A Pre-emptive Dialectic (to weed out the weaker objections)

David B., you said:

For, if your suggestion held true, we'd have no need for *any definitions* at all! As a matter of fact, "foot" does have a definition (several, in fact) to appeal to.

Just because "length" can be immediately perceptible does not mean that we don't need definitions. Like I said above, you're equivocating between first-level abstractions, such as "length," and highly abstract concepts of complex living organisms.

In short, you're merely knocking down a straw man when you say that "seeing" a dog means we don't need a definition of "dog" (Do we "see" that they are carnivorous EVERY TIME we see a dog? - no; Do we "see" 12 inches every time we see a foot? - yes).

Regarding the word "foot" having "several" definitions, I have defined the context that leads to the single valid definition (12 inches). Bringing up other definitions is merely a Red Herring argument as no other "definitions" are relevant to this context (if this is not merely an error of knowledge on your part, then I'd appreciate better intellectual respect from you).

Ed

Post 41

Thursday, June 17, 2004 - 8:25pm

Ed writes:
>Again it seems that we must be arguing past each other.�

That's often the way things start out, but I hope that we might get closer in agreement through discussion.

>So, you're right, "merely" seeing something isn't usually enough (if what you say you "see" is a complex living organism which requires high abstraction to understand well), BUT IT IS�ENOUGH with geometric length.

I think you will find this is not quite so simple as it seems. For, let's say you produce a ruler, and go "look, Daniel, this is a foot-long ruler. You see it, yes? Good! That's all that needs to happen. End of story!"

But then I produce a *shorter* ruler, and say "No, Ed, you've got it wrong! *This* is a foot-long ruler! You see it, yes? Good! That's all that needs to happen. End of story!" (this is particularly useful to me if I am selling you the foot-long hot dog...;-))

How do we decide then? Well, what happens is that we must then appeal to an abstract standard: a *definition* of a foot, otherwise it is just your word against mine. For example:, "A foot is 12" long ". But now we have crossed the line: we have appealed to a definition, and merely "seeing" something is no longer enough!

The problem at this point leads in two directions:
First, towards what is known in philosophy as "the measurement problem", which is related but which we will leave to one side for the time being. (Are you familiar with it?)

The second direction is, of course, that of demonstrable statements: statements that require some additional proof to be shown to be valid. Statements that *do not*, that simply *are*, are called "axioms" as you know. If you assert, as you have, that the concept of a "foot" requires no additonal statements (ie: a definition) to be understood, you are saying the concept "foot" is therefore *axiomatic*. Which it most certainly is not (or, if it was, would be useless: eg : "a foot is a foot", which would not solve our disagreement over your hot dog!)

Geddit? I hope I have laid this out clearly, and we are not talking past each other here. But I hope I have made clear that merely seeing "a foot" *cannot* be enough.

regards

Daniel

Post 42

Thursday, June 17, 2004 - 9:47pm

HI Ed,
You write:
>Regarding the word "foot" having "several" definitions, I have defined the context that leads to the single valid definition�(12 inches)

Oh, ok, now we *do* have a verbal definition: you've defined it as "12 inches" long? So I take it that merely *seeing* something is now not enough to establish a specific unit of length, as your previous post seemed to say? Which was:
>...we know what a "foot" is, because we've seen one (it is an immediately perceptible unit; we can apply it without any appeal to other words)

Is that the case? Do you think we *do* need a definition of "a foot" as a unit of length? If so, I would agree.

Ed continues:
>In short, you're merely knocking down a straw man when you say that "seeing" a dog means we don't need a definition of "dog"

No straw man here. Definitions are highly useful: I do *not* say that we do not need them. What I *am* saying is that the attempt to make them perfectly precise, as Ayn Rand and Aristotle recommend, has the exact *opposite* effect on actual arguments!

regards
Daniel

Post 43

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 7:14am

Ed, Daniel,

I am glad you have not let this conversation drop, and I have been following it with some interest. If you don't mind, I would like to make a couple of comments, but do not want to change the course of the discussion.

I think there is some confusion about the definition of a word and the meaning of the concept the word represents. On that issue, I think Ayn Rand made one of her most important contributions to epistemology. A word does not mean its definition. The definition serves only to isolate the concept the word designates from all others, and what a concept means is whatever is identified by it, its units or referents. On that issue, however, I do not think Rand was so clear, and made some mistakes.

Now, about feet and dogs.

Of the two concepts, dog is the simpler. A dog is an entity, a foot is an abstract, arbitrary, "unit" of measure of length, a quality, not an entity. Only entities have metaphysical existence. Events, qualities, and relationships exist only as actions of entities (events), attributes of entities (qualities) and relationships between entities. (I am referring only to concepts of the physical, not concepts of concepts or the psychological, though, by analogy, the same rules apply if "entities" is changed to "existents.")

We have all seen dogs, but no one has ever seen a foot. The concept foot is a very complex and abstract one. Like all, "units of measurement," it is arbitrary, that is to say, it is not discovered, it is invented or chosen. While length is a real attribute of physical entities and relationships between them, it does not exist independently of those entities. Something can have length and things can be a certain "distance" from each other, but "length" and "distance" do not exist on their own.

All units of measure, when actually used, have some level of imprecision. Counting is always absolute (there are five dogs or six dogs, but never five and three eighths dogs), measurement is always relative and approximate (nothing can be known to be exactly three feet). Measurement can be made as accurate as we like [within limits], but is never absolute.

This is where Ayn Rand's distinction between definition and meaning are so important. The definition of a unit of measure is never wrong, because it is chosen. Once an attribute of existents that can be measured has been identified, any useful unit may be "defined" as a unit of measure. The definition is always exact, because it is by means of the definition the meaning of the concept for a unit of measure is selected. The meaning is still not the definition, however, but the actual unit of measure.

The definition of a concept that identifies existents (entities, for example) is determined by the meaning of the concept. The opposite of the definition of units of measure.

Suppose a child learns the word "dog" for the family dog. When the child says the word dog, it means "the dog" (which is the only one it sees). On seeing the neighbors dog, if it is similar enough to the family's own dog, the child will probably say "dog" when seeing it. The child does not mean, "family dog," but simply, "one of those things that looks like that." It may not know it has only ever seen one dog, and it makes no difference, because what the child means by dog is "whatever looks like that," whether it is different dogs or the same dog on different occasions.

If the child's father is a veterinarian, his definition of dog may be quite sophisticated. The child's definition exists only ostensively, that is, "that" when pointing to a dog. What they both mean by dog (an actual dog) is exactly the same thing. The father's definition is more sophisticated because it is made in the context of much wider scope of knowledge and requires more detail to differentiate the word from others and integrate it within the hierarchy of that knowledge. The child's ostensive definition is sufficient to isolate the word within the very limited scope of the child's knowledge.

The meaning of words is not determined by their definition (except in that way that units of measure are). The meaning of words is determined by whatever concepts they designate identify; that is, the existents (including other concepts), their qualities, actions, or relationships that are the concepts units or referents. The idea of an "endless regress of definitions," gets the nature of concepts backwards. We do not start with the abstract concepts and work backward to concretes. First we have simple concepts, like dog. Then we notice there are differences in dogs. One of those differences we notice is one dog fits in the chair the other one does not. The concept we form for that observation is "length" or "size."

There are very long chains of reason that lead to our most profound abstract concepts, like A is A, but they are all derived, if they are correct, by a process of abstraction and integration from concepts originally defined like the child's dog. There is no endless regress. Working backwards, the chain always ends on the solid ground of observed facts. If it doesn't, the concept is false.

Regi

(Edited by Reginald Firehammer on 6/18, 9:16am)

Post 44

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 8:47am

I can only follow this discussion cursorily, but I did get the general impression that Daniel has it backwards. All knowledge rests on the bedrock of sensory observation; everything else is mental operations upon this material. And definitions grow and change as one's knowledge gets wider and wider, in accordance with one's perceptions of what explains what.

Post 45

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 2:21pm

Rodney writes:
>I can only follow this discussion cursorily, but I did get the general impression that Daniel has it backwards. All knowledge rests on the bedrock of sensory observation; everything else is mental operations upon this material.

This is a complex area, and little is known about it, and there is little point pretending otherwise. But nonetheless I believe that Rodney's idea may well turn out to be the backwards one. As an equally cursory reply, there's a little story. Popper used to open his classes on the philosophy of science with the command "Observe!" There would then follow a confused silence. Eventually, one student would put their hand up and say "Excuse me sir...but *observe what*....?"

- Daniel

Post 46

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 3:28pm

I would have understood right away. He must have meant "Observe reality as a first step in scientific investigation."

But this is not confined to scientists. It is basic epistemology. Concepts are ultimately validated by tracing them to their roots in sense-perceived reality. We begin with concepts of physical objects and work from there.

And it's not a matter of pretending: I know. I remember doing it, from my earliest years onward; and I remember often doing the tracing whenever I was in doubt about the meaning, import, or worth of an idea.

Mental tracing was always something I did naturally. You know how you lie in bed and let your mind drift in an effort to fall asleep? One thought leads to another, and eventually this morphs into dreaming. Sometimes as a kid, I would notice this happening and successfully backtrack, identifying every random or loose association that had brought me to where I had ended up.

As you see on my Profile page, I also independently arrived at Rand's idea of measurement-omission in the process of concept formation. So it is not the case that I know little and am pretending otherwise.

Post 47

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 3:10pm

Regi writes:
>A word does not mean its definition.

Now *there's* a heresy for you...;-)

>All units of measure, when actually used, have some level of imprecision.

Yes. this is called "the measurement problem". Like numbers, measurements are perfect in the abstract in a way that cannot be reproduced physically.

>Counting is always absolute

Like a measurement standard, a simple number is abstract, and therefore infinitely precise. But, once again, the objects it represents are not. The number "1" bears the same relationship to the first dog counted as the measurement standard "1 foot" does to Ed's foot-long hot dog. When you add "1" and "1" in abstract, you get a perfect "2", as each one is perfectly equal. However, The second dog, you will note, *is nowhere near as identical to the first dog as the first "1" is identical to the second "1"*. So it turns out to be basically the same issue as the measurement problem: that abstract numbers can be perfectly precise in a way that physical things cannot. (the perfect circle is the classic example)

>there are five dogs or six dogs, but never�five and three eighths dogs

Well, you can have 3/8's of a dog, as it happens, just as I have a kilo of cow in my fridge. Just not *exactly* 3/8ths of one! (nor *exactly* a kilo of cow). That's what the measurement problem is about.

>This is where Ayn Rand's distinction between definition and meaning are so important.

So, just trying to follow your analogy here, you are saying that the *meaning* of a word is perfectly precise in the same abstract way as a "foot" and the verbal *definition* is never completely identical with it, rather like the actual hot dog?

- Daniel

Post 48

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 3:27pm

Regi writes:

>There are very long chains of reason that lead to our most profound abstract concepts, like A is A, but they are all derived, if they are correct, by a process of abstraction and integration�from concepts originally defined like the child's dog. There is no endless regress. Working backwards, the chain always ends on the solid ground of observed facts. If it doesn't, the concept is false.

;-) Sadly I don't think this will prove true. Shall we actually try it and see?

Define "dog"...

- Daniel

Post 49

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 6:25pm

Hi Daniel,

Thanks for the comments.

You partially quoted me/; A word does not mean its definition.

Then said: Now *there's* a heresy for you...;-)

What I actually said is: A word does not mean its definition. The definition serves only to isolate the concept the word designates from all others, and what a concept means is whatever is identified by it, its units or referents.

"It is often said that definitions state the meaning of words. This is true, but it is not exact. A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other that that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of it units." [Ayn Rand, "Definitions," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Page 40] [Emphasis mine]

However, The second dog, you will note, *is nowhere near as identical to the first dog as the first "1" is identical to the second "1"*.

What an absurdity. We are not weighing dogs, or measuring them, or adding them up, we are only counting them. The size, weight, or any other quality is irrelevant to counting. You evidnetly did not get that far in mathematics.

So, just trying to follow your analogy here, you are saying that the *meaning* of a word is perfectly precise in the same abstract way as a "foot" and the verbal *definition* is never completely identical with it, rather like the actual hot dog?

Nope. That's not what I mean at all.

Regi

Post 50

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 6:28pm

Daniel,

Define "dog"...

Do you have a dog?

Regi

Post 51

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 8:37pm

Has anyone seen a panting poodle running around (it's about a foot long)? It got away from me when I was at the hotdog stand. Actually, I'm not sure that it would even be recognized, even if directly perceived. Oh well. :-O

Regi, first of all, you sure came out of the blocks and bowled me over with that comparative evaluation of "dog vs. foot" on the simplicity scale. I guess that's the nature of the game, huh? To paraphrase an old Greek: I love Plato, but not as much as I love truth.

Regi, I'll admit that "dog" is chronologically prior to geometric "length" (or "foot"). Heck, I'm even willing to admit that there is something even logically prior in identifying and integrating "dog" than there is for "length." But I WILL NOT (yet?) concede "simplicity" to the concept of "dog" over the concept of "foot" - on the grounds that "foot" is conclusively understood (there's nothing more to "know" about it).

In short, "foot" (or "length") - once understood - is as naturally pregnant with objectivity as concepts get. Therefore, my hotdog example was a wise choice that easily leads those who are intellectually curious toward sufficient understanding of the nature of objective concept formation. Your post just added the exact reason why "foot" is invariant, and the tangent that dogs come first in a child's discoveries of the world.

What do you say about that, huh?

Ed

Ed

Post 52

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 9:09pm

Daniel B.,

"Oh, ok, now we *do* have a verbal definition: you've defined it as "12 inches" long? So I take it that merely *seeing* something is now not enough to establish a specific unit of length, as your previous post seemed to say?"

Regi answered this for me - we arbitrarily define "foot." But this is where I take issue with both you and Regi: AFTER defining it, we DO "SEE" it (we "see" it every time we look at a ruler). I used quotes to indicate that we "understand" what a foot is (we could all differentiate it from other measurements at will, whether these other measurements were "an inch" or "a yard," for example).

As for the measurement problem, its solved. Requirements for precision are not infinite, they are dictated by context (see my Rational Discussion article for an example of the achievable precision dictated for effective "house building").

We only need enough precision to differentiate things from other known things (we don't require the ontological exactitude of the Idealist - at least not for living in reality).

"No straw man here. Definitions are highly useful: I do *not* say that we do not need them. What I *am* saying is that the attempt to make them perfectly precise, as Ayn Rand and Aristotle recommend, has the exact *opposite* effect on actual arguments!"

Daniel, I think you've misconceived Rand's handling of the measurement problem. Here's a quote from p. 196 of IOE:

"AR: Yes, in a very general way. But more than that, isn't there a very simple solution to the problem of accuracy? Which is this: let us say that you cannot go into infinity, but in the finite you can always be absolutely precise simply by saying, for instance: "Its length is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters."

Prof. E: And that's perfectly exact.

AR: It's exact ..."

Ed

Post 53

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 9:32pm

Regi writes:
>What an absurdity. We are not weighing dogs, or measuring them, or adding them up, we are only counting them. ..You evidnetly did not get that far in mathematics.

;-) Oh, so "adding up" is a radically different operation and is not to be confused with merely "counting". Regi, you do indeed possess a unique grasp of mathematics!

- Daniel

Post 54

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 10:12pm

Ed writes:
>Daniel, I think you've misconceived Rand's handling of the measurement problem. Here's a quote from p. 196 of IOE:

He then quotes from the IOE:
>"AR: Yes, in a very general way. But more than that, isn't there a very simple solution to the problem of accuracy? Which is this: let us say that you cannot go into infinity, but in the finite you can always be absolutely precise simply by saying, for instance: "Its length is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters."
Prof. E: And that's perfectly exact.
AR: It's exact ..."

Thanks Ed. I often think of this exact quote as an excellent example of the empty *verbalism* I was talking about - the bad philosophic habit of merely "playing with words" rather than actually solving problems.

For, she is saying in effect:
"I can *absolutely precisely* say its length is is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters"

However, anyone else would simply say:
"I can *roughly* say its length is no less than one millimeter, and no more than two millimeters".

So there you have it. How anyone could seriously think there is some profound philosophical difference between these two statements, or that the former represents any kind of advance over the latter, is quite beyond me. It is not a solution, but merely sophistry.

- Daniel

Post 55

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 10:33pm

Daniel wrote:
>Define "dog"...
�
Regi replied:
>Do you have a dog?

?

What's your point? That dog doesn't need defining, just observing? If not, what are you saying?

If you think "dog" is too hard to define, you may choose anything you like.

- D

Post 56

Friday, June 18, 2004 - 11:34pm

Daniel B.,

Putting this quote in context allows for a clear and adequate understanding. The issue was the continuity of reality vs. the discrete-ness of mathematical measurement. The main issue boils down to Kant's concept "reality in itself" ("thing in itself" - ding an sich?) and Bergson utilizing Kant's concept to invalidate any and every human means of measuring reality (because, with each measurement, we can't be sure we've got it nailed).

One enlightening point you appear to be missing is that:

-If we know we've missed perfection (as Bergson claims), then our concept is right and corresponds to reality. We can get closer and closer to perfection in measurement (correctly identifying previous vagueness) only because we know the standard we are shooting for - only because we know what reality is.

Another point is that "ding an sich" is such "dung and other such" that it's an invalid human concept (although Kant's "existence apart from consciousness" concept here would be valid for an entity that lacked consciousness, it's just hard to teach them - rocks and such - all about it).

In short, it's invalid to speak of an absolute (consciousness-, and method-free) standard of exactitude. If we come to find that a given measurement was a millimeter off - we "found" this out using OUR consciousness and OUR methods, 2 things which can be dealt with objectively.

The context and instance of measuring are necessary in order for us to understand what we mean by the words exact or precise (e.g. Precise for a "ruler"? For an electron microscope?).

Ed

Post 57

Saturday, June 19, 2004 - 12:36am

Daniel wrote:
>For, (Rand) is saying in effect:
"I can *absolutely precisely* say its length is is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters"

>However, anyone else would simply say:
"I can *roughly* say its length is no less than one millimeter, and no more than two millimeters".

>How anyone could seriously think there is some profound philosophical difference between these two statements,... is quite beyond me.

Ed replied:
>Putting (Rand's) quote in context allows for a clear and adequate understanding. The issue was the continuity of reality vs. the discrete-ness of mathematical measurement.

I am familiar with the piece, and as far as I can see, the additional context changes nothing - and you offered it in the context of the current discussion anyway, so I am assuming you thought it directly relevant.

Are you really saying this substitution of "absolutely precisely" with "roughly" makes an important difference to this statement?

Yes? No?

- Daniel

Post 58

Saturday, June 19, 2004 - 2:44am

Ed wrote:
>Regi answered this for me - we arbitrarily define "foot." But this is where I take issue with both you and Regi: AFTER defining it, we DO "SEE" it (we "see" it every time we look at a ruler)

Ed: sorry, mate but Regi's right on this one. For what you see when you look at a ruler is *roughly* "a foot", but not precisely. Just like the circle you see on paper is not a perfect circle.

Yet this standard of precision *does* exist: in abstract mathemathics, which is infinitely precise. It just does not exist in the physical world (though we can try to approach it).

(Incidentally, I think you mean"artificially" define not "arbitrarily". A foot is not an arbitrary length, but a standard that has evolved over time, based on earlier standards back into the mists of time (A foot is based on Hercules foot, apparently, which is why it is larger than the normal human one)This is a common confusion, and it makes it sound like the choice of "a foot" is entirely random, when it is not)

Post 59

Saturday, June 19, 2004 - 4:28am