RoR: Forum

Going back a few posts to address some other stuff I never got to:

Hmmm.Is that all other people do? Label suppliers? I think that's a little extreme. I tend to think that other people can teach you ideas - like a science teacher, or a philosopher for instance. But, taking your point, the way we learn an idea (or a concept in your sense too perhaps?) best is by a process like "making-and-matching". We try to put it together ourselves conjecturally, through trial and error, till it matches the concept our teacher wants us to "get". So it's still someone else's concept we're trying to learn, but we learn it best by reconstructing it ourselves. (I would contrast this with say rote learning). Incidentally, while doing this, we may notice something about the concept our teacher has not...;-)

I think that's a pretty fair characterization of how concepts generally get formed in a more social environment than that of the desert island guy. I think I meant to make the point somewhere that �label supplying� is an extreme case and probably only happens when the concept is something like �table,� which is pretty obvious and is one which a child will probably form on his own without too much intervention, and just need a label from the adults around him. Certainly the process becomes every bit as collaborative as you suggest when concepts get more complex.

The important point here is that most of the work of forming the concept does need to happen inside the individual's mind, and the teacher's role is basically that of supplying corrective data. Trying to learn the concept �fully formed��without doing the work in your own mind�is basically what rote learning (and dictionary definitions, for that matter) try to achieve, and that sort of method will generally lead to what Rand calls �floating abstractions� rather than full-fledged concepts.

Now this point goes to what I'm saying about the vagueness of words - how it's not a bug necessarily, but a feature. For both those individuals could simply choose to stick dogmatically to the concretes they;ve chosen the word to symbolise, and communication would be paralysed. (And I've also shown that basic disagreements over definitions logically cannot be settled) But they could also choose to extend their language imaginatively; to try and grasp what the other person is saying, and even accept some compromise as to what the terms refer to - thus blurring the meaning a little.

Well, the problem is, they're probably going to have a hard time grasping what the other person is saying�even grasping that the other person is saying something different, for that matter�if they don't explicitly state what they mean by the term in question in the form of a definition. Definitions, really, are just a means of translating a concept into language so that we can compare it with someone else's concepts.

And I'm sure you know that Objectivists won't really like �blurring� as a description of what happens when two people reconcile different versions of concepts, but I'll let that pass for now. :-P

Now, there are a few consequences you have to absorb when you realise that arguments over the meaning of words cannot be settled logically. The first is that you want to watch out for statements or problems that lead straight back to such arguments! For instance, "Is there any such thing as a "right" to health care?" which will lead only to "What is the true meaning of the word "right"?" You're better off making the problem more tangible, ie: "How can we make healthcare services more effective?" or "How can we reduce waiting lists?".

The problem is that statements of problems in terms like that is going to lead you into pragmatic thinking, where you start to address problems in health care without paying attention to the effect of your solutions on other things, like personal freedom or the state of the nation's economy. We think about formal political theory�including such things as an explicit definition of �right��in order to ensure that when we address specific political questions such as health care, we don't do so in isolation from the rest of politics.

And speaking of the meaning of words being decided logically...

Even Nature agreed that definitions must ultimately be by mutual agreement (or convention), and cannot be logically decided.

Well, I agreed more or less with the first part, but I don't see that as implying the second. :-P

Regarding the meaning of words and the logical decidability thereof, let's separate that problem into two distinct problems, since I don't think this distinction has been really addressed. Objectivism sees the meaning of words as having two distinct components: 1) the concept as a mental entity which groups two or more units, and 2) the definition as a statement in words of what distinguishes units in that concept from all other units. Leaving aside the question of whether a proper way of forming (1) can be logically decided, would you be willing to grant that, assuming someone has formed (1), (2) can be logically correct�i.e., that, given a concept which one has formed, one definition can be logically more correct or more concise than another in stating the difference between units in a concept and units not in that concept?

Post 301

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 8:24am

Daniel Barnes writes:

Imagine a child has to form the concept "novel"

Has to form a concept? What in the world could that possibly mean?

(let's assume it's not a "first level" concept - although who's to say? A novel is just as much a "existential concrete" as a table - but just a common or garden variety.)

Nonsense. Here's where you demonstrate that you have absolutely no clue what Rand has written. The concept 'novel' does not refer to any physical object. It refers to a particular organization of a particular type of writing. The concept 'book' is a first level concept because books can be directly perceived and the concept does not depend on any other previously formed concepts to be understood. The concept 'novel' does depend on other previously formed concepts and cannot be understood without them -- for example, at least the concepts of 'story' and 'imaginary' (or 'fiction').

Post 302

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 8:27am

Not only does Daniel drop context, he fails to distinguish between 'word' and 'concept' and between concept formation and language learning.

Post 303

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 3:18pm

Peter writes:
>The problem with your thought experiment is that it represents a heroic dropping of context - we do not form our concepts while locked in a rationalistic vacuum chamber (and more's the pity for you if you have); we form them out in the world, and we form them in a context.

Hmmm. It seems crying "context-dropping" is a handy all-purpose escape clause when one is in a difficult situation, such as Peter is.

Peter, what "heroic context dropping" and "rationalistic vacuum chamber" are you talking about? It is a simple experiment. Do you realise that all experiments must have restrictions of some nature? Do you realise it is these restrictions that make them *meaningful*, not meaningless? Do you realise that in trying to isolate *any* phenomena to see if it exists - in this case, concept formation along the lines Rand describes - leaves one open to the accusation of "dropping context"? That is why it is hard to take this level of criticism seriously! In any case, when you say we form concepts "out of the world" do you think the tables that we show the children are somehow not in "the world"? Do you think showing them a table for the first time in one particular room rather than another , or under a controlled observation makes the experiment "meaningless"? The idea is bizarre.

>Your thought experiment drops that context, and in doing so renders itself meaningless.

Not at all. However, if you truly believe this is so, I invite you once again to design a better experiment to test her theory. Tell me what restrictions should be proposed, and how it should be done. Or is her theory beyond such trivial things as tests in reality?

Hey, you also forgot to provide an analogy for Rand's theory that wasn't an unintentional howler, like hers is.

- Daniel

Post 304

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 4:23pm

I wrote:
>>Imagine a child has to form the concept "novel"

Rick replied:
>*Has* to form a concept? What in the world could that possibly mean?

Rick, according to Rand's theory one *has* to form concepts in the exact fashion she describes if one wants to use words meaningfully. Remember?

>Nonsense. Here's where you demonstrate that you have absolutely no clue what Rand has written. The concept 'novel' does not refer to any physical object.

Lord, where does he get this stuff from!? Ever been to a bookshop?

>It refers to a particular organization of a particular type of writing.
The concept 'book' is a first level concept because books can be directly perceived and the concept does not depend on any other previously formed concepts to be understood.

But why stop there? In that case, a *book* is a particular organisation of writing too (and ink, and paper)! Hey, and a table is a particular organisation of a particular type of wood and a particular type of nails! And not only that: you're telling me that when I see a novel, I'm not "directly perceiving" it, but when I see a book, I am?

Finally, you are forgetting the key point: that I have to see *two* books before I can form the concept "book", right? Yet somehow I don't have to read *two* novels to get the concept "novel"? I can just use "previously formed concepts" to understand the concept?

But hey, just keep going, you're doing great!

BTW, you may note that Nature considers this an interesting problem (I think he's right). Does that mean he's got "absolutely no clue what Rand has written" either?

- Daniel

Post 305

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 4:57pm

Nature:
> I think that's a pretty fair characterization of how concepts generally get formed in a more social environment than that of the desert island guy....Certainly the process becomes every bit as collaborative as you suggest when concepts get more complex.

Glad you think so. I think we may be reasonably close to agreement here. I agree with you about "rote learning" too, as I wrote earlier.

>Definitions, really, are just a means of translating a concept into language so that we can compare it with someone else's concepts.

Well look, I agree with what you're saying here, more or less. But the point no-one here seems to be grasping - they seem to think I'm saying "Do away with all definitions!", or "Only allow meanings that are in the dictionary!" - is that *we cannot logically resolve arguments over them*! It turns out , contra Rand, that I cannot say my definition of "democracy" is the true one and yours is false! (And vice versa!)

That is why we should not argue the meanings of words, but *reach agreement on them as quickly as possible*. For example, you may say "I define democracy as political rule by the Pope". In which case I will not waste time in arguing over whether that is its "true" meaning or not; I do not care.

All I need say is: "Ok, fine. But if that is what you mean by democracy, then I am anti-democracy"!

(BTW, I thought the rest of your post(s) interesting, but am just a little short of time right now)

- Daniel

Post 306

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 6:34pm

Daniel Barnes writes:

In that case, a *book* is a particular organisation of writing too (and ink, and paper)! Hey, and a table is a particular organisation of a particular type of wood and a particular type of nails!

Thank you for demonstrating that you do not understand what a book is, nor a novel, nor a table. Most especially, you do not understand what a concept is.

Post 307

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 7:05pm

Daniel,

Another mean streak, eh? I was beginning to wonder what had gone wrong.

>Rand is pointing out in this passage that one defines 'table' ostensively by pointing at a few in succession.

Hey, I thought we were sticking with Rand? She says nothing about "pointing at a few in succession" in this passage!

How exactly am I not sticking with Rand here? No, she isn't saying she's pointing out instances of units as an ostensive definition-- she's doing it!

Oh, got a stronger analogy than Ayn Rand's then have you? Has *she* got a better one than this? Or is her theory of concepts so unique no analogy can accurately explain it? (As we say in here in New Zealand,...yeah right!)

Where the hell did this come from? Did I claim that Rand's analogy wasn't good? Did I claim I had a better one? Does it matter? We're discussing Rand's epistemological theory, not what analogy describes it best.

>Second, as far as both children are concerned, they've both only seen one table, since there is no reason to consider them distinct if they look exactly the same.

Bzzzzt. Sorry dude. Child 1 has seen *two* tables, two separate units. Child 2 has seen one unit. Just because they don't discern the difference doesn't mean they are the same unit.

Didn't take my advice, did you? In the context of both childrens' knowledge, they only saw one table, just like in the context of the knowledge of ancient stargazers, those stargazers recognized two distinct objects called the Morning and Evening Stars which were really the same object. (Or, if you'd like to describe the ineffable process by which they distinguished two identical tables, please do, if you think you can.) Because of this, they would refer to it as a particular because of that.

But anyway, if you're happy for *neither* of them to have developed the concept "table" as a result, that's your call. Would you say that in that case, all knowledge those kids have of those objects is entirely *non*-conceptual then? Would it be therefore impossible for them to meaningfully use the *word* "table" after such an experiment, given that they have no concept to go with it?

No, they have knowledge of a particular (did you fall asleep while I was talking to Brendan about proper nouns or something?) Their knowledge of the table isn't non-conceptual any more than my knowledge of you (as a particular) is non-conceptual. And if they think the word table refers to that particular table, then their idea of table is not open-ended and hence not a concept. After all, if you showed them another table, why would they give it the same name as the first one?

No, they are both correct, and you have provided exactly zero effective counterarguments.

If something is correct, how could I provide counterarguments? Listen, we are arguing over Rand's epistemological theory, not Popper's. Go find a Popper site if you want to do that. You just try to find a hole in Rand's theory (which you haven't done, I might add). Better watch out, or you might add 'tu quoque' to your already long list of fallacies.

Even Nature agreed that definitions must ultimately be by mutual agreement (or convention), and cannot be logically decided. And everyone that's had a go at saying otherwise in the past, from Stolyarov on up to the very clever Bill Nevin, has not been able to show it. Saying they're "just wrong" isn't going to make your case, any more than wishing will make it so.

Did I claim that your definitions are wrong? As I recall, it was you who stipulated that a concept cannot be definite because of so-and-so an interpretation out of the dictionary. All I said is that you weren't applying how Rand and I used the word to apply to concepts. You can apply whatever senses of whatever words to anything you want, Daniel. Just don't be surprised when no one cares because it isn't a useful characterization.

Nate

Post 308

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 7:11pm

Rick writes:
>The concept 'novel' does not refer to any physical object.

Wow, I still cannot believe you wrote this...;-)

Say, anyone *else* want to back Rick up on this one?

- Daniel

Post 309

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 7:27pm

Brendan,

Nate: �Well, first of all, the tables T1 and T2 are not alike in every way possible-- they occupy different positions relative to other objects (such as each other). �

That�s true, but what is the relevance of this to concept formation?

Just wanted to clear up a possible argument that they are the same table because they are alike in every possible way. They are still distinct tables. You're right that it has no bearing on the matter at hand, but I could see Daniel complaining about it down the road if I don't say something about it now.

Especially when you go on to say:

�Second, as far as both children are concerned, they've both only seen one table, since there is no reason to consider them distinct if they look exactly the same.�

But you�ve just said that they�re not "alike in every way possible�. Now you�re saying that the tables are so alike that the children have in effect seen only one table. And this latter claim is false: one child has seen two tables, the other only one table.

This is good-- I have to distinguish between what the child knows and what the experimenter knows. The experimenter knows that there are two distinct tables since he, presumably, has seen then side by side. The child has not has this luxury, and indeed if the experimenter himself were presented the two tables in succession as proposed by Daniel in his experiment, he would come to the conclusion that it was the same table if they are indeed alike in every respect. Knowledge is contextual, just as in our discussion about the Morning and Evening Stars and Venus.

In the first case, there is a relationship of similarity, in the second, of identity. You�re saying the children cannot tell the difference, implying a split between the children�s minds and reality.

Of course they can't tell the difference-- by Daniel's very assumption, there is no difference. The only difference would be in relative position to the other table, which is impossible to perceive because each child only sees one table at a given time. There is no disconnect with reality here. In fact, if there is any disconnect with reality, it is Daniel's thought experiment itself as suggested by Mr. Cresswell.

As for the children having seen a table in the past, the intro to the thought experiment explicitly says they haven�t, which must be the case if the experiment is to be informative.

Noted. However, it is extremely unlikely that there is a child anywhere with a working vocabulary who hasn't seen exactly one table in his entire life to on which to perform this bizarre experiment.

Anyway, you�ve decided that the children cannot have formed a concept, but can nevertheless refer to the table as a particular. So can they use the word �table� to do this, or do they have to have formed the concept before they can use the word?

They do not have to form the concept to use the word. "Table" to the child would be naming a particular much as "Brendan" names the particular which is you. Later (unless, this child were subjected to more of Daniel's thought experiments) one would correct him and point out that the word "table" subsumes an indefinite number of units, not just the one he saw.

Nate

Post 310

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 7:29pm

Gentlemen,

Once upon a time I wrote an artcle called, "Atheism: A Question of Conscience". Perhaps you remember that one?

After about 20 post, the thread became a brawl over some ugly and unfair remarks made towards Barbara Branden. Now we are 307 post into this thread and it bothers me that my thread has become a discussion forum all its own for 3 or 4 people. Perhaps it shouldn't bother me, but it does.

You see, when I write an article I put all my heart and mind into it. This is not to say that the article is worth a damn, but only to point out that whether the article is good, average or stinks like hell - it means something to me. So, every time I see 300 plus post on my thread relating to everything except to what I wrote, it tends to grate against my sense of having tried to make a contribution to Solo.

Now you guys have the right to post anywhere you damn please, I understand this. And threads often drift from topic, and I too have been guilty of making some threads drift - but this is no drift - 307 post is a Tsunami. So I would like to ask you, just as a favor to me personally, would you please create a new thread of your own for the purpose of your ongoing discussion.

Perhaps any of you that has ever written an article, those of you that understand the time, effort, and sense of ownership one has with these things will give me a break on this one.

Sincerely,

George W. Cordero

(Edited by George W. Cordero on 1/30, 9:26pm)

Post 311

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 7:43pm

Nate wrote:
>Another mean streak, eh?� I was beginning to wonder what had gone wrong.

Was what I was saying here "mean"? I don't think so. Certainly I haven't accused you of arguments that threaten to destroy mankind's knowledge, as you did of mine a while back, nor expressed "revulsion" at them. I don't think you could point to anything I've said to you that is nearly as strong as that! Yet I don't think I've ever accused you of having a "mean streak". In fact, I have been directly complimentary when I think you've said something smart.

That said, this is a tough line of questioning, I admit. But if you've got a good theory, it should withstand it. And I will say right now that while I do not think you are right, I admire your equal toughness in hanging in there and responding as directly as you can. It puts some of your elders to shame.

>How exactly am I not sticking with Rand here?� No, she isn't saying she's pointing out instances of units as an ostensive definition-- she's doing it!

Look, um, this interpretation simply doesn't seem to be supported by the text. But OK. we can agree to disagree.

>Where the hell did this come from?� Did I claim that Rand's analogy wasn't good?

Well you did say(291):
>Attacking this particular analogy is not attacking Rand's epistemology, just the strength of her analogy.�

I took this to mean you didn't think it was a particularly strong one - you didn't seem to want to defend it much. Of course, no analogy is perfect, but they don't have to be howlers either (ie: where's the files?) So I kind of hoped you had a better one. Never mind.

>(did you fall asleep while I was talking to Brendan about proper nouns or something?)

Must have, sorry...;-) It's been a long thread.

- Daniel

Post 312

Sunday, January 30, 2005 - 7:46pm

George wrote:
>Perhaps any of you that has ever written an article, those of you that understand the time, effort, and sense of ownership one has with these things will give me a break on this one.

With pleasure. Sorry to bother you, As Rodney Rawlings rightly remarked, debates never really end. Time, gentlemen!

- Daniel

Post 313

Monday, January 31, 2005 - 5:45am

Since my name has been (somewhat inaccurately) invoked, I�d like to say I agree with the essentials of George�s article. To truly know something (for example, that there is no God), one must not only be right, but right for the right reasons.

Please note that that applies to everything else that has been discussed on this thread. It is an epistemological question.

Post 314

Monday, January 31, 2005 - 12:53pm

Nate: �The experimenter knows that there are two distinct tables since he, presumably, has seen then side by side. The child has not has this luxury, and indeed if the experimenter himself were presented the two tables in succession as proposed by Daniel in his experiment, he would come to the conclusion that it was the same table if they are indeed alike in every respect.�

You are assuming that the children will judge that the objects presented to them are in reality one and the same object. But on what basis would the children have made this judgement?

Presumably, it�s based on the fact that the children will have noted various perceptual qualities such as colour, shape, texture etc in the first viewing, and compared these with the qualities presented in the second viewing.

The children will have experienced two sets of percepts, in one case identical, in the other, very similar. You say that the children would judge the two sets as identical rather than very similar. But why should they? They could judge either way. If they were to judge the two sets of percepts as very similar, presumably they would be on the way to forming a concept.

But the important point is that as far as Rand�s theory is concerned, it doesn�t matter what judgment the children make. In comparing two sets of percepts, they have both done what Rand requires for the formation of �unit�. All it takes then is for the experimenter to point, say �table� and there�s your concept.

Brendan

Post 315

Monday, January 31, 2005 - 1:01pm