Materialism

In Post 32, I wrote, The parts of a collective can interact without being integrated in the sense that the parts of a living organism are. In Post 35, Cal replied,

But now you're saying something different, at least if my interpretation is correct that you mean here that some collectives are not integrated in the sense that they form a total with special characteristics like those of a living being, while other collectives do have such an "integration". I can agree with this, although I still find the formulation somewhat confusing. But your original statement was: "a person is not the totality of his parts in interaction; he's an integration of the parts" [emphasis added], and here I disagree. It means that the totality of the parts of a living being (in this case a person) is not a person until some operation "integration" is performed. Now a living being is not just some random collection of interacting parts, it is a very special collection of interacting parts, and it is special in the sense that it has special attributes like the possibility of the pursuit of a single end, that are only found in a Vanishingly (to use Dennett's term) small subset of all such possible collections. But it's still just the sum of those parts, there no extra "integration" operation needed.

I don't know what you mean by an "integration operation." The organism is an integration of its parts. That is to say, its parts are integrated in the service of the organism's life. They are organized towards a specific end or goal, which is the organism's survival. As such, an organism is more than the sum of its parts.

To use Ed's metaphor: the marble statue is a piece of marble, albeit with a very special form, but it is not some kind of "integrated" marble. Such special attributes, like the goal-directedness of living beings or the artistic and esthetic value of statues are not the result of some operation "integration" of the interacting parts, they're attributes of some very special collections of organic molecules, marble, etc. Perhaps this is semantic quibbling, but I think such formulations may cause confusion, as they suggest a dualistic model.

I don't know what you mean by "a dualistic model." What's dualistic about an integrated organism?

- Bill

Post 61

Tuesday, January 31, 2006 - 8:19pm

In Post 47, Ellen wrote,

I have numerous criticisms of Bill's theories. I think he has a habit of contradicting himself every which way. The contradiction I've been speaking of on this thread is that between partly sounding like he's proposing an agent-causation theory, while meanwhile proposing a mind/brain-activity identity theory. The two theory types are inconsistent. Consider an example from cosmology: You can't consistently propose both an Unmoved Mover cosmology and a Big Bang cosmology. In similar fashion, you can't consistently propose both an agent theory -- which is a theory of a top-down causal "authority" -- and a mind/brain-activity identity theory -- which is a completely bottom-up causal theory.

If by "top-down causal 'authority'," you mean that the mind controls a person's action according to the person's values, then I hold a top-down theory, but I don't see it as inconsistent with a mind/brain-activity identity theory. The latter is not a bottom-up causal theory, if by that you mean that the brain controls the mind. As I indicated in a previous post, there is no dichotomy between mental action and brain action. The brain does not direct and control the mind, nor the mind the brain. The mind is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity. Nor is this view inconsistent with an agent theory of causation. According to the latter, it is one's recognition and evaluation of reality that determines one's choices, but that recognition and evaluation is simultaneously mental and cerebral. It cannot be one without the other.

I don't seriously propose (though I made a quip on another thread which might have intimated that I do) that Bill is an "epiphenomenalist," according to my understanding of that term from my psychology training. And he wouldn't classify as an epiphenomenalist according to the (poor) definition you quoted, whichever of the (inconsistent) theories he's currently sounding like he's trying simultaneously to employ he might opt for: An agent-causation theory isn't epiphenomenalist by the cited definition. Neither, precisely, is a mind/brain-activity identity theory, since the latter says that mind just IS something the brain is doing, thus the causal efficacy is that of strict physics.

You are assuming that cerebral activity cannot be based on one's awareness and evaluation of reality -- that the brain must instead operate on the basis of blind, physical forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. The (conscious, volitional part of the) brain operates on the basis of one's awareness of reality, because conscious activity is brain activity. Awareness and evaluation are simultaneously mental and cerebral.

- Bill

Post 62

Tuesday, January 31, 2006 - 11:07pm

Bill,

In both posts 57 and 61 you state:

"The mind is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity."

In post 58 you state:

"[I]n reality, the mind is *a part* of the body."

Do you see an inconsistency between these statements? If so, which of them do you mean?

Also, do you have a definition of "mind"?

Ellen

___

Post 63

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 1:31am

Ellen,

No, I don't see an inconsistency. There is, after all, no such thing as a disembodied mind--a mind that exists independently of a body. So, where is the contradiction? As for my definition of "mind," the definition is ostensive. Consciousness is understood initially by introspection, and only later discovered to be cerebral in nature.

- Bill

Post 64

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 1:32am

Ellen asked Bill ...

=================
Also, do you have a definition of "mind"?
=================

Oooooo, Ellen, you've found my weak-spot! When it comes to defining terms, I can't resist (sorry to bud, Bill!) ...

2 a : the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons b : the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism c : the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism
3 : INTENTION, DESIRE <I changed my mind>
4 : the normal or healthy condition of the mental faculties

from:
m-w.com

Ed

Post 65

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 10:21am

Bill:

I don't know what you mean by an "integration operation." The organism is an integration of its parts. That is to say, its parts are integrated in the service of the organism's life. They are organized towards a specific end or goal, which is the organism's survival. As such, an organism is more than the sum of its parts.

No, if there is no such thing as an "integration operation", the whole term "integration" is superfluous. Then there isn't any difference between "the sum of its parts" and "the integration of its parts". In a complete physical description all the possible interactions of the combination of them are already implied in the parts. What you call "integration" is only a description of the very special character of that particular combination, but it is not something that is already implied in a complete description of its parts. The sum is not some random sum of all parts, but a very special kind of sum (a very special configuration), but it's still a sum.

Post 66

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 11:17am

Cal,

To return to an example, which I cited previously, from Binswanger's The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, two hemispherical pieces of wood are combined to form a sphere. The whole can roll, whereas the sum of its parts--the two hemispheres--cannot. The whole, therefore, possesses an "emergent" property that the sum of its parts does not possess. The whole is, therefore, more than the sum of its parts. Q.E.D.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 2/01, 11:37am)

Post 67

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 1:10pm

I quoted two statements by Bill.

(1) From both posts 57 and 61:

"The mind is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity."

(2) From post 58:

"[I]n reality, the mind is *a part* of the body."

And asked if he sees any inconsistency.

Bill, you reply, in post 63, that, no, you don't.

Ok, let's substitute "leg" in the two statements:

(1') "The [leg] is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity."

And:

(2') "[I]n reality, the [leg] is *a part* of the body."

Are you given any pause by those two statements juxtaposed?

I also asked: "[D]o you have a definition of 'mind'?"

You reply:

"As for my definition of 'mind,' the definition is ostensive. Consciousness is understood initially by introspection, and only later discovered to be cerebral in nature."

So are you using "mind" and "consciousness" as equivalent terms? (If so, you're in a tangle with other statements you've made in which you've spoken of mind as an activity of the brain of which we're introspectively aware. If "mind" itself is simply "consciousness"...?)

Ellen

___

Post 68

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 1:21pm

Ed lists the following definitions of "mind" from m-w.com":

--
2 a : the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons b : the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism c : the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism
3 : INTENTION, DESIRE [I changed my *mind*]
4 : the normal or healthy condition of the mental faculties

--

So which, if any, of these definitions would you find acceptable in the current context? And notice that definitions 2b., 2c., and 4 all define "mind" by reference to the adjectival form "mental." This type of definition might be ok in a dictionary, from which often one is only "sort of" getting the idea. But in a context wherein one is attempting to address issues of causality and one requires precise usage, I see nothing helpful provided by that type of definition.

Btw, I don't have a definition of "mind" I'm happy with. The question of how best to define "mind" is among those I puzzle over. But a definition which makes "mind" and "consciousness" equivalents soon encounters problems.

Ellen

___

Post 69

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 3:31pm

Bill:

To return to an example, which I cited previously, from Binswanger's The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, two hemispherical pieces of wood are combined to form a sphere. The whole can roll, whereas the sum of its parts--the two hemispheres--cannot. The whole, therefore, possesses an "emergent" property that the sum of its parts does not possess. The whole is, therefore, more than the sum of its parts. Q.E.D.

Not at all. Of course the whole may have properties that the separate parts don't have (surprise, surprise). For example, it will exceed certain measures of volume, weight etc. (which its parts don't exceed), its dynamical behavior will be different from that of its separate parts etc. But all these properties are already implied in the physical description of its parts, even if they may be only realized by combining them in a special arrangement (and in general not in many other arrangements). A complete physical description of its parts implies its behavior as that particular sum of its parts and is therefore in principle sufficient for a complete description of the whole.

Post 70

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 6:19pm

Oh, my goodness. I hope Bill Dwyer doesn't get apoplexy over what Ellen Stuttle has posted. I certainly would, if I were the target of it. Perhaps I can help undo some of the mess Ellen has made in her careless, hasty attempts to prove Bill guilty of inconsistency. She wrote:

I quoted two statements by Bill.

(1) From both posts 57 and 61:

"The mind is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity."

(2) From post 58:

"[I]n reality, the mind is *a part* of the body."

And asked if he sees any inconsistency.

Bill, you reply, in post 63, that, no, you don't.

Ok, let's substitute "leg" in the two statements:

(1') "The [leg] is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity."

And:

(2') "[I]n reality, the [leg] is *a part* of the body."

Are you given any pause by those two statements juxtaposed?

Pause, yes, but not due to any deficiency in what Bill originally wrote. Let's start by the clarifying method of attaching function to organ, shall we?

To build a true parallel to Bill's original example, let's use digestion (as a stand-in for the mind) and stomach (as a stand-in for the brain). Then the parallel would read:

Digestion is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the stomach's activity.
And:
In reality, digestion is a part of the body.

If we were to properly use Ellen's preferred leg example instead, we would have to use locomotion (as a stand-in for the mind) and legs (as a stand-in for the brain). Then the parallel would read:

Locomotion is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the legs' activity.
And:
In reality, locomotion is a part of the body.

Does anyone see any inconsistency in either of those parallels to Bill's two statements? I don't.

Mind, digestion, and locomotion are all PARTS of the body, in the sense that they are attributes of the body that we can observe. Specifically, they are all CAPACITIES of the body that we can observe IN ACTION. And they are all MANIFESTATIONS of the activity of organs of the body, in the sense that they are ways in which that activity is displayed to our awareness.

Ellen could have made these same simple observations that I have made. It really wasn't difficult. Unfortunately, what she did instead, in her curious attempts to debunk Bill, was not to construct a true parallel, but instead to make three left turns and to end up in Kokomo! Back to the drawing board, Ellen! Or better, let's move on to examining actual errors (if any) in Bill's viewpoint, OK?

Artie

Post 71

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 7:55pm

Good retort, Artie!

Ed

Post 72

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 9:00pm

Artremis,

I stopped to read your post. You show a wonderful sense of reasoning.

Michael

Post 73

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 9:40pm

Ed and Michael, I appreciate the compliments. :-)

This whole thread reminds me of my jewelry box after the grandkids get done looking at my necklaces. Tangles, tangles, tangles.

Bill Dwyer wrote:

As for my definition of 'mind,' the definition is ostensive. Consciousness is understood initially by introspection, and only later discovered to be cerebral in nature.

The more I pondered Bill's comment, the more it looked like he was missing something. If consciousness is a function of a living organism, it seems like even if we don't understand it fully (in scientific detail), we know enough to categorize it and give it a genus-differentia definition. I mean, isn't consciousness another attribute (capacity) and activity of living organisms, like digestion and locomotion? Isn't it another way of transforming energy into a means of our survival?

So, this whole bit about defining consciousness ostensively really has me baffled. On the one hand, Ayn Rand says that when we examine any experience, we find three irreducible facts: something exists (existence), it has a nature (identity), and we are aware of it (consciousness). She calls these parenthetical items "axiomatic concepts," and she says they can't be further analyzed. They are rock bottom features of our experience. And she says that we only can define them, as Bill suggests, ostensively.

For instance in defining "existence," Rand says you can't name any more basic category into which it fits as a species, so all you can do is wave your hand in a circle and say, "I mean this" (the waving to signify EVERYTHING). As for defining "identity," I confess I have no earthly idea what to wave and where in order to ostensively define that! But most importantly, it seems that we can do a lot better than arm-waving with "consciousness."

In contrast with existence and identity, which exist at all times and everywhere, even if and when there is no consciousness to be aware of them, consciousness is a very localized aspect of reality. It is an attribute (a capacity and a state and a process) of certain living organisms, who are relating to the world in a certain way. No living organisms, no consciousness -- even though there's plenty of existence and identity!

So, it seems there is no problem with naming a genus for consciousness. It's an attribute of some living beings. Maybe the hangup is in coming up with a differentia. We certainly differentiate consciousness from other vital attributes, such as digestion and locomotion, but how?

There is no difficulty in differentiating digestion from locomotion. One is a process of transforming energy contained in bits of food one has eaten into chemical energy to drive one's various bodily processes and actions. The other is a process of transforming chemical and electrical energy into mechanical energy so that one can move about, seeking food, shelter, avoidance of danger, someone to mate with, etc.

But as different as digestion and lomotion both are from one another, they both seem more similar to one another than either of them is to consciousness. So, how do we differentiate the first two from consciousness? It seems to me that we do so in the manner by which we are aware of consciousness vs. the manner in which we are aware of digestion and locomotion. We are aware of digestion and locomotion basically by perception, a process of direct awareness aimed at the stomach or legs. And we are aware of consciousness by introspection, a process of direct awareness aimed at the brain. (You don't need to remind me that scientists haven't yet found out the mechanism of introspection to compare to our organs of perception, but I'd be willing to bet that it's brain tissues of some sort, maybe here and there in the brain, rather than in one particular spot like an eyeball.)

At this point, you might think I've just used a lot of words to end up repeating what Bill said: "Consciousness is understood initially by introspection." And you'd be right. But there's an important added ingredient: I'm saying that this is the differentia with which we define "consciousness." And in that respect, I respectfully take issue with Bill's claim that we define "consciousness" ostensively. So, here it is, from Artie's Own Glossary: consciousness is the biological process of which we are directly aware through introspection.

Artie

(Edited by Ms. Kerridge Artemis Kerridge on 2/01, 9:50pm)

(Edited by Ms. Kerridge Artemis Kerridge on 2/01, 9:53pm)

Post 74

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 10:30pm

Good finisher, Artie.

Here is my own 2 cents on a definition ...

Consciousness (Mind):
The twin awareness/directional powers of intellect and will (intention); always & only possessed by living beings, but not possessed by sub-human animals (or plants, for that matter)

Ed

Post 75

Wednesday, February 1, 2006 - 10:36pm

Artemis,

So, this whole bit about defining consciousness ostensively really has me baffled.

If it isn't "ostensive", rooted in existence, then we're stuck in a mystic Platonic realm of dismebodied spirits. Minds are not floating abstractions, though abstractions often float in our minds.

For instance in defining "existence," Rand says you can't name any more basic category into which it fits as a species, so all you can do is wave your hand in a circle and say, "I mean this" (the waving to signify EVERYTHING). As for defining "identity," I confess I have no earthly idea what to wave and where in order to ostensively define that!

I would point to a Unified Field Theory as the hypothetical identity of existence, because it is the identification of the identity, the action, of existence existing.

But most importantly, it seems that we can do a lot better than arm-waving with "consciousness."
...
We certainly differentiate consciousness from other vital attributes, such as digestion and locomotion, but how?
...
It seems to me that we do so in the manner by which we are aware of consciousness vs. the manner in which we are aware of digestion and locomotion.

How do we - query our feelings? Focus attention? Order thoughts? Make abstract concepts? Order abstractions to engineer a car, plan a trip, or write a poem? Ask what the meaning is, and why ask why?

We are aware of digestion and locomotion basically by perception, a process of direct awareness aimed at the stomach or legs. And we are aware of consciousness by introspection, a process of direct awareness aimed at the brain.

Yes, our stomach and gut and limbs have nervese to inform the mind, and autonomic systems of their state. No doubt our minds continually sense themselves.

Its a shame more people are not familiar with electronic control systems, sequential and combinational logic, FIR and IIR filters, neural networks that can do many of the things our minds do - recognize spatio-temporal signals, integrate fluctuations to smoothly fly in complex patterns to shoot down an aircraft. Route a circuit board with millions of paths. Play chess, et.

All these tasks require a form of "introspections", a constant check of "how am I doing to accomplish my goal?". Many computers have event-timers that fire off interupts - time to eat, sleep, mate, et.

The one thing, to me, special about "life" is, we're an attribute of nature, not pre-existing creators having engineered us as their tools. We have "free will", are ends-in-ourselves. Like nature, works of the ostensive-art of existence.

Scott

Post 76

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 6:36am

Artemis Kerridge wrote:

Artie's Own Glossary: consciousness is the biological process of which we are directly aware through introspection.

I've enjoyed reading your other comments, but I am perplexed by this. I think introspection belongs, but what about perception? You also seem to confine consciousness to awareness. How do concepts, volition, memory, and emotion fit? Are they parts of a larger thing called "mind"?

Post 77

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 10:50am

Merlin (love the picture!),

====================
How do concepts, volition, memory, and emotion fit? Are they parts of a larger thing called "mind"?
====================

Artemis may disagree with this, but the easiest way to delineate what is meant by "mind" is to contrast those mental capacities (conceptual awareness & will) which humans have, but animals don't.

Ed
["will" stands in direct opposition to "instinct" -- though both generate action in animate beings]

Post 78

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 4:44pm

Merlin Jetton wrote:

Artemis Kerridge wrote:

Artie's Own Glossary: consciousness is the biological process of which we are directly aware through introspection.
I've enjoyed reading your other comments, but I am perplexed by this. I think introspection belongs, but what about perception? You also seem to confine consciousness to awareness. How do concepts, volition, memory, and emotion fit? Are they parts of a larger thing called "mind"?

Are you asking two (or three) separate questions (judging by the question marks)?

If so, I'll do the best I can. Here goes: (1) I don't think we're directly aware of consciousness through perception. At least, I don't think I am. I do perceive other people that I know are conscious, and I am perceptually aware (in the mirror, etc.) of myself and know that I am conscious. I think this is all inferential, however, and not direct awareness of consciousness. (2)&(3) As for concepts, volition, memory, and emotion, remember I am addressing consciousness (and mind) in my definition as an active process of which we can be aware.

I don't believe that there is such a thing as unconscious consciousness (or mind) or subconscious consciousness (or mind). There is just the brain, doing things some of which are on the level that we can be introspectively aware of. Now, if you mean these things as capacities, i.e., stored stuff, that is potential waiting to be actualized in a way we can be conscious of, yes. But it's all stuff stored in the brain; mind is not some separate thing lurking inside our brains.

I think I agree with Ed. Mind is what distinguishes us from the animals in re our conscious awareness. Animals have memories, too, but those while stored are not consciousness (let alone, mind). They are just stored stuff in the brain, waiting to be activated (or not).

I hope this helps answer your questions, Merlin.

Artie

Post 79

Thursday, February 2, 2006 - 5:10pm