A Pre-emptive Dialectic (to weed out the weaker objections)

Mr. Barnes,

"For any knowledge our primitive scientist might hope to gain from his guesses and experiments would be, from the Aristotelian perspective, hopelessly flawed from the outset. Why? Because, as far more knowledgeable philosophers might have informed our poor caveman, he should really have focussed his energies on first establishing the correct definition of 'stick'..."

Actually Mr. Barnes, if our caveman recognizes the utility of "A is A," then he will know the stick is what it is - and it will be what it is, later on. Within this objective context, he is free to experiment on it and when he has acquired more knowledge, he can use this knowledge to update his original crude definition of it (capturing proper facts related to its identity). Indeed, identity is the very reason why science works.

On this view, Aristotle appears to be father of both logic and science - 2 things that have been more than a little beneficial to the welfare of mankind.

Ed

Post 21

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 8:45am

Ed, Brendan, Daniel B, Rodney, Daniel O.,

The following are some notes form my ontology which I have modified for this thread. I am mostly curious about your thoughts about the pertinence of these ideas to the present discussion.

In classical logic, the manner or way in which something exists is called a thing's mode of existence. The importance of modes of existence is context. The importance of context to logic cannot be over-estimated. Ignoring this essential principle has produced whole schools of logic which are completely mistaken, such as logical positivism and linguistic analysis.

Arguments like, "A is A is doubtful because a stick inserted in water looks bent; therefore, if A is the percept of a straight stick, A is not always the same, or not always A," is possible only by dropping the context. Nothing exists independently of its context. There is no such thing as just a straight stick. A "straight stick in the air, " is not a "straight stick in the water." A stick is also not its appearance. A stick is a stick, but its appearance is only one aspect of the stick, and that aspect is conditional on the stick's, "context."

So, a stick's appearance (A) is a stick's appearance (A), but since a stick's appearance is contextual, the phrase, "a stick's appearance," implies (and would be better stated), "all other relationships being the same, a stick's appearance is a stick's appearance."

[NOTE: The question of whether A is A adds anything to human knowledge is another example of context dropping. A is A, like 2+2=4, does not add anything to our knowledge of the material world, they are not metaphysical concepts. They are actually an expression of knowledge we already have about the world, put into a form that makes them useful.

We are indebted to Ayn Rand for making the fact disciplines like logic and mathematics are methods, not research, and as methods they tell us nothing in themselves except about how that method works. It is only if we apply the methods to actual facts of existence that the validity and utility of the methods can be established and any new knowledge can be discovered. Logic and mathematics are real knowledge, just as the alphabet is real knowledge; but, they are knowledge about a human creation not independent ontological existents.

Logic and mathematics are correct methods; they, "work," because the world and our minds have specific natures, both of which must be discovered first, before those correct methods can be explicitly and formally developed.]

Regi

Post 22

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 9:46am

Regi,

I like it! Especially the following part about the pivotal relation between method and discovery ...

It is only if we apply the methods to actual facts of existence that the validity and utility of the methods can be established and any new knowledge can be discovered.

With this single sentence, you have satisfactorily explained how and why it is that I can "know what I know" - and why I don't already "know more than I know" - and what it would take for me to come to "know more than I now know!" And all knowledge (science included) stands or falls with the acceptance of this profound insight.

Ed

Post 23

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 5:26am

Ed: �I'll admit that there was a time - decades ago - when I was lacking a clear and adequate understanding of Reality. I will pander to your concern here and replace "man" with "me" ... primitive "me"�.

I do beg your pardon. I thought you were referring to Rand�s �savages� etc.

�One possible predicate to choose would be: "is bent" (the stick "is bent" when it is under water)� Another possible predicate to choose would be: "appears bent" (the stick "appears bent" when it is under water)�How do we choose between these? When faced with this choice, does "A is A" now have import (as an intellectual "guardrail" leading us to the truth of the matter)?

Ed, you seem to be saying that we should use �A is A� as a foundational concept in order that we can choose between your alternatives. But of course this merely begs the question. You need to establish the truth of A=A in order to distinguish between �is bent� and �appears bent�.

Brendan

Post 24

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 12:16pm

For my reasons stated above, I can only speak at this time of my initial impressions, and mine are that no one has here explained the Law of Identity completely properly. I most profoundly disagree with both Mr. Barnes and Mr. Geddes about that law, but I am afraid I also would take issue with some aspects at least of all its defenders' arguments here.

This is not to say that it's all valueless. I believe that deep down there is an understanding of the law in most Objectivists. There is merely the problem of putting it into words, since identity, being axiomatic, cannot be defined in terms of any other concepts.

(By the way, one of the two editorial projects preventing me from participating in this and other threads is called, ironically, Baye/Zandi after the book's two authors--or "BayeZ and I"! The other project is called Fulton/Blaney--"full of a ton of blarney." This could apply to whatever side of the debate one disagrees with, of course. In my case, I obviously do not think it is I; but I don�t think it is poor Bayes either--just those who have "epistemologized" him.)

(I can never resist such word games--but I have an advantage in that I always know when that is what they are.)

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 6/16, 3:15pm)

Post 25

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 2:11pm

Brendan,

Remember, I reconciled the spurious doubts that have been feebily debated back and forth regarding truth values (in post 19). Do you have another source of concern for me to reconcile my views with? Please provide another source of concern if you have one.

Here's another example to aid in grasping the relations of the facts of this issue:

When describing some brown bears, we may call them "brownish bears" but not "bearish browns." The reason that we use the one and not the other is linked to the identity of the creatures in question. Their genus (rather than the color of their fur) is the more fundamental of these 2 things in capturing their identity.

Using A = A here, we note that bears are bears, whether brown, black, white, etc. Brendan, with this second example of the logic of the process, do you see the importance of A = A (identity)?

Ed

Post 26

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 2:12pm

Hi Ed, et al down here in Dissenter's Alley...;-)

A little more on "A=A" in a moment. For the meantime, though, do you agree that the above criticism of Aristotle's theory of definition (ie: if it is applied consistently it must logically lead to an infinite regress) is correct? If not, how is it wrong?

(After all, Aristotle is certainly the father of logic. But that does not mean his own logic was always correct)

- Daniel

Post 27

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 5:33pm

Ed,

Very good article and comments.

I wanted to quibble at one technical detail of the Aristotelian's presentation though. While demanding that the partial note contain more than 50% of the material of the original note to be accepted is (in practical terms) a necessary condition to prevent fraud, it is not a sufficient one. It is necessary to demand that the serial numbers printed on opposite ends of the bill be intact and that they match.

What the Aristotelian actually claimed, that allowing 50% or less of a note to be accepted as a note would lead to a bankrupt system, is true as a practical rule of thumb in today's society but is not strictly true in principle. It is not true, for example, of a hypothetical society in which knowledge of the serial number requirement is universal.

(Dodging tomatoes thrown by the defenders of reason.) I hope the non-Objectivists here do not seize on my caveat to promote their own unfortunate fallacies, and that this comment does not thereby make your life more difficult.

-Bill

Post 28

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 7:53pm

Bill,

Thanks! And thanks for keeping me honest! You've made 2 clinching statements:

1) A formal rule is already [formerly "in place" - edited to say "an alternative non-geometric solution"] (serial number rule)

2) These serial numbers are placed at both ends and (and this is the clincher!) they take up LESS THAN HALF of the dollar's length

I can't believe this is happening! Not here, not now, not when it started out as such a beautiful treatise!

I'm now forced to appeal to the dreaded counter-factual in the effort to preserve my argument's logical validity - down with these dreaded identifiers of uniqueness!

This is actually quite a predicament for me, as I am being led into a logical-empirical dichotomy here (on the Dissent thread as well!). Could you even think of something more ironic? Bill, are you taking pleasure in picturing me typing with a foot in my mouth? :-/

Bill, email would've been fine on this one ... really! ;-)

Seriously though, thanks for taking enough interest to spur a critique (I'll accept my increase in wisdom here with integrity)

Ed-itor's note: Notice how more appropriately wording the actual dilemma (which is really only a potential dilemma, not an actual one!) preserves the validity of the original argument. In short, banks aren't UTILIZING the serial number rule to turn away torn dollars. This makes the rest of my post here mere inconsequential entertainment.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/15, 6:42am)

Post 29

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 8:33pm

Daniel B.,

It is my understanding that the meaningfulness of words was first validated with Aristotle's informal proof of the principle of non-contradiction (paraphrased below):

1) Think of a word, such as "moral"

2) Tentatively admit that the word means something

3) As soon as you do, you have implicitly denied or excluded its contradictory "non-moral" (or in another sense or mode "not being moral")

4) For anything to mean something, it opposite must be excluded

5) So, the principle of non-contradiction is necessary for the meaningfulness of words

Regarding definitions, Aristotle (being a Realist), thought that real essences were in objects - an inherent essence; without which, things would not be what they are.

As far as the process by which he went about tallying up all these essences, well that is not well understood by me at my current level of study. I think he's guilty of mixing intuitive leaps in with otherwise objective reasoning. Anybody else want to comment?

Daniel, what you seem to be saying though is that either EVERYTHING would have to be defined ostensibly ("Wittgenstein's baptism?") or infinite regress occurs. This seems to be an overall "linguistic analyst" criticism of language formation however, not something specific to Aristotle. Maybe you could give a source for your position here?

Ed

Post 30

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 8:35pm

Earlier, Ed wrote:
> I declare that I know the rules that will work and the rules that will fail, before even running an experiment and using further perception - ie. with no new, special empirical knowledge...I can still make the correct prediction with 100% certainty.

only to discover:
Bill:
>What the Aristotelian actually claimed, that allowing 50% or less of a note to be accepted as a note would lead to a bankrupt system, is true as a practical rule of thumb in today's society but is not strictly true in principle.

Ed:
>I can't believe this is happening! Not here, not now, not when it started out as such a beautiful treatise!

Not that I'm keeping score here in the old "100% certainty " stakes, but doesn't that make it 1-0 to Marc G?

(not that I agree with MG's Bayesian approach by any means ;-) The issue is simply that humans are fallible.)

- Daniel

Post 31

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 11:10pm

That is exactly my point. The truth of A is A is not dependent on your degree of rational conviction.

Regi,

Of course propositions are absolutely true or false independently of ones degree of rational conviction. This is the very meaning of objective reality. I saw your point easily enough, but failed to see what relevance it has to the Bayesian versus Aristotelian argument.

Let's assume A is A is true, absolutely. If you are not convinced A is A is true absolutely, there must be something about the proposition that you do not know, because if you knew it, you would be 100% convinced. The reason for your doubt is ignorance about some aspect of A is A. If you say, even if you knew everything there was to know about A is A, you would still not be certain, your meaning of certainty is irrational. To doubt, there must be a reason.

I accept this.

You may doubt that you really know everything there is to know about A is A, but you are in no position to assume no one else does. Someone who takes the position that they cannot know anything with 100% certainty, cannot be certain about what anyone else does or does not know.

The fact that I cannot be certain is quite irrelevant. Of course a Bayesian has to doubt his own arguments. This in no way invalidates them, since the Bayesian doubts the arguments of his opponents also. The degree of rational conviction about the correctness of his own argument won't be the same as the degree of rational conviction about the correctness of his opponents argument. Just because there are doubts about all arguments does not mean that all arguments are equal (that would be post-modernism not rationality!) One argument will usually be more likely than the other, and this is the one that the Bayesian can rationally go with.

I am willing to accept your argument that you cannot know anything with absolute certainty, including that you do not know that no one else knows anything with absolute certainty.

You can say you are not certain about anything, but if you say I cannot be certain either, you have to doubt what you said.

Regi

Ah, but I do think that I know that no one else knows anything with absolute certainty.

In the thread 'Reason is an absolute' I gave a general argument explaining why I think that NO ONE can know with certainty that they know everything there is to know about something. (Read carefully what I said about defining a context).

Of course I have doubts about my own argument, but this is quite irrelevant, since as I explained above, doubt about the argument does not invalidate it.

Post 32

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 11:30pm

Rodney said:

For my reasons stated above, I can only speak at this time of my initial impressions, and mine are that no one has here explained the Law of Identity completely properly. I most profoundly disagree with both Mr. Barnes and Mr. Geddes about that law, but I am afraid I also would take issue with some aspects at least of all its defenders' arguments here.

*Marc chuckles and claps his hand with glee*

You see that when asked to explain exactly what the law of identity actually is, each person has a slightly different interpretation. So 'A is A' is not so certain after all it seems ;)

I think that in so far as something is certain it is meaningless. Any meaningful proposition unavoidably involves some degree of uncertainty.

'A IS A' is almost, but not quite, meaningless. I'm prepared to admit that there is some content to it. But only a tiny amount. In so far as there is genuine content, uncertainty will always sneak in, since any attempt to explain this content will appeal to empirical understanding.

My interpretation of the law of identity is that its a sort of mapping between an entity and the description of that entity. Hence the word 'is'. To say that an entity has identity is to say that it can't be everything at once. It is limited in some ways which can be grasped through reason.

The uncertainty sneaks in through this word: 'IS'.

'A IS A', but are you 100% sure you know everything there is to know about the term 'IS'? ;) As Bertrand Russell said about the proposition '2+2=4�;

"You are quit right, except in marginal cases - and it is only in marginal cases that you are doubtful whether a certain animal is a dog or certain length is less than a meter. Two must be two of something, and the proposition '2 and 2 are 4' is useless it can be applied. Two dogs and two dogs are certainly four dogs, but cases arise in which you are doubtful whether two of them are dogs. 'Well, at any rate there are four animals,' you may say. But there are microorganisms concerning which it is doubtful whether they are animals or plants. 'Well, then living organisms,' you say. But there are things of which it is doubtful whether they are living organisms or not. You will be driven into stating: 'Two entities and two entities are four entities.' When you have told me what you mean by 'entity', we will resume the argument."

Regi said:

Logic and mathematics are real knowledge, just as the alphabet is real knowledge; but, they are knowledge about a human creation not independent ontological existents.

No, no, no, no, no, no! This is the analytic/synthetic distinction! Logic and mathematics are not knowledge about human creations. Human creations are not objective and hence not knowledge at all! Rand herself proved it.

If we reject the analytic/synethetic distinction (as Rand did) we have to admit that in so far as logic and mathematics are knowledge at all, they have to be knowledge about actual independent ontological existents. Any such knowledge is empirical in nature and hence involves uncertainty in exactly the same way that knowledge about concrete physical objects does.

Any piece of logic that has content is actually an empirical hypothesis. So in so far as 'A is A' has content, it is actually an axiom with empirical content.

Good brief intro to Bayes though Ed. I need to think about what you said there.

(Edited by Marc Geddes on 6/15, 12:32am)

Post 33

Monday, June 14, 2004 - 9:56pm

Ed: �When describing some brown bears, we may call them "brownish bears" but not "bearish browns." The reason that we use the one and not the other is linked to the identity of the creatures in question.�

The colour of bears is a matter of predication, not identity. In another context, such as a colour chart, �bearish browns� would be a legitimate statement, where �bearishness� would be a predicate of �brown-ness�. On its own, A = A cannot distinguish between contexts, as in the bent-stick example, where both straightness and bentness are consistent with A=A. In which case, the identity principle is insufficient to establish your conclusion. When it comes to the external world, one must import some additional information in order to get A = A off the ground.

If I understand him correctly, Daniel Barnes is making the same point in a different way: that Aristotle's theory of definition, if applied consistently, leads to an infinite regress, because all definitions rest on some additional understanding, ad infinitum.

Another way to approach this issue is to refer to Regi�s post 21, where he states: �Nothing exists independently of its context. There is no such thing as just a straight stick. A "straight stick in the air, " is not a "straight stick in the water." A stick is also not its appearance.�

I�m aware that Regi has some issues with Rand�s account of perception, but in the above he has apparently made a distinction between appearance and reality, which takes us back to Kant�s distinction between things as they are and things as they appear to us. I would assume that at this point Objectivists would cry �Context�, but whichever way one views it, Context invariably boils down to �Appearance�, or similar, which again takes us back to Kant.

Brendan

Post 34

Tuesday, June 15, 2004 - 5:15am

Brendan, Ed,

I think you are misunderstand the meaning of what I said, Brendan. I will take the blame for that. But I think I must explain simply because it would not be quite fair to Ed to allow you to use my post as a "stick," bent or otherwise, with which you give Ed an intellectual beating. I will not be complicit in your crime. ;>)

Another way to approach this issue is to refer to Regi�s post 21, where he states: �Nothing exists independently of its context. There is no such thing as just a straight stick. A "straight stick in the air, " is not a "straight stick in the water." A stick is also not its appearance.�

This, "...he has apparently made a distinction between appearance and reality, which takes us back to Kant�s distinction between things as they are and things as they appear to us," is the essence of the mistake you make. By, "appearance," I mean our perception of a thing, which is an absolutely faithful conscious apprehension of that thing in its exact context at the moment it is being perceived. This is the opposite of Kant's view that perception is some creation of the mind that only 'represents' the thing being perceived.

Our direct consciousness of a thing and the thing itself, of course, are not the same thing, obviously. My meaning of "appearance" is only "the direct consciousness of a thing at the moment it is perceived, exactly as it is."

The "appearance" of a thing, if it is to be a faithful apprehension, must change as a thing's context changes, because a things identity is all of its qualities and attributes, including its relationships to other things. It is a things own nature that determines what relationships are possible to it and what its actual relationships are. If our perception of a thing did not reflect a thing's actual state, (is it in bright light or dim? is it near or far from us? are we "seeing" it or "feeling it?") including its relationships to us, the perceivers, it would not be a faithful or accurate perception.

If our perception of a thing remained the same, whatever a thing's context was, that perception would be only "similar" to the thing as it actually is; It is the fact that perception includes the context of a thing that makes the "appearance" absolutely correct. It means, our perception of a thing, that is, its "appearance" is of a thing as it actually is, determined by its exact nature in its exact context, and that appearance is determined by that things exact identity. If it had any other identity, in that same context, it would not appear as it does.

By the way, my, "issues with Rand�s account of perception," are that she inadvertently "let in," the Kantian mistake that makes perception of entities the result of some undefined process of sensory data, something that lies between the source of sensory data and conscious perception. She describes percepts as "creations" produced by some integrating process is carried on by either the brain or neurological system.

I have submitted an article, called, "Perception," that will be posted sometime on SOLO addressing this shortcoming of Objectivism, and providing an almost ridiculously simple solution. My view is more "Randian," than Ayn Rand's, that is, my view makes perception unquestionably reliable, which I do not think Rand's explanation, (or Peikoff's or Kelley's) does.

Regi

Post 35

Tuesday, June 15, 2004 - 4:28pm

Ed wrote:
>Regarding definitions, Aristotle (being a Realist), thought that real
essences were in objects - an inherent essence; without which,
things would not be what they are.

Yes. It's kind of Plato-lite.

>As far as the process by which Aristotle went about tallying up all these essences, well that is not well understood by me at my current level of study.

Ah. Well, I suggest you take a serious look at it, as Ayn Rand based her entire epistemology on Aristotle's "essentialist" theory of definitions. I'll do a quick fly-over of the problem here. My apologies in advance for inevitable errors of omission or compression.

Firstly, it's not clear that Aristotle actually understood the problem Plato was trying to solve with his version of Realism, which was the problem of universals, or simply "why are individual things similar?" Influenced by the discovery of abstract geometry, and understandably impressed by its perfection compared with real objects, Plato hypothesised that there was a primary world of perfect "forms" of which real objects were merely rough copies, thus explaining similarities between, say, horses, which were nonetheless individually different.

As Plato's pupil, Aristotle tried to introduce his own twist to his master's original idea. Instead of having the "forms" exist in some mysterious other world, he proposed that they existed - equally mysteriously - *inside* the objects themselves, like a kind of seed. This seed is the object's "essence", a kind of inherent identity which the object must behave in accordance with, and move toward as an ultimate aim or end. As you can see, this is basically Plato in reverse, with the "forms" on the inside rather than the outside, and representing the *ends* rather than the beginnings of
the objects. Sadly, you will also note that this original twist unfortunately defeats the original purpose of the exercise: for, if the "essences" are inherent in things, why should there not be as many essences as there are things? Doh! So the problem of similarities remained unsolved by Aristotle's theory.

Because he placed his "essences" inside natural things, he taught that one should partly rely on the senses (eg:through observation) to discover their nature. But ultimately he held their nature could *not* be wholly apprehended this way, but, a la Plato, had to be ultimately grasped by intellectual intuition, or the 'mind's eye' : ("We can know a thing only by knowing its essence"). These "essences' are captured by verbal *definitions*, which in turn form the basic premises of all proofs.

Now, Aristotle realised that one cannot demonstrate the truth of all statements, otherwise this would lead to an infinite regress - hence the "axiomatic" statements like A=A that we 'intuit' the truth of with our 'mind's eye'. But, as with the problem of universals, he missed the key point: that this is true of *definitions* too. For every definition requires an additional term, or they are meaningless tautologies. Yet every additional term requires an additional definition...Doh! again! Hence the starting challenge of the Aristotelian method, "define your terms!" turns out to be, if applied consistently, an infinite one. It simply does not work as advertised: Instead of creating incredibly precise arguments, the focus on making terms ever more precise does *exactly the reverse*; making them either tautological, or involving an infinitely longwinded series of preliminaries making it impossible for the argument to get started! (Karl Popper compared Aristotelian arguments to eternally sharpening your pencil and never actually getting around to writing anything). And of course, changing the aim of this method from "essences" to "concepts", as Rand does, does not change the problem at all, which lies *in the method itself*.

Aristotle's methodological influence is the reason why most philosophic schools have a tendency towards tautological argument; and the stronger the influence, the stronger the tendency. After all, if the truth of your arguments depends on the truth of your definitions, one must be logically compelled to make these definitions as true as possible: which, sadly ends up in them being as tautological as possible! And so discussion becomes quickly bogged down.

The interesting thing is to contrast this "essentialist" method with the method of science, in which little depends on definitions, and much depends on the *proposals* offered. In other words, the scientific approach is to propose a theory (eg:"A stick doesn't actually bend in water, but only appears to") and perhaps construct a number of tests of that theory. As little rests on them, the definitions need only be *rough*: a stick of such-and such a size or thickness perhaps or water of a certain temperature if more detail is required.

Whereas the essentialist Aristotelian approach is "First precisely define stick!" (and then "water", and then "bend", blah blah). These logically insurmountable obstacles (and the subsequent fallback to "first premises") are why easily testable Aristotelian fallacies, such as the speed of falling bodies of different weights, went unchallenged for centuries - especially by true-blue Aristotelians like the Scholastics. For it seems that while Aristotle's enthusiasm for science and nature is certainly responsible for unleashing periodic floods of similar enthusiasm, unfortunately his actual *method* clogs them quickly up again. And one can only compare progress in philosophy, where his and Plato's methods have dominated, to progress in science, where they have not, to see the difference.

Anyway, I hope this quick treatment gives you some idea of the problem, which I believe is fatal for Aristotle's method. My sources for these arguments are from Karl Popper's chapter "The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism" from his classic "The Open Society And Its Enemies", where he puts it all far better than I have here.

>Daniel, what you seem to be saying though is that either EVERYTHING would have to be defined ostensibly ("Wittgenstein's baptism?") or infinite regress occurs. This seems to be an overall "linguistic analyst" criticism of language formation however, not something specific to Aristotle.

Actually, it's quite the opposite! Popper's argument against Aristotle's method traces its influence all the way up to Wittgenstein and "linguistic analysis". Because "linguistic analysis" is basically the idea that there are no real problems, only *arguments about words*!!

- Daniel

Post 36

Wednesday, June 16, 2004 - 3:31pm

Brendan writes:
>If I understand him correctly, Daniel Barnes is making the same point in a different way: that Aristotle's theory of definition, if applied consistently, leads to an infinite regress, because all definitions rest on some additional understanding, ad infinitum.

Yep. Basically, Aristotle's method is founded on a logical error. He got it right regarding statements, but simply forgot that this applies to definitions too.

So it turns out that with this problem, Aristotle's allegedly unsinkable method meets its iceberg. No doubt the band will play on for some time yet, however...;-)

- Daniel

Post 37

Thursday, June 17, 2004 - 12:19pm

Daniel B., you said:

"For every definition requires an additional term, or they are meaningless tautologies."

and

"And of course, changing the aim of this method from 'essences' to 'concepts', as Rand does, does not change the problem at all, which lies *in the method itself*."

Daniel, you are looking at the relation between different definitions as if it were something that is qualitative (requires qualifiers), and not quantitative (requires a standard unit - which can be defined ostensively). You currently seem to have an insufficient understanding of objective concept formation.

An objective method of concept formation employs our ability to grasp concretes as things which are reducible to a common unit. We can do this WITHOUT antecedent concepts (words). Here is a catchy illustration of the beginning of the process:

When first defining "foot-long hotdogs," one method would be to quickly make an intuitive leap and argue that it means "panting poodles!" I believe that this is the process you are attacking when you attack Aristotle's methods as something requiring intuition - lacking objectivity in the assignment of "essences."

An objective method, however, would proceed differently. Let's take the first term first "foot-long." In regard to length, we know what a "foot" is, because we've seen one (it is an immediately perceptible unit; we can apply it without any appeal to other words). We can directly relate concretes to this unit to determine OBJECTIVELY whether a given concrete is to be excluded from the definition (by failing to correspond to the unit "foot").

Daniel, do you see where this is going (we will end with objectively formed definitions that are BOTH successfully differentiated AND refer to the facts of reality? Do you see how "every definition" DOES NOT require "an additional term?" Do you see how "changing the aim of this method from 'essences' to 'concepts', as Rand does," DOES "change the problem?"

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/17, 12:22pm)

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/17, 12:24pm)

Post 38

Thursday, June 17, 2004 - 2:34pm

Ed writes:
>When first defining "foot-long hotdogs"...Let's take the first term first "foot-long."...In regard to length, we know what a "foot" is, because we've seen one (it is an immediately perceptible unit; we can apply it without any appeal to other words)...Daniel, do you see where this is going...?

Yes, I know exactly where this is going, and I think I can show you. Because, funnily enough...I can do that too with "dog" as well, *because I've seen one* - and it was "immediately perceptible " too, so I can now apply it without any appeal to other words. Do you think the dog I saw was somehow less "perceptible" than your "foot"? How? Same with "long", as I've seen something long too, and it was immediately perceptible as being such. And with "hot". And so on...

So you can see that your suggestion - simply, if you see something, any definition is unnecessary - is not a solution, but a basic error. In fact it rather misses the point of the whole problem. For, if your suggestion held true, we'd have no need for *any definitions* at all! As a matter of fact, "foot" does have a definition (several, in fact) to appeal to. You will find this fact immediately perceptible in your nearest dictionary...;-)

- Daniel

Post 39

Thursday, June 17, 2004 - 7:14pm