A Pre-emptive Dialectic (to weed out the weaker objections)

My comments above only pertained to Regi's statements here, of course. I have requested and received a copy of his essay on perception, but cannot get to it right away. I keep an open mind in the meantime.

Post 121

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 10:35am

Rodney,

I would note here that AR, to my knowledge, only used the term "universals" because that was the accepted label for the issues involved. She never used it otherwise, except loosely perhaps, and her theory from then on is free of the invalid implications Regi cites, in my opinion.

Yes, I beleive that is right. As far as I know, she only mentions universals in her "Foreword," to Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. She refers to the "problem of universals," I believe, but equates the problem to the nature of concepts, which is not quite correct.

In fact, I think it led her into a mistake about the nature of concepts. Apparently, she only considered general concepts (that is concepts of classes or categorical concepts) as legitimate concepts. Her definition of concepts and discussion of the formation of concepts excludes concepts for individual (particualr) existents; which is very odd.

Regi

Post 122

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 12:23pm

Rodney, Stolly,

You got squeezed between Stolyarov and Perigo (oof), and I missed this:

I thought this thread was winding down, but now I see we are only a bit more than halfway there. We started with A is A, and we are only up to queue is kue.

By the time it�s over, we will all be wanting to catch some Z�s.

Your fill-us-awful-kill insights definitely deserve more attention. (How's my spelling, G.?)

Regi

Post 123

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 12:31pm

Mr. Stolyarov,

Thanks for the kind words. Of course you are absolutely right in your evaluation of the article and its importance.

Your modest friend,

Regi

Post 124

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 4:31am

Bill wrote:

>>>The words in a dictionary do not even follow a circular
> pattern, much less an infinite one. If they did, dictionaries would
> not be possible, nor useful....
(snip)
>...So instead of a circular pattern, we see a spiral pattern, spiralin>g down to a small finite core (which can be simply taught).
(snip)
>(This core contains)...words of a very general
> nature: words such as 'round', 'straight', 'line', 'black',
> 'white', 'red', 'very', 'general', 'nature', etc
(snip)
>...The meaning of each word is grounded in reality. And, as we
> know from Aristotle, there are no actual infinities in reality. So the
> type of infinite regress you fear is not possible.

Hi Bill,

The first and most obvious thing to say in reply is that there is no reason to regard the words in any dictionary as fixed in number, and there is no reason to assume this �small, finite core� is finite or fixed in any way either. You appear to consider the both the number of terms, and the terms themselves, to be static. This is plainly *not* the case with any language, nor is it ever likely to be. Your maths is correct; it�s your underlying assumption that�s wrong.

Secondly, and more importantly, even if it is finite, there is no reason this �core� cannot generate an infinite or near-infinite number of different terms. (Look at what we have created with just 26 letters!) For example, a Japanese friend last night remarked that there are a couple of different words for a vague term like �age� in the Asian language. One was similar to the Western definition, and meant �corrupting, or rotting�. But the other was not: it was more positive, and meant a kind of �layering�. Now, we can see immediately what she means by this, but there is no English equivalent word - at least not in my Shorter Oxford. Yet, no doubt if the need arises - for example, a trend in positive psychology courses for aging Baby Boomers! - we will create one, and it will need a definition. This is, of couse, hardly shocking news.

Thirdly, it should be pointed out that the problem with these �core� words -which we could call �defining terms� - is that they are indeed very �general� and vague in �nature�. However, as the definitions descend, it is not towards a hard, precise core, just a hair's breadth from �referents in reality� as your model seems to imply, but rather a descent out of relative clarity into a *fog*. Because, as you say, these "defining terms" are themselves very difficult to define, and one must rely on teaching (perhaps by example) and/or your own contextual guessing to pick up the �gist� of them. (Incidentally, neither method can be claimed as anywhere near perfectly reliable, obviously, so there is no guarantee of accuracy or even consistency in language due to this).

Now, this �fogginess� is not a always a bug; it also can be a *feature*. For, as in the above, it is this very vagueness, this generality that allows us to grope forward to understand new ideas and implications, such as the unusual meaning of �age� mentioned above. If these defining terms were narrow and rigid they would be useless, and our ability to understand new things paralysed.Further, it is ambiguities and flexibilities of language that allow us to adapt to new conditions, and adapt old terms to new necessities (the noun �cab� refers to a substantially different object than it did 150 years ago, if an only slightly different service).

On the down side however, if we persist in defining our terms, we will inevitably end up arguing in this fog, and pretending that *we* are the only ones who can see clearly! As Popper remarks �...the defining terms...for many reasons are likely to be just as vague and confusing as the terms we started with;and in any case, we should have to go on to define them in turn, which leads to *new* terms which too must be defined. And so on into infinity�. And *there* lies the potential regress. One only needs to think of the vague and confusing terms that surround subjects like politics or philosophy for example, and the wave of neologisms generated just in the past 50 years in these areas by what Popper calls �crafty metphysicians� to see this process in action. As annoying as this is, this process is can equally be useful too. And, decisively,*in no way can it be considered finite*.

A further criticism of these terms is that they tend to be taught by *example*; but who decides which is the right example for vague generalities? Even a relatively specific one like �democracy� can generate confusing examples like Saddam Hussein�s popular vote, and the US can be used as a counterexample (portraying it as a two-party dictatorship as the likes of Ralph Nader often do). This leads to a deadly logical problem, indeed the very one that led Aristotle to his idea of the intellectual intuition of the �essences�, and which Rand does not escape, despite having pressed Aristotle�s method into the service of �concepts� rather than �essences�. It is worth exploring this issue in more depth, but I will have to do that a little later.

Once again:all this is not to say that words have no meaning - just that for the above reasons (and others) we should not concern ourselves too much with them. We should not worry about what the word means so much as *what the problem(s) is that we want to solve� (in the case of �democracy�, it is first and foremost the problem of *removing the government without violence*. Seen in that light, the difference between Saddam;s Iraq and the USA cannot so easily be blurred by �crafty metaphysicians�).

To finish quickly, there is a lovely line about scholasticism being the pretence of being precise with something that is actually rather vague (i will dig up the original). *And this is just what we are dealing with here*.

I apologise for being a little tardy responding; the answer looked almost too obvious, and I thought your reply was worth serious consideration anyway. But unfortunately I don�t think it succeeds.

Next, I�d like to look more closely at the whole �essentialist� theory of definitions and why it fails for more reasons than merely the regressive ones. (In fact, I don�t think there is any area where it actually succeeds). I am a little tied up with some business and family stuff, but hopefully willl get to it shortly.

- Daniel

Post 125

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 4:01pm

Regi writes:
>(Rand's) definition of concepts and discussion of the formation of concepts�excludes concepts for individual (particualr) existents; which is very odd.

You mean you guys have only just noticed this?

- Daniel

Post 126

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 4:35pm

I've always known this, but I didn't find it odd. "Eiffel Tower" has no units except the one tower itself. It's a debatable point, I realize, whether it should be called a concept or not. In one sense it is, and in another sense it is not--AR chose the latter, and I tend to agree. This never bothered me.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 6/26, 4:43pm)

Post 127

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 5:40pm

Daniel,

Just out of curiosity, when did you first read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? I first read it in 1969, which is when I first noticed this and several other problems with Ayn Rand's explanation of the nature or concepts.

Also, would you please list any other things you think are wrong with Ayn Rand's explication of concepts, just so we know how far ahead of us you are.

Regi

Post 128

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 6:20pm

Rodney,

I've always known this, but I didn't find it odd. "Eiffel Tower" has no units except the one tower itself. It's a debatable point, I realize, whether it should be called a concept or not. In one sense it is, and in another sense it is not--AR chose the latter, and I tend to agree. This never bothered me.

Ayn Rand said in her "Foreword" to Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, "...man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts." then, quoting Edward C. Moore, she wrote, "All knowledge is in terms of concepts."

This is a huge problem, Rodney. If all our knowledge is in terms of concepts and there are no particular concepts, we can have no knowledge of particulars. We cannot know the earth, the sun, the moon, or any specific star, and no individual person. In fact there is not one particular thing that can be known if there are only universal concepts.

If we are to have knowledge of particulars we must either deny Ayn Rand's view that all knowledge is in terms of concepts, (because if there are only universal concepts, our knowledge of particulars must be by some other means) or we must deny that there are only universal concepts.

By the way, Ayn Rand really did equate concepts and universals. From the same source quoted above, "The issue of concepts (known as 'the problem of universals') is philosophy's central issue. ...concepts are ... universals ..." [emphasis mine.]

Ayn Rand's contributions to the field of epistemology are extremely important. This just doesn't happen to be one of them. It is a mistake.

Regi

Post 129

Saturday, June 26, 2004 - 6:57pm

Regi, the paragraph you quote is exactly the one I had in mind with regard to AR's use of the term "universals." We truly have different premises! I already see several items in your essay that (so far) I consider wrong. (However, I wish to grasp the totality of your argument before deciding whether I am right or you are.)

About the other issue, all I can do is repeat: in one sense the idea "Eiffel Tower" is a concept, in another it is not. AR said: "Proper names are used in order to identify and include particular entities in a conceptual method of cognition." I think you are being somewhat rationalistic in your approach and in your interpretations of Rand's statements. She did not look for rules to impose on reality and force everything into those rules. She observes reality, to see what is really going on in all its complexity, and I don't think you give her enough credit for that.

Post 130

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 1:22am

Regi: �The Platonic version is ontological, and in some sense, never made explicit, they are thought of as actual ontological (metaphysical) real things. That is the basis of Platonic "realism." The other version of "universals" is epistemological.�

Well, yes and no. The problem of universals is primarily an ontological one, because it�s all about the claimed ontological status of the features of objects. Realists affirm the real existence of universals, either in actual objects or some Platonic realm; nominalists deny their real existence, hence for nominalists the issue devolves to epistemology.

The term universal refers to features that are repeated in multiple objects, and is just an umbrella term that is equivalent to your characteristics, attributes, properties, relationships. It�s not an �extra� term over and above these terms. As far as can be ascertained, Rand aimed for conceptualism, or moderate realism, but kept slipping back into realism.

Regi: �Qualities are "real" because existents are "real" and the identity of any existent is all it's qualities. Some existents have the same qualities as other existents.�

And this has all the appearance of a realist statement on universals, especially where you say some existents have the same qualities as other existents. That�s just what universals are claimed to be. Not in the Platonic sense, mind you, rather in the Aristotelian, where universals are said to subsist within objects and cannot be separated from those objects.

Brendan

Post 131

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 3:56am

But they don't exist as "universals" - they are simply attributes of the entities. Regi is right - the whole idea of universals is a nonsense. Entities have attributes, one of which can be identified as their "essence" - distinctive to those entities & explaining their other distinctive attributes. For instance, in man, the rational faculty explains his conceptual language-speaking capacity. Both are distinctive, but the rational faculty is fundamental. It makes the other attributes possible. Essences are real - they are not simply the name one gives them, nor is the identification of them arbitrary. But they don't reside in individual entities with a label on them that says "I am an essence, or universal." They are simply there.

Anyway, what I came here to say, further to the editor's update I've just pasted on the main page, is this:

Mr. Stolyarov has attacked me here for not posting Regi's piece on perception as an article. It was in excess of 8000 words, half of them unnecessary. It purported to proffer an extraordinary insight that had eluded Rand, Kelley & Peikoff. I adjudged it to be much ado about nothing, but told Regi he was free to post it immediately, anyway, on this very thread - *I* would not be posting it as an article. Regi took umbrage & the thing then appeared on Stoly's site. Folk can see it there & judge for themselves. I encourage everyone to do so. If I've missed the greatest breakthrough in the history of "filosofy" (sic) in the last twenty-five years, as Mr. Stolyarov claims, then mea culpa.

Mr. Stolyarov has also written on this site about phanaticism. He has listed me & Fil Howison among those with phanatical tendencies. I have to conphess I phind this rather phunny. In listing the criteria by which one can adjudge someone to be a phanatic, Mr. Stolyarov omits a crucial one: the complete lack of a sense of humour. Phunny that.

Linz
(Edited by Lindsay Perigo on 6/27, 3:59am)

Post 132

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 6:40am

Linz,

Anyway, what I came here to say, further to the editor's update I've just pasted on the main page, is this:

I have done a page search on the, "main page," and a site-search for, "editor's update," but cannot find what you are talking about. Can you provide a link to (or description of how to get to) whatever it is you are referring to as the "editor's update." (I found the old thread by that name, but nothing is new there.)

Now what the point of this is, I'm not sure, but it is at least partially incorrect, factually.

Mr. Stolyarov has attacked me here for not posting Regi's piece on perception as an article.

Poor Linz, attacked by the vicious Stolyarov. This is how we now describe someone's opinion with which we disagree, I guess.

It was in excess of 8000 words, half of them unnecessary.

That is true. It is not a puff piece, and not sensationalist, and the concepts it deals with are not easily grasped, so some things are explained in more that one way, and there is some "hand-holding" guidance to understanding those principles. Even then, it is apparently insufficient for some minds.

It purported to proffer an extraordinary insight that had eluded Rand, Kelley & Peikoff. I adjudged it to be much ado about nothing, but told Regi he was free to post it immediately, anyway, on this very thread - *I* would not be posting it as an article. Regi took umbrage

I did? Well that's news to me, and it would be the first time I did that because a submission of mine was rejected, here or anywhere else. It's only an article and this is only a forum.

As for the article's significance, I say myself the issue is a small one, and very simple, but not so simple that anyone else noticed it, and Kelley wrote a whole book about this, "much ado about nothing," question. The fact is, if human perception is going to be understood, the two little mistakes I point out must first be swept away.

& the thing then appeared on Stoly's site.

Well, yes it did. Gennady had requested permission to post the article on his site before I ever submitted it to SOLO. I give him that permission but asked him to wait until it appeared on SOLO, if it ever did. When he saw it was not going to appear there, he asked me when he could post it. I thought it would be unfair to ask him to wait any longer, so I gave him permission to go ahead. What would you have done, Linz?

Folk can see it there & judge for themselves. I encourage everyone to do so. If I've missed the greatest breakthrough in the history of "filosofy" (sic) in the last twenty-five years, as Mr. Stolyarov claims, then mea culpa.

Yes, everyone must judge it for themselves, if they are interested. I suspect that very few will get it and will judge it, just as you have, as "much ado about nothing." Mr. Stolyarov's claims are his own, but he is mistaken about one thing. It may not be the greatest breakthrough in philosophy, but it is new ground, and the first new ground, not in twenty five years, but fifty. There has been no new philosophical principle in fifty years.

Now, if you do not mind, I would like for Mr. Stolyarov to post the article from his site to SOLO, so anyone who chooses can read it here as well as there, and comment on it.

To Clear the Air

Everyone must be bored to tears by now with our discussion of discussions, so with the intention of ending them I will do what I hate to do, explain. When I submitted my article, "Perception," I really expected you to tell me it was too long. If I were the editor of a forum and had set the limit to 1000 to 2000 words and received an 8000 word article, I would have rejected it too. I thought it was worth a shot and am not at all surprised that it was rejected.

I was a little disappointed that no one bothered to tell me it was rejected, and I made the mistake of assuming, when I heard nothing at all, that, surprise to me, it was accepted as is. That is the reason I made the mistake of mentioning the article in one of my posts. Only then did I receive an email saying it had been rejected, making it necessary for me to go back and correct my stupid mistake.

Which was fine with me, because it is what I expected all along. I assumed I would get an email saying something like, "Regi, I rejected your article because it is too long," or something like that; because, then I could have suggested cutting it or providing a condensed version for SOLO, linking to the full article elsewhere. (It is unsuitable for serialization, or I would have suggested that.)

So I think you are making way too much of this, but I appreciate the promotional value of your complaints. I would not have bothered with this explanation, but you insisted on hanging the family laundry in public and I just wanted everyone to know, I'm not the one who wears the pink panties.

Thanks!

Your devoted "Old Fart,"

Regi

Post 133

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 10:17am

Regi,

Lindsay's update is here. It is presently the second item from the top on the homepage, immediately below today's article "Desert Island Discs #3".

MH

Post 134

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 1:10pm

Desert Island Discs #3by Chris Matthew Sciabarra

Matthew,

Thanks for the link.

It is presently the second item from the top on the homepage, immediately below today's article "Desert Island Discs #3".

But it isn't on the home page I get. Here's the first three items on the page I get when I click on HOME at the bottom of a page. I don't see any editor's update. If I'm not getting them, may others aren't either. What's the scoop?

Today's Article:

Sunday
June 27, 2004

If I'm in exile, I'm gonna want to boogie! Some of my fondest memories from New York dance clubs are from the 80s, and no album better captures that moment than ... (Read more...)
Discuss this Article (0 messages)

Article:

Saturday
June 26, 2004

The Greatest Happiness for the Least Deservingby Jonathan Rick

A link to an article at another web site. (Read more...)
Discuss this Article (1 message)

Article:

Friday
June 25, 2004

Intellectual Property: Have Your Cake Or Eat Itby Joseph Rowlands

There are plenty of interesting arguments on both sides of the intellectual property debate, and this article isn't written to end it. Instead, I want to up the stakes of the debate. (Read more...)
Discuss this Article (9 messages)

Post 135

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 2:17pm

Regi, (and anyone else with similar problems)

It looks to me like your user account isn't configured to display news items on the front page.

Click on your name at the bottom of this page, where it says "You are currently logged in as...". You should get your "User Options" page. Scroll down a little and you will see a list titled "Custom Front Page Options". The eighth option on that list should be "View new News & Interesting Links". If I'm right then at the moment the check box next to that option is blank. Click the box so there is a tick in there, scroll right to the bottom of the page and click the "Submit" button. You should now be able to see the news items on the front page. Let me know if that works or not.

MH

(Edited by Matthew Humphreys on 6/27, 2:19pm)

Post 136

Sunday, June 27, 2004 - 5:37pm

Matthew,

Thank you for taking the trouble to ferret this out.

The eighth option on that list should be "View new News & Interesting Links". If I'm right then at the moment the check box next to that option is blank.

That's exactly right.

So if you are not interested in having interesting news and links show up on the front page you don't get the "editor's update." I can live with that.

Thanks again.

Regi

Post 137

Monday, June 28, 2004 - 2:45pm

Linz: �Entities have attributes, one of which can be identified as their "essence" - distinctive to those entities & explaining their other distinctive attributes.�

Which is to say that these �essences� are universals. A universal is claimed to be a really existing feature � or attribute, essence, quality, property, relationship, the exact term is immaterial � that is common to any number of like objects.

The technical term happens to be universals; the defining difference between realism and nominalism is whether universals exist, either as real features in objects, and/or as abstractions �in� the mind.

I am not defending realism on universals. I�m simply pointing out what I see as the realist position and how Objectivism aligns with this position. In the intro to ITOE Ayn Rand provides her synopsis of four positions on universals, including Aristotle�s essentialism, all of which she considers to be mistaken. Unfortunately, she fails to provide a summary of her own position, so one has to surmise it from the text.

Since she equates universals with concepts, she appears to be arguing explicitly for conceptualism, a half-way house between realism and nominalism. A further clue is provided by the fact that she bases her concept formation on perceived similarities, which are then grouped together for epistemological convenience.

Conceptualism deals with similarities between objects rather than supposed essences found within objects. Unfortunately, by the time Rand has completed the process of concept formation, she has slipped back into realism, so her definitions refer to �essential characteristics� -- which is the Aristotelian realism she has previously rejected -- rather than the perceived similarities that form the basis of her concept formation. And of course this eventually devolves to rationalism.

Brendan

Post 138

Monday, June 28, 2004 - 3:42pm

Brendan, did you miss the section with the following sentence?

Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards it as epistemological.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 6/28, 5:20pm)

Post 139

Monday, June 28, 2004 - 7:20pm