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Geez, the amazing (and to me utterly surprising) new twist of language
which has been added by Bill while I was out shoveling snow. Before I
went to shovel, I read Bill's post 30, in which he describes himself as
"absolutely baffled" by my finding his use of language inconsistent.
And I read Cal's post 31, in which Cal says he doesn't "see any
difference between a person as 'the totality of his parts in interaction'
and a person as 'an integration of the parts.'"
I had a reply formulated in my thoughts at that time, and I'll proceed
to say what I'd intended to say, which was...
Cal, I do see a difference between "the totality of his parts in
interaction" and "an integration of the parts" -- in the context of
this discussion -- and apparently Bill also saw a difference, else why
would he have changed the wording? The difference I see is that the
second phrasing flirts with at minimum agent causation and thus almost
inevitably flirts with dualism-speak. I add the adverb "almost" before
"inevitably" so as to leave room for its being possible that a theorist
might espouse agent causation without having at least lurking dualist
premises. But thus far I don't think I've encountered a theorist who
argues for agent causation who doesn't have -- at least lurking --
dualist premises.
Bill claims that he isn't a dualist; he seems to want to maintain a
strict physicalist theory. As he himself stated in his post 30, the
thesis he believes he's making "absolutely clear" is that: "The mind
*is* the brain identified introspectively." Or, as he stated this
with more precision in post 7: "The mind is (a certain part of)
the brain identified introspectively."
What I'm saying in reply to Bill is that, no, this thesis is not
coming through clearly to me. And I think that the reason this
thesis isn't coming through clearly to me is because Bill doesn't
consistently hold this thesis.
Recall, from earlier posts in the discussion..
In post 6, Dean wrote:
"Vision is a process, it is what light, eyes, cones, rods, and
neurons can do. Thinking is a process, it is what neurons can do."
Bill replied, in post 7:
"I have no problem with this, as long as we recognize that by 'do'
in this context, we mean that thinking is a function performed by these
neurons, which a person engages in, just as seeing is a function of the
eyes that he performs, or digestion a function of the stomach that he
undergoes. It is a person who thinks, sees, digests food, etc., not
just his bodily parts. I'm not suggesting that you are denying this,
but only stressing it, so there's no misunderstanding."
I then wrote, in post 12:
"I see either (a) no meaning added by 'the person' in this description;
or (b) an inconsistency introduced. This is the same issue I raised
on the 'Perception of Reality' thread. And Bill gives what seems to me
the same answer -- only he gave it more briefly here.
"Bill, if all you mean by 'person' (or 'I') is the total entity, what
have you added by referring to the 'person' as the locus of the
'doing'? What you appear to me to mean is that there's something over
and above the neuronal functioning, some kind of additional entity which
'thinks, sees, digests food, etc,' some kind of entity which 'has'
the bodily parts instead of being merely the totality of those parts
in interaction."
I still say that, were Bill being consistent with his own claim that
"[t]he mind is (a certain part of) the brain identified introspectively,"
he'd see no need for adding the caveat he added in post 7, and he
wouldn't use language such as "a person engages in, [...] performs
[and] undergoes."
So I'll ask the question this way, Bill: Why did you feel it necessary,
in your reply to Dean, to write: *as long as we recognize that*
by 'do' in this context, we mean that thinking is a function
performed by these neurons, which *a person engages in*, just as seeing
is a function of the eyes that *he performs*, or digestion a function
of the stomach that *he undergoes*" [my emphasis]? What do you believe
has been added by your caveat phrase? What meaning do you see as
requiring the addition?
I think that, were you being consistent, you'd see no need of the
addition and that, instead, you'd express what you mean by
"a person" in a parallel statement to your declared view of "mind."
Repeating your claim about "mind": "The mind is (a certain part
of) the brain identified introspectively."
I'd see as a consistent parallel: A person is the totality of a
human organism as experienced.
But I anticipate that you won't like this way of defining "person,"
given your comments earlier responding to Cal re Dennett on the
"Perception of Reality" thread (your post 55 on that thread).
Possibly it will help you to understand why I'm questioning your
language -- why your language seems to me to be implying some *entity*
over and above the brain-functioning which you say *is* "mind" --
if I refer to a book title. The book title is *The Self and Its Brain*
(by Popper and Eccles, 1977). What you sound to me as if you're
talking about is summarized by that title: here's the brain, and
then here's the "self" which "does" by means of, which "uses" the
brain, which "has" the brain. Of course the usage "I have a brain"
is quite common. But it's also inappropriate usage if one is
attempting to propose a consistently physicalist non-dualist
theory of the nature of consciousness.
A passage from Dennett might help on this issue. He writes,
on pg. 28-29 of *Consciousness Explained*:
--
[Excerpt]
"Mind stuff [...] apparently has some remarkable properties. One
of these we have already noticed in passing, but it is extremely
resistant to definition. As a first pass, let us say that mind stuff
always *has a witness*. The trouble with brain events, we noticed,
is that no matter how closely they 'match' the events in our streams
of consciousness, they have one apparently fatal drawback: *There's
nobody in there watching them*. Events that happen in your brain,
just like events that happen in your stomach or your liver, are not
normally witnessed by anyone, nor does it make any difference to
how they happen whether they occur witnessed or unwitnessed. Events
in consciousness, on the other hand, are 'by definition' witnessed;
they are *experienced* by an *experiencer*, and their being thus
experienced is what makes them what they are: *conscious* events.
An experienced event cannot just happen on its own hook, it seems;
it must be *somebody's* experience. For a thought to happen,
someone (some mind) must think it, and for a pain to happen,
someone must feel it, and for a purple cow to burst into existence
'in imagination,' someone must imagine it.
"And the trouble with brains, it seems, is that when you look in them,
you discover that *there's nobody home*. No part of the brain is the
thinker that does the thinking or the feeler that does the feeling,
and the whole brain appears to be no better a candidate for that very
special role. This is a slippery topic. Do brains think? Do eyes see?
Or do people see with their eyes and think with their brains?
Is there a difference? Is this just a trivial point of 'grammar' or
does it reveal a major source of confusion? The idea that a *self*
(or a person, or, for that matter, a soul) is distinct from a brain
or a body is deeply rooted in our ways of speaking, and hence
in our ways of thinking.
"I have a brain.
"This seems to be a perfectly uncontroversial thing to say. And
it does not seem to mean just
"This body has a brain (and a heart, and two lungs, etc.).
"or
"This brain has itself.
"It is quite natural to think of 'the self and its brain' (Popper
and Eccles, 1977) as two distinct things, with different properties,
no matter how closely they depend on each other."
[End Excerpt]
--
However, IF one is trying to propose a theory which holds that "mind
*is* (a certain part of the brain) as experienced introspectively,"
then to be consistent, one needs to make a strenuous effort to break
the "self and its brain" way of thinking and to avoid the language
which goes with it.
So... that's what I was planning to say before I went out to shovel
snow. And it's what I've said. But meanwhile...
Help!! HELLO?? How did politics suddenly get into this? Bill, I
thought we were talking about materialism and the mind/body issue,
not about collectivism versus individualism. You write in response
to Cal: "[The difference between 'totality' and 'integrate' is]
the difference between an organization and an organism, or between
a collective and an individual. Collectivists typically make no such
distinction. They treat the collective as if it were an individual."
If all you're trying to get at is the difference between an
"aggregate" and an organism, then I can understand your objecting to
the word "totality," although the way in which you objected to it
sounds like at least borderline dualism-speak. But I see no relevance
whatsoever here in the context of this discussion to any mention of
"collectivists"; nor do I see any relevance to the issue of
"collectivism" versus "individualism" in the passage you quoted
from Branden. However, what I see in the second part of that
passage is exactly a reference (which you're apparently quoting
approvingly) to what you're claiming you're arguing *against*,
that is, mind-body interaction.
???
Ellen
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