I'm not sure "I know one when I see one" counts as an very sound - or indeed, revolutionary - epistemological theory. In fact, like so much of the IOE, it merely begs the question, as does the whole contextual theory of knowledge, substituting a merely verbal solution for real one.

Now, according to this theory, we could say perfectly definitely that these were two different concepts - in the context of man's knowledge of the time, that is.

But we could also say - perfectly definitely, according to this theory - that the two stars were the *same* concept in the context of man's knowledge of a later time. And we could also say perfectly definitely that they *were not even stars*, but another concept - planet - entirely!

It becomes clear that saying the above contradictory statements are both "perfectly definite" is simply playing with words. Like Rand's use of "absolutely certain" or "absolute precision", it is a mere rhetorical flourish that solves nothing and only adds confusion.

PS: The proper noun issue is neither here nor there. We can learn more about stars, we can learn more about Alpha Centauri, what's the difference?

This is another good example of the very question-begging I'm talking about. How do we discover the concept "2"? Why, simply find any two things!

Who committed the crime? Why, the guilty man of course!

Three concepts all thought to be entirely separate all turn out to be the same basic phenomena (electromagnetism) - seen at different times of day, as it were...;-)

Contrary to the contextual theory of knowledge, where earlier concepts are never "invalidated" or "overthrown", all three original concepts have been clearly invalidated at the most fundamental level - starting with their *identities as separate concepts*!

Of course, I suppose one could argue as a last ditch that these concepts haven't been "invalidated" or overthrown, but mysteriously "subsumed" (!) but by this stage I think it is clear one would be merely playing with words.

A short while ago (post 172 to be precise) you were “puzzled” and “at a loss to describe how we are able to do it [refer to unique existents by proper names] cognitively”. Now you say it is true that the above expressions are valid and perfectly definite concepts.

At the time, you promised to check out IOE for a steer on this matter. Clearly, your new-found confidence in the validity and perfect definiteness of these concepts indicates that IOE has been a great help in this matter.

Since that appears to be the case, why not share your discovery, and show how you have derived these concepts via the requisite Objectivist method – object, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Similarly, with “perfect” and “definite”.

If you can then arrange these discoveries in the proper hierarchy, I think you could lay the matter to rest once and for all. Meanwhile, I’m off to the beach for a week or two. Happy Holidays.

Brendan

PS, while you’re at it: find two things; derive the concept; throw away the concept; find two things.

Sure, the term “Venus” refers to a single entity, but Venus is a planet and is therefore also subsumed under the general term. But it’s hard to see how "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" could also be so subsumed.

Well, a thing can be subsumed under more than one concept, of course, so there's no problem with "Venus" in that respect.  Note that the existent Venus itself (the literal planet in space), is being subsumed under the concept "planet," not the term symbolizing it nor the concept of it in our minds.  Otherwise the statement "Venus and the Morning Star are the same entity" would equate a speck of light in the sky with a concept in our heads!

As for the stars, the Morning Star and Evening Star were both once considered stars (under the more primitive definition of "star" that I gave Daniel above) which explains the terms.  We retain the terminology in certain contexts (like when we're just stargazing for fun, writing poetry or examining historical records), but we know now that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same planet, Venus.

Among other things, you are again conflating words and concepts.

Sorry about that: the phrase "the word refers to" is merely a shorthand way of saying: "the concept symbolized by the word in question refers to."  Anyway, to refer to a specific existent, you have to give it a name.  After you've done that, the concept (a mental representation) of that particular existent subsumes merely that existent itself.  Unlike more general concepts, concepts symbolized by proper names are open-ended only in the sense that you can learn more about them, not that there are an unlimited number of them.

A point I'd like to make (before we go any further with this) is that when Ayn Rand wrote IOE, she was seeking a solution to the problem of universals, and with her concept theory she very nicely succeeded.  Proper nouns don't really exemplify universals, and I don't think that it's a death blow to the epistemology that words identifying specific entities are treated differently from words intended to denote concepts.  Nonetheless, it's a good point to bring up.

Nate

Hi Nate. I don’t quite follow this. In what way is the concept “planet” different from the concept “in our minds”. Since a concept is regarded as a “mental entity”, I’m not sure in what way it could exist other than in our minds. If you mean we should distinguish between concepts and their referents, I would agree.

As to how all this can be explained in terms of Rand’s theory of concepts, I don’t think you’ve offered anything more than a conventional explanation of the way that our knowledge changes. It doesn’t seem that proper names can be easily accommodated by the theory, nor axiomatic concepts for that matter.

On a side issue, one thing I’ve noticed is that few Objectivists seem to explicitly apply the theory in their arguments, as on this thread, which has focused on definitions, with appeal to the dictionary rather than the facts of reality. Doesn’t that say something about the feasibility of the theory?

Brendan

That’s what I was referring to – the method of forming concepts. We agree that some apparent concepts cannot be formed by Rand’s method, yet in conveying information they nevertheless perform a cognitive function.

As for axiomatic concepts, Rand herself agrees that they cannot be formed by the requisite method, yet they too are claimed to convey some very important information. So there are some vital areas of epistemology that cannot be accounted for by Rand’s method.

…”are you objecting to the fact that Objectivists tend to point to definitions instead of real examples, or are you objecting to the fact that Objectivists don't argue from their own theory, but instead rely on the dictionary to back them up?”

Both, since this is one and the same issue. Take the case of “definite” and “open-ended” in previous posts to this thread. The dictionary definitions didn’t settle the debate, so the participants used the legitimate method of examples to argue their case.

Well and good, but I would have thought that a demonstration of the way in which these concepts are formed would have provided a powerful argument in favour of the Objectivist epistemology.

But I didn’t see any such demonstration. Rand provided a method for forming concepts, comprising: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Again, how would we form the concepts “definite” and “open-ended” using this method?

Brendan

Hi Brendan,

... I didn’t see any such demonstration. Rand provided a method for forming concepts, comprising: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word. Again, how would we form the concepts “definite” and “open-ended” using this method?

Well, first we'll do "definite."  The things you're examining in making this concept are "mental entities which subsume referents", or to put it more colloquially, "meaningful mental entities."  You note that there are many mental entities which refer to things, and moreover you know what they refer to; similarly, there are others whose referents you can't identify successfully (such as a word that you don't know the proper definition of and have to guess at its meaning through context, or a sub-concept of an existing concept you haven't yet successfully applied).  You mentally blend all of the former into a new mental entity and symbolize it with a word, "definite."  You top it all off with a definition: "A mental entity is 'definite' if you know to which existents it refers."

Next, "open-ended."  Here, you'll do the same as you did with "definite", except you'll distinguish those entities which subsume a fixed number of referents (including "proper concepts") from those which don't, blend the latter into a new mental entity and designate it by "open-ended."  Then you close with the definition: "A mental entity is 'open-ended' if it subsumes an unlimited number of referents."

As for why I didn't give an explicit example of this process, all of the main objectors told me that they read IOE, and there are plenty of examples in there.  As far as specifically detailing the cognitive process required to form the concepts "definite" and "open-ended", it's not necessary to go through the whole process to explain what the concept means-- after all, that's what definitions do.

Nate

My apologies for the delay in replying.

"Mental entities which subsume referents" and "meaningful mental entities" are very general terms, and trotting out the definition is insufficient as a demonstration, since the definition can be obtained from the dictionary.  What I was looking for was a demonstration of the derivation of “definite” using Rand’s method: percept, differentiation, similarity, unit, definition, word.

That would require choosing an example of a concept based on a real world object -- “table” would do -- and showing how we could derive the concept of “definite” from that example.

Well, we don't really 'derive' concepts from examples, we take a group of existents that have something in common and regard them, mentally, as an abstract concept of which each such existent is a unit.  Of course, this is possible, simply by tracing through referents until you reach concepts whose referents are first-level.  First-level concepts are those with referents which are directly perceived, like the concept "table" you mention.

The reason I ask is because Rand is a radical empiricist, who claims that all knowledge is derived from experience of the external world.

Well, yes, but also you have logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) to help yourself along, too.  While it's true that the laws of logic are also derived from experience, but they become powerful tools in deriving truth in an abstract setting (such as mathematics, or epistemology).

Given that claim, a concept such as “definite” must be ultimately grounded in the experience or observation of a real-world object. So let us see a demonstration of that.

Okay.  Note that for most concepts, this would involve an extremely long chain of unpacking referents from concepts, but in this case I think I can do it in three levels of abstraction.

First, I'll find referents for "definite."  I'll do this from my own perspective.  By my last post, the concepts "red" and "green" are subsumed under "definite", since I can tell the difference between red and not red, green and not green.  You can find two red objects and two green objects from which to form these concepts, I trust.

The next part is what I differentiate "red" and "green" from.  This will be a mental entity which I do not know exactly to what in reality it refers.  Take, for example, Sartre's example of a "noughting-nought".  I have no idea to what this refers, but it's clear that Sartre meant something by it (or at least he thought so).  Therefore, as a mental entity, I can recognize "noughting-nought" without knowing exactly to what it refers (it's one of those anti-concepts).  As such it is indefinite, by the definition in my last post.  Moreover, this is a mental entity which is directly perceivable via introspection (and I first formed the 'idea', if you can call it that, by reading about it in Rand's IOE).

So there you go: two red objects, two green objects, and the anti-concept of "noughting-nought" that Sartre tried to delude people with can form the concept "definite".  Even though I gave you an example this time, don't expect me to go through this process for any word you claim, since it could get much more complicated than this.  This illustrates the point of why we have concepts in the first place-- without them we could never reach the levels of abstraction needed to understand this world, let alone to live in it.

While you are thinking about it, you may like to reconcile the following claims: 1) “A mental entity is 'definite' if you know to which existents it refers.” 2) “A mental entity is 'open-ended' if it subsumes an unlimited number of referents.”

You seem to be claiming knowledge not only of the objects that you can observe but also of those you cannot. What observations lead you to conclude that a mental entity can subsume an “unlimited number of referents?

No that's not what I'm saying-- how can I make an honest claim about something I haven't observed yet?  I'm merely saying by open-ended that the concept doesn't just refer to a fixed number of referents, and that another existent may come along which is a referent of the concept.  By definite, I mean that when I observe an existent, I can determine whether it is a referent of the concept or not, not that I somehow know all of the referents of a concept beforehand.

I suppose that the use of the term "unlimited" needs to be further explained here-- it doesn't necessarily mean infinite.  That was why I gave that example of tires to Daniel-- there are only a finite number of tires in the world at a given time, but you could always make a new one which could be correctly identified as a tire.

Nate