Steve, re 63/4 'freedom' We can agree that freedom by Aristotelian standards is not natural. We don't observe it as factually true, everywhere. We can also cite the Platonic/Socratic traditions and come up with something viable, albeit, imho, wrong--and surely wrong by enlightenment thought. In this sense, 'freedom' is a pure idea, given by god, that we grasp. For Socrates, only the initiated are priveleged enough to grasp 'pure' ideas (nous). Ditto, somewhat, for Augustine--only the elect grasp goodness. Aquinas somewhat changed the axis when he described god as giving all humans the capacity to grasp the good, hence freedom as knowable, hence attainable, for all. This led to the Salamanca school, 1600: we are all endowed by our creator with inalienable rights....including the indians, which was the practical thrust of their writings. That Jeff clearly falls within this tradition isn't surprising. Rousseau took the Salamanca ball and ran with it, and popularized it as a political slogan. Evidence is strong that Jeff, while not actually having read Rousseau, was familiar with his ideas, hence the D of I write-in. Enlightenment/Kantian freedom is different, as I've explained. So Jeff and his D of I isn't Enlightenment-based. But because Kant/Enlightenment was cutting edge for his epoch, Jeff was, intellectually speaking, 150 years behind. Which is okay. He had parties to give, universities to start, Eurotravel, politics, and a family- owned plantation to run. Busy guy. But the only issue here is his ability to understand and write philosophy What interests me is the persistence of Platonism. Both Rand and my fave, Deleuze, wrote that the task of philosophy is its overturning. Yet when it clearly pops up in important places (Dof I!) alleged Ranites shuffle about, grovel, and accuse the finders of closet communism. >>>is also reasonable to say that freedom is man's natural state if by that you mean that human nature includes a rational faculty and the requirment to choose between options presented by reason <<< Yes, this is the Kantian notion of capacity, ie faculty. But the caveat here --as noted by Kant himself-- is that humans have lots of competing capacities. In other words, greed, selfishness, resentment, are all capacities, too, in this sense. So the question becomes, what makes us choose to act in one capacity rather than another? The Platonic answer is that those who grasp the idea of the good (to kalon) will naturally choose it. In other words, the capacities within our mental framework are heirarchical, and the good people ostensibly choose from the top. Now as explained in some detail by Machan, Rand's explanation of choice is more of less nothing but that. By not offering a viable solution other than that given by Plato (Socrates), she defaults over into being a Platonist. So to answer your question directly, 'reason' alone cannot tell us not to steal: there's nothing un-reasonable about calculating cost-benefit of not getting caught. Therefore, the what-else-ness to this argument involves questions of rightness not dictated by self-interest. Again, the Randian answer of choosing 'higher' motives is based upon the platonic principle that there is a 'natural' ordering of motives to begin with. Again, as Machan noted, Rand platonically chose from the top. Many philosophers, such as Hume and Russell , have noted that it's really okay for the masses to believe in a natural, heirarchal ordering of values. This, in fact is the moral glue that holds societies together. Otherwise, people question too much, and become 'radical'! But as with the Jeff issue, doing philosophy is diffferent So other philosophies offers different solutions and relolutions; you'll have to be willing to listen... Eva
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