RoR: Forum

Post 180

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 2:09am

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What, exactly do you mean by universals and can you give some examples of universals and explain why they are universals, according to your understanding of the term, rather than just concepts (of existents or attributes) or just attributes?

To contrast with that, are there concepts or attributes you would not classify as universals, and can you give examples of those, if there are any?

End of Question

I have another request. Since you post and this question really relate to Ed's, "Intentional Conceptualism," to be fair to him, would you mind answering my question on that thread. It would be helpful if you cut my question and pasted it into you answer for reference there, that's why I marked it. This is only a suggestion, however.

Thanks!

Regi

Um... later perhaps. I'm too lazy right now.

Post 181

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 10:43am

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Joe,

Beginning at the end:

Since I have no idea what you're looking for, I don't know if that answered your question.

You did a good job anyway. I only wanted to know exactly where you thought context was relevant to concepts and you told me exactly that.

Are you referring to the referents of a concepts? If so, I don't see how a wider knowledge would change the referents.

Yes, that's exactly right. Context cannot change the meaning of the concept. I hear Objectivists say things all the time that sound like they think context affects the meaning, or that new knowledge expands the meaning of a concept. While we might discover new things (actual existents) that we did not formerly know were referents of a concept, the concept does not change. It always meant those referents, even if we didn't know they existed.

My only other comment is about this: ... when you form the concept, you go through a process of differentiation. You observe the referents in a wider context of what you know, and recognize that they are similar to each other, and different from other things.

I do not disagree here, except that the, "difference from other things," is seldom recognized explicitly, nor is it required. Things could not be recognized at all if they were not different from other things. To recognize them implies they are different, else they would never have been noticed in the first place. The problem with recognizing a things difference from other things explicitly is that every thing and every class of things is different from everything else. To identify explicit differences it would be necessary to specify a thing's differences from every other kind of existent there is, or, at least the ones known.

To identify man as the, "rational animal," it is only necessary to specify what qualities a human being has, (all of the qualities of an animal plus the quality of rationality). It is not necessary to specify that man is different from the other animals explicitly, because it is implied by the fact he has a quality no other animal does, and animality is sufficient to differentiate man form all other things, e.g. plants, and the non-living.

Thanks again, Joe,

Regi

Post 182

Friday, July 2, 2004 - 8:11pm

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Rodney, I beg your pardon for my misattribution. I�m not sure that I follow your point one, but in (2) you say: ��the objects may have any of a range of different lengths. That is the universal aspect of length that is mind-independent �which is recognized (as an objective fact) in the mental separation. It does not imply that length as such exists as some sort of entity in itself. Length is expressed only in the being of some physical thing.�

To my mind, the above expresses Aristotelian universals, or moderate realism. As I understand it, moderate realism is the view that universals have real existence in objects, but cannot be separated from those objects, so it�s true that length �as such� does not exists an entity in itself; it exists as an attribute �in the being of some physical thing.� For a moderate realist, specific lengths also count as universals, since it�s claimed they can be repeated in numerous objects.

Rodney: �As a general point, I do not think it is fruitful to try to grasp AR�s theory by juggling past theories, which may be full of confusion and error �Simply observe reality first-hand�How did I first grasp the concept of length, and does it imply there is some metaphysical �essence of length�?�

Rand placed her theory of concepts within the context of the problem of universals, so it�s probably useful to investigate the actual problem and the previous solutions she was trying to correct.

I can�t remember how I first grasped the concept of length, but I would agree with Rand that abstract �length� is derived from the consideration of the specific lengths of individual objects, and that the term �length� refers to a quality of similarity or resemblance in this attribute between individual objects. In that case, while there is no universal quality in the object that is shared with like objects, the general term can be grounded in real-world objects, although not with the sort of precision implied by measurement omission.

Brendan

Post 183

Sunday, July 4, 2004 - 10:41am

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"[T]he previous solutions she was trying to correct": This phrase indicates the mistaken critical-rationalism premise. Rand did not build her theory by critiquing past theories; she basically looked at reality, and using logic first-hand (as opposed to testing the logic of others' theories), sought the facts. And all philosophers should do the same, rather than primarily evaluating preexisting ideas (which can easily slip into a primacy of consciousness premise, and I think often does).

Rather than taking a previous theory as a benchmark, and describing AR's as a "moderate" variety of it, one must recognize that reality is in no sense "moderate," that facts abide by the principle of the excluded middle. Reality is "extreme," and Rand's theory is "extreme" Objectivism. If there are elements of truth in some "realist" ideas, fine, say so and let it go at that; but continually adding refinements and qualifications to an idea that at best is muddled and at worst is mistaken, or combining multiple instances of such ideas in hopes of "approaching" truth, only compounds the confusion and is unscientific.

Post 184

Sunday, July 4, 2004 - 5:07pm

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Rodney writes:
>This phrase indicates the mistaken critical-rationalism premise.

Which is...?

>Rand did not build her theory by critiquing past theories; she basically looked at reality, and using logic first-hand (as opposed to testing the logic of others' theories), sought the facts.

So, you are saying as she "looked at reality" and used logic, her theories are beyond criticism? (In other words, we must *take it or leave it*?)

- Daniel

Post 185

Monday, March 13, 2006 - 1:15pm

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You can see the glaring mistake that Daniel Barnes is making here. He is actually deliniating a pretty good critique of deductive reason. I consider deductive reasoning to be one tool out of many in an overall process that will and should inevitably rely more on induction.

If deductive reasoning is relied on exclusively, or more plausibly if there is some PRETENSE that it must be relied on alone or some felt need that it ought to be the only tool then I would say (though many here would probably disagree) that Daniels criticisms are valid.

This is the gigantic mistake that Daniel is making:

Instead of calling the thing he is criticising by a name that would make him aware of his blunder. Instead of calling this thing 'Deductive Reasoning' he's calling it 'Essentialism' and blaming the whole thing on Aristotle.

"Karl Popper compared Aristotelian arguments to eternally sharpening your pencil and never actually getting around to writing anything."

Anyone whose read Aristotle would know that this is not so. Aristotle is a fellow who gets right to the meat of it and has written on an astounding array of subjects.

But anyone who has tried to read Popper would know that it was HE and not Aristotle that was mucking about with long-winded deductive 'windbaggery' (to use a Barnesian word).

Now here's the irony. It is Popper who tried to deep-six induction. It is HIS influence that therefore is likely to bog philosophy down in deductive overuse.

And the beauty of this is that Barnes has been able to try this on by being sloppy about defining his terms.

A Pre-emptive Dialectic (to weed out the weaker objections)