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Post 180

Sunday, December 19, 2004 - 11:39pmSanction this postReply
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Nate writes:
>Well, you know a tire when you see one, and you don't need to know about every tire in the world to recognize a new one.

;-)

I'm not sure "I know one when I see one" counts as an very sound - or indeed, revolutionary - epistemological theory. In fact, like so much of the IOE, it merely begs the question, as does the whole contextual theory of knowledge, substituting a merely verbal solution for real one.

How so? Let's look again at the concepts "Morning Star" and "Evening Star".

Now, according to this theory, we could say perfectly definitely that these were two different concepts - in the context of man's knowledge of the time, that is.

But we could also say - perfectly definitely, according to this theory - that the two stars were the *same* concept in the context of man's knowledge of a later time. And we could also say perfectly definitely that they *were not even stars*, but another concept - planet - entirely!

It becomes clear that saying the above contradictory statements are both "perfectly definite" is simply playing with words. Like Rand's use of "absolutely certain" or "absolute precision", it is a mere rhetorical flourish that solves nothing and only adds confusion.

- Daniel

PS: The proper noun issue is neither here nor there. We can learn more about stars, we can learn more about Alpha Centauri, what's the difference?









Post 181

Sunday, December 19, 2004 - 11:51pmSanction this postReply
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Nate writes:
>Yes, "2" is a referent of the concept "natural number".  Even though "2" is itself a concept (whose referents are any two things of the same kind, as Rand puts it),

This is another good example of the very question-begging I'm talking about. How do we discover the concept "2"? Why, simply find any two things!

Who committed the crime? Why, the guilty man of course!

Epistemology is, as a famous economist once said, a very hard subject. And mathematical epistemology is a tough bugger too. But the above style of argument only gives the illusion of solving it.

- Daniel

Post 182

Monday, December 20, 2004 - 7:07amSanction this postReply
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Daniel Barnes writes:
Let's look again at the concepts "Morning Star" and "Evening Star".
Those are not concepts.

In order to form a concept there has to be at least two items that are both different from a third. This difference has to be a difference in quantity (quality).

It takes three data entities to form a concept. If you have only two entities you can know there is a difference but you can't specify what it is.

A single entity (eg, "Morning Star") cannot be the basis for a concept.

In popular usage "concept" often means simply "a general idea [about something]". That is not at all what Rand means when she uses the term.

PS: The proper noun issue is neither here nor there. We can learn more about stars, we can learn more about Alpha Centauri, what's the difference?

The difference is that what we learn about stars will necessarily apply to Alpha Centauri while what we learn about Alpha Centauri may or may not apply to other stars.

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Post 183

Wednesday, December 22, 2004 - 1:23amSanction this postReply
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Rick writes:
>A single entity (eg, "Morning Star") cannot be the basis for a concept.

However, Ayn Rand writes (IOE Chap 2, "Concept-Formation):
"Proper names are used in order to identify and include particular entities *in a conceptual method of cognition*." (emphasis DB)

Hi Rick,
While it is rather vague - like so much of the IOE - this passage does seem to suggest that she thinks particular entities translate into *a form* of concept. After all, what else could result from "identifying" something via "a conceptual method of cognition" than some kind of concept?

She even stresses their similarity to regular concepts in the next sentence:

"Observe that even proper names, in advanced civilizations, follow the definitional principles of genus and differentia: e.g., John Smith, with "Smith" serving as genus and "John" as differentia-or New York, U.S.A."

The only qualification she raises is in the prior paragraph, where she excludes proper nouns from being regular concepts as they do not refer to multiple concretes - which is obvious anyway.

So if we're dealing with something that apparently 1) follows the same definitional principles as a concept, and 2) same method of cognition, it's fair to say a particular entity results in *a form* of concept. Quacks like a duck etc. Further - and equally obviously - if human knowledge is conceptual, then if the only way we can know anything about single entities must be via a concept of some description. (If not - then what?)

So, let's then call the type of concept used in "Morning Star" etc a *particular* concept or just "concept (P)".

If we then take my example and replace everywhere you think "concept" is wrongly used with "concept (P)", does it change anything? I don't think so. The situation is still deeply contradictory.

If, however, you are still uncomfortable with this, just change the word "concept" for the word of your choice (entity, existent, particular etc - whatever you like) that best sums up how Objectivism considers a cognitive particular like "Morning Star" or "Venus". I believe this doesn't change the situation either - for if regular concepts - like "planet" - are "perfectly definite" surely particulars - like "Venus" - can't be *less* so!

Rick wrote:
>The difference is that what we learn about stars will necessarily apply to Alpha Centauri while what we learn about Alpha Centauri may or may not apply to other stars.

Yes, but we were talking about the "open endedness" of concepts - that you could keep learning more and more about stars, and learning more and more about Alpha Centuari, without limit. Or do you think there is a limit to one, and not the other?

- Daniel


(Edited by Daniel Barnes on 12/22, 2:31pm)


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Post 184

Wednesday, December 22, 2004 - 2:25pmSanction this postReply
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Just to finally drive the point home, you'll find my example holds also on regular concepts too.

Just change "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" for "electricity", "magnetism" - and throw "light" in for good measure!

Three concepts all thought to be entirely separate all turn out to be the same basic phenomena (electromagnetism) - seen at different times of day, as it were...;-)

Contrary to the contextual theory of knowledge, where earlier concepts are never "invalidated" or "overthrown", all three original concepts have been clearly invalidated at the most fundamental level - starting with their *identities as separate concepts*!

Of course, I suppose one could argue as a last ditch that these concepts haven't been "invalidated" or overthrown, but mysteriously "subsumed" (!) but by this stage I think it is clear one would be merely playing with words.

- Daniel





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Post 185

Thursday, December 23, 2004 - 2:03pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Daniel,

Venturing into the water again, are we?
I'm not sure "I know one when I see one" counts as an very sound - or indeed, revolutionary - epistemological theory. In fact, like so much of the IOE, it merely begs the question, as does the whole contextual theory of knowledge, substituting a merely verbal solution for real one.
Mock all you want-- I've explained my position about definite vs. open-ended many, many times.  The above responds to an offhanded way of summarizing my position.  I'm sorry to have assumed too much, that you would remember what my position on concepts is from post to post.  Read what I wrote about "definite" and "open-ended", apply it to tires, and you'll have no straw man to attack.
Now, according to this theory, we could say perfectly definitely that these were two different concepts - in the context of man's knowledge of the time, that is.

That's right.

But we could also say - perfectly definitely, according to this theory - that the two stars were the *same* concept in the context of man's knowledge of a later time. And we could also say perfectly definitely that they *were not even stars*, but another concept - planet - entirely!
Of course.

It becomes clear that saying the above contradictory statements are both "perfectly definite" is simply playing with words. Like Rand's use of "absolutely certain" or "absolute precision", it is a mere rhetorical flourish that solves nothing and only adds confusion.
Not at all clear, I'm afraid.  It is true that "Morning Star", "Evening Star", "Planet Venus", etc., are all valid concepts, and are all perfectly definite so long as you specify the proper context.  It wasn't assumed that Morning Star and Evening Star were the same object (since they were on different sides of the sky, you know) and the discovery with the telescope that they were in fact the same planet lead to an increase in knowledge and a change in definition, which is now perfectly well defined in our current context of knowledge.

PS: The proper noun issue is neither here nor there. We can learn more about stars, we can learn more about Alpha Centauri, what's the difference?
Well, what is true of Alpha Centauri might not be true of all stars.  Why do you think we bother to point it out?

This is another good example of the very question-begging I'm talking about. How do we discover the concept "2"? Why, simply find any two things!
That's right, that's what 'two' means.  You know, two is that number that's after one.  Surely you know what one means, right?

Who committed the crime? Why, the guilty man of course!



Talk about arguing through definitions. ;-)


Three concepts all thought to be entirely separate all turn out to be the same basic phenomena (electromagnetism) - seen at different times of day, as it were...;-)

Contrary to the contextual theory of knowledge, where earlier concepts are never "invalidated" or "overthrown", all three original concepts have been clearly invalidated at the most fundamental level - starting with their *identities as separate concepts*!

Of course, I suppose one could argue as a last ditch that these concepts haven't been "invalidated" or overthrown, but mysteriously "subsumed" (!) but by this stage I think it is clear one would be merely playing with words.
Do you really expect to teach someone who has never heard of electricity and magnetism that lightning bolts and magnets have anything to do with one another?  Do you think that the knowledge that electricity and magnetism are both aspects of the same force simply fell out of the sky and landed on a silver platter?  Scientists had to investigate these forces extensively before Maxwell came up with his famous equations describing the force of electromagnetism.  To say that "electricity", "magnetism" and "light" have been overthrown by the discovery of electromagnetism is to say that the concepts are invalid, that we should not refer to them (much as we do not refer to the aether), and that we should only talk about electromagnetism.  Do you see a problem with this?  If not, try to teach a high school physics student the general theory of relativity in order to teach him about gravity, and you'll understand why it is that these "overthrown" ideas still have a vital use in the hierarchy of knowledge.

Nate
(Edited by Nate T. on 12/23, 2:16pm)


Post 186

Thursday, December 23, 2004 - 4:43pmSanction this postReply
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Nate:
>Venturing into the water again, are we?

I wasn't aware I had left this particular paddling pool...;-)

Nate:
>It is true that "Morning Star", "Evening Star", "Planet Venus", etc., are all valid concepts, and are all perfectly definite so long as you specify the proper context.

Nate, do you know what you're saying here? You're claiming that concepts that are invalid are actually *valid* depending on how or when you look at them! So if I see the planet Venus, and think it's a star - does that make it true, given the context of my knowledge at the time? Of course not.

Now, if *all people* on earth think the same thing at the time, does that make it true either? Of course not. Think it through, lad. "Context" is not some magic word that lets you pretend false ideas are true ones, nor is "concept". You're kidding yourself with your own jargon.

>Well, what is true of Alpha Centauri might not be true of all stars.  Why do you think we bother to point it out?

As I said to Rick: do you think there is a limit to what we can learn about one, and not the other? That you can always learn more about something - that's what you mean by "open ended" isn't it?

>That's right, that's what 'two' means.  You know, two is that number that's after one.  Surely you know what one means, right?

Don't be juvenile. You're proposing a mathematical epistemology that is the merely equivalent of saying: "Who committed the crime? Why, the guilty man!" But I can see from your reply you've missed the point. Never mind.

- Daniel



Post 187

Friday, December 24, 2004 - 12:24pmSanction this postReply
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Nate: “It is true that "Morning Star", "Evening Star", "Planet Venus", etc., are all valid concepts, and are all perfectly definite so long as you specify the proper context.”

A short while ago (post 172 to be precise) you were “puzzled” and “at a loss to describe how we are able to do it [refer to unique existents by proper names] cognitively”. Now you say it is true that the above expressions are valid and perfectly definite concepts.

At the time, you promised to check out IOE for a steer on this matter. Clearly, your new-found confidence in the validity and perfect definiteness of these concepts indicates that IOE has been a great help in this matter.

Since that appears to be the case, why not share your discovery, and show how you have derived these concepts via the requisite Objectivist method – object, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Similarly, with “perfect” and “definite”.

If you can then arrange these discoveries in the proper hierarchy, I think you could lay the matter to rest once and for all. Meanwhile, I’m off to the beach for a week or two. Happy Holidays.

Brendan

PS, while you’re at it: find two things; derive the concept; throw away the concept; find two things.


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Post 188

Sunday, January 2, 2005 - 2:06pmSanction this postReply
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Daniel,

Nate, do you know what you're saying here? You're claiming that concepts that are invalid are actually *valid* depending on how or when you look at them! So if I see the planet Venus, and think it's a star - does that make it true, given the context of my knowledge at the time? Of course not.

Now, if *all people* on earth think the same thing at the time, does that make it true either? Of course not. Think it through, lad. "Context" is not some magic word that lets you pretend false ideas are true ones, nor is "concept". You're kidding yourself with your own jargon.
I'm saying no such thing.  What do you think people of that time defined a star to be?  It wasn't "a large ball of hydrogen and helium comprising a thermonuclear reaction", it was "a little speck of light in the sky".  The term "star" was later updated (correctly, I might add, by Rand's epistemological razor, since most of the little specks in the sky do satisfy the former definition) and means a different thing now than before people knew this, with the planets being similarly distinguished once more was known about them.  Since more knowledge is involved, these terms are better than the older ones.  So stop equivocating, okay?

All people holding the same statement as true does not make it true-- this is the bandwagon fallacy, as you and I know.  It's not what I'm talking about.

As I said to Rick: do you think there is a limit to what we can learn about one, and not the other? That you can always learn more about something - that's what you mean by "open ended" isn't it?

Wow, I am really sorry if you thought that I was implying anything about a limit to what we could learn.  Something that's true about Alpha Centauri may not be true of other stars, that's why we distinguish it.  What's the problem here?

Don't be juvenile. You're proposing a mathematical epistemology that is the merely equivalent of saying: "Who committed the crime? Why, the guilty man!" But I can see from your reply you've missed the point. Never mind.

Do you know what "one" means?  If you do, then you know what two means-- it means, "one and one".  If you know what that means, then you know what three means: it means "one and one and one".  Are you following me here?  Why do you think that we teach children to count by a sequence of words?  All they have to do is pair the things they're counting in a one-to-one correspondence with these words, and they'll know that when they run out of things to count, the word they end with will represent the number of the things they've counted.  Haven't you ever done this before?  If not, you shouldn't be the one calling me juvenile.

Brendan,

Much as we would like to have all concepts follow the pattern of differentiation and integration, proper nouns don't.  To try to shoehorn proper nouns into that process would be an error, since, as you rightly point out, there's only one existent to observe.  This isn't a problem though, since you aren't really seeking to isolate an 'essence' if you have a specific existent in mind.  You simply give it a name, and the word refers to the one object, whereas non-Proper concepts refer to an unlimited number of referents.  I don't see it as being much of a problem, to be honest.

Nate


(Edited by Nate T. on 1/02, 2:11pm)


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Post 189

Monday, January 3, 2005 - 11:45amSanction this postReply
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It is obvious Daniel is a 'poster child' for public education.

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Post 190

Monday, January 3, 2005 - 1:26pmSanction this postReply
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Nate: “Much as we would like to have all concepts follow the pattern of differentiation and integration, proper nouns don't…You simply give it a name, and the word refers to the one object, whereas non-Proper concepts refer to an unlimited number of referents.”

Sure, the term “Venus” refers to a single entity, but Venus is a planet and is therefore also subsumed under the general term. But it’s hard to see how "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" could also be so subsumed.

Among other things, you are again conflating words and concepts. As a test of this, it may be instructive to show how these apparent concepts are integrated with each other and into the hierarchy of knowledge, in a way that is consistent with Rand’s view that the meaning of a concept is its referents.

Brendan


Post 191

Monday, January 3, 2005 - 4:06pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Brendan,

Sure, the term “Venus” refers to a single entity, but Venus is a planet and is therefore also subsumed under the general term. But it’s hard to see how "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" could also be so subsumed.


 

Well, a thing can be subsumed under more than one concept, of course, so there's no problem with "Venus" in that respect.  Note that the existent Venus itself (the literal planet in space), is being subsumed under the concept "planet," not the term symbolizing it nor the concept of it in our minds.  Otherwise the statement "Venus and the Morning Star are the same entity" would equate a speck of light in the sky with a concept in our heads!

 

As for the stars, the Morning Star and Evening Star were both once considered stars (under the more primitive definition of "star" that I gave Daniel above) which explains the terms.  We retain the terminology in certain contexts (like when we're just stargazing for fun, writing poetry or examining historical records), but we know now that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same planet, Venus.

Among other things, you are again conflating words and concepts.

Sorry about that: the phrase "the word refers to" is merely a shorthand way of saying: "the concept symbolized by the word in question refers to."  Anyway, to refer to a specific existent, you have to give it a name.  After you've done that, the concept (a mental representation) of that particular existent subsumes merely that existent itself.  Unlike more general concepts, concepts symbolized by proper names are open-ended only in the sense that you can learn more about them, not that there are an unlimited number of them.

 

A point I'd like to make (before we go any further with this) is that when Ayn Rand wrote IOE, she was seeking a solution to the problem of universals, and with her concept theory she very nicely succeeded.  Proper nouns don't really exemplify universals, and I don't think that it's a death blow to the epistemology that words identifying specific entities are treated differently from words intended to denote concepts.  Nonetheless, it's a good point to bring up.

 

Nate





Post 192

Monday, January 3, 2005 - 4:08pmSanction this postReply
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Double post.  Damn.
(Edited by Nate T. on 1/03, 4:10pm)


Post 193

Tuesday, January 4, 2005 - 5:17pmSanction this postReply
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Nate: “Note that the existent Venus itself …is being subsumed under the concept "planet," not the term symbolizing it nor the concept of it in our minds. Otherwise the statement "Venus and the Morning Star are the same entity" would equate a speck of light in the sky with a concept in our heads!”

Hi Nate. I don’t quite follow this. In what way is the concept “planet” different from the concept “in our minds”. Since a concept is regarded as a “mental entity”, I’m not sure in what way it could exist other than in our minds. If you mean we should distinguish between concepts and their referents, I would agree.

As to how all this can be explained in terms of Rand’s theory of concepts, I don’t think you’ve offered anything more than a conventional explanation of the way that our knowledge changes. It doesn’t seem that proper names can be easily accommodated by the theory, nor axiomatic concepts for that matter.

On a side issue, one thing I’ve noticed is that few Objectivists seem to explicitly apply the theory in their arguments, as on this thread, which has focused on definitions, with appeal to the dictionary rather than the facts of reality. Doesn’t that say something about the feasibility of the theory?

Brendan


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Post 194

Tuesday, January 4, 2005 - 6:43pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Brendan,

 

I don’t quite follow this. In what way is the concept “planet” different from the concept “in our minds”. Since a concept is regarded as a “mental entity”, I’m not sure in what way it could exist other than in our minds. If you mean we should distinguish between concepts and their referents, I would agree.

Your objection seemed to be confusing the concept of the planet Venus and the planet itself, so I was trying to differentiate them-- sorry if it wasn't clear.  I am indeed just trying to distinguish the concept from the referent here.

As to how all this can be explained in terms of Rand’s theory of concepts, I don’t think you’ve offered anything more than a conventional explanation of the way that our knowledge changes. It doesn’t seem that proper names can be easily accommodated by the theory, nor axiomatic concepts for that matter.

"Proper concepts", as I've been calling them, aren't explained in terms of Rand's theory about concepts in the sense that they aren't exactly concepts-- they're still mental entities which are symbolized by words, and which subsume an existent, but they don't follow the formation rules that general concepts do since there's only one existent to distinguish, as you point out.  But I think I am justified (via Rand's epistemological razor) in associating them with concepts, since they share most of the important properties of concepts : they have the same genus as bona fide concepts, they refer to existents, are definite, are open-ended (in the sense of knowledge about the referent, anyway) and they are used in essentially the same way as normal concepts (i.e., you can say that 'all green things are visible' and you can say 'Brendan and Nate are visible'-- both do what they are supposed to do, which is convey information about referents).

As far as axiomatic concepts go, how do you figure that they can't be handled with Rand's concept theory?  I suppose you could regard existence as a proper noun (since there is only one), if that's what's bothering you.

On a side issue, one thing I’ve noticed is that few Objectivists seem to explicitly apply the theory in their arguments, as on this thread, which has focused on definitions, with appeal to the dictionary rather than the facts of reality. Doesn’t that say something about the feasibility of the theory?

Your sentence is ambiguous-- are you objecting to the fact that Objectivists tend to point to definitions instead of real examples, or are you objecting to the fact that Objectivists don't argue from their own theory, but instead rely on the dictionary to back them up?  Just in case, I'll answer these both, and hopefully you meant one of them.

For the former, I would hope that the dictionary does refer to the facts of reality.  I'll have no part of a dictionary that doesn't accurately represent the words it's supposed to be defining, and I can judge if the definition proposed in the dictionary is correct. 

For the latter, I can speak for myself and say that all of the epistemology I've argued on this thread has come from IOE (except maybe this last stuff about 'proper concepts', since Rand doesn't really talk about it much in IOE).  I don't feel bad about using a dictionary to help myself out here-- after all it wasn't Rand's job to come up with definitions; she merely told us what they are and how to come up with them.

Nate




Post 195

Thursday, January 6, 2005 - 1:37amSanction this postReply
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Nate: “"Proper concepts", as I've been calling them, aren't explained in terms of Rand's theory about concepts in the sense that they aren't exactly concepts…they don't follow the formation rules that general concepts do…”

That’s what I was referring to – the method of forming concepts. We agree that some apparent concepts cannot be formed by Rand’s method, yet in conveying information they nevertheless perform a cognitive function.

As for axiomatic concepts, Rand herself agrees that they cannot be formed by the requisite method, yet they too are claimed to convey some very important information. So there are some vital areas of epistemology that cannot be accounted for by Rand’s method.

…”are you objecting to the fact that Objectivists tend to point to definitions instead of real examples, or are you objecting to the fact that Objectivists don't argue from their own theory, but instead rely on the dictionary to back them up?”

Both, since this is one and the same issue. Take the case of “definite” and “open-ended” in previous posts to this thread. The dictionary definitions didn’t settle the debate, so the participants used the legitimate method of examples to argue their case.

Well and good, but I would have thought that a demonstration of the way in which these concepts are formed would have provided a powerful argument in favour of the Objectivist epistemology.

But I didn’t see any such demonstration. Rand provided a method for forming concepts, comprising: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Again, how would we form the concepts “definite” and “open-ended” using this method?

Brendan


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Post 196

Thursday, January 6, 2005 - 11:27amSanction this postReply
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But I didn’t see any such demonstration. Rand provided a method for forming concepts, comprising: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Again, how would we form the concepts “definite” and “open-ended” using this method?


That's easy if you've understood the book.

Keep also in mind that “open-ended” is given a special sense by AR and is an analogy to begin with.

Some of the critics of  IOE do not seem to have a first-hand grasp of it, and are trying to fit it into the established outlook. Remember that Ayn Rand is struggling to take philosophy to the next level.


Post 197

Thursday, January 6, 2005 - 6:01pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Brendan,

... I didn’t see any such demonstration. Rand provided a method for forming concepts, comprising: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Again, how would we form the concepts “definite” and “open-ended” using this method?

Well, first we'll do "definite."  The things you're examining in making this concept are "mental entities which subsume referents", or to put it more colloquially, "meaningful mental entities."  You note that there are many mental entities which refer to things, and moreover you know what they refer to; similarly, there are others whose referents you can't identify successfully (such as a word that you don't know the proper definition of and have to guess at its meaning through context, or a sub-concept of an existing concept you haven't yet successfully applied).  You mentally blend all of the former into a new mental entity and symbolize it with a word, "definite."  You top it all off with a definition: "A mental entity is 'definite' if you know to which existents it refers."

Next, "open-ended."  Here, you'll do the same as you did with "definite", except you'll distinguish those entities which subsume a fixed number of referents (including "proper concepts") from those which don't, blend the latter into a new mental entity and designate it by "open-ended."  Then you close with the definition: "A mental entity is 'open-ended' if it subsumes an unlimited number of referents."

As for why I didn't give an explicit example of this process, all of the main objectors told me that they read IOE, and there are plenty of examples in there.  As far as specifically detailing the cognitive process required to form the concepts "definite" and "open-ended", it's not necessary to go through the whole process to explain what the concept means-- after all, that's what definitions do.

Nate


Post 198

Saturday, January 8, 2005 - 5:01pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Nate. My apologies for the delay in replying. "Mental entities which subsume referents" and "meaningful mental entities" are very general terms, and trotting out the definition is insufficient as a demonstration, since the definition can be obtained from the dictionary. What I was looking for was a demonstration of the derivation of “definite” using Rand’s method: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word.

That would require choosing an example of a concept based on a real world object -- “table” would do -- and showing how we could derive the concept of “definite” from that example. The reason I ask is because Rand is a radical empiricist, who claims that all knowledge is derived from experience of the external world.

Given that claim, a concept such as “definite” must be ultimately grounded in the experience or observation of a real-world object. So let us see a demonstration of that.

While you are thinking about it, you may like to reconcile the following claims: 1) “A mental entity is 'definite' if you know to which existents it refers.” 2) “A mental entity is 'open-ended' if it subsumes an unlimited number of referents.”

You seem to be claiming knowledge not only of the objects that you can observe but also of those you cannot. What observations lead you to conclude that a mental entity can subsume an “unlimited number of referents?

Brendan


Post 199

Saturday, January 8, 2005 - 9:33pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Brendan,
My apologies for the delay in replying.
No problem-- I've been busy lately, so I've needed the extra time.
"Mental entities which subsume referents" and "meaningful mental entities" are very general terms, and trotting out the definition is insufficient as a demonstration, since the definition can be obtained from the dictionary.  What I was looking for was a demonstration of the derivation of “definite” using Rand’s method: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word.

That would require choosing an example of a concept based on a real world object -- “table” would do -- and showing how we could derive the concept of “definite” from that example.

Well, we don't really 'derive' concepts from examples, we take a group of existents that have something in common and regard them, mentally, as an abstract concept of which each such existent is a unit.  Of course, this is possible, simply by tracing through referents until you reach concepts whose referents are first-level.  First-level concepts are those with referents which are directly perceived, like the concept "table" you mention.

The reason I ask is because Rand is a radical empiricist, who claims that all knowledge is derived from experience of the external world.

Well, yes, but also you have logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) to help yourself along, too.  While it's true that the laws of logic are also derived from experience, but they become powerful tools in deriving truth in an abstract setting (such as mathematics, or epistemology).

Given that claim, a concept such as “definite” must be ultimately grounded in the experience or observation of a real-world object. So let us see a demonstration of that.

Okay.  Note that for most concepts, this would involve an extremely long chain of unpacking referents from concepts, but in this case I think I can do it in three levels of abstraction.

First, I'll find referents for "definite."  I'll do this from my own perspective.  By my last post, the concepts "red" and "green" are subsumed under "definite", since I can tell the difference between red and not red, green and not green.  You can find two red objects and two green objects from which to form these concepts, I trust.

The next part is what I differentiate "red" and "green" from.  This will be a mental entity which I do not know exactly to what in reality it refers.  Take, for example, Sartre's example of a "noughting-nought".  I have no idea to what this refers, but it's clear that Sartre meant something by it (or at least he thought so).  Therefore, as a mental entity, I can recognize "noughting-nought" without knowing exactly to what it refers (it's one of those anti-concepts).  As such it is indefinite, by the definition in my last post.  Moreover, this is a mental entity which is directly perceivable via introspection (and I first formed the 'idea', if you can call it that, by reading about it in Rand's IOE).

So there you go: two red objects, two green objects, and the anti-concept of "noughting-nought" that Sartre tried to delude people with can form the concept "definite".  Even though I gave you an example this time, don't expect me to go through this process for any word you claim, since it could get much more complicated than this.  This illustrates the point of why we have concepts in the first place-- without them we could never reach the levels of abstraction needed to understand this world, let alone to live in it.

While you are thinking about it, you may like to reconcile the following claims: 1) “A mental entity is 'definite' if you know to which existents it refers.” 2) “A mental entity is 'open-ended' if it subsumes an unlimited number of referents.”

You seem to be claiming knowledge not only of the objects that you can observe but also of those you cannot. What observations lead you to conclude that a mental entity can subsume an “unlimited number of referents?

No that's not what I'm saying-- how can I make an honest claim about something I haven't observed yet?  I'm merely saying by open-ended that the concept doesn't just refer to a fixed number of referents, and that another existent may come along which is a referent of the concept.  By definite, I mean that when I observe an existent, I can determine whether it is a referent of the concept or not, not that I somehow know all of the referents of a concept beforehand.

I suppose that the use of the term "unlimited" needs to be further explained here-- it doesn't necessarily mean infinite.  That was why I gave that example of tires to Daniel-- there are only a finite number of tires in the world at a given time, but you could always make a new one which could be correctly identified as a tire.

Nate





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