| | Ed, ...humans do not start out with any rights against being punished for violating others' rights. Humans start out with the right to go where they wish as long as it doesn't constitute trespass. They have the freedom of movement. Locking someone up would be a violation of that freedom of movement, unless they had done something that changed their relationship to the rights they once had. On January 1, 2013, John Doe had the right to travel from his home in San Diego to Mexico City. On February 1, he is caught in the act of cashing a check he knows to be bad and confesses. By June 1, 2013, he has been convicted and locked up. He now has no right to go to Mexico City.
We have the rights against the initiation of force, the threat of initiated force, fraud and theft... at the start of our life. It will take force to keep John Doe in jail. The force is NOT an example of self-defense because his bad act started and ended on January 1 and force is still be used to keep him in jail even though it is now August - yet he started out with the right of free movement. If that right, for him, is not seen as no longer there, then it would be wrong to use force against him.
I have the right to start a business of a certain kind. But, someone already in that kind of business can come along and offer me enough money to get an agreement from me that I won't start up my own business - a non-compete agreement. No one can take away my right to take that kind of action, but I can voluntarily surrender it. It would be immoral to use force to stop me from starting that business, in the beginning, but once I give up that right, I no longer have a right to be free of force used to stop me from that act. It makes no sense to say that I did not start out with any rights to resist force that is used to honor agreements where I gave up a right... unless you are agreeing that a person can voluntarily step away from a right - which kind of kills the heart of your argument where you've said that we always have the rights we start out with.
When you use the word "punishment" it presumes a chain of events that are understood with a logical chain of thought. The presumption is that a person acts as to violate another's moral right, that there is a law against that act based on that moral right, and that the violator is caught, tried, convicted and sentenced... otherwise the issue of punishment could not come to pass. Punishment will described as a range of possible actions that are carried out by the legal arm of society and are going to be in the range that is deemed culturally acceptable. The acts of punishment can be examined to see if they are logically appropriate to the violation of the right that started this, but they will still have a great deal of cultural relativism in their makeup. What is strict but appropriate in this day and place will not match what was seen as strict but appropriate in other times or other cultures. I mention this so that you can see that "punishment" may be subject to moral judgement, but is not fundamental enough to be in the definition of moral rights. It is a legal concept.
John Doe had the right to go to Mexico City and now he doesn't. That right went away. It went away when he stepped away from the concept of right by choosing to violate the rights of another. The degree to which he gave up his rights depends upon the degree to which he violated the rights of others. This relationship is the one that lets us judge a given culture's choice of punishment for a given act. If this was Saudi Arabia and they decided that punishment should be chopping off both hands, how would we argue against the punishment, how would we say that there is a logical root to what is appropriate if we don't see that rights are lost BUT ONLY in proportion to rights being violated? If what you say is that the check casher did not start out with a right to be free of punishment from violating the rights of others you haven't done that. Why? Because the Saudi Justice system could just say, "He was not born with the right to keep his hands when he violated the rights of others." It is an arbitrary answer and that is what happens when you don't have rights being lost proportional to rights being violated.
Criminal laws, when properly designed, are but descriptions of the acts that violate individual rights. And punishments should follow the same logic. They should be measured reflections of the intensity and nature of the rights that were violated. Rights and their violations occur in the moral world - even if far out to sea, or deep in outer space, where no law exists. Laws describing criminal acts, and laws proscribing punishments are legal entities. The law has no moral stature to use force against someone who still possesses the moral right to be free of force.
I appreciate how fine and minute the difference is between your way of formulating this and the concept that rights are voluntarily ceded by acts that violate rights, and I don't think it would ever cause a big problem, but I think it is less accurate.
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