RoR: Forum

Nature writes:
>ITOE argues that an individual not engaged in any communication at all would still need to form concepts, would need to create some sort of language in order to label those concepts with perceptual symbols, and would still benefit greatly from explicitly examining and stating definitions for his concepts. So in that sense, other people are irrelevant to concept formation.

Nature, thank you for a very good post. I disagree with what you are saying, but perhaps not as much as you think. I think you should consider something that is so obvious it seems to be being completely overlooked (in a forest-for-the-trees-ish way). That is, that probably *99% of what we know, right and wrong, we have learned from other people*. Starting with our language, which is clearly a cultural artifact, the cumulative sum of millions of people's individual interactions over millenia.

What you seem to be suggesting is that, rather like Tarzan, we can start from nothing and form human-like concepts and language - and indeed we *must* if we are not just to be products of collectivism, as Rodney seems to be insisting.

But I say this is impossible, and Rodney's suggestion denies a plain fact of reality - not to mention a something of a slight on the human achievements of our predecessors which we are lucky enough to be the beneficiaries of. I say, if you go back to Adam, you will get no further than Adam got. And indeed, in the rare cases where children have been raised among animals rather than humans, "not engaged in any communication at all" (like the recent "chicken man" in Fiji, or Kaspar Hauser, who appears to have been locked in a closet for most of his childhood ) they have emerged conceptually retarded, and without language any higher than that found in animals (ie: what are called the "expressive" and "signalling" functions). So the idea you have outlined above seems fundamentally incorrect.

Of course, no-one wants to be a complacent beneficiary - a "spoiled rich kid"...;-) and, like the worst post modernists, lounge around all day bitching about how what we have inherited "just isn't good enough!" Armed with our massive inheritance, we must make the best of it - test it, to see what is useful and what is not, adapt it, and use our reason and imagination to make our own contribution to improving it.

- Daniel

Post 281

Sunday, January 23, 2005 - 4:05pm

I wrote:
>>For example, Rick's statement that concepts can "neither be complete, nor incomplete" is a very typical kind of esoteric statement.

Rick then responded.
>I never made any such statement! You are clearly very confused.

Yes, I freely admit I am! Reading what you wrote below:

Rick (225) :
>Evidently I should have simply said in response to your #4 "I have no idea what a 'complete' or 'incomplete' concept is".

...I took that to mean a concept is *not* "complete" *nor* is it "incomplete" ie:*neither* word describes it, concepts are neither complete nor incomplete. I freely admit I do not understand this position, any more than I understand Sartre's "Noughty-noughtness" which Nate cited.But if you do, fine.

I then wrote:
>>And perhaps neither does he, because it seems he had formerly said that they were *both* complete and incomplete!

Rick responded:
>Nor did I ever write any such thing.

It seemed to both me and Nate that you did in post 217.
Nate (224) even compared it his "both definite and indefinite", saying it was "exactly the same" position. But clearly it can't be, unless "both" means "neither"!.

And you did write:
>Since a concept refers to all the entities of a particular type it is complete.

...although later you took it back saying I'd put the words in your mouth, and that's not what you would normally say. So perhaps my confusion is just a little understandable.

But all this is insanely boring and nit-picky, especially when I have clear, interesting posts like Nature's to read instead. It's hurting my head. I'm happy just to take it on the chin, and agree with Rick that I *am* deeply confused by statements like his "I have no idea what a 'complete' or 'incomplete' concept is". And leave it at that.

- Daniel

Post 282

Sunday, January 23, 2005 - 7:59pm

Daniel, do not quote me as saying something, complete with quotation marks, if you are not quoting my exact words. I do not care to deal with such dishonesty.

Is a square fast or slow? "What", you say, "how could a square be fast or slow? The term is not applicable."

Precisely, and neither is the term "complete" applicable to concepts.

However, when you quote me as writing "Since a concept refers to all the entities of a particular type it is complete." it should be clear from the context that the word "is" can and perhaps should be replaced (simply to avoid your misunderstanding) with "can be understood in this very limited sense to be".

And again, I never wrote that you "put words in [my] mouth". What I did write was that I was using your words in an (evidently futile) attempt to help you understand. Clearly that was an error on my part to think that you had any interest in understanding.

Post 283

Monday, January 24, 2005 - 1:35am

Rick wrote:
>Daniel, do not quote me as saying something, complete with quotation marks, if you are not quoting my exact words. I do not care to deal with such dishonesty.

I apologise if I have done so. Obviously if you're accusing me of dishonesty, my misquote must be egregious. Which is annoying, as I took some pains to paste the right passages, even identifying the post numbers I quoted you from. I'd hardly do that if I were trying to stitch you up. Where exactly did I get it so horribly wrong?

>Is a square fast or slow? "What", you say, "how could a square be fast or slow? The term is not applicable." Precisely, and neither is the term "complete" applicable to concepts.

Whoops. You forgot to say that the term "incomplete" wasn't applicable either. But yes, I am familiar with this frankly odd line of argument from young Mr Rawlings. And no, I do not understand it, any more than if you said a square was neither complete, nor incomplete.

But never mind: such cryptic utterances are obviously far beyond my philosophic capacity! I will leave this one for the initiates.

- Daniel

Post 284

Monday, January 24, 2005 - 2:13am

Nature writes:
>Now, in the context of communication between individuals�which I think has been the focus of this thread�other people are relevant to a degree, even if it's only in supplying labels from an existing language for an individual to apply to concepts he forms on his own.

Hmmm.Is that all other people do? Label suppliers? I think that's a little extreme. I tend to think that other people can teach you ideas - like a science teacher, or a philosopher for instance. But, taking your point, the way we learn an idea (or a concept in your sense too perhaps?) best is by a process like "making-and-matching". We try to put it together ourselves conjecturally, through trial and error, till it matches the concept our teacher wants us to "get". So it's still someone else's concept we're trying to learn, but we learn it best by reconstructing it ourselves. (I would contrast this with say rote learning). Incidentally, while doing this, we may notice something about the concept our teacher has not...;-)

>Also individuals thinking alone may form different concepts, especially for very abstract concepts.

Now this point goes to what I'm saying about the vagueness of words - how it's not a bug necessarily, but a feature. For both those individuals could simply choose to stick dogmatically to the concretes they;ve chosen the word to symbolise, and communication would be paralysed. (And I've also shown that basic disagreements over definitions logically cannot be settled) But they could also choose to extend their language imaginatively; to try and grasp what the other person is saying, and even accept some compromise as to what the terms refer to - thus blurring the meaning a little. And then communication can be reopened. (And this is, in effect, what actually happens with words all the time)

>Using these definitions, can you form any kind of coherent proposition about whether there is any such thing as a �right� to health care?

Now, there are a few consequences you have to absorb when you realise that arguments over the meaning of words cannot be settled logically. The first is that you want to watch out for statements or problems that lead straight back to such arguments! For instance, "Is there any such thing as a "right" to health care?" which will lead only to "What is the true meaning of the word "right"?" You're better off making the problem more tangible, ie: "How can we make healthcare services more effective?" or "How can we reduce waiting lists?".

Part of solving a problem is in the way you put it. Putting it this way is more likely to generate useful plans or theories than asking "what is..." type questions. These are likely to generate only more words!

- Daniel

Post 285

Wednesday, January 26, 2005 - 6:58pm

Daniel,

This thread is getting so long it isn't reporting to me on the home page. Anyway,

You sure scare easy!

Yes-- scared in the sense of disgusted to the point of revulsion that anyone could think what you purported to write. If that wasn't clear from the context, I apoligise.

Nate:
>You seem to be arguing that if a discipline requires new words and concepts to understand, it isn't worth investigating.

No, not at all. What I'm arguing is that using ordinary words, but constantly appealing to *extraordinary* meanings of them is obviously confusing (like "First Level" for example). It also opens the way to a philosophy becoming esoteric (that is, comprehensible only to the initiated believers). For example, Rick's statement that concepts can "neither be complete, nor incomplete" is a very typical kind of esoteric statement. I do not understand it, and neither did you. (And perhaps neither does he, because it seems he had formerly said that they were *both* complete and incomplete! Whew! Perhaps the words "both" and "neither" don't apply to concepts too..;-))

That's all well and good for Rick's statement. What about Rand's statements, which she does define? What's confusing about a first-level concept? Don't you know what it is?

Now, obviously we will always be inventing new words, and bending existing ones to fit new ideas. (Inherited, borrowed, adapted, vague etc) But we should do this as little as possible if we want to communicate clearly.

For once, we agree (except for "vague" in the paranthetical). That's why if there is a word which applies in a different context which shares some similarity to the specialized concept in question, you should consolidate your terms, instead of inventing a totally new word to describe what you're talking about.

But since no one had ever considered Rand's conception of epistemology before, it makes sense to apply words in new contexts to represent concepts involved in her theory.

Nate, I find it hard to believe you would actually credit me with [the destruction of human thought].

Not you. The ideas you're propagating. If it were up to you, you would shrink from any opportunity to use old words in a new context, fearing that this sullies the meaning of the concepts involved. Humans would be stuck at the current level of knowledge, unable to organize and more clearly express what they were talking about, forever tied to the "dictionary definitions."

Nate

Post 286

Wednesday, January 26, 2005 - 9:27pm

Nate wrote:
> This thread is getting so long it isn't reporting to me on the home page.�

Yes, I think technology is trying to tell us something.

>Yes-- scared in the sense of�disgusted to the point of revulsion that anyone could think what you purported to write.

What, that 1) disputes over definitions are logically irresolvable and 2) lead to an infinite regress? Therefore one should spend as little time arguing over them as possible? Why would these interesting facts, and their reasonable consequence, make you "disgusted to the point of revulsion?".

>That's all well and good for Rick's statement.� What about Rand's statements, which she does define?� What's confusing about a first-level concept?� Don't you know what it is?

Well, let's closely examine what Rand actually says:

(IOE, "First Level Concepts)
>Rand:"What I call the "first level" of concepts are existential concretes-that to which you can point as if it were an ostensive definition and say: "I mean this." Now, you can point to a table. You cannot point to furniture."

Now read it carefully. Have you noticed what's basically wrong here?

I'll tell you. She uses "a table" as an example of a "First Level Concept". She doesn't say "table". She says "*a* table". *Singular*. She says you can even point to this single unit "as if it were an ostensive definition" of the First Level concept. Further, she says that you cannot point to "furniture" (incidentally this is incorrect) thus clearly indicating you cannot point to the broader "table" as a first level concept either. She means just what she says: "a table" is a First Level concept.

Yet - and I think you can see now where this goes - concepts are a mental integration of *two* or more units! So which is it? So you can see why I consider the IOE is basically incoherent, and despite its initial plausibility her theory gets worse the more you look into it.

Look, this has developed into something of a side issue, but I don't think Rand's theory when examined works the way you assume it does - which is, I'm thinking, along a kind of files-and-folders type model. Is that correct?

>If it were up to you, you would shrink from any opportunity to use old words in a new context, fearing that this sullies the meaning of the concepts involved.� Humans would be stuck at the current level of knowledge, unable to organize and more clearly express what they were talking about, forever tied to the "dictionary definitions."

I think it's probably my turn to cry "Context!" here! Have you forgotten everything else I've written on this thread about words being "inherited, adapted, borrowed" etc and how their "vagueness" is not a bug, but a feature that allows them to cover different senses and new meanings? So they can be used *creatively* and not stuck dead to meanings for ever after like butterflies on a pin. The use of dictionaries is just a convention to avoid timewasting verbal arguments, not an attempt to freeze-dry language for evermore! The opposite!

- Daniel

Post 287

Thursday, January 27, 2005 - 5:51pm

Daniel,

What [disgusts you to the point of revulsion], that 1) disputes over definitions are logically irresolvable and 2) lead to an infinite regress? Therefore one should spend as little time arguing over them as possible? Why would these interesting facts, and their reasonable consequence, make you "disgusted to the point of revulsion?".

No, I was referring specifically to the fact that you would abolish a discipline to "Esotericville" on the grounds that it employs new terms for new concepts. The end result would be to stagnate any and all academic progress in any field. I don't abhor (1) and (2) above, they are just wrong.

Have you noticed what's basically wrong here? ... She uses "a table" as an example of a "First Level Concept". She doesn't say "table". She says "*a* table". *Singular*. She says you can even point to this single unit "as if it were an ostensive definition" of the First Level concept. Further, she says that you cannot point to "furniture" (incidentally this is incorrect) thus clearly indicating you cannot point to the broader "table" as a first level concept either. She means just what she says: "a table" is a First Level concept.

Yet - and I think you can see now where this goes - concepts are a mental integration of *two* or more units! So which is it? So you can see why I consider the IOE is basically incoherent, and despite its initial plausibility her theory gets worse the more you look into it.

Um, you should probably read the entire passage before jumping to the conclusion that Rand is blatantly contradicting what she spelled out in great detail in the main text of IOE. She is pointing out why ostensive definitions don't work for "furniture" and do work for "table" here-- because tables have a shape and a function which are similar enough to justify forming a concept on purely perceptual grounds. When she says "you can point to a table", she means you can define a table ostensively, just by virtue of its shape. When she says, "you can't point to furniture", that means that you can't define furniture ostensively. There is no problem here.

Look, this has developed into something of a side issue, but I don't think Rand's theory when examined works the way you assume it does - which is, I'm thinking, along a kind of files-and-folders type model. Is that correct?

I can tell you what Rand wrote on the subject in her chapter on definitions.

Since concepts represent a system of cognitive classification, a given concept serves (metaphorically) as a file folder in which man's mind files his knowledge and the existents it subsumes. (IOE, 66)

So to answer your question, yes, you can metaphorically compare concepts to a file folder system, in which a concept corresponds to a folder and an existent corresponds to a file. Is there a problem with this? I can't think of one, other than the fact that folders can be a file in its own right in other folders and that the same file can be in multiple folders, where the analogy isn't as clear-cut as it should be.

I think it's probably my turn to cry "Context!" here! Have you forgotten everything else I've written on this thread about words being "inherited, adapted, borrowed" etc and how their "vagueness" is not a bug, but a feature that allows them to cover different senses and new meanings? So they can be used *creatively* and not stuck dead to meanings for ever after like butterflies on a pin. The use of dictionaries is just a convention to avoid timewasting verbal arguments, not an attempt to freeze-dry language for evermore! The opposite!

No, I haven't forgotten what you've written. Nor have I forgotten your attack on the characterization of concepts as definite and open-ended by relying solely on colloquial definitions found in a dictionary. Nor have I forgotten the time I have wasted trying to convince you that you can use the word definite to describe a concept, protestations about not matching a definition on the dictionary notwithstanding. Nor, lest I forget, failed to note that you stand very solidly behind the literal interpretations of passages while at the same time arguing that definitions are just "rough ideas" about the meanings of concepts.

Now that I recall these things, you tell me whose use of dictionaries is attempting to freeze-dry the english language here.

Anyway, if the lack of creative use of words is what you're afraid of, why do you object to Rand's concept theory? You can use words as creatively as you want according to Rand. Just be sure you know what they mean, is all.

Nate

Post 288

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 12:59pm

Nate:
>No, I was referring specifically to�the fact that you would abolish a discipline to "Esotericville" on the grounds that it employs new terms for new concepts.�

Actually, you are employing almost entirely *old* terms for new and often unfamiliar ideas. (Do you think Rand invented the term "concept"?) So you indeed using common terms, but in exclusive and esoteric senses, and this is always becomes confusing. Further, you are asking that everyone else gives up the ordinary meanings in order to understand your theories. Now you are perfectly welcome to do this - it's a free country! And sadly it is an all too common practice in philosophy as a whole. It's just that the end result of this style is very typically equally esoteric beliefs, like "noughty-noughtnesses" and that "concepts are neither complete nor incomplete". Rather than profundity, this suggests to me a basic vacancy.

>Um, you should probably read the entire passage before jumping to the conclusion that Rand is blatantly contradicting what she spelled out in great detail in the main text of IOE.�

I suggest you do the same. You will note the whole passage takes place under the heading "First Level Concepts". She is explaining what they are. She indicates - contrary to the rest of the book - they are formed by pointing at *a chair* ("...I mean *this*"). Your reply talks about ostensive definitions, but doesn't mention "First Level Concepts" ie: the concepts one must first form before grasping others. You've forgotten that this is where I say the problem lies.

>So to answer your question, yes, you can metaphorically compare concepts to a file folder system, in which a concept�corresponds to�a folder and an existent corresponds to a file.� Is there a problem with this?

There is, as a matter of fact, but we'll get to that in a minute. First of all, can you name me a *file* which is not also *a folder?* And not just something vague like an "existent". Name something that is an actual file, and a file alone.

>Nor, lest I forget, failed to note that you stand very�solidly�behind the literal interpretations of passages while at the same time arguing that definitions are just "rough ideas" about the meanings of concepts.

Of course, it is far better to argue about statements and proposals than the meanings of words, and this is just what I am doing here. It is also why I am taking her *literally* ie: as if her words required no speciaI interpretations. Because, you see, you can always try to get out of problemic statements with special interpretations of words - just as Bill Clinton famously did! Only it's not considered a very respectable practice. Because we can use imaginative interpretations two ways, one good one bad: to try to understand each other better on one hand, and on the other, to try to conceal our mistakes.

- Daniel

Post 289

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 1:13pm

Let's try a thought experiment to test Rand's theory about concept formation. After all, we should always test our theories, and not just believe what we are told, right? And let's make it simple, but still a reasonably tough test. After all, the better it survives testing, the better the theory.

So, let's take two children who've never seen a table before,and place them in two separate rooms.

Go to a store and buy two tables, both as *alike* as possible in every respect: the same type, size, colour etc. Call each of these units T1 and T2.

We show Child 1 first T1. Then we remove it, and bring in T2. This child has now seen *two* separate units - even though they are both identical - and thus will according to Rand's theory, have been able to develop the concept "table".(An assitant can give the child the word "table" to complete the process)

Child 2, however, we show first T1. Then we remove it, and *bring T1 in again* instead of T2. We repeat this another, say, 27,000 times. Now, according to Rand's theory, Child 2 will still *never* develop the concept "table" cos all they've ever seen is a single unit!!

Now, you could always adapt Rand's theory to get out of this - maybe talk about "instances" rather than "units". But this would be a major change. Alternatively, one might propose that a kind of"limited" concept might get formed. But then I would reply that, given the number of tables that be, have been and will ever be, why would *two* be less "limited" than one!?

- Daniel

Post 290

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 1:47pm

Dan,

You need to go to a barbershop and get some spare hairs to split.

Ethan

Post 291

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 2:56pm

Daniel,

Actually, you are employing almost entirely *old* terms for new and often unfamiliar ideas. (Do you think Rand invented the term "concept"?) So you indeed [are?] using common terms, but in exclusive and esoteric senses, and this is always becomes confusing.

Yet here we are, discussing Rand's theory of concepts, without any confusion as to her claims. It must be a miracle. Also, one verb per sentence please.

Further, you are asking that everyone else gives up the ordinary meanings in order to understand your theories.

Nope. They can keep their old meanings, as well as use mine. Introducing a new use for a term does not require rejecting old uses in other contexts.

Now you are perfectly welcome to do this - it's a free country!

It won't be for long if we take your advice to regard words as vague ideas, which they all but have. The collapse of jurisprudence wouldn't be far behind-- in fact, it's already begun.

And sadly it is an all too common practice in philosophy as a whole. It's just that the end result of this style is very typically equally esoteric beliefs, like "noughty-noughtnesses" and that "concepts are neither complete nor incomplete". Rather than profundity, this suggests to me a basic vacancy.

That's quite true. Let's stick with Rand.

I suggest you do the same. You will note the whole passage takes place under the heading "First Level Concepts". She is explaining what they are. She indicates - contrary to the rest of the book - they are formed by pointing at *a chair* ("...I mean *this*"). Your reply talks about ostensive definitions, but doesn't mention "First Level Concepts" ie: the concepts one must first form before grasping others. You've forgotten that this is where I say the problem lies.

When one first forms concepts, first level concepts must be defined ostensively, since there are no other words with which to define it at that point. Even in some cases, like 'red', ostensive definitions are still necessary. Rand is pointing out in this passage that one defines 'table' ostensively by pointing at a few in succession. You can only point at one table at a time to do this, which necessitates her use of the indefinite article "a".

There is, as a matter of fact, but we'll get to that in a minute. First of all, can you name me a *file* which is not also *a folder?* And not just something vague like an "existent". Name something that is an actual file, and a file alone.

Metaphor. This is a Metaphor. Attacking this particular analogy is not attacking Rand's epistemology, just the strength of her analogy. Both concepts/referents and folder/file are things which are associated under other things. That's pretty much the extent of the analogy. Rand isn't literally suggesting that the hierarchy of knowledge is a giant folder system in your brain, hence the paranthetical (metaphorically) prefacing her statement. You'd be best to attack her theory from another angle.

Of course, it is far better to argue about statements and proposals than the meanings of words, and this is just what I am doing here. It is also why I am taking her *literally* ie: as if her words required no speciaI interpretations.

Words always require interpretation, in the sense that they require a context. The only way that a word could require no interpretation is if it has been freshly invented and has only one sense. If you think otherwise, perhaps you could interpret the meaning of the statement "It killed at the box office" without such context? Also, it's funny how your "interpretations" always run counter to the sense in which I use the words, which are also found in dictionaries.

Because, you see, you can always try to get out of problemic statements with special interpretations of words - just as Bill Clinton famously did! Only it's not considered a very respectable practice. Because we can use imaginative interpretations two ways, one good one bad: to try to understand each other better on one hand, and on the other, to try to conceal our mistakes.

Using special interpretations of words is fine. However, if you try to equivocate (you remember that, don't you), trying to use two different meanings at different points in your argument, that is improper. How exactly do we determine when people are equivocating when words are just supposed to be "vague ideas?"

On to your thought experiment:

So, let's take two children who've never seen a table before,and place them in two separate rooms.

Go to a store and buy two tables, both as *alike* as possible in every respect: the same type, size, colour etc. Call each of these units T1 and T2.

We show Child 1 first T1. Then we remove it, and bring in T2. This child has now seen *two* separate units - even though they are both identical - and thus will according to Rand's theory, have been able to develop the concept "table".(An assitant can give the child the word "table" to complete the process)

Child 2, however, we show first T1. Then we remove it, and *bring T1 in again* instead of T2. We repeat this another, say, 27,000 times. Now, according to Rand's theory, Child 2 will still *never* develop the concept "table" cos all they've ever seen is a single unit!!

Well, first of all, the tables T1 and T2 are not alike in every way possible-- they occupy different positions relative to other objects (such as each other). As Rand mentions in IOE, if you have a collection of tires which are all exactly the same, this doesn't make them all blend into a gigantic super-tire. They are all individual tires. Any attempts to circumvent the truth that identity is the sum of characteristics will always fail in this way.

Second, as far as both children are concerned, they've both only seen one table, since there is no reason to consider them distinct if they look exactly the same. As such, the child will not form the concept of table, and instead refer to it as a particular, if they do at all. I suggest you reread what I talked about when we were discussing the Morning and Evening Star-- this is the dual of that situation.

Incidentally, if the child has ever seen a table in the past, and if he notices the requisite similarities between it and the table before him presently, he will use his memory of the other table as his other particular to begin the process of concept formation, which will be capped off with the proper English word, thanks to your fictional assistant.

Nate

Post 292

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 3:44pm

Ethan writes:
>Dan, You need to go to a barbershop and get some spare hairs to split.

What exactly is hairsplitting about my argument? Funny, you haven't said.

And if you're going to be the Hairsplitting Police, what about the one-man verbal crime wave Rick Pasotto's been committing on this thread?(which reached a peak with his delighful fudging over the meaning of the word "is"!!) Where have you been, mate? Having a donut?

- Daniel

Post 293

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 4:33pm

With his description of his proposed thought experiment, I now begin to understand both how Mr Barnes formed his own concepts, and therefore why the poor chap is so beffuddled. He deserves our sympathy.

Post 294

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 4:24pm

Nate (disposing of both Sartre and Rick) writes:
>That's quite true.� Let's stick with Rand.

Fine by me.

>Rand is pointing out in this passage that one defines 'table' ostensively by pointing at a few in succession.

Hey, I thought we were sticking with Rand? She says nothing about "pointing at a few in succession" in this passage!

>Attacking this particular analogy is not attacking Rand's epistemology, just the strength of her analogy.

Oh, got a stronger analogy than Ayn Rand's then have you? Has *she* got a better one than this? Or is her theory of concepts so unique no analogy can accurately explain it? (As we say in here in New Zealand,...yeah right!)

>Second, as far as both children are concerned, they've both only seen one table, since there is no reason to consider them distinct if they look exactly the same.�

Bzzzzt. Sorry dude. Child 1 has seen *two* tables, two separate units. Child 2 has seen one unit. Just because they don't discern the difference doesn't mean they are the same unit.

But anyway, if you're happy for *neither* of them to have developed the concept "table" as a result, that's your call. Would you say that in that case, all knowledge those kids have of those objects is entirely *non*-conceptual then? Would it be therefore impossible for them to meaningfully use the *word* "table" after such an experiment, given that they have no concept to go with it?

(Frankly, in reality I doubt this would be the case)

Jumping back a moment in 287 Nate wrote:
>I don't abhor (1) and (2) above, they are just wrong.

No, they are both correct, and you have provided exactly zero effective counterarguments. Even Nature agreed that definitions must ultimately be by mutual agreement (or convention), and cannot be logically decided. And everyone that's had a go at saying otherwise in the past, from Stolyarov on up to the very clever Bill Nevin, has not been able to show it. Saying they're "just wrong" isn't going to make your case, any more than wishing will make it so.

- Daniel

Post 295

Friday, January 28, 2005 - 11:21pm

Nate: �Well, first of all, the tables T1 and T2 are not alike in every way possible-- they occupy different positions relative to other objects (such as each other). �

That�s true, but what is the relevance of this to concept formation? Especially when you go on to say:

�Second, as far as both children are concerned, they've both only seen one table, since there is no reason to consider them distinct if they look exactly the same.�

But you�ve just said that they�re not "alike in every way possible�. Now you�re saying that the tables are so alike that the children have in effect seen only one table. And this latter claim is false: one child has seen two tables, the other only one table.

In the first case, there is a relationship of similarity, in the second, of identity. You�re saying the children cannot tell the difference, implying a split between the children�s minds and reality.

As for the children having seen a table in the past, the intro to the thought experiment explicitly says they haven�t, which must be the case if the experiment is to be informative. If the children had seen tables in the past, the experiment couldn�t tell us anything about first-level concept formation, could it?

Anyway, you�ve decided that the children cannot have formed a concept, but can nevertheless refer to the table as a particular. So can they use the word �table� to do this, or do they have to have formed the concept before they can use the word?

Brendan

Post 296

Saturday, January 29, 2005 - 1:26pm

Peter Cresswell writes:
>With�his description of his proposed�thought experiment, I now begin to understand both how�Mr Barnes formed his own concepts, and therefore why the poor chap is so beffuddled. He deserves our sympathy.

Well, Mr Cresswell, despite the heavy sarcasm, like Mr Dawe you are somewhat light on detail. What exactly is wrong with it? Care to elaborate?

And of course, as a result you would also be able to describe how a test of Rand's theory *should* be designed, as opposed to my misguided effort. (Assuming, of course, you think theories should be tested)

And while you're at it, you might be able to help Nate out with an better analogy for Rand's theory, given that the files and folders one she uses appears to be a howler.

- Daniel

Post 297

Saturday, January 29, 2005 - 2:23pm

While we're waiting for PC to come back with some clues as to the correct way to test Rand's theory of concept formation, let's try an even simpler test. After all, it is rather banal talking about chairs and tables all day. Let's try something more interesting.

Imagine a child has to form the concept "novel" (let's assume it's not a "first level" concept - although who's to say? A novel is just as much a "existential concrete" as a table - but just a common or garden variety.). He's able to read, has read many kids books before, but no novels - and he's at the right age to start reading them. Now, we give him a copy of "Atlas Shrugged". He reads it thoroughly, and enjoys it. So much so he reads it again. And again. And again. So much so that he can tell you the story off by heart, which are his favourite characters etc. Yet according to Rand's theory, he still has no *concept* of what a novel is, as concept formation "is a mental integration of two or more units". So even after reading it, should he happen to use the word "novel" it would merely be an inarticulate sound on his part! Indeed, his understanding of the term would have to be *non*-conceptual - perhaps mere "muscle-memory", to use Rick's example of non-conceptual knowledge. And so it will remain, no matter how many times he reads it, until the day he reads "The Fountainhead".

Is this correct?

- Daniel

Post 298

Saturday, January 29, 2005 - 4:49pm

Daniel,
The problem with your thought experiment is that it represents a heroic dropping of context - we do not form our concepts while locked in a rationalistic vacuum chamber (and more's the pity for you if you have); we form them out in the world, and we form them in a context.

Your thought experiment drops that context, and in doing so renders itself meaningless.

Post 299

Saturday, January 29, 2005 - 6:16pm