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Post 100

Monday, March 26, 2007 - 10:02pmSanction this postReply
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To understand any percentage of a fantasy would indeed be a remarkable feat........

Post 101

Monday, March 26, 2007 - 10:06pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I was funnying Bill, not Brady.

“The universe always was.” Then, “it was perhaps misleading for me to say that…” “By saying that it always existed, I simply meant [something which doesn’t require that it always existed.]” Then, “Why are you pressing this point,” “I explained very clearly that I rejected existence having had a start.”

Then, “let's say that relative to an extraterrestrial planet, everything on earth were expanding at the same rate.” Then, no rate at all—just a one-time expansion, “on the order of, say, 2%,” which “would not be enough for us to notice.”

Then the assertion—contrary to the obvious truth that a discrete number of entities can interact only so much in a discrete period of time, yielding a finite number of events—I am told that “there is no answer.” Not even, ‘large but finite,’ just, “there is no answer.”



It’s like I’m in Alice in frickin’ Wonderland.

I give up.


Post 102

Tuesday, March 27, 2007 - 10:25amSanction this postReply
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Jon,

Sorry you feel that way. I've done the best I can in trying to explain my views on this issue. If I can think of a better way to put it, I'll add to what I've said.

In the future, though, I'd appreciate a bit less sarcasm, and a better effort at representing me fairly instead of taking the worst possible interpretation of what I say, holding it up to ridicule, and then making a big production out of your failure to understand me. What do you think is served by taking that approach?

This is not an easy issue, as I'm sure you are aware, fraught as it is with potential problems and paradoxes. A little good will goes a long way.

- Bill



Post 103

Tuesday, March 27, 2007 - 11:00amSanction this postReply
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Jon,

All right. Let me try one more time. You wrote,

“The universe always was.” Then, “it was perhaps misleading for me to say that…” “By saying that it always existed, I simply meant [something which doesn’t require that it always existed.]”
Again, by "always" was, I meant that there was no point in time when it didn't exist, because time depends on existence. Does that mean that the universe existed for an infinite period of time? I explained that I didn't see how one could make that inference, since the concept of an actual infinity is incoherent.
Then, “Why are you pressing this point,” “I explained very clearly that I rejected existence having had a start.”
Right. What's the problem here? You already acknowledged and accepted this in a previous post.
Then, “let's say that relative to an extraterrestrial planet, everything on earth were expanding at the same rate.” Then, no rate at all—just a one-time expansion, “on the order of, say, 2%,” which “would not be enough for us to notice.”
I said that "everything" is expanding at the same rate, meaning that no one would notice any difference, because everyone and everything would remain the same relative to each other, which is what I meant by "the same rate." The fact that the expansion was limited doesn't mean that it didn't occur at the same rate for everyone and everything. Furthermore, if everything on earth expands at the same rate, but the net expansion relative to an external object, like an extraterrestrial planet, is minimal -- on the order of, say, 2% -- then the people on earth wouldn't notice the expansion relative to the other planet, because they wouldn't see the other planet as getting smaller. The point here is simply that the expansion would have to be very great before they would see any difference.
Then the assertion—contrary to the obvious truth that a discrete number of entities can interact only so much in a discrete period of time, yielding a finite number of events—I am told that “there is no answer.” Not even, ‘large but finite,’ just, “there is no answer.”
There is no answer, because there is no point of reference outside the universe in relation to which things in the universe could be said to move or change. Things in the universe can move or change relative to other things, but on that basis alone, there is no way to specify the number of events in the universe as a whole. For that, you would need a frame of reference external to the universe itself, which you don't have.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/27, 12:30pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/28, 1:15am)


Post 104

Tuesday, March 27, 2007 - 2:26pmSanction this postReply
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William wrote: 
Define your terms. What is time? It is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes bodies that move. If nothing existed, there would be no time. Since time depends on things that already exist, time is a property of the universe, and exists within the universe. The universe does not exist within time.
To say that time is a property of the universe, while denying that the universe exists within time, is to make a distinction where there is no difference, if the universe began to exist.  If the universe began to exist (and began to exist in motion), then the universe itself, which amounts to just those things of which it is composed, possesses time as an essential property of itself.  And this is just to say that the universe exists within time; since there is no way it could possibly exist without it. 

Is it your view that the idea of relative motion is a common misconception? Unless it is, I don't see how you can say that the entire universe is expanding. For the question then arises: what is it expanding in relation to? 

It is expanding in relation to itself.  It began as it progessed from a dimensionless point, or singularity, to a state of expansion relative to this point. 

I wrote: 
 "I just don't see how this can be. If the 'universe', for example, began as just one uninflated balloon, and then began to expand (as if it were being blown up) an observer on the surface would notice a steadily decreasing curvature contiguous with the expansion, and therefrom would be able to deduce the expansion of his 'universe' itself."

William replied: 
But in that case, the balloon on which you are situated would be expanding relative to you, the observer. For suppose that you were expanding at the same rate as the balloon. In that case, you would notice no difference in the balloon’s curvature. Remember, the universe is the totality of existence, not just part of it, in which case, you as an observer must be included.
There is no reason to suppose that all constituents within the universe expand at a rate proportional to the rate of the universe's expansion.  It only needs to be the case that at least a single constituent does, viz. the dimensional substratum.   

I wrote:  "By all means, use the nomenclature you see fit. I would just point out that theists make a distinction between the universe and God in order to highlight what they believe to be the ontological dissimilarity of the two: God is uncreated, the universe is created."

William responded: 
But it’s an arbitrary distinction. Why include within the universe everything in existence except for one other thing, especially when the term “universe” refers to what is universal, i.e., to everything?
Universals refer to properties which can be predicated universally of the substances which possess them.  "Redness" is thus a universal applying to all those things which are red.  It is not a universal in the sense that everything is red. 

Using the same line of thought, I think it makes sense to say that the universe defines the collection of entities within a certain set, viz. the set of created entities. 

Furthermore, if God can be uncreated, why can’t the universe be uncreated? If God can be considered a “necessary” being, then why can’t the universe be considered a necessary being? On the other hand, if the universe requires a creator, why doesn’t God require one?
The universe is contingent, i.e. what it is does not entail that it exist.  This is the case insofar as all of the entitites that compose the universe are contingent.  My T-mobile cell-phone, for instance, is a contingent entity, since its concept does not entail that it exist.  I can prove this by imagining its concept while smashing it to pieces with a hammer.   

A necessary being must be a being for whom it is impossible that it not exist; hence it must be a being whose conceptual possibility entails its necessary existence.  But:
(1)  Necessary existence is a positive property. 
(2)  God, as a maximally perfect being, possesses all and only positive properties. 
________________________________________________________
(3)  God exists (necessarily).  

God does not require a creator because God exists necessarily.

The universe does not exist necessarily, because the universe possesses negative properties (e.g. privation).  Hence, the universe must require something to actualize, or create, it:  God.

The ontological distinction that you make between God and the universe is arbitrary.
See above.  


Post 105

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 1:07amSanction this postReply
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I wrote (to GWL): "Define your terms. What is time? It is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes bodies that move. If nothing existed, there would be no time. Since time depends on things that already exist, time is a property of the universe, and exists within the universe. The universe does not exist within time." He replied,
To say that time is a property of the universe, while denying that the universe exists within time, is to make a distinction where there is no difference, if the universe began to exist. If the universe began to exist (and began to exist in motion), then the universe itself, which amounts to just those things of which it is composed, possesses time as an essential property of itself. And this is just to say that the universe exists within time; since there is no way it could possibly exist without it.
If you say the universe exists within time, you're implying that it exists for a certain period of time -- for a certain duration --which in turn implies that its duration can be measured by a standard outside itself, which is impossible since there is nothing outside the universe.

I wrote, "Is it your view that the idea of relative motion is a common misconception? Unless it is, I don't see how you can say that the entire universe is expanding. For the question then arises: what is it expanding in relation to?"
It is expanding in relation to itself. It began as it progessed from a dimensionless point, or singularity, to a state of expansion relative to this point.
You can't say that it's expanding in relation to itself. One part may move or expand in relation to another, but the whole cannot do so in relation to itself.

GWL wrote: "I just don't see how this can be. If the 'universe', for example, began as just one uninflated balloon, and then began to expand (as if it were being blown up) an observer on the surface would notice a steadily decreasing curvature contiguous with the expansion, and therefrom would be able to deduce the expansion of his 'universe' itself." I replied, "But in that case, the balloon on which you are situated would be expanding relative to you, the observer. For suppose that you were expanding at the same rate as the balloon. In that case, you would notice no difference in the balloon’s curvature. Remember, the universe is the totality of existence, not just part of it, in which case, you as an observer must be included."
There is no reason to suppose that all constituents within the universe expand at a rate proportional to the rate of the universe's expansion.
Again, you're assuming that the universe as a whole can be said to expand; it cannot, for the reasons I already stated. Things within the universe can expand relative to other things, but the universe as a whole -- as the sum total of existence -- cannot, because it would have to expand relative to a standard outside itself, which is impossible, since nothing exists outside the universe.
It only needs to be the case that at least a single constituent does, viz. the dimensional substratum.
What's a "dimensional substratum"?

GWL wrote: "By all means, use the nomenclature you see fit. I would just point out that theists make a distinction between the universe and God in order to highlight what they believe to be the ontological dissimilarity of the two: God is uncreated, the universe is created."

I replied, "But it’s an arbitrary distinction. Why include within the universe everything in existence except for one other thing, especially when the term 'universe' refers to what is universal, i.e., to everything?"
Universals refer to properties which can be predicated universally of the substances which possess them. "Redness" is thus a universal applying to all those things which are red. It is not a universal in the sense that everything is red.
Of course! But if I'm talking about the universe of existents, I mean everything in existence.

I wrote, "Furthermore, if God can be uncreated, why can’t the universe be uncreated? If God can be considered a 'necessary' being, then why can’t the universe be considered a necessary being? On the other hand, if the universe requires a creator, why doesn’t God require one?"
The universe is contingent, i.e. what it is does not entail that it exist.
What it is certainly does entail that it exist, because "what it is" is something that exists.
This is the case insofar as all of the entitites that compose the universe are contingent. My T-mobile cell-phone, for instance, is a contingent entity, since its concept does not entail that it exist. I can prove this by imagining its concept while smashing it to pieces with a hammer.
As I understand the term "contingent," it means dependent on something else for its existence -- and generally, on something else that could have been otherwise, like human choice -- but the ultimate constituents of the universe are not dependent on anything else, much less on human choice. They are irreducible, indestructible primaries.
A necessary being must be a being for whom it is impossible that it not exist . . .
Okay, then the fundamental constituents of existence are "necessary beings," for it is impossible for them not to exist.
. . . hence it must be a being whose conceptual possibility entails its necessary existence.
It doesn't follow that a necessary being is one whose conceptual possibility entails its necessary existence. From the fact that something is conceptually possible it doesn't follow that it exists, let alone exists necessarily.
But:
(1) Necessary existence is a positive property.
(2) God, as a maximally perfect being, possesses all and only positive properties.
________________________________________________________
(3) God exists (necessarily).
Suppose that a maximally perfect being didn't exist. In other words, suppose that every being lacked some positive property. Then obviously such a being wouldn't exist, in which case, he wouldn't exist necessarily. So, according to this argument, his existence is necessary only if he first exists. But that he exists is the very thing the argument is designed to prove. Therefore, it cannot be argued that God exists because his existence is necessary, if his existence is necessary only if he first exists. In short, this "ontological argument" is question begging and circular.
The universe does not exist necessarily, because the universe possesses negative properties (e.g. privation). Hence, the universe must require something to actualize, or create, it: God.
Your criterion for necessary existence is incorrect. The fundamental constituents of the universe do exist necessarily, because it isn't possible for them not to exist. Privation has nothing to do with it.

Bill

(I revised my response to the ontological argument.)


(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/28, 1:11am)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/28, 8:46am)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/28, 6:42pm)


Post 106

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 2:52pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Bill,

I think you meant "GWL" when you cited "GBL" in the above post.

Brady


Post 107

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 4:41pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

You wrote, “There is no answer, because there is no point of reference outside the universe in relation to which things in the universe could be said to move or change. Things in the universe can move or change relative to other things, but on that basis alone, there is no way to specify the number of events in the universe as a whole. For that, you would need a frame of reference external to the universe itself, which you don't have.”

This is nonsense. We can see that entities change and move relative to one another, from right here in the universe. We can infer that given a finite number of them and a finite duration, their interactions, changes, motions, will be finite. It is simply not so that we would need to step outside of existence and look back at it to confirm the veracity of that inference. You keep repeating it, but have offered no argument for it (no wonder, since it is obviously silly.)

You asked for some good will, so I am going to say this with as much good will as I can muster…you are putting out rhetorical bullshit. Perhaps not intentionally, but it looks intentional to me. And of course, this also doesn’t feel like good will. I’ll only get more annoyed if we continue. I think we’ve exhausted each other’s ideas (and ways of expressing them) on this subject, so let’s call it here. Thanks for conversation.


Post 108

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 6:25pmSanction this postReply
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Some just can't grasp it, Bill - too big a concept to handle...

[but sympathize with them - took me a bit of time back when first exposed to it to grasp it too...]


Post 109

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 6:44pmSanction this postReply
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Thanks for the heads up, Brady. Sorry about that. Duly noted and corrected! :-P

- Bill

Post 110

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 8:12pmSanction this postReply
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How many events have occurred? [Jon]

Since when? Since the beginning of this century? Since the beginning of the earth? Since the beginning of our galaxy? You have to specify a time period in order for the question to be meaningful. And if you do, THE NUMBER WILL BE FINITE. [Bill] [My caps]

Post 48, An Idea of Infinity, General Forum


And Robert, kindly put too big a concept up your ass.


Post 111

Wednesday, March 28, 2007 - 10:50pmSanction this postReply
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If you say the universe exists within time, you're implying that it exists for a certain period of time -- for a certain duration --which in turn implies that its duration can be measured by a standard outside itself, which is impossible since there is nothing outside the universe.

No, that isn't it at all.  If I exist as the center point within an expanding sphere, I can begin measuring the sphere's expansion at any point in time.  How?  Well, simply by defining any arbitrary unit as a subdivision of the radial length.  Then I can define time as an arbitrary interval.  Even if the sphere stops expanding, I can still measure the elapsed time by using the arbitrary method I've just devised.  Easy. 
You can't say that it's expanding in relation to itself. One part may move or expand in relation to another, but the whole cannot do so in relation to itself.
The makes absolutely no sense.  If the universe were simply a sphere expanding from a central point, it would be expanding in relation to itself.  It's volume would be increasing, and volume can be determined internally, i.e. by knowing the radius (whose length can be determined internal to the sphere) and entering that into the formula for volume.    
Again, you're assuming that the universe as a whole can be said to expand; it cannot, for the reasons I already stated. Things within the universe can expand relative to other things, but the universe as a whole -- as the sum total of existence -- cannot, because it would have to expand relative to a standard outside itself, which is impossible, since nothing exists outside the universe.
No, you can set arbitrary standards within the universe, then use these to measure from a fixed point. 
What's a "dimensional substratum"?
The space-time manifold.  And, no, it's not illusory.  The reason why not even light can escape from black holes owes to the fact that black holes are points where infinitely curved space-time collapses on a point. 


Of course! But if I'm talking about the universe of existents, I mean everything in existence.
Use the terms as you wish.  All I'm trying to say is that 'universe' in the sense I am using it is perfectly appropriate. 

I wrote:  "The universe is contingent, i.e. what it is does not entail that it exist."
What it is certainly does entail that it exist, because "what it is" is something that exists.
You're not getting the point...
As I understand the term "contingent," it means dependent on something else for its existence -- and generally, on something else that could have been otherwise, like human choice -- but the ultimate constituents of the universe are not dependent on anything else, much less on human choice. They are irreducible, indestructible primaries.
This is just dogmatism, as there is no way to substantiate such a claim. It's simply arbitrary.
Okay, then the fundamental constituents of existence are "necessary beings," for it is impossible for them not to exist.
You cannot know this.  You can only assert it.  The only way to determine necessity is by conceptual analysis.  This was my point with respect to innate ideas.  Your opinion was that we know 2+2=4 to be a necessary truth strictly by observation.  But surely this cannot be, since we can only observe the actual world.  Necessary truths are truths that hold in all possible worlds, which means that, for any imaginable world, 2+2=4 is true.        
It doesn't follow that a necessary being is one whose conceptual possibility entails its necessary existence.
Yes it does.  This is a logical certitude.  If anything necessary is possible, it must exist necessarily.  Why?  Because a necessary being is (by definition) a being such that if it exists in any possible world, it exists in all of them.   
From the fact that something is conceptually possible it doesn't follow that it exists, let alone exists necessarily. 
If the something possesses the property of necessary existence, it does.  Logically.    
 Suppose that a maximally perfect being didn't exist. In other words, suppose that every being lacked some positive property. Then obviously such a being wouldn't exist, in which case, he wouldn't exist necessarily.
Ah, but a mere supposition won't do.  So long as it isn't impossible that a necessary being exist, a necessary being exists.  You need to show that the existence of a maximally perfect being (which, by definition, must possess the property of necessary existence) cannot possibly exist.  Since you can't do this, it would seem that a maximally perfect being exists (necessarily). 
So, according to this argument, his existence is necessary only if he first exists. But that he exists is the very thing the argument is designed to prove. Therefore, it cannot be argued that God exists because his existence is necessary, if his existence is necessary only if he first exists. In short, this "ontological argument" is question begging and circular.

You're making the same mistake Kant made in his Critique of Pure Reason, wherein he tried to refute the ontological argument.  It is not true that this being's existence is necessary only if it first exists-- this would only be the case if actual existence were a necessary property of the being.  (Obviously, if you annul the concept of a being which possesses the property of actual existence as part of its essence, you annul the being.  Because you can just say that the being, while possible, is not actual.) 

But we're talking about the property of necessary existence, not actual existence.  And the possibility of a concept which by definition possesses the property of necessary existence must have a necessarily existent object.  Why?  Because you cannot annul it; to annul it would be to call it impossible.  But a maximally perfect being is a consistent concept; hence, it's object is possible.  Hence, it exists.   

(Edited by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on 3/29, 12:35pm)


Post 112

Thursday, March 29, 2007 - 12:36amSanction this postReply
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Jon asked, "How many events have occurred?"

I replied, "Since when? Since the beginning of this century? Since the beginning of the earth? Since the beginning of our galaxy? You have to specify a time period in order for the question to be meaningful. And if you do, THE NUMBER WILL BE FINITE. [Bill] [Jon's caps]"

Right. My thinking on this issue had undergone a change in the course of our discussion (which means it was a productive exchange of ideas). I now regard my previous view as mistaken, for more than one reason.

First, in order to quantify the events, you would have to be talking about the number of events in a particular part of the universe, rather than in the universe as a whole, and secondly, you would have to define what constituted a discrete event, which would be arbitrary and probably very difficult to do with any consistency. Is an event the movement of blood pumped by a single heart beat? Is it the movement of a corpuscle a centimeter along a blood vessel, a half a centimeter, a quarter of a centimeter? Is an event a thunderstorm, a single rain drop, etc.? I don't know how you would specify what qualifies as an event and what doesn't in order to say that there was a specific number of them, even if you narrowed the context to a particular part of the universe. You might be able to specify a particular kind of event, like a baseball game, and come up with a finite number. But that, I think, is the best you could do.

- Bill



Post 113

Thursday, March 29, 2007 - 8:56pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Would you tell me whether your views have changed on something else?

Previously, you have said that the universe must be finite because everything in the universe is finite. Granted, every particular entity is finite. When I asked how we can know that the count of entities in the entire universe is finite, you answered that we can know it because the universe is defined as ‘all that exists,’ and ‘all’ means ‘none left out,’ and where an infinity is involved there is always some left out.

I wonder if you might change your view now, from ‘the quantity of entities in the universe is finite’ to ‘there is no answer.’ Would you now say that we would have to be talking about the number of entities in a particular part of the universe, rather than in the universe as a whole? As you have noted, “event” can be interpreted so as to yield larger or smaller counts— “Is an event a thunderstorm, a single rain drop, etc.?” and we see the same for “entity”—‘is the earth an entity, a single bee, etc.?’ For events, you have argued that this ambiguity necessitates that “there is no answer.” Same for entities?


Post 114

Friday, March 30, 2007 - 4:24pmSanction this postReply
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John,

Excellent series of questions. You write,
Would you tell me whether your views have changed on something else?

Previously, you have said that the universe must be finite because everything in the universe is finite. Granted, every particular entity is finite. When I asked how we can know that the count of entities in the entire universe is finite, you answered that we can know it because the universe is defined as ‘all that exists,’ and ‘all’ means ‘none left out,’ and where an infinity is involved there is always some left out.

I wonder if you might change your view now, from ‘the quantity of entities in the universe is finite’ to ‘there is no answer.’ Would you now say that we would have to be talking about the number of entities in a particular part of the universe, rather than in the universe as a whole?
Offhand, I'd say, no, because whether or not something is an entity does not depend on one's frame of reference, as it does with an event. Moreover, since there are ultimate, irreducible entities out of which everything else is composed, if one were to include these as well as every entity made from them in one's calculation, one could theoretically arrive at a finite number.
As you have noted, “event” can be interpreted so as to yield larger or smaller counts— “Is an event a thunderstorm, a single rain drop, etc.?” and we see the same for “entity”—‘is the earth an entity, a single bee, etc.?’ For events, you have argued that this ambiguity necessitates that “there is no answer.” Same for entities?
I hadn't considered the parallel in this respect, although it does seem to apply. I had thought that there is no definitive way to quantify all events, because an event can always be split into sub-events, each of which is itself an event, etc, ad infinitum.

But here's something I hadn't realized. According to modern physics, there is a smallest distance, an irreducible length, that cannot be sub-divided further, which means that since motion takes place over a distance, there is a shortest event, which cannot be subdivided into shorter events. If true, that would mean that if one were to subdivide every macro event into as many micro events as physically possible, one could theoretically arrive at a finite number of them, assuming once again a particular frame of reference.

That's where I stand now. What are your thoughts on this issue, after all the dust has cleared?

- Bill

Post 115

Sunday, April 1, 2007 - 1:06amSanction this postReply
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GWL, you said that I didn't adequately address your "ontological argument" for the existence of God. Okay, then let me try again. The argument as you've presented it is this:

(1) Necessary existence is a positive property.
(2) God, as a maximally perfect being, possesses all and only positive properties.
________________________________________________________
(3) God exists (necessarily).

As I understand this argument, you are asking me to imagine a maximally perfect being that possesses all and only positive properties. I'm not sure what you mean by "positive properties." If they are what I think they are, then all of them cannot be possessed by a single entity simultaneously, without being mutually exclusive and self-contradictory. But I'll do the best I can to imagine such a being for the sake of argument.

Okay, I'm imagining a maximally perfect being that possesses all and only positive properties. These properties are at this stage of the argument strictly imaginary, since we have yet to establish that such a being exists. For example, a unicorn possesses the positive property of a single horn, but the horn is still imaginary, since we have yet to discover that such an animal exists.

Now, you ask me to include within all of the positive properties possessed by this maximally perfect being the property of necessary existence. Very well, I shall include it, but remember that the positive properties possessed by this perfect being are still imaginary, since (like the unicorn) we have yet to discover that such a being exists. That means that the property of necessary existence is also imaginary. I am imagining a being that possesses the property of necessary existence, just as I imagine a unicorn that possesses a single horn in the middle of its head. Of course, if this maximally perfect being were to exist, it would actually possess the property of necessary existence, just as if a unicorn were to exist, it would actually possess a single horn in the middle of its head.

But then you say that to imagine this maximally perfect being as possessing the property of necessary existence is to imply that it actually possesses it. In drawing this conclusion, you are confusing an imaginary property with a real one. Just as to imagine something as actually existing is not to demonstrate that it actually exists, so to imagine something as existing necessarily is not to demonstrate that it exists necessarily. In short, you cannot bring an imaginary being into existence by declaring that it possesses the property of necessary existence, any more than you can bring an imaginary being into existence by declaring that it possesses the property of actual existence. There is a difference between asserting that something exists and proving that it exists. To prove that something exists, one needs more than assertion; one needs evidence.

- Bill

Post 116

Monday, April 2, 2007 - 10:49amSanction this postReply
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I wrote, "As I understand the term 'contingent,' it means dependent on something else for its existence -- and generally, on something else that could have been otherwise, like human choice -- but the ultimate constituents of the universe are not dependent on anything else, much less on human choice. They are irreducible, indestructible primaries." GWL replied,
This is just dogmatism, as there is no way to substantiate such a claim. It's simply arbitrary.
I thought I did substantiate it. To say that something is contingent is to say that it is dependent on something else, but the fundamental constituents of existence cannot be dependent on anything else; if they were, they wouldn't be fundamental.

I wrote, "Okay, then the fundamental constituents of existence are 'necessary beings,' for it is impossible for them not to exist." GW replied,
You cannot know this. You can only assert it. The only way to determine necessity is by conceptual analysis.
Doesn't it constitute conceptual analysis to show that if the fundamental constituents of existence could not have come into existence out of nothing, they are necessary? If nihilo ex nihilo -- from nothing comes nothing -- then if the fundamental constituents of the universe are here, they are here necessarily, because there is no alternative to their existence. They could not have failed to exist, for if they did, they could not have come into existence.

This principle applies to whatever you consider fundamental. It applies to God, if you consider God fundamental, and it applies to nature if you consider nature fundamental. Since I don't believe in a God, because I don't see any evidence for such a being, it is logical for me to infer that nature is fundamental and that its existence is therefore logically necessary.
This was my point with respect to innate ideas. Your opinion was that we know 2+2=4 to be a necessary truth strictly by observation. But surely this cannot be, since we can only observe the actual world. Necessary truths are truths that hold in all possible worlds, which means that, for any imaginable world, 2+2=4 is true.
But what is possible depends on what is actual. It is from the actual world that we get our concepts of possibility. E.g., it is not possible for water to boil at zero degrees centigrade under normal atmospheric pressure, because that is the nature of water. It is not possible for human beings to live without oxygen, because that is the nature of human beings. Etc. The worlds that are possible depend on the world that is actual. They depend on what actually exists in the real world -- not on your imagination. That you can imagine something does not mean that it is possible, still less that it exists.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 4/02, 10:51am)


Post 117

Monday, April 2, 2007 - 8:41pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

We can be sure that only a finite number of motions, events, may occur given a finite number of entities and a finite duration. We do not have to surrender to ‘there is no answer’ just because motion is relative to a frame of reference. From the assumption that the number of entities is finite, we know that a finite number of observers exist and therefore a finite number of frames of reference. Different observers will record fewer or more motions, but we can still be sure that if we add up all their reports, we will get a finite number.

Now that all the dust has cleared, I would have to say that I haven’t changed my views on infinity at all.


Post 118

Tuesday, April 3, 2007 - 5:13amSanction this postReply
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Now, you ask me to include within all of the positive properties possessed by this maximally perfect being the property of necessary existence. Very well, I shall include it, but remember that the positive properties possessed by this perfect being are still imaginary, since (like the unicorn) we have yet to discover that such a being exists.
Such a being does exist, so long as such a being is possible.  A unicorn, though possible, wouldn't possess necessary existence.  Therefore, even though a unicorn exists in at least one possible world, there is no reason to think it actual in ours. 
That means that the property of necessary existence is also imaginary. I am imagining a being that possesses the property of necessary existence, just as I imagine a unicorn that possesses a single horn in the middle of its head. Of course, if this maximally perfect being were to exist, it would actually possess the property of necessary existence, just as if a unicorn were to exist, it would actually possess a single horn in the middle of its head.
Still aren't getting it.  If something is necessary, it exists in all possible worlds.  Thus, if possibility is determined according to conceivability, then this necessary being exists in our world, since it is conceivable. 
But then you say that to imagine this maximally perfect being as possessing the property of necessary existence is to imply that it actually possesses it. In drawing this conclusion, you are confusing an imaginary property with a real one. Just as to imagine something as actually existing is not to demonstrate that it actually exists, so to imagine something as existing necessarily is not to demonstrate that it exists necessarily.
False.  The property of triangles having their angles sum to 180 degrees is necessary.  As such, there is no possible world in which a triangle exists whose angles do not add up to 180 degrees. 

Now, I imagine this necessity not out of thin air, but rather according to the concept of a triangle itself-- a three sided figure composed of three line segments. 

The same is true of a maximally perfect being.  I ascribe necessary existence to it by virtue of necessary existence being contained in the concept of maximally perfect being.   

In short, you cannot bring an imaginary being into existence by declaring that it possesses the property of necessary existence, any more than you can bring an imaginary being into existence by declaring that it possesses the property of actual existence.
You're forgetting the distinction. 
There is a difference between asserting that something exists and proving that it exists. To prove that something exists, one needs more than assertion; one needs evidence.
I have evidence, viz. the argument itself. 

(Edited by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on 4/03, 5:18am)


Post 119

Tuesday, April 3, 2007 - 9:16pmSanction this postReply
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To say that something is contingent is to say that it is dependent on something else, but the fundamental constituents of existence cannot be dependent on anything else; if they were, they wouldn't be fundamental. 
There really are two forms or modes of contingency:  existential and rational.  Thus, pointing out that the fundamental particles or material simples of our universe depend on nothing else for their physical existence is not enough to justify classifying them as necessary, for there cannot be found in them a sufficient reason as to why they exist rather than otherwise.  Though necessary in an existential sense, they are nevertheless contingent in the rational sense, insofar as there is no property of their being that offers a rational explanation for their existence.   
Doesn't it constitute conceptual analysis to show that if the fundamental constituents of existence could not have come into existence out of nothing, they are necessary? If nihilo ex nihilo -- from nothing comes nothing -- then if the fundamental constituents of the universe are here, they are here necessarily, because there is no alternative to their existence. They could not have failed to exist, for if they did, they could not have come into existence.
That a given entity exists eternally within an actual world does not make it a necessary being.  There could very well be a possible world in which unicorns exist eternally, but this does not imply that unicorns eternally exist in all possible worlds.  They don't, for example, exist eternally in ours.  (They don't exist at all in ours.)
This principle applies to whatever you consider fundamental. It applies to God, if you consider God fundamental, and it applies to nature if you consider nature fundamental. Since I don't believe in a God, because I don't see any evidence for such a being, it is logical for me to infer that nature is fundamental and that its existence is therefore logically necessary.
I consider God to be not just fundamental (i.e. eternal) in the actual world, but also eternally existent in all possible worlds.  This position can be justified by a consideration of the concept of a maximally perfect being, for herein lies a sufficient reason as to why such a being must exist necessarily.  Nature--the sum total of entities--can provide no similar sufficient reason for its existing necessarily.  Therefore, it is not logical for you to infer that existence (i.e. 'nature' or the 'universe') is logically necessary. 
But what is possible depends on what is actual. It is from the actual world that we get our concepts of possibility.
I agree (in a sense). 
E.g., it is not possible for water to boil at zero degrees centigrade under normal atmospheric pressure, because that is the nature of water. It is not possible for human beings to live without oxygen, because that is the nature of human beings.
I would say 'no' on this score.  In my opinion, it is possible that water boil at zero degrees centigrade under normal atmospheric conditions, and it is possible that human beings live without oxygen.  Why?  Well, it would seem that there is no inherent conceptual property in either water or human beings such as 'not boiling at zero degrees centigrade' or 'not living without oxygen'. 
That you can imagine something does not mean that it is possible, still less that it exists.

One must imagine a coherent concept in order to justifiably claim the concept's object's possibility.  But it would seem that this is all that is required for determining possibility. 


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