| | In a departing post, Ellen Stuttle writes:
I must admit that I'm astonished to discover developments which have transpired on this thread since I last posted. Roger's using an alter-ego again? Why? Near as I can tell from a quick skim of the "Artemis" posts, because of his having "apoplexy" at my describing Bill as habitually contradicting himself on these subjects. But...so what, from Roger's standpoint? And I'm mystified as to why Roger wouldn't recognize that to speak of "mind" both as a brain-activity and as "a part" of the brain (or body) doesn't scan. Ah, well. (I might at a later time attempt to read the whole sequence to see if I can figure out what point Roger is making, but not now.) Bill Dwyer commented:
The problem here may turn on the word "part." Is running part of the legs, or digestion part of the stomach. Not really. Running is a function of the legs, and digestion, a function of the stomach. But as functions of bodily parts, they are definitely part of the body itself; there is no such thing as disembodied running or digestion. Similarly, vision is not so much "part" of the eye, as it is a function of the eye (or a sensory manifestation of its function). In the same way, vision can also be considered part of the body, as there is no such thing as disembodied vision, unmediated by an organ of perception. This brings us to the relationship between the mind and the brain. Analogously, the mind is not, strictly speaking, "part" of the brain (any more than brain activity is), but it is part of the body in the sense that it is a function, attribute or manifestation of the brain, which is itself part of the body. There is no such thing as disembodied thought, any more than there is disembodied vision. This is approximately what I would have said in reply. However, I think there's more than can and should be said. When I used the word "part," I was using it not in the sense of physical part, but metaphysical part. In other words, not as a physically separable aspect of an organ's or organism's identity, but as a metaphysically inseparable aspect -- an aspect which is separable only in thought. I don't have the page reference available to me right now, but Rand uses "part" in this way in the Appendix of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. In general, an entity's attributes (including capacities) and actions are metaphysical parts of the entity. (In my "Artemis" post, I expressed it this way: "Mind, digestion, and locomotion are all PARTS of the body, in the sense that they are attributes of the body that we can observe." I think it "scans" quite well, thank you.)
Bill also wrote:
The "mind-body" problem arises from a faulty premise -- of the mind as distinct from the body. It is as though one had posited an attribute-entity problem -- a problem of how an attribute could be part of the entity, when it is distinct from the entity -- of how it could be material when only the entity itself is material. The answer is: an entity is its attributes. It is not as though the attributes existed apart from the entity and were joined together to form a unified whole. They are the entity. If the entity is material, its attributes are material. Insofar as the mind is an attribute of the brain, it is no less material than the brain is. There are not two substances, mind and matter, any more than there are two substances, entity and attribute. There are only material entities. Mind is an attribute of a material organ. This line of reasoning actually works quite well, as can be seen if you reverse it. Humans are not only physical or material, but also conscious beings. So, if an entity (human being) is conscious, its attributes are conscious, and vice versa. Insofar as the mind is an attribute of the brain, the brain is no less conscious than the mind is. Insofar as the mind is an attribute of a human being, a human being is no less conscious than the mind is. In fact, the mind is a human brain or a human being being conscious! (This is the consequence of seeing its attributes as being the entity. And it contrasts fundamentally to the dualist, Cartesian view that human beings are conscious because they have some ghost lurking inside them that is conscious and that animates them.)
REB
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