Epistemology In Short

Steve,

One cannot trade away one's property rights, understood as the right to dispose of one's property according to one's judgment. In that sense, property rights are unalienable. For example, to sell one's car is not to surrender one's right to control that which one owns -- which is what is meant by "property rights" -- because a car that one sells is no longer a car that one owns.

Let's say a man is dying of liver cancer but has a good heart and he is a very rare blood type. Does he have the right to sell his heart, to earn money to leave his family, even though it means ending his life a few months early? Bill, I agree with you that if he didn't FIRST possess the right to his body, the right to his life, the right to trade away whatever he owns, he couldn't dispose of them. But if he makes this deal, accepts the money and disposes of that, can he back out of his deal? Can he claim that it would violate some right that can never be taken from him, or given away? Clearly, ending his life will end every single right he ever possessed. If the contract were fulfilled, against the man's later change of mind, and his life taken to harvest the heart he sold, was that a violation of any of his rights? And if not, then a person can trade away their most basic of rights (but only their own, not for anyone else).

First of all, ending his life doesn't end his rights, because you can only end a person's rights, if he exists to possess them. Secondly, he cannot unilaterally back out of the contract, especially since other people's lives depend on his fulfilling it. Nor does holding him to it violate his rights or deprive him of them, because he does not have the right to violate the rights of others, and breaking the contract would violate them. In other words, by adhering to the contract, he does not trade away the right to break it, because he does not have a right to break it. So although refusing to break the contract involves the surrender of his life, it does not involve the surrender of his rights.

But if he has a right to life, doesn't his fulfilling the contract trade away that right? No, because to say that he has a right to life simply means that he has the right to control his life according to his own judgment, and in this particular case, he has decided, according to his own judgment, to trade away his life in exchange for money. In making that decision, he does not trade away his "right to life," because he does not trade away his right to control his life according to his own judgment, which is what the "right to life" means in this context. On the contrary, he exercises that right in the very act of agreeing to the contract.

As one can see, this case is no different in principle than selling one's car in exchange for money. In selling one's car, one does not trade away one's property rights, understood as the right to control that which one owns. On the contrary, one exercises that right in the very act of choosing to sell the car. It's no different in the case of selling one's heart (and consequently one's life) in exchange for money. In doing so, one does not trade away one's rights; one exercises them.

(Edited by William Dwyer on 8/10, 11:16pm)

Post 61

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 12:49pm

Bill,

You wrote,

One cannot trade away one's property rights, understood as the right to dispose of one's property according to one's judgment. In that sense, property rights are unalienable.

Unalienable might be understood in that fashion, but you would have to make an argument for it. It make more sense from the Objectivist understanding of individual rights to see "unalienable" as meaning that they cannot be taken away. In Ayn Rand's on-line Lexicon she has an entry for "inalienability" which is clearly about violation, and nothing about not being able to trade away or voluntarily forego. Your use of the word "unalienable" doesn't settle the argument since it would have to be justified in itself as going beyond meaning rights should never be violated.
----------

Next, I just realized that "the right to control" as we are discussing it, IS ownership and ownership IS the right to control (use, dispose, etc.).

Ayn Rand's definition: A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man�s freedom of action in a social context." The two parts of the moral principle are the defining, and the sanctioning. The sanctioning is the statement of an actions rightness. The defining is where action is described.

Property, properly understood, is not just an object, but carries an implication of ownership as well (e.g., an object that is or can be owned). And ownership is the possession of a bundle of moral sanctions of actions regarding the object.

I think you are attempting to assert a 'right to control' without ever having any connection to any object. (More on this later).
-----------------

This is just a quibble. Regarding my example of the man who makes a contract to sell his heart (he has terminal liver cancer and only a few months to live and wants die early if it enables him to earn the money to leave his family), you said, "...ending his life doesn't end his rights, because you can only end a person's rights, if he exists to possess them." Actually, you can only violate his rights while he is alive. And, he can only voluntarily surrender any right that can be surrendered, while he is alive. But once he is dead, he no longer has any rights. I didn't say that the ending of his life, in this strange example, was a violation of his rights, but that once he no longer existed, his rights no longer existed.

We agree that fulfilling the contract did not violate his rights, even though it meant putting him to death against his will - because he had made a contract when he sold his heart, and in that contract he voluntarily surrendered his heart, and thereby, his life, and his right to his life. Ending his life ended his rights (his breathing, his awareness, his ownership of things, etc.) but that isn't the same as saying his right were violated. There are "endings" which are not violations. Going to a car example: A car can be taken from a person against their will - but it might not be a violation of their rights, as in a theft or robbery - because it might be the enforcement of a valid contract - as in a lawful repossession.
------------------

I created that strange example to indicate that we own our rights. That is really where I see you coming from. I agree with the tautology that we have a right to that which is ours by right. And that will always be so, because of the structure of the sentence. But it doesn't have any further meaning until you identify the object of the right. At that point, there is a thing that can be surrendered.

Rights with defined objects, like anything else we own, we can voluntarily surrender... as through trade. A woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy. She can choose to not have the abortion in exchange for some consideration (e.g., some childless couple offers her enough money to change her mind).

You disagreed with the idea that we can trade away a right. Referring to the man who sold his heart, you wrote:

But if he has a right to life, doesn't his fulfilling the contract trade away that right? No, because to say that he has a right to life simply means that he has the right to control his life according to his own judgment, and in this particular case, he has decided, according to his own judgment, to trade away his life in exchange for money. In making that decision, he does not trade away his "right to life," because he does not trade away his right to control his life according to his own judgment, which is what the "right to life" means in this context. On the contrary, he exercises that right in the very act of agreeing to the contract.

We agree that he had the right to sell his heart. And we agree for the same reason, "he has the right to control his life according to his own judgement".

But the man changes his mind later, and tries to get out of the contract (after disposing of the money he received). This change of mind he has is also his judgement. It is more recent. Perhaps it is held with more intensity. Perhaps he musters more convincing arguments to support his new position. But to no avail. What is different is that he no longer possesses the right to control this aspect of his life. It was a moral right (a moral sanction to a defined freedom of action) that he surrendered in a voluntary agreement. He still possess the right to control some other aspects of his life, but not this one.

If I can adequately define a freedom of action to which I possess moral sanction to exercise, then I can trade that. I can surrender it for consideration.
--------------------

You wrote, "...one does not trade away one's rights; one exercises them." Actually, one does both. In the exercise of the right to trade away a right, a right is lost. But there may still be other rights left, and maybe even more rights are acquired than were lost. If I make a good business deal, it might increase the number or the quality of the freedom of actions to which I have moral sanction.

There is an epistemological, or logical, symmetry that is required in the descriptions of rights and their objects. If I talk about the right to control, I have an obligation to indicate what the context is - what is being controlled. If I say that I have a right to control all things, that would obliterate the universal nature of individual rights, because it would be a claim to control things that others own. It would be a claim to have a right to violate a right, and therefore not logical. If I say I have a right to control that which I own, I am only saying that property rights exist. It doesn't change the ability to trade away rights in a defined object.

I am left viewing your statement that "One cannot trade away one's property rights, understood as the right to dispose of one's property according to one's judgment" as really only being true in the sense that one can not trade away the concept of property rights such that it would not exist for anyone. But clearly one can trade away absolutely anything that can be adequately described such that it can be the object of the meeting of minds in a voluntary agreement - and that includes objects that are rights (moral sanctions of defined freedom of actions).

Post 62

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 2:12pm

Steve,

In the exercise of the right to trade away a right, a right is lost. But there may still be other rights left, and maybe even more rights are acquired than were lost. If I make a good business deal, it might increase the number or the quality of the freedom of actions to which I have moral sanction.

But this is an equivalence of the legal with the moral. A net increase in rights is particularly illuminating. You can acquire more legal rights (e.g., rights to the ownership and willful disposal of various material objects, etc.) from a trade -- but you cannot acquire more moral rights from a trade.

Let's say that, counter-intuitively, that you start out as a being without the right to own and dispose of property (i.e., without moral property rights). Can you even enter into a trade while being that kind of a creature? No. Only creatures who already have, who always have (in virtue of their metaphysical nature), the right to own and dispose of property -- can ever enter into trades. It is not a trade if it didn't start out with property rights on both sides of the equation. You couldn't start without them, and then somehow gain them from a trade -- as that would involve the fallacy of the stolen concept.

This is a little like anarcho-libertarianism, were the anarchist assumes that trading can or will occur without a pre-existing moral foundation.

Ed

Post 63

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 2:15pm

Steve,

The Declaration of Independence enunciates the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These are the rights of man. One can trade away the right to a car. Can one trade away the rights of man? Can one trade away one's right to life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness? Do you see a difference between the right to a specific piece of property and the rights of man?

Post 64

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 4:48pm

Ed,

I said, "In the exercise of the right to trade away a right, a right is lost. But there may still be other rights left, and maybe even more rights are acquired than were lost. If I make a good business deal, it might increase the number or the quality of the freedom of actions to which I have moral sanction."

And you replied:

...this is an equivalence of the legal with the moral.

No, I stayed in the moral sphere in my example. What I said could have happened between two people on a desert island with no government at all. I could have offered to trade away my right to eat my freshly caught sea bass in exchange for you giving up your right to eat the two coconuts you harvested. I had a moral right to eat the sea bass I caught, and you had the moral right to eat the coconuts you climbed a tree to get. No legal involved.
------------------

Back to basics: "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man�s freedom of action in a social context." From Ayn Rand. That describes the defining properties or parts of a moral right (it is a moral right, by definition, where she says that is a MORAL principle, as opposed to a legal principle). The key parts here are that a man's freedom of action is sanctioned, and that the action is described. It must be in a social context - if you have a desert island that's okay, as long as there is at least on other person, somewhere, and the freedom of action might involve them.

Rand starts with our basic right - the right to life (which is a process of actions). She derives other rights from this basic right. We can divide up a more general right into finer and finer units. We can get the right to not just property, but real property, intellectual property, the right sell a right to display a painting that you own, etc.

Because these are finer and finer units does not make them "legal" rights. To be a legal right, it must be the subject of legal statutes and/or judicial rulings and those may or may not conflict with moral rights.
-----------------

... you cannot acquire more moral rights from a trade.

A moral right is a moral sanction of the freedom of action in a social context. Yes, a trade could increase the freedom of action I have in a given sphere or context and if you talk about my moral right to pursue these newly opened avenues, you are talking about my increase in moral rights. This way of enumerating rights does not change the basis of rights, or my metaphysical nature, but I can have more areas of movement open to me than before a trade - movement that would have not been morally sanctioned before the trade (prevented by not owning something, for example, and therefore not allowed to control it).
------------------

Let's say that, counter-intuitively, that you start out as a being without the right to own and dispose of property (i.e., without moral property rights). Can you even enter into a trade while being that kind of a creature? No. Only creatures who already have, who always have (in virtue of their metaphysical nature), the right to own and dispose of property -- can ever enter into trades. It is not a trade if it didn't start out with property rights on both sides of the equation. You couldn't start without them, and then somehow gain them from a trade -- as that would involve the fallacy of the stolen concept.

You start out saying I'm a creature without rights, and then ask if I can deal with such a creature... agh! But I understand the question you are raising. But it is irrelevant for this reason. We all start out with the rights to own property. We can receive property as a gift, or acquire it by trading some value (effort, ideas, etc.). So, we all start with the right to own property, but for the most part don't have any, or very much at the start. You have created a straw-man called "you can't start a trade without property rights" - I never argued that you could. You are still arguing that one can have a right to something, trade it away, and still have it. There is no stolen concept in my argument, but there is a straw-man doing some magical eat-it-and-still-have-it in yours :-)

Post 65

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 5:22pm

Bill,

The Declaration of Independence enunciates the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These are the rights of man. One can trade away the right to a car. Can one trade away the rights of man? Can one trade away one's right to life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness? Do you see a difference between the right to a specific piece of property and the rights of man?

Ayn Rand stated, "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man�s freedom of action in a social context. There is only one fundamental right (all the others are its consequences or corollaries): a man�s right to his own life. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action�which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life. (Such is the meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)"

The right to life entails the liberty it requires, and these morally sanctioned actions will include the right to control the property one owns, and this can include my right to sell my 2006 Chrysler Sebring that I own. Moral rights is an entire, and contiguous sphere in which there are no human actions that take place in a social context that we can't examine from that perspective. We are used to living in a society with a history of law that goes back far earlier than anyone's earliest memory and that can let us confuse legal and moral rights. But I could sell my car even if there were no government and no law and that act could be judged as moral or immoral.
--------------

You ask do I see a difference between "the rights of man" and "the right to a specific piece of property" - Yes, I do. The rights of man is a description of moral principles as they apply to all men, as men. The right to a specific piece of property refers to the application of moral principle to a specific man or men in a specific circumstance. And that is the purpose for understanding the rights of man - that we can apply them to our specifics. They are both descriptions of morally sanctioned, defined actions taking place in a social context.

To avoid any confusion, I've stated before that no single man, or group of men can trade away the right of others. We can only trade what we own. I can trade away my rights, you can trade away yours, and Ed can trade away his, but no one can trade away another's. So, I can not trade away the "rights of man" which would make no sense. But I can trade away my specific moral rights derived from a general moral principle. How else would I ever get the right to control what had been owned by others - the very principle of trade requires that we be able to trade away a specific moral rights. I have never said that to do so in any way invalidates, or destroys the general moral principle as it applies to all men. Apples and oranges.
-----------------

And, by the way, in our discussions we have been associating the 'specific' right with material objects - like a car. But that is just convenient, not necessary. The specific could be an intellectual right, or a promise of action or a promise to not take a given action.

Post 66

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 7:55pm

Steve,

But I can trade away my specific moral rights derived from a general moral principle. How else would I ever get the right to control what had been owned by others - the very principle of trade requires that we be able to trade away a specific moral rights.

These 2 sentences capture our difference; specifically the single question:

... I can trade away my specific moral rights ... . How else would I ever get the right to control what had been owned by others[?]

But moral rights are always negatives, not positives (though legal rights can be positives). So when you say that you gain the right to control something, that is a positive -- and therefore, a legal, right. Another way to say this is that it is a right to something. Alternatively, moral rights are always rights against something -- usually against the potential coercion from other people.

Ed

Post 67

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 8:43pm

Ed,

But moral rights are always negatives, not positives

You are mixing up categories. Individual rights, as we Objectivists understand them are freedom from coercion. And when we define a particular right to a finer grain, it stays about freedom from coercion, but in a more limited context. Example: I have the right to my life. That is saying that I have the moral sanction to those actions my life requires and that, as a statement, means that I am morally right to be free of coercion in those acts.

This is not a positive right because it is not a statement that I have a right to something that requires the resources or efforts or time of others. I don't have the right to health care, because that would mean I had a right to the time of other and their resources.

I have a right to sell my car because that is a statement that I own my car, that I have entered into an agreement with someone that involves no coercion or fraud, and that it would be wrong for someone to interfere using force or the threat of force to stop me from selling my car. That is a negative right because it lays no claim to the time or resources of anyone else. (To be precise, I would say, "I have the right to sell my car provided there is a buyer who has the right to buy it and we enter into the sales agreement voluntarily.")

When I say "gaining control over something" I'm saying that free trade enables me to acquire ownership over something I didn't have before. I buy a car and I have ownership of that car. If it was sold to me voluntarily, then I acquired the ownership and I had a right to make that deal and that right is a negative right because it is saying that no had the right to stop me and the seller from that transaction. Because of the transaction I now have freedom of actions like driving the new car, selling the new car, renting out the new car, etc. That is what I have gained in control over this car. I had the right to buy it (as long as it was a voluntary transaction) and I have the right to exercise my control over it now that I own it. Still all negative rights - not a single positive right in the bunch because no where is there a demand that someone else, involuntarily supply time, effort or resources.

If I said I have a right to have a car, that would be a positive right because it would mean that someone else had to provide me with a car. That's not the same as saying I have the right to buy a car - and buying a car is how one acquires various rights of control over this car.
-------------

I can give you a moral right that is a positive, of a kind. You and I are on a desert island. There is no government. I give you a fish I just caught and you promise to get me two coconuts tomorrow. Tomorrow I'll have a positive right to those two coconuts. Remember, contracts have a moral nature before, and apart from any legal nature they may or may not have.
-------------

The reason this gets confusing is in the ideological origin of the negative and positive rights. The original distinction was that positive rights obligate action. (And no distinction was made between contractual obligations, and involuntary demands.) If a government is forcing party A to perform some action on behalf of party B it is rarely going to be in concert with Objectivism's concept of individual rights.

If you want to see how muddled thing become if you try to use the distinction of negative versus positive as a main dividing line between rights just go look up "Negative Rights" on Wikipedia.

Negative versus Positive, when understood as Objectivist do, has some value, but it isn't the best way to look at rights.

Post 68

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 8:45pm

Steve,

So I could trade away my right to liberty?

Post 69

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 9:30pm

Steve,

How do you square your view with these 2 quotes from OPAR [emphasis mine]?:

p 355 - "philosophic" abstraction of rights vs. "legal" application and implementation of rights

The rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness are the only rights treated by philosophical politics. They are the only rights formulated in terms of broad abstractions and resting directly on universal ethical principles. The numerous applications and implementations of these rights, such as freedom of the press or trial by jury or the other prerogatives detail in the Bill of Rights, belong to the field of philosophy of law and require for their validation a process of reduction to man's philosophic rights.

p 356 - rights as both absolute and universal

If rights are defined in rational terms, no conflict is possible between the rights of one individual and those of another. Every man is sovereign. He is absolutely free within the sphere of his own rights, and every man has the same rights.

For instance, taking the last phrase above, if we could trade rights with one another, then the allocation/appropriation of rights would be differentiated based on the number and nature of trades that took place and, therefore, every man would not have the same rights.

Ed

Post 70

Sunday, August 11, 2013 - 11:42pm

Bill,

So I could trade away my right to liberty?

Well, is it yours? Does someone have the moral right to stop you from doing that? Do moral rights arise out of our ability to choose? If you could find a way to trade away your liberty, even though it was a terrible idea, should the government prohibit you from even attempting to do that?

(I assume we agree that you couldn't trade away someone else's Liberty.)

Everyone trades away specific pieces of liberty all the time, in exchange for some value or another. Other times people trade some value for increased liberty. I know that these are all specifics, but liberty is the name we give to a wider collection of actions. Liberty, the state of freedom to act on our own behalf in non-coercive ways. But I can think of no good reason or example for trading away all of your liberty and getting nothing significant in value in return. (I can't even think of what would be a value that would be significant in this context.) But I don't have to. The principle is the same.

Liberty is a moral right. Moral rights are moral principles that sanction a defined set of actions in a social context. So, with a definition of those actions that fit within the boundary of "liberty" - those are the actions that the absurd idea of selling the right to forego would include.

Those are the principles as I see them.

Post 71

Monday, August 12, 2013 - 12:26am

Ed,

How do you square your view with these 2 quotes from OPAR [emphasis mine]?

I don't disagree in a profound way with either of them. I do have quibbles. I'll take a look at them in context, because how we phrase things and the perspective we come from have to do with the purpose we have as we craft our sentences and paragraphs. After I look at them in context I'll reply if I have more to say. At this point neither contradicts my view of individual rights.

Remember, in that first quote he setting up the transition from moral principle to law and describing the foundation of moral law - that does not mean that morality comes to a stop where the law begins. Every act we take in a social context can be examined from a moral perspective - whether we have good laws, bad laws, or no laws.

As to the "...every man has the same rights," I agree we start with the same rights. But I don't believe we stay at the exact same level in all areas. Some people earn more moral currency than others. Some throw away moral capital with acts of failed virtues. Our generic rights, our universal rights, our rights of man... they remain the same unless we do something really bizarre like try to trade away all of our liberty. The changes in our moral rights on specific items aren't great - and looked at in the generic, they stay same as well.

Please note two things:
1.) No where does this change of moral status, or rights, between people mean that anyone acquires a right to initiate violence, do fraud or theft. The entire moral world still turns solely on voluntary associations.
2.) There are no free rides for those who act with abject immorality. They don't retain the exact same rights while violating the rights of others. Even if someone behaves in a grossly immoral and disgusting fashion, but without initiating violence, they may have the same moral rights, but they have lost moral capital - moral stature.

Post 72

Monday, August 12, 2013 - 3:10pm

Ed,

I've been reading OPAR - the chapter that you quoted from. And I have my usual reaction to Peikoff. I have a lot of respect for the man, and I agree with him on all of the main principles, and I learn from him nearly every time I read from him... but something in the way he chooses his words bothers me. There is a lack of precision that I find bothersome because, with his background, I'd expect more. It isn't a major thing, but it sure seems to come up often.
---------

From OPRAR, page 351. First he says something that I really like, "A right is a sanction to independent action; the opposite of acting by right is acting by permission." (The footnote indicates he got that Rand, but it isn't in quotes, so maybe the wording is his - well, whatever... I like it.)

Not having to ask permission is a key element of rights, and even though he is discussing moral rights (which is made clear in the context), notice that the 'by right' versus 'by permission' would apply just as well to legal rights. You can even see it in etiquette (e.g., I ask permission to reach in front of someone to get the salt, but I don't ask permission when it is in front of me. A cultural, and perhaps symbolic, adaptation of the distinction that isn't important regarding the salt, or even reaching in front of someone, but is important in the psychological reminder to one an all that somethings we do by permission and others by right.)
---------

But then, 2 paragraphs later he writes: "If a man lived on a desert island, there would be no question of defining his proper relationship to others. Even if men interacted with each other on some island, but did so at random, without establishing a social system, the issue of rights would be premature. There would not yet be any context for the concept, or, therefore, any means of implementing it; there would be no agency to interpret, apply, enforce it. When men do decide to form (or reform) an organized society, however, when they decide to pursue systematically the advantages of living of living together, then they need the guidance of principle. That is the context in which the principle of rights arises."

He is stating that men interact with each other on some island but do so at random. What does that mean? Like billiard balls? Or, without purposeful motivation? Or, that despite it being an island they only bump into one another by accident on infrequent occasions?

His mention of interacting "without establishing a social system" isn't that coherent since a social system is what exists when people interact. It might not be one that is a product of conscious design of a system as such, but it will be a social system. Pick up an Cultural Anthropology text and you'll see the descriptions of social systems that have and can exist. If he meant 'government' he should have said so.

But more importantly, how can he say, "...there would be no question of defining his proper relationship to others." Do you interact with anyone without categories of human relationships arising? Is this person a friend? A colleague? A trading partner? A romantic interest? A threat? etc. But beyond that, we need to define our relationship to others all the more carefully, and consciously when we do not have a structured, organized society that provides various known boundaries, laws, and social mores to help perceive and manage in the relationship area.

The most serious flaw in that paragraph is the statement that the principle of rights does not arise until an agency is established to interpret, apply and enforce them. I understand his general point of proper government arising out of individual rights, with the application of rights as government's proper purpose, and proper law as the translation of those rights. But his form of phrasing is just wrong. His wording makes moral rights not applicable until there is a government (or agency, in his words). Moral rights exist before government, before law, and continue to exist after the creation of government and laws. He implies that [moral] principle [moral rights in this context] is not needed until living together is pursued systematically. NO! In the absence of a structured, systematic approach, with an agency, that implements individual rights, moral rights are alone, and the communication and acceptance of them on an individual basis is the ONLY commonality supporting liberty. Moral rights never cease to be important, and when they exist without laws and structures to support them, they are more important.
---------------

Social relationships that exist are of a kind - that is, they can be identified and categorized - and that is so even if they are made up of just a few people on a desert island. Individual rights also exist even if there are only a few people on a desert island, and they are implemented by the exercise of self-defense if there is no other mechanism available and that applies to 2 men on an otherwise deserted island, or on Manhattan Island. Individual rights are never premature.
---------------

I feel bad when I pick at Peikoff like this, because I agree him on the basics, but I get annoyed at his wording. A practicing philosopher who was so closely associated with Rand for so long should do better. (I keep imagining Rand, when she was alive, cringing at some of his phrasing).

Post 73

Tuesday, August 13, 2013 - 12:59am

Steve,

I don't think my right to liberty is the same as my right to a car that I've purchased. You say that I can trade away my right to liberty just as I can trade away my right to a car.

Very well, let's see what would be involved in my trading away my right to liberty. Suppose that I sell you my right to liberty in exchange for $10,000. Don't I then have a right to the $10,000 -- to spend it as I choose? But, wait, how could I have the right to spend it as I choose if I don't have the liberty to do so?

It's easy to see that there is an inherent contradiction in this kind of trade. Any time one makes a trade, one retains the right to the proceeds of the trade, but the retention of that right presupposes that one also retains the right to liberty.

Post 74

Tuesday, August 13, 2013 - 12:00pm

Bill,

...let's see what would be involved in my trading away my right to liberty. Suppose that I sell you my right to liberty in exchange for $10,000. Don't I then have a right to the $10,000 -- to spend it as I choose? But, wait, how could I have the right to spend it as I choose if I don't have the liberty to do so?

It's easy to see that there is an inherent contradiction in this kind of trade. Any time one makes a trade, one retains the right to the proceeds of the trade, but the retention of that right presupposes that one also retains the right to liberty.

No, there is no contradiction. All you have to do is structure the deal a little differently. The trade would have to be that your right to liberty would be tendered at a point in the future, say one year, and the $10,000 and the liberty to spend it are received immediately. The problem is that you described a structure that asked to have your cake and eat it too. The problem was in the details of the arbitrary structure and not a contradiction inherent in selling a moral right.

But, like I said in an earlier post, any examples or attempts to consider trading away a major category of moral rights is always going to be somewhat silly - an academic exercise - because there is no demand to do that kind of thing, there is no reason to do that kind of thing, there is no consideration great enough to make it worthwhile, and because it is complicated and tortuous to structure.

We can divide moral rights into two categories: Those where the object of the right is described in a such a general fashion as to be describing a moral right that is universal - as stated. (E.g., "The moral right of a person to sell what they own.") These moral rights are each derived from either a more fundamental moral right, or directly from human nature.

The other category is that where the moral rights were derived directly from a more fundamental right (maybe from a universal right), but where the description of the object of the right has narrowed the instances where it would apply such that it is no longer applicable to every human being. (E.g., "I, Steve Wolfer, have the right to sell this particular car that I own, at this time.") And in this latter category we have all those instances of a universal moral right whose object has been made as specific and concrete as possible - a single person at a single instance. If we couldn't follow a universal moral right from the most general - such that it applies to everyone down to where it can be verified as present in a single, specific act, then they would be like floating abstractions. We need this bridge from man's nature to a universal moral right to a man's specific act as being moral or immoral.

Going from "Everyone has a moral right to sell what they own" to "I have a moral right to sell this car I own" is the process of applying a universal moral right. It is required if we are going to be able to pronounce moral judgement on specific acts. Without that, we would have to say that morality only exists in the abstract and we somehow come up with and use laws to govern specific acts and it is just by magic that we determine if the acts chosen to include or exclude in the law's description meet the universal moral principle.

And, because the law is a man-made product, it may or may not be present, much less in parallel with morality. The law has to come after morality, by their natures. Thus it is clear that morality exists even without any laws at all. So, imagine that desert island where there is no government and no laws and ask, "How do the few inhabitants decide what interactions are moral?"

If it is universally moral that a person be able to take those actions his life requires, so long as those actions do not violate that same right of another, then the act of pulling a fish from the sea is one that does not require the permission of another islander - it can be done by right. But that doesn't mean that the islanders can't form agreements where they trade rights for something. Islander A can propose a deal where if Islander B will not do any fishing in a particular area, leaving it as Islander A's exclusive fish preserve, Islander B will give him 2 coconuts a month. They both have the right to engage in free trade, and neither gives up their right to make deals. They both had the moral right to make this specific deal. They both gave up one specific moral right in exchange for another. Islander A no longer has the moral right to fish in a specific area, but he still has his liberty because that wasn't the object of the deal. He still has the right to make deals. Now he has the moral right to the 2 coconuts per month. Islander B can only stop finding and turning over those 2 coconuts per month by permission, not by right.

Post 75

Tuesday, August 13, 2013 - 7:45pm

Steve wrote,

No, there is no contradiction. All you have to do is structure the deal a little differently. The trade would have to be that your right to liberty would be tendered at a point in the future, say one year, and the $10,000 and the liberty to spend it are received immediately. The problem is that you described a structure that asked to have your cake and eat it too. The problem was in the details of the arbitrary structure and not a contradiction inherent in selling a moral right.

Ah yes, good point.

What I may have been thinking of initially is the idea that so long as one's rights are respected, one continues to retain them. So, in placing myself under someone else's arbitrary control a year from now in exchange for the sum of $10,000 to be spent as I choose in the meantime, I have freely chosen to be bound by such a contract. So my rights continue to be respected, in the same way that they would be respected if I joined the army and willingly placed myself under the command of an officer for a specified duration, say four years.

Would you also say that I have traded away my right to liberty during those four years of service in the army? Or would you say that this is a different case, since you still have some freedom of choice, whereas in agreeing to be someone else's slave, you have surrendered all freedom of choice, since the slave master can order you to do anything he wants?

Post 76

Tuesday, August 13, 2013 - 10:18pm

Bill,

Would you also say that I have traded away my right to liberty during those four years of service in the army? Or would you say that this is a different case, since you still have some freedom of choice, whereas in agreeing to be someone else's slave, you have surrendered all freedom of choice, since the slave master can order you to do anything he wants?

I definitely don't see it as a loss of liberty to join the military for four years. Instead it is embracing a level of discipline that includes accepting the direction of others in the details of living one's life that is quite high. But it certainly is not the loss of Liberty itself. And it is seen by many as a career and as an opportunity to gain skills and maturity and that part is not unlike someone that does some kind of apprenticeship, or submits to a tutelage from a strict master to gain some skill. It is also interesting that many people dedicate themselves to their military service because they are passionate in seeing it as an active defense of liberty for our nation - they are choosing to be defenders of freedom.

Your comparison between four years service in the military with being a slave is a stark contrast and a good one for the purpose of illustration. Unless the person who chooses to be a slave does so because of a severe mental/emotional disorder, they are knowingly giving up enormous values, and facing what would be the opposite of flourishing and likely bereft of any happiness. To do that could only be imagined as arising out extreme circumstance and imply that they expect they will get something they see as extraordinary before they give up their liberty, or the slavery will end at a contracted time (not unlike indentured servitude that once existed) and they will be given something extraordinary then. The slavery is trading endurance of a worthless period for some value that happens outside of that slave period. Those who join the voluntary military force give up many freedoms in their daily life for something that they value inside of the enlistment period.

Real slavery however has an additional component. It starts out as involuntary. It is always and in every way involuntary. There is no trade involved, because there is no choice involved. And that is radically different from choosing to give up one's liberty.

When we had the military draft, it was referred to as Selective Slavery, and that was apt, given that unlike today's military, you had no choice about joining.

Post 77

Wednesday, August 14, 2013 - 5:58pm

Steve,

What I meant by "agreeing to be someone else's slave" is what I thought you meant by "trading away one's right to liberty." Now I'm confused. What then do you mean by "trading away one's right to liberty"? You gave the example of someone's agreeing to give away his right to liberty in a year in exchange for $10,000 to be spent as he chooses in the meantime. Okay, then what exactly are you doing when you give up your right to liberty in a year? Aren't you allowing the person to whom you've "traded" your right to liberty to tell you what to do thereafter? Aren't you agreeing to obey his orders even if you disagree with them?

I understand that there's a difference between that arrangement and joining the military, but there's also a similarity isn't there? When you agree to serve in the military for four years, you're agreeing to obey the orders of your commander, even if you disagree with them. If you choose to disobey them, you're violating the terms of your contract, in the same way that if you choose to disobey the orders of the person you've sold your liberty to, you're violating the terms of your contract.

To be sure, there's a difference in the duration of commitment -- four years versus the rest of your life -- and in the nature and scope of the orders you're expected to follow -- but in a very relevant sense, there's no difference in principle. In both cases you've agreed to place yourself in the control of another human being and to obey his or her orders for a specified period of time.

Post 78

Wednesday, August 14, 2013 - 9:51pm

Bill,

...what exactly are you doing when you give up your right to liberty in a year? Aren't you allowing the person to whom you've "traded" your right to liberty to tell you what to do thereafter? Aren't you agreeing to obey his orders even if you disagree with them?

I just pointed out some of the differences between these circumstances:

Trading away your liberty for a fixed period of time (All liberty is gone for that period, but the person did it voluntarily)
Joining the military - here there is far, far less loss of liberty and it is voluntary, and the person may not see it as a loss of liberty, but rather an opportunity for training, employment, etc.
Slavery - real slavery is the permanent end of all liberty and it is not voluntary.

I think those bullet points illustrate both the similarities and differences.
--------------

...but in a very relevant sense, there's no difference in principle. In both cases ["traded' your right to liberty and joining the military] you've agreed to place yourself in the control of another human being and to obey his or her orders for a specified period of time.

For those two, the difference isn't as great as real slavery, since the person is in the situation because they chose it. But I think that there is still a great difference. A total loss of liberty means you could be chained to the wall and have no freedoms at all. I can NOT see that as being anything like the military. We have a military force right now that numbers about 1.4 million and they are all there voluntarily. I can NOT see that as being so similar to a slavery-like existence that the only conclusion would be that we have 1.4 million severely disordered, masochistic submissives. The military is a job, a career, and the top down orders are significantly more authoritarian than what you find in the corporate world, but slavery? No way - not even close. You have made a contractual agreement with an organization whose rules and modus operandi were known in advance - that's not anywhere like becoming the slave of some nut case who is as likely as not a sadist.

Post 79

Thursday, August 15, 2013 - 12:38am