RoR: Forum

Rand’s Texts on Her Esthetics

1971. The Romantic Manifesto. Signet.

Chapters 1–4

1. The Psycho-Epistemology of Art (1965)

2. Philosophy and Sense of Life (1966)

3. Art and Sense of Life (1966)

4. Art and Cognition (1971)

Books about Rand’s Esthetics

Peikoff, L. 1991. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Dutton.

Chapter 12 Art

I. Art as a Concretization of Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

II. Romantic Literature as Illustrating Role of Philosophy in Art . . . 428

III. Esthetic Value as Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438

Torres, L., and M. Kamhi 2000. What Art Is. Open Court.

Sciabarra, C.M., editor, 2004. Ayn Rand and Art: A Symposium.

Dedicated issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 2(2).

Papers pertaining to Rand’s Esthetics

Sures, M.A. 1969. Metaphysics in Marble. The Objectivist (Feb-Mar).

Seddon, F. 1984. On the Randian Definition of Art. The Free Philosopher Quarterly 2(2):33–36.

Husted, J. 1984. Art, Analogy, and Access to the “Sense of Life” The Free Philosopher Quarterly 2(4):106–8.

Reedstrom, K. 1995. What Is Art? Is Ayn Rand’s Definition Enough? Full Context (June):9–11.

Bissell, R. 1999. Music and Perceptual Cognition. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 1(1):59–86.

Kamhi, M., and L. Torres 2000. Critical Neglect of Ayn Rand’s Theory of Art. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 2(1):1–46.

Bissell, R. 2004. Art as Microcosm. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5(2):307–63.

Minsaas, K. 2005. Mimesis and Expressivism in Rand’s Theory of Art. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 2(1):19–56.

Mayhew, R. 2005. Ayn Rand as Aristotelian: Literary Esthetics. Delivered December 29th at the Ayn Rand Society in New York.

Rand’s essay “Art and Cognition” includes the topic of music. Concerning this portion of Rand’s esthetics, in 1995 Marsha Enright contributed the following paper to Objectivity (V2N3:117–47):

"Con Molto Sentimento"

I. Briefly, Theories of Music’s Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

II. Neuropsychological Data on Language and Music . . . 125

III. Neuropsychological Data on Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

IV. Beyond Neuropsychology to Music as Art . . . . . . . . . 135

V. Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

SUBJECT INDEX for “Con Molto Sentimento”

ABSTRACTION; and Concrete Rendition 136, 138 / ART; and Deep Truth 136; Psychological Need for 136 / BRAIN; Cerebral Lateralization of 126–30, 144, 146–47; Information Processing by 126–31 / EMOTIONS 146; and Music 117–20, 122–25, 128–34; and Sociability 124–25; 131–33 / EVIDENCE; Scientific 126–30 / EXPERIMENTS; in Musical Experience 120–23 / EXPLANATION; Scientific 120–24 / HYPTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD 117–18, 120–23 / INTELLIGENCE; and Musical Cognition 139 / LANGUAGE; and Music 119–20, 125–28; Semantics and Syntax of 119, 126; Sounds 119, 126, 131, 146 / MIND; Abstractive 133–35 / MUSIC 117–47; v. Bird Song 146 / NEURONAL MEDIATION; of Language 126–27, 146–47; of Music 126–27, 130, 141; of Perception 126–27 / OBJECTIVISM 117–18; 135–43 / SUBCONSCIOUS; Preconscious Part of 147; and Thought 147 / SYMBOLS; Iconic 121, 123, 133–34, 136–37, 142–43 / THOUGHT; Inventive 133–35, 143

In 1997 Roger Bissell contributed the following paper on Rand’s esthetics to Objectivity (V2N5:33–65):

"The Essence of Art"

I. The Two Valid Concepts of Art . . . . . . . . 33

II. Art as a Tool of Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

III. Cognitive Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

IV. Art, Nature, and Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

V. An Invalid Category: Fine Art . . . . . . . . . 54

SUBJECT INDEX for “The Essence of Art”

ABSTRACTION; Conceptual 37–46; and Concrete Rendition 34, 37–46; Emotional 37 / ACTION; and Contradiction 56 / ANALOGY 34–35 / ART 33–65; Essence in 34, 52–53; Fine 54–62; as Microcosm 34, 48–49, 51, 54, 62; and Possibility 47–49; Psychological Need for 41–42, 45–46; without Reference 49, 53–54; Unity in 34, 46 / ASSOCIATION; v. Representation 39–40 / CONCEPTS; and Language 39, 42–44; and Mental Economy 41–42 / CONSCIOUSNESS; Intentionality of 37–38 / DEATH 35; and Possibility of Art 35–37 / EXPLANATION; Unity of 48–49 / IMAGES; v. Concepts 40; v. Percepts 34–35, 52–53 / INFORMATION; Conceptual 41–42 / INTROSPECTION 38 / LIFE; of Organisms 35; and Thought 35–36; Unity in a 35 / LOGIC; as Ideal Reasoning 56 / MIND; Abstractive 34, 37–38, 40–42; Constructive 34–54 / MUSIC 33, 49, 53, 59, 63 / OBJECTIVISM 34–39, 45–46, 50–54, 55–56, 61–63 / PERCEPTION; Existent and Content of 37; Recognition in 40–41 / PHILOSOPHY 45 / REASON; Integrating Perceptions 36–38 / SYMBOLS; Esthetic 40–46; Iconic 37–44; Lexical 37–44 / THOUGHT; Comprehensive 34–41; Discursive 39–44; Inventive 33–35, 46–54 / UNITY; of World v. of Mind 49 / VALUE; Artistic Embodiment of 34, 45–46, 49, 52; Cognitive Instrumental 35–46; Esthetic 51–52; Metaphysical 34–35; Moral 45

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The botched link in the notice should be: Bill Brewer.
Thanks, Ted (below).

(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 7/19, 12:59pm)

Post 1

Saturday, July 19, 2008 - 12:07pm

The Brewer link in the original post doesn't seem to work.

Post 2

Sunday, July 20, 2008 - 6:51am

I neglected to list an important paper of 2003 by Michelle Marder Kamhi:
“What ‘Rand’s Aesthetics’ Is, and Why It Matters”
The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 4(2):413–89.

Note

Post 3

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 7:58am

“A Perfectionist-Egoist Theory of the Good”

The session of the Ayn Rand Society will be on December 28^th from 2:00–5:00 p.m.

At this Eastern Division Meeting, other sessions with participants having an interest in Rand’s philosophy:

December 29^th from 7:00–9:00 p.m.

American Society for Value Inquiry

Presidential Address – David Schmidtz

December 29^th from 1:30–4:30 p.m.

Molinari Society

Authors Meet Critics

Against the State – Crispin Sartwell, author

Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country?

Roderick Long and Tibor Machan, editors

Contributors to the latter work include: Lester Hunt, Roderick Long, Tibor Machan,

Jan Narveson, Aeon Skoble, Adam Reed, and William Thomas.

December 30^th from 9:00–11:00 a.m.

Philosophical Perspectives on Newton

Chair: Jason Rheins

9:00–10:00 a.m.

Speaker: Hylarie Kochiras

“Metaphysical Principles and Newton’s Problem about Gravity”

Commentator: Mary Domski

10:00–11:00 a.m.

Speaker: David Miller

“Qualities, Properties, and Laws in Newton’s Induction”

Commentator: Eric Schliesser

December 28^th from 11:15–1:15 p.m.

Exploitation

Chair: Carrie-Ann Biondi

Speaker: Stephen Kershnar

Commentator: Irfan Khawaja

In 1997 Irfan Khawaja contributed a paper to Objectivity (V2N5:95–147), which includes a significant analysis of exploitation:

I. Why Be Moral? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

II. The Concept of Self-Interest . . . . 105

III. The Perfectionist-Egoist Self . . . . 109

IV. Exploitation and Reciprocity . . . . 115

V. The Egoistic Value of Justice . . . 123

SUBJECT INDEX for “A Perfectionist-Egoist Theory of the Good”

ACTION; and Belief 126–30; and Contradiction 123–30, 137; Goal-Directed 100–103, 119, 131–33 / ALIENATION 106–7, 116, 129–30 / AUTONOMY 111–13, 123 / BELIEF; and Knowledge 112 / CAUSALITY; Efficient 100, and Explanation 101, 103, 123; Final 100–104, 110–11, 123–26, 133, 137–38, 140; Formal 111–12; Necessity in 99–102; and Responsibility 111, 139; Self-Forming 110–11 / CHARITY 108, 136 / CONSEQUENTIALISM 107, 123, 139–40 / DECISION; Control over 111–13; Rationality of 108, 126–30 / DEONTOLOGY 108, 123–27 / DESIRE 110–11, 113, 126, 135 / DETERMINISM; v. Free Will 98–100, 111–12 / EGOISM; Eudaimonic 95–96, 105, 110–11, 120–21, 135; Harmonious 95–96, 110–11, 120–21, 135; Perfectionist 95–141; Rational 95, 107–21, 131 / ESSENCE 124; and Explanation 100–104, 124–25; and Identity 100–104; and Substance 140–41; EVIL 119, 140; from Evasion 130; in Exploitation 119–20 / EVOLUTION; of Organisms 101–2, 133 / EXPLANATION; Philosophic 97–104, 114–15, 123–30 / EXPLOITATION 114–21, 124–25, 129–30, 138; FEMINISM 116–17 / FOUNDATIONALISM 95, 100–101, 123–26 / FREE WILL 98–104, 111–13; with Constraints 113, 137; and Knowledge 111–12; and Robots 112; as Self-Causing 111 / GOD 111, 133, 135 / HAPPINESS 110, 122 / HONESTY 108, 115, 129–30 / JUSTICE 114–16, 120–24, 136–37 / KNOWLEDGE; Integration in 123–29 / LIFE; of Organisms 100–101, 131, 138; Quality of 132; Unity in a 101–3, 110–11, 125–30; and Value 100–105, 110–11, 131–32, 133–35 / NECESSITY; Hypothetical 100–102; Biological 100–104; Metaphysical 98–100; Moral 97–104, 107–8, 114, 123–30; Practical 97–99 / OBJECTIVISM 130–32, 134–35 / PAULINE PRINCIPLE 134, 139 / PRODUCTIVE WORK; for Exchange 116; Virtue of 110 / PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED; for Social Relations 114, 120–30, 138; for Synthetic Unity 106–7, 109–13, 123–30, 141 / RATIONALITY; Economic 108; Practical 95–111, 131–35, 138–41 / REASON; Moral Value of 95–96, 104, 107–11, 123–32, 134, 136–37, 141 / RECIPROCITY 115–16, 120–21, 124–25, 129–30, 138 / RELATIONS; Essential 124–26, 140–41; Means-Ends 97, 100, 119, 123, 137–40 / SELF-COMPOSITION 123–27, 135 / SELF-ESTEEM 107, 112–13, 128–30 / SELF-REALIZATION 105–13 / SELF-SACRIFICE 108, 113 / VALUE; Cognitive Instrumental 125–27; and Feeling 95; Intrinsic 140; Moral 95–111, 117–18, 125–30, 133–40; Objective 95–96, 105, 110–11, 123–30, 132; Subjective 132; Ultimate 101–3, 113, 123–24, 131–32, 140 / VIRTUE 110–12, 139

Post 4

Sunday, September 21, 2008 - 11:31am

Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality

Other sessions which RoR readers might find of interest at this Eastern Division Meeting:

SATURDAY 12/27

6:30–9:30 p.m.

Symposium: Intentionality, Teleology, and Practical Reason

Mark Okrent, author of

Willem deVries, author of

Wilfrid Sellars

Mark Risjord, author of

"Evolution and the Kantian World View"

MONDAY 12/29

9:00–11:00 a.m.

Author Meets Critics: The Harmonic Mind:

From Neural Computation to Optimality-Theoretic Grammar

Chair: Gualtiero Piccinini

Critics: Terry Horgan and William Ramsey

Author: Paul Smolensky (co-author with Géraldine Legendre)

TUESDAY 12/30

9:00–11:00 a.m. [RoR connection]

Author Meets Critics: Epistemology after Protagoras:

Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus

Chair: Susan Sauvé

Critics: Paula Gottlieb and C.C.W. Taylor

Author: Mi-Kyoung Lee

Post 5

Sunday, December 21, 2008 - 1:57am

Ayn Rand Society – 28 December 2008

“Art and Metaphysical Values” – Harry Binswanger

I. Introduction: Art and Reason

II. The Essence: Art Is the Voice of Philosophy

III. The Function Art Performs

IV. Integration with Rand’s Epistemology

V. The Definition of Art

“Rand, Art, and Metaphysical Mirroring” – Mitchell Green

I. The Comprehensive View

II. Babbitts, Hamlets, and the “Sense of Life”

“Esthetics and Metaphysics: Reflections on Rand’s Romantic Manifesto” – Bill Brewer

A key claim at the heart of Rand’s Romantic Manifesto is that art is a concrete manifestation or presentation of metaphysics, in particular, of certain metaphysical value-judgments. This is a striking and original idea; and in what follows I pursue a series of questions and puzzles that came up for me in trying to understand and assess it.
. . .
Most of my problems concern the precise relationship proposed here between an art-work and its associated system of metaphysical value-judgments . . . .

Post 6

Sunday, December 21, 2008 - 6:00am

That so called problem should resolve if one recognises the artwork is an essentialization of a universe, and how that universe is composed exposes the metaphisical underpinings of the artist, whether correct, factually, or not...

Post 7

Thursday, January 1, 2009 - 2:52pm

Professor Gotthelf reports that “the discussion that followed the presentations was long and lively.”
There was some

detailed discussion centering around the concept of a metaphysical value-judgment. This included (i) what, precisely, a metaphysical value-judgment is; (ii) the sorts (i.e., the subject-matter) of those metaphysical value-judgments which, according to AR, are expressed in works of art in general; (iii) the degree of specificity of these judgments [(ii) and (iii) were among the questions raised in Professor Brewer's paper]; and (iv) how one determined which particular metaphysical value-judgments were being expressed in particular works of art. We also explored the claim by Professor Green in his paper that much of the expression in works of art is more "local" and less metaphysical than Ayn Rand and the Objectivists defending her view were claiming.

Post 8

Thursday, January 1, 2009 - 3:55pm

More local seems as if of less in dealing with universals? thus of lesser metaphysical value?

Post 9

Thursday, January 1, 2009 - 4:49pm

Is there any way to hear about that discussion, Stephen? I'm particularly interested in the details of what the value-judgments are, and some examples of specific judgment in particular art works...

Post 10

Friday, January 2, 2009 - 1:16am

Robert,

In his paper, Mitchell Green begins by disputing the following thesis stated by Rand:

“Consciously or subconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, man knows that he needs a

comprehensive view of existence to integrate his values, to choose his goals, to plan his

future, to maintain the unity and coherence of his life–and that his metaphysical value

judgments are involved in every moment of his life, in his every choice, decision and action.” (RM 6)

To need-to-have is one thing, to prefer-to-have is another. Green denies the universal need has been shown. Rand adds to the disputed thesis above, this one:

“Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s metaphysical value judgments. . . . By a selective recreation, art isolates and integrates those aspects of reality which represent man’s fundamental view of himself and of existence.” (RM 8; italics original)

Green objects that just as one can state a proposition that does not voice one’s own views, so an artist can depict a state of affairs that does not express any of her metaphysical value judgments. Moreover, an artist can put forth a picture of a state of affairs that she thinks “has no interesting correspondence to how things are or ought to be.”

I was unable to attend the conference. From the paper itself, I would say that the sense of more “local” artistic representation is simply meant to as one less comprehensive in its window than one giving a fundamental view of the world and human being in it.

Are there readers here who can defend the views of Rand above, which are denied by Green?

I notice in Prof. Green’s References for his paper:

Aesthetic Creation by Nick Zangwill

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mindy,

In his paper, Harry Binswanger maintains that “even so ‘mute’ a work as a still life painting conveys the artist’s view of existence—i.e., his philosophy. To view a still life by Cezanne is to enter a different universe from that of a still life by a Dutch master, like Willem Kalf, and still another universe for a still life by Paul S. Brown.” (pictures)

Post 11

Friday, January 2, 2009 - 6:51am

Just off the top of my head, I would suggest that as an exercise in 'how another person 'sees' the world', one could project a sense of life view not in accordance with one's own - but as an acting of one's own accord, there would have to be an interest of one's own involved, else why bother, which would mitigate such an alien viewpoint...

Post 12

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 1:05pm

Stephen's challenge: :-)

Working from what is in Stephen's post:

There are two parts to what M. Green is saying.

Not every drawing is art. Take artists' renderings of the people in a closed-to-cameras courtroom. These artists are recording the identities, the moods, the responses, etc. of the participants. They draw, and they try to make good drawings. But the artist's job in this situation is to make a record of actual events, not to express anything about his own point of view, beliefs, or values.

Art of this sort is artifactual, but not artistic. It has the physical form that "aesthetic art" does, but nothing more. It doesn't express metaphysical value-judgments, it isn't meant to, and it would be a detriment to have them introduced into it.

Green would be mistaken to take these drawings as exceptions to Rand's description of the basis of romantic art, as they aren't art in the right sense.
Green speaks of artists who deliberately draw, etc., art that a viewer would see as expressing "deep values" that he, the artist, did not actually hold. I assume Green's thinking is, why not, what's to stop him? But this won't do, either, and the simple answer to this line of thought (I have supposed it to be Green's) is: it can't be done; his own nature will stop him.

Even Green's "contrarian" artists must use some basis to choose the content and manner of their art. If they want to paint something, for example, that would actually contradict Rand's statement, they would have to identify some "deep values" contrary to their own, and then figure out how to express those contrary ones. But there's the rub. How do you know what "poor" values are? How do you know how to express them? These judgments and choices have to have a basis. The artist's own knowledge of the world, and his "deep" value-judgments about the world and about life must be relied on here. There simply isn't anything else to go on. If one turns to practical, means-to-an-end criteria, the product ceases to be art, and becomes akin to court-reporting.

The second part of answering Green involves a direct confirmation of Rand's statement.
(cont.)

Post 13

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 2:31pm

That indeed is part of the problem, as I've mentioned many times - the term 'art' is used in more than 'fine art' as meaning... plus, as Mindy pointed out, there is the 'recorder' attribute, which until photography was as much the raison d'etre for rendering as anything - even the mythological views were as such an aspect of this instead of true 'fine art' - art for contemplative purposes...

not to mention the other major use of the term 'art' - meaning aesthetics, a broader umbrella which covers both the contemplative, decorative, and utilitarian [craft]...

and I do agree that a still life reflects at least in part the artist's metaphysical value-judgments, in that is as an allegory.. as for example my Full Life -

http://visioneerwindows.blogspot.com/2007/12/full-life.html
(Edited by robert malcom on 1/04, 2:37pm)

Post 14

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 3:11pm

Why does Stephen Boydstun not yet have four Atlas Icons? Are we waiting for him to start attacking people? His contributions here are enormous, yet mostly unsung please visit his list of posts and premium articles and exercise your sanction button finger today.

Post 15

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 4:59pm

Why didn't Einstein go back and get a Ph.D.?

Post 16

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 7:19pm

Mindy, I assume you don't realize that Atlas Icons are awarded by others as recognition of good work done? One does not apply for them. The only reason he lacks them is people's tendency to award conflict above all.

Giving "credit where credit is due" is a joyful Objectivist "duty." Unlike many people with only a few posts on RoR Boydstun has not yet learned to apply the art of the sarcastic rejoinder, and he should be praised for his contributions here.

(Edited by Ted Keer on 1/04, 8:52pm)

Post 17

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 8:18pm

Cashing out what are the different metaphysical value judgments concretized in those different works of art is a task not taken up in Binswanger’s fine paper (note). Would anyone here take on that challenge?
...............

Are these different from the ones postulated by myself and Newberry [independently of each other] regarding the nature of the universe between the walls of the canvas, from a metaphysical valuating standpoint?

Post 18

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 9:04pm

Yes, thanks, Ted, I was stretching for something there, didn't come across. No problem. If you will notice, I wrote in the "Discuss yourself" box on my profile. Hope it satisfies.

Post 19

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 9:41pm