About
Content
Store
Forum

Rebirth of Reason
War
People
Archives
Objectivism

Post to this threadMark all messages in this thread as readMark all messages in this thread as unreadBack one pagePage 0Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Forward one pageLast Page


Sanction: 1, No Sanction: 0
Post 80

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 2:03pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Regi:
>Why would you want to avoid a tautology?

Because it would defeat the purpose of a definition. Because the purpose of a definition is to *tell you something*. It may be to tell you something about a word you already *know something about*,or a word you *don't know anything about*. To do this, it has to in
troduce *new terms* in addition to the existing word.

Whereas a tautology can *only tell you something you know already* - for example, "A=A". To be truly tautological *you cannot introduce new terms*.

Opening my dictionary at random I find the word "thrift", which I do know something about, but clearly not *everything*, as it also means a type of plant apparently. So in this case, the *new term* "plant" must be added. So I have learned something I did not
know before I opened the dictionary. Also I find the word "Thrombin", which I know *nothing* about, but I can *learn* something about from the other terms in thedefinition. This is why a definition - and therefore a dictionary - is useful: because it can *tell me something I didn't know already*!

He continues:
>If a definition is correct, just like any other true proposition, it will be tautological.

Sigh. Let us then try concretise this, then: to imagine Regi's Truly Tautological Dictionary. I open it in the same place and it reads:
"Thrift:Thrift"
"Thrombin:Thrombin"

In other words, his definitions will be almost entirely *useless*. They can tell you nothing you don't know already. As his definitions form the basis of his arguments, his arguments must be equally so.

- Daniel



Post 81

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 4:53pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed: “Putting this quote in context allows for a clear and adequate understanding. The issue was the continuity of reality vs. the discrete-ness of mathematical measurement.”

Yes, but the broader context is the Objectivist theory of measurement omission, so the issue is also one of the accuracy of measurement. Rand’s claim is: “…in the finite you can always be absolutely precise simply by saying, for instance: "Its length is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters. Prof. E: And that's perfectly exact. AR: It's exact ..."

Of course it’s no such thing. As Daniel points out, the measurement is roughly accurate. For a carpenter, a rough accuracy of this type would be sufficient for most everyday purposes, but if pressed he would admit his measurement is not “absolutely precise”.

In using the terms “absolutely precise”, and – with a little help from the well-schooled Prof E – “exact”, Rand is not trying to lay down guidelines for carpentry so much as establish a claim that her philosophy will provide certainty in knowledge.

Since such certainty is dependent on accuracy in measurement, terms like “roughly” or “near enough” when applied to measurement cannot fulfill her polemical purpose. Hence Rand plays around with words in order to bring the plain facts into conformity with her previously established ideology. And she accuses everyone else of subjectivism!

Brendan


Sanction: 3, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 3, No Sanction: 0
Post 82

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 6:29pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Daniel,

The words in a dictionary do not even follow a circular pattern, much less an infinite one.  If they did, dictionaries would not be possible, nor useful.  What I mean by not following a circular pattern is the following:

Take all the words that appear as entries in a big, thick English dictionary, from 'aardvark' to 'zebra', or whatever.  Notice that the word 'aardvark' does not appear in the text of any of the meanings given for the word 'zebra'.  In fact, it might very well not occur anywhere in the dictionary except in its own entry.

Now let's generalize this.  Specialized or technical words are not needed to define any other words, except possibly for words in the same field of knowledge that are even more specialized or technical.  So consider all the words that appear as entries again, and this time call them collectively 'List 1'.  This is the set of all words that the dictionary in question defines.  Now take all the words that appear in the text of the definitions of all the words in List 1.  Make a new list consisting of all these words, counting each one only once, no matter how many times it appears in the dictionary.  Call this 'List 2.'  It is the list of all words needed by the dictionary compilers to write the definitions of the entries.  Now I submit that List 2 is shorter than List 1, because it does not contain all the words such as 'aardvark' that are not needed to define other words.

Now let's repeat this process by taking all the words that appear in the text of the definitions of all the words on List 2.  Compiling all unique occurrences, we arrive at 'List 3.'  I submit that it in turn is shorter than List 2 for a reason analogous to that for which List 2 is shorter than List 1.

Now if we invoke this process recursively, to form 'List 4', 'List 5', etc., we will eventually reach rock bottom.  At this point, we will find a 'List n' that is identical to 'List n+1'.  We cannot make (by the same process) a list that is any shorter than List n.  List n contains all the grammatical particles 'a', 'an', 'the', 'and', 'or', 'but', 'is', etc.  These are the English analogs to the Chinese words that in Chinese linguistics are described as 'empty'.  It also contains content (or, to borrow again a technical term from Chinese linguistics, 'full') words of a very general nature: words such as 'round', 'straight', 'line', 'black', 'white', 'red', 'very', 'general', 'nature', etc.  It might also contain a few slightly technical or specialized 'full' words from each major branch of knowledge, each of which made the list because either i.) it is a difficult word to define in terms of only general words without the help, say, of an illustration, or ii.) the dictionary compilers did not work hard enough.  Together, the words on List n form the core of our language.

So instead of a circular pattern, we see a spiral pattern, spiraling down to a small finite core.

Young children can be taught and can come to use properly any of the words on List n.  In fact, bright educated children routinely learn all of the commonly used words on any such list. I submit that if young children are capable of understanding the meaning and usage of these core words, then bright adults with university backgrounds should as well.  And if the adults in question are not so capable, it is because, under the corrupting influence of non-Aristotelian philosophers, they have come to believe a great many assertions that are not true.

The fundamental error you are making is described by my earlier word game thesis.

To diagram the issue, you are thinking in terms of the following:

word -> definition -> word -> definition -> word -> definition -> word -> blah, blah, blah, -> more academic drivel


The way to diagram the correct outlook is as follows:

word                     word                     word
   |                            |                            |
   |                            |                            |
(definition)           (definition)          (definition)         
   |                            |                            |
   |                            |                            |
  \/                           \/                           \/
referent                 referent                 referent

The meaning of each word is grounded in reality.  And, as we know from Aristotle, there are no actual infinities in reality.  So the type of infinite regress you fear is not possible.

-Bill


Sanction: 1, No Sanction: 0
Post 83

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 5:36pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Linz writes:
>Depends what you mean by "it," Regi. Hahaha! Don't ya get sick of 'em?

Hey, it's not my philosophical system that places such a strong emphasis on the importance of precise definitions; it's *yours and Regi's*. The whole reason for my "Define dog..." challenge to Regi is to show why this emphasis is misplaced - that it's actually illogical. Personally, I hate pedants who pull all that "ah, but define definition..." type bull - they are precisely my target. And you may read all my other posts on any subject so far in this forum and I doubt you will find a *single* example of me making this kind of challenge.

So to make out this is somehow *my* modus operandi is to miss the point entirely! It's actually part and parcel of what you and Regi believe. But maybe you've come into this discussion a little late.

You see, as Regi didn't seem to accept the straight logical argument - god knows why, as he wasn't able to refute it either - I offered in addition to demonstrate the problem in real time for him. Rather generous on my part, given that such a demonstration threatens to be infinite...;-)

And yes, I do get "sick of 'em", all the "what do you mean by definition?" types. That's why I want to get rid of 'em.

-Daniel



Post 84

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 6:16pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Linz wrote:
> I *know* Daniel has IOE, but I see no evidence that he's absorbed it. Anyway, carry on boys! :-)...
..Regi, you're a rationalistic old fart at times, but on this thread you're surpassing your *best* moments.

What an excellent excuse for an action replay of one of those "surpassing" moments. There are some out there who may have missed it!

Regi writes (post 62):
>...you could have 3/8s of a dog cadaver, but not 3/8s of a dog.

So, according to Regi you can have 3/8ths of a dead dog, but not 3/8ths of a live one! Fractional maths, it seems, depends on whether its subject is alive or dead! And apparently this and his other amazing insights into mathematical epistemology can be discovered in the IOE only by "absorbing" it as opposed to merely reading it and trying to make sense of the jolly thing. If it produces theories like this, I can only speculate that its pages are impregnated with some form of secret psychedelic drug...;-)

This "Firehammer Moment" was brought to you by:

- Daniel




Post 85

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 7:55pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Daniel

Let's compare:

Daniel: ... the purpose of a definition is to *tell you something ... about a word ...

What does it tell? Well, "something," although Daniel does not know quite what, apparently.

Ayn Rand: "A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept. ... The purpose of a definition is to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units differentiated from all other existents." ["Definitions," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Page 40.]

Ayn Rand also says a definition tell us something about a word, only Ayn Rand knows exactly what it tells. A definition tells us exactly what referents or "units" the concept a word represents identifies.

Daniel says a definition has to introduce *new terms* in addition to the existing word.

Well, duh! No kidding!?

Then Daniel gives an example of what he thinks a tautology is: "Thrift:Thrift"
"Thrombin:Thrombin"


So, what is a tautology? It is "1. The repetition of the same meaning but using different words. 2. Restating the same idea but in different words. 3. In categorical logic, expressing a quality or meaning in the predicate which is already contained implicitly or explicitly in the subject. Examples: 'All women are human.' 'All bachelors are unmarried males.' ..." (it is a very long entry) [Dictionary of Philosophy, Peter A. Angeles, Page 289]

Notice, "... same meaning ... using different words, ... same idea ... but in different words

Different words, Daniel. Got that? 

Also notice the example of a tautology in the definition: All bachelors are unmarried males.

Here is a real dictionary entry:
 
 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition.  2000.
 
bachelor
 
SYLLABICATION:bach·e·lor
PRONUNCIATION:  bch-lr, bchlr
NOUN:1. An unmarried man. 2. A person who has completed the undergraduate curriculum of a college or university and holds a bachelor's degree. 3. A male animal that does not mate during the breeding season, especially a young male fur seal kept from the breeding territory by older males. 4. A young knight in the service of another knight in feudal times.


But, what is this? Is it possible? This dictionary uses a tautology as its very first definition, "a bachelor is an unmarried man." But,.wait, the word also represents other concepts, as words sometimes do. What about those definitions? Uh-oh, they are all tautologies.

Take another look at your dictionary Daniel. Every definition in it is a tautology. If they weren't, they would be incorrect.

Does it amaze you that a tautology can actually provide new knowledge? It seems to amaze everyone blinded by the positivists and analysts. Now suppose you do not know what the word fricative means.

It looks like an adjective. So a definition might say, "it is not an adjective." Well, there are your new terms, and they are correct, but that is not a definition.

Well then, it looks like it might have something to do with friction. So a definition might say, "fricative has nothing to do with friction." Again, we have new terms which are true, but not a definition.

To be a definition, the "new terms" are going to have to indicate what concept the word itself represents; that is the only way we are going to know what that concept is. The definition will have to be a tautology.

How does that give you new Knowledge? Well, unless you already know what fricative means, it will be a tautology you never knew was a tautology before, but you will know it once you have seen the definition. That is new knowledge, and that is the only new knowledge a definition must (or can) supply.

Oh yes, a fricative:

noun:   a continuant consonant produced by breath moving against a narrowing of the vocal tract (as `f', `s', `z', or `th' in both `thin' and `then')

[There is actually an adjective form, in case you were thinking of being a prig about it.]

Regi

(Edited by Reginald Firehammer on 6/22, 8:20am)


Post 86

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 8:47pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Bill,

I have been eclipsed. While I was composing my response to Daniel in reference to dictionaries, you posted your brilliant analysis.

If you do not mind my referring to your work with a, "dirty word," it is linguistic analysis that actually means something.

However, in this particular debate it suffers three shortcomings: it is logical, objective, and correct--these characteristics have no effect on the anti-Aristotelian other than to infuriate them.

I salute you!

Regi


Sanction: 4, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 4, No Sanction: 0
Post 87

Monday, June 21, 2004 - 9:43pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Brendan,

"Yes, but the broader context is the Objectivist theory of measurement omission, so the issue is also one of the accuracy of measurement."


Brendan, before you get off the ground with this accuracy-is-pivotal stance, here's a directed retort that shakes the foundation you are standing on in order to mount this offense (IOE-p31):

"There is no exact method of measuring the intensity of all psychological processes, but - as in the case of forming concepts of colors - conceptualization does not require the knowledge of exact measurements. Degrees of intensity can and are measured approximately, on a comparative scale."

Brendan, do you see how Rand's quote preserves effective distinctions (a definition's purpose) without having to appeal to accuracy/precision?



"As Daniel points out, the measurement is roughly accurate. For a carpenter, a rough accuracy of this type would be sufficient for most everyday purposes, but if pressed he would admit his measurement is not 'absolutely precise'."

Yes Brendan, I agree (you have ACCURATELY described how this inquiry will turn out). But the REASON that the carpenter dispenses with talk of "absolutes" is that he can get by in his trade without talking about them (philosophers don't have this "luxury"). In other words, this weak analogy does not enable strong inferences to epistemology.



"In using the terms “absolutely precise”, and – with a little help from the well-schooled Prof E – “exact”, Rand is not trying to lay down guidelines for carpentry so much as establish a claim that her philosophy will provide certainty in knowledge."

Right! And I find this quite a noble goal for a philosopher (quite a virtue - an excellent aspiration).



"Since such certainty is dependent on accuracy in measurement, terms like “roughly” or “near enough” when applied to measurement cannot fulfill her polemical purpose. Hence Rand plays around with words in order to bring the plain facts into conformity with her previously established ideology. And she accuses everyone else of subjectivism!"

Brendan, taking the last point first: you do have a minor point here (she might've went "postal" on some of the folks who took issue with her). But considering this woman's history - victim of statism in Russia, came to US with hope, finds US spirit corroding into cesspool of post-modern relativism, realizes where that leads - c'mon man! Would you (in her position) have been any LESS defensive having a key message to tell, but with most folks reacting against it?

Regarding your first point, you'd have to define a context, Brendan. My quote of her above clearly refutes this as a universal proposition regarding her stance. Also, didn't you find my inch-foot-yard example relevant and decisive? Not much accuracy needed there to be absolutely precise regarding categorical propositions:

foot-long subway sandwich VS. inch-long subway sandwich VS. yard-long subway sandwich

Brendan, can you tell - with precise-enough measurement - which one of these will give you a stomach ache, which one will leave you wanting, and which one will be just right?

Ed

Post 88

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 5:14amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed, Brendan,

Brendan, you make some very wild assertions, like the following: "...certainty is dependent on accuracy in measurement...," with no argument at all.

Certainty never depends on accuracy of measurement, except when accuracy of measurement is the specific question, which is almost never.

Ed, your example of the Subway sandwich is a perfect illustration of this fact. I think you ought to call it the Goldilocks proof. One may not know the precise temperature of the porridge, but one can be certain if it is "too cold" or "too hot," if it is, and certainly know when the temperature is "just right," even if it is a range of temperatures.

Regi


Post 89

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 6:27amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed, Regi, Bill: Just a note on the fine job I think you're all doing. I may quibble with things, but that does not mean I don't appreciate what is great also. My silence should not be construed as non-approval!

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 6/22, 1:28pm)


Sanction: 1, No Sanction: 0
Post 90

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 1:00pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Daniel B., Brendan;

I have my own type of "Ockham's Razor" that I find useful. Instead of parsimony, it focuses on the discernment of fundamental differences that necessarily lead to opposing viewpoints on matters (and while MacIntyre chronologically beat me to this insight; I did developed it independently).

The objective is to be able to explain why - looking from the perspective of your opponent - he logically HAS to come to the conclusion that he does on the matter in question. I had called it Thompson's Razor, but concede now to forever call it MacIntyre's Razor (though I believe I'm the first philosopher to coin this "razor").

It appears now that I have achieved this crucial insight on the definition-precision debate. Daniel B. looks to definitions to tell him some new facts - Rand looks to definitions to organize old facts - a new understanding of old facts ("old facts" are those you already know, but are attempting to integrate into your growing body of knowledge). Recall that I had originally mentioned understanding as the knowing of how facts "hang together."

Assuming the purpose Daniel does, stringently defining things inevitably leads to the obfuscation of human understanding (as the mind is overwhelmed by the infinite regress that necessarily ensues). Assuming the purpose Rand does, stringently defining things inevitably leads to human understanding (as the facts - which we use to live on earth - become organized into a coherent picture of reality).

p.s. Thanks Rodney! It's inevitable that we will take different paths to understanding based on background knowledge and experience. Hopefully though, we will asymptotically approach the same objective understanding of all matters important to humans!

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/22, 1:01pm)


Post 91

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 2:17pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit

Ed, that is a good way to put it, your saying:

It appears now that I have achieved this crucial insight on the definition-precision debate. Daniel B. looks to definitions to tell him some new facts—Rand looks to definitions to organize old facts—a new understanding of old facts (“old facts” are those you already know, but are attempting to integrate into your growing body of knowledge). Recall that I had originally mentioned understanding as the knowing of how facts “hang together.”

Recall also my own statement in an earlier post that definitions change and develop with our understanding of “what explains what.” Thus, an early rational definition of lightning was presumably something like “a sudden forked flash of light from the sky accompanied by a loud noise and causing damage.” Nowadays, we define it (for example, using my desk dictionary) as “an abrupt discontinuous electrical discharge in the atmosphere”—which embodies our knowledge of why it is accompanied by a loud noise and causes damage.

A definition that included “ball lightning” would be different, since such “lightning” appears to occur under different conditions than ordinary lightning, and has different behavior and effects. The similarities are the reason the same word is used. Should principles common to the two kinds of “lightning” become known, scientists might either revise the definition of lightning or coin a new concept, with its own definition, to cover both phenomena. In any case the definition organizes and fixes human knowledge that has already been attained, in terms of existing causal relations—or, when knowledge of these is lacking, existing observations.


Post 92

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 4:30pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Rodney,
Thanks for the extra insight!  Your contributed insight pre-emptively answers many of the deeper concerns likely to rise from initial skepticism.

Regi, Goldilocks it is!  This comes after wavering over whether or not to call it the Jared Proof  (after Jared - the post-obese "poster-boy" in the Subway fast-food chain television commercials that claim their sandwhiches helped him lose weight)!

Ed 


Post 93

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 6:38pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed: [Rand quote] "There is no exact method of measuring the intensity of all psychological processes, but - as in the case of forming concepts of colors - conceptualization does not require the knowledge of exact measurements."
“Brendan, do you see how Rand's quote preserves effective distinctions (a definition's purpose) without having to appeal to accuracy/precision?”

Fair enough, I stand corrected there. The point I was making is that Rand has a bad habit of equivocation. In the current case, while she elsewhere admits that precision in measurement is not necessary, she goes on to claim it anyway. She’s just using words for polemical effect, and the faithful Prof E echoes this with his “perfectly exact”.

Ed; “In other words, this weak [carpenter’s] analogy does not enable strong inferences to epistemology.”

If it’s acceptable to appeal to a lack of precision in psychological processes, as above, in support of philosophical claims, why cannot one appeal to carpentry?

Brendan: “Rand is not trying to lay down guidelines for carpentry so much as establish a claim that her philosophy will provide certainty in knowledge."
Ed; “Right! And I find this quite a noble goal for a philosopher…”

Of course, but the goal must be based on sound evidence and argument. And nor does nobility of goals guarantee truth. "Its length is no less than one millimeter and no more than two millimeters” is neither precise nor exact. It’s approximate. Noble motives can’t change the fact.

Ed: “Brendan, taking the last point first: you do have a minor point here (she might've went "postal" on some of the folks who took issue with her). But considering this woman's history - victim of statism in Russia, came to US with hope, finds US spirit corroding into cesspool of post-modern relativism, realizes where that leads - c'mon man! Would you (in her position) have been any LESS defensive having a key message to tell, but with most folks reacting against it?”

I was referring to philosophical rather than psychological subjectivism. Otherwise, Rand’s reaction to the US is a fairly common immigrant experience, where the immigrant isolates certain features of the new society, and extrapolates these as essential characteristics while ignoring other, equally important features. The flaw, ironically, is to ignore context. If I were in her position, and the natives were telling me I was mistaken, I would hope to at least consider their views.

Ed:”…foot-long subway sandwich VS. inch-long subway sandwich VS. yard-long subway sandwich…Brendan, can you tell - with precise-enough measurement - which one of these will give you a stomach ache, which one will leave you wanting, and which one will be just right?”

I have yet to experience the gastronomic delights of a subway sandwich, but I do frequent another excellent international dining establishment, which offers wholesome food served by bright and engaging young people in a festive atmosphere. This establishment boasts standardised portions, but in my experience in several countries, I have found that the serving sizes are near enough rather than precise enough in terms of satisfying my appetite.

Ed, you seem to be happy enough to accept a lack of precision in matters such as psychology and carpentry, but you seem to have an undue attachment to this notion, and we find it creeping back into a reference to food. Why don’t we just agree that these are matters of approximation, near enough but good enough, and leave precision to the engineers?

Brendan


Sanction: 1, No Sanction: 0
Post 94

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 7:24pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Hmmm. Judging by Linz's, Bill's and Regi's reponses I seem to have confused everyone with my little attempt to play the pedant. Imagine - the one time I couldn't find an Objectivist who'd offer a definition!

I am not a Linguistic Analyst, nor anything like it, and neither is Popper (hardly!). I was hoping to show just how pedantic the demand for definitions can get when applied consistently, but it seems to have backfired somewhat - no-one took me up on it, and people seem to think I was genuinely making the demand! And after all my dismissals of this same idea...Oh well; this is my blunder, and will take it on the chin and do my best to clear it up, and try and get my point across better. I'm a Critical Rationalist, as they say, and I can't let the old school get an even worse name through my misfiring strategies!

Bill makes the interesting point that the regress of definitions may not be infinite or circular. I am not so sure, but will think that one through a little. However, whether it is infinite or not, it certainly has the potential to be very, very long, particularly by the time sense and context are also argued over. Surely it is not really just the little hop-skip-jump your diagram makes it out to be? So, like the very title of this thread, there are all these preliminaries before even the first word of an argument can be uttered, let alone getting an argument underway. Further, there also appears to be an another regress, even at Bill's most basic-level terms - his "full" and "empty" ones. For these must be *taught* - unless somehow our child will teach herself language purely from the "referents in reality"; rather like Tarzan, only without the aid of his schoolbooks. But if they are to be taught then they must be taught by someone else, and who is to say *they* have it right? After all, these are fundamentals of a sort - bedrock from which more sophisticated definitions will be built, if I understand it correctly - and their teachers are not likely to be Objectivists, who know how this sort of thing is to be done. Quite the opposite, most likely. And the teachers too must be taught, and their teachers so on, all without error, back to prehistory. So it seems hardly the simple system of guaranteed truth in language one might expect. But we will see. I have a few other questions about his theory and will write more later when I get some time - it is nonetheless one of the better posts on this thread so far.

Then there is the issue of the tautology of definitions, which as Regi correctly says "is just the same ideas *in different words*. As I *meant* to say, this is precisely why we must avoid *putting too much emphasis on them* (rather than just "avoid" them) . For it is an all too familiar feature of philosophy that the same old ideas go round and round - just with different words - and this is precisely the problem one would expect with a method that puts definitions at its centre!

Do I say that words have *no meaning*? No. From a Critical Rationalist point of view, words are extremely useful, and troubles only come from placing too much emphasis on them, and not enough on *problems* and *theories*. That's why none of the usual verbal problems - absolute precision, senses, definitional circularities, regressions etc really affect it at all. Questions like "what does this word *really* mean?" should, in the CR view, therefore be replaced by "what problem are you trying to solve?". Then it can become clearer whether the problem is genuine, or just related to some of the other problems words encounter and the ensuing verbalist blather.

Perhaps, then, I should make clear what problem *I* am trying to solve with my suggestion (adapted from Popper) that Aristotle's method has had a less than benign effect on philosophy in general, and things like Objectivism (and Linguistic Analysis for example) in particular. The problem seems to be what you might call Objectivism's "failure to thrive". What other philosophy has multi-million selling novels, movies, interviews in Playboy, an entrepreneurial ethic, an inspiring vision and scores of enthusiastic young folk signing up? Yet it has been 50 years since Atlas Shrugged, and as someone complained recently, judging by its history nothing short of a "miracle" would make it soar past the original ideas of its founder.

There are a number of competing theories as to why: the culture, the state, the inherent stupidity of sheeple, Ayn Rand herself, the ARI, the heretical breakaways, bad cover artwork etc etc. And as a philosophy it does seem to have some good things going for it; existence exists, primacy of existence, volition, objective knowledge, all of which I for one would pretty much agree with (with a couple of caveats). Yet for some reason it produces an awful lot of *words*, but it must be admitted, hardly new *ideas* or *things*. I wondered whether this might be a result of not of Objectivism's environment or people, but perhaps of the *method* it uses. It seemed that only an outsider would make a criticism of it, as it is something of a sacred cow. I've never encountered an Objectivist criticism of it - perhaps to do so would mean you were no longer an Objectivist. And if you thought words were really important, you might really care if this happened to you! But nonetheless this method of relying on definitions - the meanings of words - puts words *first* in the method. And if the definitions are already true - and they are, as they are tautological - the *discovering* of new ideas, and new facts of reality will be at a something of a disadvantage from the start.

This is a rather off-the-cuff example, but consider the following:

Non-Objectivist scientist: "I think birds might be reptiles"

Objectivist scientist: "Oh dear. Clearly modern science has corrupted your method, as this simply cannot be. Things are what they are - do you not know that? A bird is a bird, and a reptile is a reptile - they can hardly be anything else, and they cannot be each other! Check your premises! You have come to this irrational idea because you have not properly integrated your definitions into the correct concept for "bird" and "reptile", which have already been established according to repeated observations of the facts of reality."

Now this is a little unfair, of course. Objectivism encourages independent thought, at least in principle, and after examining the facts of reality the Objectivist scientist may soon see past all that, and evenutally add "reptile ancestry" to that of "bird". The point is: do you see what a head start the non-Objectivist scientist has already? Doesn't have to wade through the dictionary checking his terms, infinitely or somewhat less. Doesn't have to wonder whether his rivals will condemn him for "irrationalism" in pursuit of his theory. He doesn't even need to worry to what degree his theory is *true* - whether they are *entirely* reptiles, or partly, or once were, or whatever.His only concern is that his creative idea, however it occured, is *fruitful*. And such an idea certainly is. However, as this example suggests, should it be approached from the Objectivist scientist's point of view, it stands a good chance of being strangled from the start - most likely by *himself*.

I can't help thinking the latter tendency - Aristotelian scholasticism, basically - is holding the philosophy back far worse than the "statists" or Leonard Peikoff ever will. I've belonged to discussion groups for 10 or more years, and I don't think I ever see propositions like "You can have 3/8ths of dog cadaver but not 3/8ths of dog" regulary treated like serious ideas -as advances in "mathematical epistemology"!. It's like something out of the Middle Ages. Now, this is not because I have a "closed mind" to wild ideas, for this would defeat my own argument. It is simply this: if you asked "What problem is this argument trying to solve?" what would the answer be? Similarly, this is not to say the people are stupid - they're not. Regi, who I regularly mock for such pointless nonsense, is one of the few people - including Objectivists - I've encountered who understands the arguments for non-physical consciouness. But then, because of this stupid method he spends half the rest of his time with stuff like "But for any organism, to be means to be the kind of organism an organism is--not just the perpetuation of protoplasm"; and to my mind, wasting what appears to be a considerable brain. He's channelling either the Middle Ages, or Jacques Derrida. Or both. and therein lies the problem: Objectivism perhaps shares a few more of the failings of modern philosophy than it cares to admit.

Ah - I can hear them already: Would Objectivism still truly be Objectivism without the Aristotelian emphasis on words and definitions, and adopted, say, CR's emphasis on theories and problems? I pass on that one. But then I say: if a philosophy is fruitful, who gives a damn what you call it?

And if it isn't, the same applies.

-Daniel

































Post 95

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 8:35pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Gentlemen,

I think there has been a little bit of a communications breakdown concerning Rand's views on the importance of precision and accuracy in concept formation.  I think that this is caused in part by her own inconsistent use of words in IOE. (Inconsistent at least with respect to the vocabulary of engineering and experimental science.)

Precision and accuracy are two concepts that are usually closely related and often confused, but are actually quite distinct in meaning.  Accuracy refers to the closeness of an estimate or measurement to reality.  Precision refers to the fineness of detail used in stating an estimate or the value of a measurement.

To illustrate the striking difference these respective definitions entail, let me imagine a hypothetical contest between absent-minded old Prof. Throckmorton, Ph.D., and one Billy Bob Cobb, who works as a part-time mesquite-stoker at a local Open Pit Bar-B-Que Emporium, keeping said open pit stoked with an adequate supply of its mesquite fuel.  Suppose these two worthies are asked to state a decimal approximation of the value of the mathematical constant pi.  Absent-minded old Prof. Throckmorton absent-mindedly replies 4.141592654.  Billy Bob by contrast, true to his fundamentalist Christian heritage, is inclined towards the value to be inferred from the dimensions of the Molten Sea of Solomon's Temple, as described in II Chronicles 4:2.  "Three", answers Billy Bob.

How good are these two approximations?  Prof. Throckmorton has stated 10 significant figures, whereas Billy Bob has stated only one.  There is 10 times as much information, in the sense of data, in the former's estimate.  If the values' digits were encoded as ASCII, it would take 10 times as long to transmit the first over a dial-up line as it would to transmit the second.   Therefore Prof. Throckmorton's answer has 10 times the precision of Billy Bob's.

But since a correct approximation to 10 significant figures is 3.141592654, (rounding up on a following '5',) Prof. Throckmorton's answer is almost 32% high.  Billy Bob's, on the other hand, is less than 5% low.  Dividing the absolute value of the former percentage error by that of the latter, it turns out that the humble Texan good ole' boy was over 6.7 times as accurate as the esteemed Professor.

Accuracy and precision are closely bound together in making physical measurements.  A good experimental apparatus used with a good method will yield numbers whose accuracy and precision are both of the same approximate size (as measured, say, by counting significant figures.)  An experiment that can measure a certain quantity to12 sigfigs of accuracy is usually a lot more expensive in both capital and operating costs (or labor) than one that can only measure the same quantity to3 sigfigs of accuracy. Such an experiment is almost always set up to produce numbers with about 12 sigfigs of precision.  If a scientist who knowingly, with an 3 sigfig experiment, attempted to publish results in a journal with numbers given to12 sigfigs, it would be a case of intellectual fraud.  The final 9 digits of each stated value would be pure invention.  On the other hand, a scientist who had a 12 sigfig experiment but only quoted his own results to 3 figures would be wasting a great potential, like a Ferrari owner who only drove through school zones.

This numerical equality of precision and accuracy in well-designed experiments has unfortunately done much to confuse this issue in the minds of many, including in the minds of some students of the physical sciences.

I think that what Ayn Rand meant to say is something to the effect that, outside perhaps the specialized sciences and other technical disciplines, a high level of precision is not usually required when conducting measurements that are sufficiently accurate to properly distinguish with certainty members of two or more separate conceptual categories .


Post 96

Tuesday, June 22, 2004 - 9:16pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
And I can limbo even lower than that!  *L*

Borrowing a basic illustration from old science books that I recall reading some time ago, precision and accuracy are two concepts that can be illustrated by shooting arrows at a bulls-eye target.

(What I'm about to present are the standardized, "controlled vocabulary" definitions for these terms... though others may take their own liberties.)

Basically, you can consistently land all of your arrows in the exact same spot; say, in the upper right corner of the target, which is obviously not the bulls-eye.  It does takes skill to be that consistent, however, even though you're not necessarily hitting the bulls-eye.  That's precision.

But when you actually hit the bulls-eye -- which is the true goal of the game -- that's accuracy.

(Edited by Orion Reasoner on 6/22, 9:25pm)


Post 97

Wednesday, June 23, 2004 - 5:50amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
For my part, I understood where you were going on the "dog" request, Daniel, but decided I did not have the time.

It kind of puzzled me that no one else would "bite" but I chalked it up to the fact that I had not followed the discussion closely enough to understand the intellectual context.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 6/23, 5:59pm)


Post 98

Wednesday, June 23, 2004 - 7:27pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Goodness gracious me.  Everyone has their own pet ideas about epistemology it seems.

*Marc covers his head with his hands.  His head is spinning with all the big words.  He is in philosophical turmoil and he wishes the anguish in his head would stop*

Regarding the discussion about tautologies, this may come as a shock to some of you, but for once, I actually agree with something Regi said. ;)    If you think about it, the whole structure of knowledge is in some sense tautological.  Reality is a 'closed system'.  There is nothing outside reality (by definition).  So every part of reality has to be explained in terms of the other parts.  For instance if you program a computer, all the knowledge that can come from the program is actually tautological in nature.  So tautology is not a dirty word.

The discussion originally started off being about Bayesian epistemology versus Aristotlean epistemology then started branching out into a lot of different areas.    You'll all come around to Bayesian reasoning eventually of course ;)

Those of you that haven't read this very good intro on Bayesian reasoning can check it out here:

An Intuitive Explanation of Bayesian Reasoning


Sanction: 3, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 3, No Sanction: 0
Post 99

Wednesday, June 23, 2004 - 10:11pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Let's try this again:

Ed (post 3 paraphrased):
... I'll attempt to provide the clearest exposition of Bayes Theorem to date (available anywhere)

Ed (post 10 paraphrased):
Bayesian Reasoning: Strengths & Limitations
by Ed Thompson

What is it?
... It is a method of updating the estimate of the likelihood of a given contingency, in light of the evidence of another contingency that is taken to be in a conditional relationship with the first (a horizontal justification of propositions - justification via the Coherency theory of Truth).

Where does it fit within the field of Epistemology?
... A prerequisite for utilizing Bayesian Reasoning is that all of the propositions under consideration must be interpreted as contingent (no irrefutable "necessary truths" are allowed in).

Are there predictable consequences to philosophically championing Bayesian epistemology?
A Bayesian epistemology - by way of being inherently nominalist - precludes any awareness of an objective Metaphysics (no "understanding" of Reality is possible).

... within the context of any philosophy claiming objectivity (those acknowledging Identity), the necessity inherent to Identity necessarily invalidates "Bayesian" utility.

... Bayesian Reasoning is essentially a tool of the nominalist (a subjectivist who disbelieves that conceptual thought can give humans a clear and sufficient understanding of Identity; or of "classes" or "kinds").

... nominalism is "intractably problematic, and irremediably so." (read on)

Adler's decisive wholesale debunking of nominalists and the whole enterprise of nominalism:
" ... If human beings do not have conceptual thought, how can they recognize the sameness that permits the nominalists to say that the same word can be applied indifferently in a number of individuals?
Are they not contradicting themselves? Should not nominalism -- the assertion that names have general significance even though human beings can have no understanding of kinds or classes -- be rejected?"
------
88 posts go by and ...
------
Marc (post 98):
You'll all come around to Bayesian reasoning eventually of course ;)

Ed: Well, this prophecy can happen only by way of 'us all' first adopting nominalism, which is - as we've seen twice now - somewhat of a "hard sell" to a rational mind (Marc, you left this part out - please comment on this omission).

Ed

Post to this threadBack one pagePage 0Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Forward one pageLast Page


User ID Password or create a free account.