A Pre-emptive Dialectic (to weed out the weaker objections)

Deleted and re-posted in "Intentional Conceptualism" thread.

(Edited by Citizen Rat on 6/30, 2:15pm)

Post 161

Wednesday, June 30, 2004 - 3:06pm

Bill,

Thank you for the very complementary comments. I am flattered you found the essay illuminating.

I shall have to memorize your 7 point outline in case someone asks me if I can explain my views on perception while standing on one foot.

Your whole summary is excellent, and exactly right. I especially liked this:

"My perception is what it is. It's metaphysical because it is a strictly mechanical process that exists and operates without regard to my volition (with the exception of choosing to focus my senses upon something). Therefore, epistemology begins with what I do with the information I perceive; or put another way, epistemology begins where I can start making mistakes."

The only thing I would have changed is, "mechanical process," to, "automatic process," because the process is a function of the life of the organism, and you already know I do not regard "life" itself physical, so functions depending on the life process cannot be merely mechanical. Otherwise, its perfect.

"Where I can begin making mistakes," is also exactly correct. There can be no such thing as an optical illusion, there can only be mistakes in the interpretation of what we see. That was very perceptive."

I would like to say a couple of things about your comments.

Only "direct" perception is involuntary and "unalterable." Dreams, hallucinations, and recalled images are "recreations" from percepts or perceptual data stored in memory. To some extent, that aspect of perception is voluntary, for example, imagination.

On your point #3, "Identity consists of qualities which both distinguish a thing from other things and also establish a thing�s relationship to other things," I would add, "and determine that things nature, that is, what it is."

That may be what you meant by "distinguish a thing from other things," which it's qualities certainly do, but its nature is more than just differences from other things.

You still get an A+.

(Bill, is there any chance we can make a copy of your post to the thread Gennady started here: http://solohq.com/Forum/Dissent/0006.shtml. I'll do it for you if you like, but not without your permission.)

Thank you so much, again. It is very gratifying not just to have one's work appreciated, but obviously very well understood.

Regi

Post 162

Wednesday, June 30, 2004 - 9:47pm

Isn't Max Moore some sort of transhumanist? Just asking because I once read an article of his that was very pro-Objectivist except on politics (if memory serves he took the view, which I've come across before, that anarcho-capitalism is more consistent with the rest of Objectivism than Rand's own Minarchist position). I know almost nothing about the ins and outs of transhumanism in general.

MH

Max More was the founder of the 'Extropian' movement, the first (and still the best) variant of Transhumanism. He ran 'Extropy Institute' (the 'SOLO' of Transhumanism) for a while, but has now passed on the mantle to his wife Natasha. Yes, I believe that he did toy with the idea of anarcho-capitalism for a while, but reading what he writes now I think he's more of a Minarchist Libertarian these days.

As to the 'in's and outs' of Transhumanism, I shall try to summarize the general philosophy whilst standing on one foot ;)   Here's goes:

Metaphysics: Quantum Multiverse/Universal Computation
Epistemology: Bayesian reasoning
Ethics:             Altruism
Politics:           Capitalism (Libertarianism)

I should add though, that there are many different variants of Transhumanism. What I list above is only the way I see the movement as a whole leaning. Obviously the biggest disagreement with Objectivism is the ethical theory. You might like to check out the main discussion board of the movement if you want to get an idea of the flavor. Go to:

Extropy BB

Post 163

Wednesday, June 30, 2004 - 10:59pm

Marc, in post 100 you said:

"I'm puzzled as to why you think that Bayesian reasoning is : 'inherently nominalist'.��This is the first I have heard that it implies nominalism.��Exactly what is your defintion of nominalism?��BTW It's not clear�that Objectivism itself isn't nominalist."

And I said (post 101):

"I plan to have a relevant article (addressing Objectivism's relationship to nominalism) in the cue by the end of next week."

Marc (neverminding the hell that was raised over my misuse of "cue" for "queue"!): Now that the article is up (on its own thread), do you feel that the 2 questions which you raised (ie. What is nominalism?; and Where does O-ism fall on the Realism-Nominalism scale?) have been adequately put to rest?

Ed

Post 164

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 1:00am

I'm not really interested in jumping into this debate, but I did want to add one point. Context seems to be missing from the discussion. Rodney, who I am in general agreement said:

"Now, conceivably one may arrive at a final definition that explains all characteristics forever. In fact, that is what all definitions should tend toward. However, no method of cognition can assume omniscience and infallibility."

What I don't like about this, and comments made by various other people, is that it seems to focus only on the aspect of a concept that includes similar referents. But a concept does more than that. It also distinguishes these referents from other things. This process of differentiation is a critical component of Objectivist Epistemology. You don't look for similar things. You look for things that are similar relative to other things. Which means you don't see that an apple, a sports car, and a woman's lips are all the same color (red). You see that they are all similar when contrasted with other colors.

A definition is always contextual. There is no such thing as a perfect, "final" definition, because the context can always grow. Rational animal is a good definition of man only in the context of non-rational animals. This "essential" quality is only essential in this specific context. Grab a bunch of intelligent martians, and suddenly your definition is different. Notice that this has nothing to do with your understanding of man. You may not learn anything different about what it means to be human. It's outside knowledge (the context) that changes the definition. And that means the defining attributes are changed as well. What may have been considered the essence of man on Tuesday is quite a bit different on Wednesday when the Intergalactic Space Council decides to vacation in NYC.

Post 165

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 1:36am

Marc (neverminding the hell that was raised over my misuse of "cue" for "queue"!): Now that the article is up (on its own thread), do you feel that the 2 questions which you raised (ie. What is nominalism?; and Where does O-ism fall on the Realism-Nominalism scale?) have been adequately put to rest?

Ed

I read your piece Ed. We agree on what Nominalism is, we agree that Nominalism is nonsense, we also now agree that Objectivism is not Nominalist.

You sketched three alternatives to Nominalism, which you called realism, classical conceptualism and intentional conceptualism. The trouble is that it's not clear that these three positions are really any different to one other. As Brendan argued in post 137, Rand started off trying to draw distinctions, but she may have ended up back at realism. If you ask professional philosophers, I'm not so sure that they would draw the distinctions you mention. It could be that realism and nominalism are really the only two possibilities. In which case the debate is really just a matter of semantics. O.K, so Rand didn't like the word 'Universals', perhaps due to the way philosophers misused the concept to argue for some sort of mystical platonic reality over and above physical reality. But the fact of the matter is that her position basically seems to end up affirming Universals (realism).

(Edited by Marc Geddes on 7/01, 1:38am)

Post 166

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 6:09am

Hi, Regi.

I'm pleased to hear I got your take on perception correctly. Subjects like ontology and epistemology involve a level of abstraction -- which of course is unavoidable to generalize the great swaths of reality they seek to explain -- that I am usually too impatient to master. I've always understood reality to be what it is, so I am always suspicious of complexity (like Objectivism's "extra step" to explain perception) in the explanation of it. Such things always smack of an agenda -- e.g., tweaking the formula to produce a pre-determined result.

Now that I've got the basics of Firehammerian ontology as a starting point, I can now read others with better understanding to see if you are also the end point on this subject. So, thanks, Regi. You've done me a service in opening a door to whole new area of knowledge for me. In exchange, please feel free to make whatever use of my post and its seven points you like.

Regards,
Bill

P.S. I've copied my "seven points" post to Stolyarov's thread as requested.

Post 167

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 8:10am

Hi Marc,

(Every time I type that, the thought, "high mark," comes to mind. I guess it's a "sub-conscious" evaluation of your posts, although I have no trust at all in anything produced by the "sub-conscious.")

O.K, so Rand didn't like the word 'Universals', perhaps due to the way philosophers misused the concept to argue for some sort of mystical platonic reality over and above physical reality.

I don't know if Rand disliked the term Universals, since she only used it once or twice and equated the term with concepts. She did avoid the word and if it was because she did not like it, the reason would not be because of Platonic realism, because she specifically addresses Aristotle's use of the term which she explicitly objected to.

My Question

I, personally, have no use for the term universals at all and consider it both meaningless and a useless collection of more or less disparate concepts under one head. On that basis, I would like to ask a question (because I really do not know what people mean when they use the term, because everyone seems to mean something slightly different.)

What, exactly do you mean by universals and can you give some examples of universals and explain why they are universals, according to your understanding of the term, rather than just concepts (of existents or attributes) or just attributes?

To contrast with that, are there concepts or attributes you would not classify as universals, and can you give examples of those, if there are any?

End of Question

I have another request. Since you post and this question really relate to Ed's, "Intentional Conceptualism," to be fair to him, would you mind answering my question on that thread. It would be helpful if you cut my question and pasted it into you answer for reference there, that's why I marked it. This is only a suggestion, however.

Thanks!

Regi

Post 168

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 8:46am

Bill,

Now that I've got the basics of Firehammerian ontology as a starting point ...

Hmmm, very nice thought, but not quite correct. What you understand is, in my view, correct and consistent with my ontology, but I have revealed nothing of that ontology except the very minor (though very important) corollaries of the axiom of existence. The ontology is very extensive and deals with such subjects as:

The Nature of Cause
Cause and Determinism
Determinism, Life, and Volition
Matter and Consciousness
What are Qualities Qualities Of?
The Substantialness of Substance
Analog Versus Discrete

...and also provides the hierarchy of physical and material existence, the justification for scientific knowledge, the basis for the nature of material existence that makes it "knowable," etc.

The "analog versus discrete" question is related to the "entity versus matter ontology" question, which might interest you. Objectivism implicitly holds the "entity ontology" view (only entities exist) but Ayn Rand said, "matter can be neither created or destroyed, it can only be changed," (quote from memory) which is true but obviously problematic for an entity ontology. If material existence is only material (physical) entities, since entities cease to exist and new ones begin to exist all the time, it would mean matter is constantly being created and destroyed (something the modern scientist actually asserts).

Of course the Objectivist would claim (without thinking) matter itself doesn't go out of existence when an entity ceases to be, and matter itself is not created when a new entity begins to exist, it is the same matter only changed. But that sounds distinctly like a "matter ontology," which Objectivism rejects. Ayn Rand did not believe such questions needed to be answered by philosophy. But they do.

I've copied my "seven points" post to Stolyarov's thread as requested.

Thank you. I think that is fair to Mr. Stolyarov.

Regi

Post 169

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 8:54am

If AR had ever made explicit her opinion of the idea of "universals," I am sure she would have concluded that it is an invalid concept, an attempt to integrate errors. As I said earlier, she only used the term because it was the generally employed label for the class of questions she was addressing. Her conclusions make the term obsolete unless one wants to continue to use it as a vague label.

(Will answer you later, Joe, to basically agree with you but explain how that paragraph came to be.)

Post 170

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 9:00am

Deleted and posted on the "Intentional Conceptualism" thread.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/01, 9:10am)

Post 171

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 9:54am

Rodney,

If AR had ever made explicit her opinion of the idea of "universals," I am sure she would have concluded that it is an invalid concept, an attempt to integrate errors.

Oh yes, I think that is right. It's only a guess, but it certainly agrees with what she did make explicit.

Regi

Post 172

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 10:06am

Joe,

I have a question.

I agree:

This process of differentiation is a critical component of Objectivist Epistemology.

and

A definition is always contextual.

Since there are two different but related concepts here, which aspect of Objectivist epistemology (a concept's formation, a concept's meaning, and the definition of the word for a concept) does each of these, context, and differentiation, pertain to:

In case I have made that unclear, I mean, of the two concepts:

context
differentiation

which pertains to the particular aspect of concepts;

their formation
their meaning
their definition (i.e. of the word representing them)?

Thanks!

Regi

Post 173

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 10:50am

Hi, Regi.

Me: >>Now that I've got the basics of Firehammerian ontology as a starting point ... <<

You: >>Hmmm, very nice thought, but not quite correct.<<

All of which goes to show how little I know yet. Thanks for the outline on ontology. It gives me a framework for organizing my thoughts on this (for me) new subject.

Regards,
Bill

Post 174

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 1:35pm

As to the 'in's and outs' of Transhumanism, I shall try to summarize the general philosophy whilst standing on one foot ;)   Here's goes:

Metaphysics: Quantum Multiverse/Universal Computation
Epistemology: Bayesian reasoning
Ethics:             Altruism
Politics:           Capitalism (Libertarianism)

Hmmm how about developing a varient of Transhumanism that adheres to the following:
Metaphysics: Objective reality
Epistemology: Reason
Ethics: Self-interest
Politics: Capitalism/libertarianism

Why on earth was More so pro-Rand if he was an altruist?

MH

Post 175

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 2:09pm

Ed: �Brendan, can you give me an example of where exactly in IOE AR seems to imply essences are metaphysical?�

On p 277 Rand reprimands Prof A for claiming that length doesn�t exist �per se� in reality, and insists that it does, just not separately from an entity. She goes on to say that the �only thing that is epistemological and not metaphysical in the concept of �length� is the act of separation��

Since the only act of the mind is a mental �separation� of the attribute from the object, this implies that �length� � and not just specific lengths � has real mind-independent existence, not just in an individual object, but also �in� diverse objects. And that qualifies as moderate realism.

Maybe this quote was just a slip of the tongue, or maybe I�ve misread it. At the very least, Rand�s exposition of the subject is unclear. To gain a clear view, one has to place ITOE in the context of the problem of universals. I see you�ve done that on another thread, and congratulate you on your clarity, despite my reservations that there is any significant difference between classical conceptualism and your intentional variety.

Brendan

Post 176

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 2:25pm

It was I who asked for the example, but I realize your compliment of course is for Ed. Will try to see if I can find time to answer your post however.

Post 177

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 3:51pm

Brendan, unless I�m missing something, I find your concern easy to address:

1. Length is not an essence; it is one of those things about which one might say it has an (epistemological or metaphysical) essence (depending on your stance).

2. Individual objects must have some length by the nature of objects, and every isolated instance of length is mind-independent�but the objects may have any of a range of different lengths. That is the universal aspect of length that is mind-independent, to which Rand refers here, and which is recognized (as an objective fact) in the mental separation. It does not imply that length as such exists as some sort of entity in itself. Length is expressed only in the being of some physical thing.

As a general point, I do not think it is fruitful to try to grasp AR�s theory by juggling past theories, which may be full of confusion and error (such as the persistence of the notion of �universals�). Simply observe reality first-hand, and try to describe what you see. Ask yourself: How did I first grasp the concept of length, and does it imply there is some metaphysical �essence of length�?

Post 178

Thursday, July 1, 2004 - 11:29pm

Rodney, you don't need to respond to me. I can tell from your other posts that you understand the importance of context. Sorry to pick on you, but your sentence was the most concise example I found.

Regi, why not ask a hard one? I suspect you have your own answers for these, but I'll give you a quick answer. But I don't really want to get dragged into this debate. I'm was just hoping that everyone would discuss how context matters to their position. Anyway, here's something.

You ask how context and differentiation affect these aspects of a concept: their formation; their meaning; their definition. First, I think the three are very much tied together. The formation of a concept works the way it does because of the nature of a concept. And the definition is an attempt at identifying the concept. So they're not three disjoint aspects.

So anyway, when you form the concept, you go through a process of differentiation. You observe the referents in a wider context of what you know, and recognize that they are similar to each other, and different from other things.

Skipping to definitions, the point of the definition is to identify the concept. The definition should be able to explain the kind of referents that belong to the concept, but also be able to say what's not in the concept. Which mean, you need to continue to be able to differentiate what's in the concept and what's not in the concept. That's why the context of your knowledge matters. What might have been a suitable criteria for distinguishing your concept in the past (i.e. rational animal), may no longer be adequate (i.e., Martians show up). If you don't change the definition, it will no longer properly explain the boundaries of your concept. What may have been deemed the essential distinguishing quality at one point may become insufficient.

As an aside on this, new information doesn't necessarily change the definition. We have concepts for specific reasons. If we find new things that aren't sufficiently different given our purpose for the concept, they might just be included. If we find a new type of deer-like animal, but with striped fur or something, we might continue to call them deer.

And now going back to your second question, which is how does differentiation and context relate to the meaning of a concept. I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Are you referring to the referents of a concepts? If so, I don't see how a wider knowledge would change the referents. If you know more, you might have more information about the referents, or you might know of new kinds of referents that still fit the concept (like a striped dear). But that's very different from how context affects the formation and definition.

That's if by "meaning of the concept" you meant the referents. But it might also be the way in which you retain the concept. The features of the referents that you find to be fundamental. These are the things you focus on. Like when someone says "Human beings", you probably focus on their rational faculty, or the kind of life they have (use of production and trade) or some other important quality. But if, after you meet all the Martians and friends, you may decide that being from earth is one of the fundamental qualities. Or maybe that we're warm blooded, or bipeds, or any number of other things.

If you take the file-folder analogy with concepts, the criteria for selecting what things go into that file is part of how you use it. When thinking about the referents of a concept, you alway keep in mind what things really are referents, and which things are outside of the concept, as well as where the borderlines are. With this in mind, context and differentiation matter for the same reason they matter for definitions and concept formation.

Since I have no idea what you're looking for, I don't know if that answered your question.

Post 179

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 2:00am