is infinite, it is indefinite. But nothing can be both actual and indefinite. Therefore, there cannot be an actual infinity of any sort – an actually infinite number of coexisting atoms, an actually infinite world, an actually infinite space that is filled with actually existing units of matter.
"The only infinities that there can be, according to Aristotle, are the potential infinities that are involved in the endless process of addition or division. Since one moment of time succeeds another or proceeds another, and since two moments of time do not actually coexist, time can be infinite.” (Mortimer J. Adler, Aristotle for Everybody, p. 174)
I would not, however, say that the universe is actually infinite in time, because time does not apply to the universe in its entirety. Quoting Rand: " The universe is finite, and the concept of time applies to the relationship between entities. Specifically, time is a measurement of motion, which is a change of relationship between entities within the universe. Time cannot exist by itself. It exists only within the universe; it does not apply to the universe as a whole. By 'universe' I mean the total of what exists. The universe could have no relationship to anything outside itself: no motion, no change, and therefore, no time." (Ford Hall Forum, Boston, 1968) - Quoted in Ayn Rand Answers, p. 151)
Or, in Professor Leonard Peikoff's words: " Time applies only within the universe, when you define a standard -- such as the motion of the earth around the sun. If you take that as a unit, you can say: 'This person has a certain relationship to that motion; he has existed for three revolutions; he is three years old." But when you get to the universe as a whole, obviously no standard is applicable. You cannot get outside the universe. The universe is eternal in the literal sense: non-temporal, out of time." ("The Philosophy of Objectivism," lecture series (1976), question period, Lecture 2. - Quoted in Harry Binswanger's, The Ayn Rand Lexicon, p. 503.)
Observe that by "eternal," Peikoff does not mean infinite in time. He means without time or timeless. Since the concept of time doesn't apply to the entire universe, it makes no sense to say that the universe exists in time or that it has a duration, either finite or infinite. People sometimes say that the universe will exist "forever,” but what they mean is that it won't end at some point in time, which is true, but not in the sense that people typically mean it. The concept of "some point in time" can apply only to events and entities within the universe, not to the universe as a whole.
The same reasoning applies to any alleged origin of the universe. (Again, by "universe" in this context is meant the sum total of that which exists, not simply the present state of the cosmos whose origin is the "Big Bang." The term "universe" gets its meaning from the term "universal" which refers to all units of a particular kind -- in this case, all the fundamental constituents of existence.) As such, the universe did not begin, let alone begin at some point in time (since for time to exist, the universe would already have to exist). Time is in the universe; the universe is not in time. The concept of a "beginning" also presupposes prior existence, because in order for something to begin, it has to begin as the result of the action of already existing entities. Nihilo ex nihilo; from nothing comes nothing. This is beside the point. The point is that you've again proven that you don't understand Aristotle's position. In this case, I think you're right, and I therefore stand corrected. Still, there are aspects of his argument that puzzle me. Allow me to quote from p.6 of bk. 8 of Aristotle's physics (By the way, a 'movent' is a mover): ”It is clear, then, that though there may be countless instances of the perishing of some principles that are unmoved but impart motion, and though many things that move themselves perish and are succeeded by others that come into being, and though one thing that is unmoved moves one thing while another moves another, nevertheless there is something that comprehends them all, and that as something apart from each one of them, and this it is that is the cause of the fact that some things are and others are not and of the continuous process of change: . . . "
Let me stop you here, and ask: Why does there have to be “something that comprehends them all,” as Aristotle says, -- “something apart from each one of them . . . that is the cause of the fact that some things are and others are not”? Why can’t their existence be caused by things that previously existed and why can’t the continuous process of change that things undergo be caused by the constituents of the things themselves?
“ . . . and this causes the motion of the other movents, while they are the causes of the motion of other things. Motion, then, being eternal, the first movent, if there is but one, will be eternal also: if there are more than one, there will be a plurality of such eternal movents. We ought, however, to suppose that there is one rather than many, and a finite rather than an infinite number. When the consequences of either assumption are the same, we should always assume that things are finite rather than infinite in number, since in things constituted by nature that which is finite and that which is better ought, if possible, to be present rather than the reverse: and here it is sufficient to assume only one movent, the first of unmoved things, which being eternal will be the principle of motion to everything else.”
If I understand Aristotle correctly, he is saying that motion did not begin – did not spring into being – ex nihilo, but always existed – that there had to be an unmoved movers – movers that generate their own for movement – in order for movement to exist at all. Here I agree with him. Aristotle clearly does not make a "false assumption" that "stillness is the natural order of things". As is clear from the above selection, Aristotle actually believes that motion is "eternal." The unmoved mover, then, is responsible for causing movement in the logical sense, not in the temporal; there was never a time at which the unmoved mover started the movement. Yes, you are correct in your understanding of Aristotle. I was clearly mistaken in what I took him to be saying. Aristotle is concerned with motion insofar as it exercises a causal influence on the "fact that some things are and others are not and of the continuous process of change". What this means is that Aristotle is essentially investigating the effects of motion, i.e. how motion contributes to accidental and substantial change in entities over time. Of course, if there were no intrinsic changes to entities, but entities merely floated through space in perpetual motion or remained hung in space in perfect stillness (in both cases without effect to their identity), then Aristotle would be silly to search for a causal explanation. For there is no reason to explain a brute fact.
Changes, however, require explanation. Thus, Aristotle wants to look into what it is that brings about change. What he decides is that change can be caused by internal or external forces, in terms of the receptivity entities have to be changed and the active power entities possess in order to effect change. Now, he reasons, since most entities, insofar as they have a certain form, come into being and then perish as a result of acting and being acted upon, it cannot be the case that they are either necessary or eternal. For, if they were necessary, they would not cease to exist, and, if they were eternal, they would not admit change. However, since motion itself is both eternal and necessary, says Aristotle, and because motion describes action which effects change, it must be the case that that which is responsible for motion is eternal and necessary itself. Hence, the unmoved mover, who acts as the causal explanation for why entities pass from being to non-being, and who is the necessary and eternal ground for contingent and temporal instances of change. You’re assuming, along with Aristotle, that there must be one unmoved mover. But there is no reason to assume this, is there? If motion is inherent in the nature of reality, there can be many “unmoved movers.” Also, you’re assuming that the unmoved mover must be a person – a “who” rather than a “what.” What reason is there to assume that? Thus, you were right to say that "there is no reason to assume that motion as such requires a causal explanation any more than there is to assume that stillness does". However, you ought now to realize that Aristotle agrees with this, and that he seeks not to give a reason for motion qua motion, but rather intends to produce an explanation for the effects of motion. Whether or not Aristotle's argument is unsound, it is certainly not refuted on account of your misapplied critique. True.
I wrote, “As long as we’re citing Aristotle, let’s not forget that it was he who identified time as the measurement of motion – i.e., as the relationship of motion to a standard. For example, we measure an hour (in the movement of a clock) as 1/24th of the earth’s rotation on its axis, and a day as 1/365th of the revolution of the earth around the sun. When we ask how much “time” a particular activity took, we are comparing its duration to that of another motion, e.g., to the movement of a clock, to the earth’s rotation on its axis or to its revolution around the sun. All such measured relationships and therefore all temporal units are finite; they have a specific, limited duration. Like the process of counting or enumeration, there is no limit on the potential to extend them continuously forward or backward, but any specific extension –- any length of time -- is by its nature finite.” St. Augustine also maintained that time was relative. Which is why he thought time began at the moment of God's creative act. But again, why are you trying to argue that time is only potentially infinite? That forces you to admit that the universe began to exist, which is a problematic position for atheists, given the kalam cosmological argument. What I meant is that one can always imagine a time that exists before and/or after a particular event, but whatever duration one imagines, it will necessarily be some specific amount of time, and therefore limited. One can continue the process of temporal subtraction or addition indefinitely, but at any point in that process, the amount of time will necessarily be finite, although there is no theoretical limit on extending it either forwards or backwards. The universe did not begin, and will not end, at some point in time.
I wrote, “I did not assume that a god must be conscious in the same way that humans are, as there is no reason to assume that consciousness must entail a specifically human mode of awareness. There are many forms of consciousness other than human. My point was that, whatever its form, a consciousness must have one; it must have a specific mode of awareness. Consciousness without any form of awareness is literally inconceivable. To be conscious is to be conscious in some particular way. An entity must be aware somehow. To be aware no how is not be aware. If a god is conscious, how does it perceive the world? To say that it doesn’t perceive it in any way, shape or form is to say that it doesn’t perceive it at all. A disembodied (non-corporeal) consciousness would have no specific means of awareness, and could not therefore be conscious.” Let me yet again quote from St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles):
Now the mere divine essence, which is the intelligible representation whereby the divine understanding understands, is absolutely one and the same with God Himself and with the understanding of God. God therefore knows Himself most perfectly...
We are said to know a thing when we know its cause. But God Himself by His essence is the cause of being to others. Since therefore He knows His own essence most fully, we must suppose that He knows also other beings.
Whoever knows anything perfectly, knows all that can be truly said of that thing, and all its natural attributes. But a natural attribute of God is to be cause of other things. Since then He perfectly knows Himself, He knows that He is a cause: which could not be unless He knew something also of what He has caused, which is something different from Himself, for nothing is its own cause. Gathering together these two conclusions, it appears that God knows Himself as the primary and essential object of His knowledge, and other things as seen in His essence. This does not refute my argument, which is that a non-corporeal consciousness is unintelligible and inconceivable. Aquinas simply takes it for granted that a such consciousness is possible, which is the very point I’m denying.
I wrote: “But necessity is a function of actuality, because it is a function of a thing’s identity. What a thing is necessitates how it will behave. For example, if I remove an ice-cube from my freezer and drop it into a glass of water, it will necessarily float. Why? Because that is its nature. Since it is less dense than water, it must float.” What you should have said is that the way the world is necessitates how entities within it will behave. For in a universe with different laws of physics, things will act differently. You are assuming that the universe could have been different, which is the very point I’m denying. It could not have been different, for the simple reason that what is possible to the universe depends on what it is. It could only have different laws if it were different. But since it is what it is, it can only have the laws that it has.
I wrote, “If I jump unaided from the Golden Gate Bridge, I will necessarily fall to the water below. Why? Because, as a human being, I cannot fly (unaided).” False, because an angel (whose existence is logically possible) may happen to intervene, apply an upward force on your body, and then transport you to shore. If what you mean by “an angel” is a person who is physically human but has wings and can, therefore, fly (unaided), then I don’t see how that is logically possible. Human beings are anatomically incapable of winged flight. I suppose you'd say that Superman (whose existence you'd claim is "logically possible") could intervene and transport me to safety. But being saved by Superman is no more logically possible than being saved by an angel. A better example, from your perspective, would be a hang glider's flying by and grabbing me (if that could be done safely), but in my example I was assuming there were no hang gliders or similar interventions available.
GWL wrote, “1. Let omnipotence describe the capacity to actualize any and all logically possible states of affairs.
2. Is there anything logically incoherent about my definition? If not, then you are completely unjustified in stating that omnipotence is impossible.”
I replied, “Yes, there is something logically incoherent in your definition, because omnipotence does not describe the capacity to actualize any and all logically possible states of affairs. The capacity to actualize any and all logically possible states of affairs is limited by the nature of the acting entities. For instance, it is not logically possible for a cow to jump over the moon, given the nature of a cow, the nature of the moon and its distance from the earth.” You are right in bringing up metaphysical possibility, but logical possibility subsumes metaphysical possibility in the case of God. Objectivism rejects this distinction. If something is metaphysically impossible, then it is logically impossible (since the law of identity, which is the basis of logic, is itself metaphysical). Why? Well, let's just look at your example of the cow jumping over the moon. Of course, given the universe as it acts now, it is impossible for a cow to jump over the moon. However, God, being omnipotent, could immediately act on the cow such that it could perform such a feat. God could increase the force the cow could apply to the ground, perhaps alter the force of gravity around the vicinity of the cow also, such that the cow could leap out of the atmosphere. Of course, God could also provide the cow with oxygen, warming, and other protection as it ascended into space, steer (no pun intended) the cow around the moon, and deposit him safely back in the pasture. This is what is meant by a miracle.
Since I’ve already rejected omnipotence as an invalid concept, I reject your invocation of God as a logically possible intervention.
I wrote, “It is true that people have often been amazed by the grandeur and magnitude of the universe. What I was con |
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