| | Hoy Jennifer,-
If one is devoted to life as the ultimate categorical imperative then self-termination is the ultimate malfunction to end all malfunctions. Nothing could be worse. There are no amoral agents, only immoral ones.
Lindsay's point is that Peikoff's argument defending that reaction doesn't work. Sure, we can understand his reaction, but is it consistent with Objectivism?
I don't mean to explain Peikoff's argument but to defend it. That one is beyond morality's perview does not absolve him of moral judgement. Man is an ethical being by metaphysical edict, choose as he might to be amoral.
An amoral agent is the most immoral of agents. Could there be anyone more gone to hell than one who rejects life qua life? Men are subject to moral judgement even if they refuse to admit it. So Peikoff is right.
But, if we say that life is the standard of value, then there is no standard for valuing life, as that would make the argument circular Yes. And unless you're the sort of person who can tolerate such nonsense (I am not) you need for life to be an end in itself. Being alive is its own reason that one ought to be alive. One has a duty to be what one is- this is not a disposition to be achieved passively but one we must consciously accept and submit to by choice.
Even to say "I value life" would be an odd version of concept-stealing. I wouldn't say that because I don't believe in amoral choices. The choice to submit to one's duty (duty: to fulfil one's function and live) is prior to morality but must never the less be evaluated in moral terms. No other framework can exist for evaluating man's choices, there is never anything amoral about man's business. So the language of 'value' is not out of place at all.
like the Nike logo. It's just honey-talk.
Eventually, ideas have to point to experience outside of themselves. Some questions inherently have gut-level, experiential answers. (What's your favorite ice cream flavor? Who's the love of your life?) Otherwise words and ideas would be floating abstractions, ideas referring to other ideas ad nauseam. We can still reason about those experiential reactions as we do any other aspect of reality, but we can't dismiss them as outside the realm of the intellect without making the intellect irrelevant to our experience. I don't agree. I think there is a unity of values and ideas and feelings, a mappable hierarchy that is always relivent to our own experience. Furthermore, I say that Objectivists should be able to explicate all of their values, ideas and feelings from ice cream choices to romantic choices and I claim to be able to do it.
If it were otherwise your objection might stand.
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