About
Content
Store
Forum

Rebirth of Reason
War
People
Archives
Objectivism

Post to this threadMark all messages in this thread as readMark all messages in this thread as unreadBack one pagePage 0Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Forward one pageLast Page


Post 40

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:21amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Binswanger is not a substance dualist (as claimed by some)!

Folks've claimed that Harry B. is a Cartesian dualist (from his comments on his taped lecture: Metaphysics of Consciousness), but this cannot be true. Here is an excerpt trashing substance dualism, edited by Binswanger himself ...

========================
For a Dualist, who must deny the identity of the Self and the Brain, neurological science has followed the nerves "back" from the sensory organs, and demonstrated that all there is, no matter how far "back" you look, is merely electrical signals between different sets of neurons. So obviously, there must be some sort of "theatre" where all these electrical signals get translated into some form of "image" that the mind can then understand and be aware of. Obviously, the mind is not aware of the electrical signals that are being exchanged during all that second-stage processing.

With the three-step, Idealist or Dualist, model of perception, one can entertain all sorts of fancy thought experiments ranging from the Brain in a Vat to Descartes' Demon, where the mischief is located somewhere between the sensory receptors that receive the image of "things as they really are" and the mind that receives the image of "things as they appear". One can then argue that what the mind "perceives" is not what the senses receive from the environment. And therefore, even in the absence of mischief, what the mind perceives as the way the world "appears" is not necessarily the way the world "really is". And since we can never know whether some perception has been the result of mischief along the way, we can never know "things as they really are". Of even if there is such a thing as "the way they really are".

Which raises the question of just what exactly would be the nature of some thing "as it really is" as opposed to the way that the thing "appears" ...
========================

Does anyone smell a Kantian (ie. wrong-headed; trash-filled) theme here?

Ed

Source:
www.philosophos.com/knowledge_base/new_archives/answers_18.html


(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/24, 12:24am)


Post 41

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 9:21amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed, I agree that Searle makes solid points.  I am not sure I have wrapped my head around it completely yet, but thanks for the post.

Post 42

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 9:57amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed, thanks for the references to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It was my first time hearing of predicate dualism. I didn't read the entire article - only the sections giving the triad - predicate dualism, property dualism and substance dualism.

It seems to me that predicate dualism and property dualism are quite compatible. While Searle denies being a property dualist per the article referenced by Ellen Stuttle (post #12), his reason pertains to eliminative reductionism. Hence, it seems he could be regarded as a property dualist when the alternatives are the triad.

One topic the triad does not discuss is goal-directedness. However, considering it strengthens my favoring property dualism.

EDIT: It wasn't clear why I mentioned goal-directedness. It was because the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry made a connection between a 'vital force' and property dualism. No 'vital force' is needed; goal-directedness can support property dualism.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 1/24, 12:19pm)


Post 43

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 11:13amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Bill,

As Ellen's primary charge against you involves a suspected contradiction in your view -- and subsequent slippage back into an epiphenomenalism -- I thought it might help to make that concept clear here (which would then allow you to clearly differentiate your view from it -- if you wish to) ...

epiphenomenalism

The doctrine that mental phenomena are not causal despite the fact they may seem to be.




Source:
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/E.html

Now that doesn't sound like you, Bill. Is it? Could what you've said be commensurate with that?

Just trying to get a few cents in here,

Ed

p.s. Thanks Kurt & Merlin, this stuff is deep alright. I started out as a dyed-in-the-wool property dualist -- but now I've got to even question that (and I may end up as a predicate dualist!).


Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Post 44

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 11:30amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
But even then, a dualist you will remain !! Engaard!!! ;-)

Post 45

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:07pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Sir Malcolm, [loud clash of steel: clang, clang] I would admit that thee were better than I [clang, clang] ... but I am not left-handed!  

;-)

Ed
[spoof from The Princess Bride]

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/24, 12:07pm)


Post 46

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:12pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Uh... Ed?

[whispers]

I think the reply was "I am not left handed either!"

Post 47

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:30pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed quoted a Dictionary of Mind definition of "epiphenomenalism":

"The doctrine that mental phenomena are not causal despite the fact they may seem to be."

I haven't read the article yet, but I think that this definition is a poor one. It could cover a whole lot of theorists, including Searle. I've discovered in recent readings that there seems to have been slippage in the meaning of "epiphenomenalism" over the last maybe twenty-five or so years. What it used to mean (in psychology; it might have had a somewhat different meaning even then in philosophy) was the doctrine that consciousness is irrelevant, beside the point, that everything would happen the same if there were no such phenomenon as consciousness.

Ed writes re my criticisms of Bill:

"[Her] primary charge [...] involves a suspected contradiction in your view -- and subsequent slippage back into an epiphenomenalism ."

I have numerous criticisms of Bill's theories. I think he has a habit of contradicting himself every which way. The contradiction I've been speaking of on this thread is that between partly sounding like he's proposing an agent-causation theory, while meanwhile proposing a mind/brain-activity identity theory. The two theory types are inconsistent. Consider an example from cosmology: You can't consistently propose both an Unmoved Mover cosmology and a Big Bang cosmology. In similar fashion, you can't consistently propose both an agent theory -- which is a theory of a top-down causal "authority" -- and a mind/brain-activity identity theory -- which is a completely bottom-up causal theory.

I don't seriously propose (though I made a quip on another thread which might have intimated that I do) that Bill is an "epiphenomenalist," according to my understanding of that term from my psychology training. And he wouldn't classify as an epiphenomenalist according to the (poor) definition you quoted, whichever of the (inconsistent) theories he's currently sounding like he's trying simultaneously to employ he might opt for: An agent-causation theory isn't epiphenomenalist by the cited definition. Neither, precisely, is a mind/brain-activity identity theory, since the latter says that mind just IS something the brain is doing, thus the causal efficacy is that of strict physics.

Ellen


___
(Edited by Ellen Stuttle
on 1/24, 12:40pm)


Post 48

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:35pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Robert Malcolm wrote (to Ed):

"But even then, a dualist you will remain !! Engaard!!! ;-)"

Anyone who's an Objectivist is a dualist of some form (precisely which form is the question, not if), since Objectivism holds that the mental is real and isn't identical to the physical. (Else why would there be an "interaction" or an "integration" of the twain?)

ES


Post 49

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 12:49pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Okay Ellen. But I was thinking of original, Hobbesian epiphenomenalism ("consciousness" is merely the "smoke" of the mechanico-material "fire" -- we're "along for a scenic ride" but not in the "driver's seat"), and I felt that that definition captured that notion well enough. It seems that you are trying to pin substance dualism on Bill, or, at least on part of his argument.

Mike E., you are using Vincini's Defense against me, naturally you'd expect me to attack with Cappatillo ...   ;-)

Ed
[more Bride]


Post 50

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 1:06pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed,

That would be

"You're using Bonetti's defense against me, eh?"
"I thought it fitting considering the rocky terrain."
"Naturally you must expect I will attack with capo ferro."
"Naturally. But I find that Thibault cancels out capo ferro. Don't you?"
"Not if the enemy has studied his Agrippa. Which I have."


Ethan

"The R.U.Ss? I don't think they exist."

(Edited by Ethan Dawe on 1/24, 1:08pm)


Post 51

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 1:14pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Yikes! I'm a non-combatant! Just an observer!

Roberrrt!!

Post 52

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 3:37pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Fessig!!! I need you!!!

Post 53

Tuesday, January 24, 2006 - 3:42pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
And I AM left-handed..............;-))

[always knew there was going to be a use for those Raphael Sabatini works.......;-)]


Post 54

Friday, January 27, 2006 - 7:44amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ellen wrote:
Anyone who's an Objectivist is a dualist of some form (precisely which form is the question, not if), since Objectivism holds that the mental is real and isn't identical to the physical. (Else why would there be an "interaction" or an "integration" of the twain?)
      I'm glad to see that there's something clarified re what she believes about O'ism and what I believe about it to be true, especially regarding a subject that has NOT been clarified within O'ism proper, (so far as I'm familiar with), for exactly the reason she parenthetically...and rhetorically...asks. (An other 'gap' in O'ism philosophy, if you will; the identification-or-lack-thereof-of-Mind-and-Matter.)

     My view on the situation is akin to when the 'morning star' and the 'evening star' were debated as to whether or not they were the same: as Mr. Spock would say, "Insufficient data, Captain."

     Knowledgeable O'ists can correct me if I'm wrong on this (I've not been able to afford the latest thought-tapes on 'O'ism-proper'), but the 'mental' aspect of human existence IS considered as, so far, substantially different from the 'non-mental' aspects of human existence; hence, they are, again, 'so far', considered as substantially (at least epistemologically, if not metaphysically)...different. Hence, an apparent 'dualism'...at whatever level...requiring a perspective that calls for some kind of 'relationship' argument re 'interaction', 'integration', 'identification', etc.

     Mesuspects that in a certain sense, they're both 'aspects' of the same thing. No, I'm not talking 'physical reductionism', anymore than I'd argue that a magnetic-source and it's  field (or, a magnetic field and it's source) are the same thing. A 'brain-state' and it's concomitant 'awareness' MAY be the same thing, but, from different 'perspectives'. (Question: what does [or even can] 'perspective' mean in purely physicalist terms?)

     I think that there's too much quandrying over the 'mental' aspects of this...puzzle; methinks there's more to the 'physical' (or 'matter') side that has yet to be discovered, identified, and related (not to mention understood)...and is the real source of the answers to the 'mind-matter' puzzle. I consider Physical-Reductionists to be too myopic in their consideration of present-day 'knowledge' to be 'enough' (Remember the 'bumblebee argument'?) --- Such answers might come in our lifetime, but I wouldn't hold my breath. Until then, we should accept the apparently interacting-'dualism'...philosophically-"integratable" or not. So far, the 'morningstar' is NOT (another term for) the 'eveningstar'. Let's let go of this Black-Hole of philosophy, until we eventually learn how to create Worm-Holes through it. 'Till then, there's no reason to accept the belief that Santa is a Martian.

     Mind is not matter; matter is not Mind. Gravity is not matter; matter is not Gravity.
      Until we scientifically discover more in physics about physics...why not leave it at that...and deal with it as such?

LLAP
J:D


Post 55

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 12:16amSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
John,

==================
Mind is not matter; matter is not Mind. Gravity is not matter; matter is not Gravity.
      Until we scientifically discover more in physics about physics...why not leave it at that...and deal with it as such?
==================

Because that's no fun.

:-)

Ed
[I like the gravity-analogy; I've used it before. Gravity is a non-physical phenomenon (pure "force") that interacts with physical phenomena -- and that's interesting]



Post 56

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 7:17pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ed,

On the surface, it looks like gravity is some invisible cause, (like mind?), that coerces mass to obey. With relativity and QM, you have an entity, space-time, that has properties like curvature and energy. "Gravity" is a property of that entity, curvature of the continuum. "Mass" is an observation of the energy at a point.

The dualism I notice is the ephemeral nature of not "force", an observation with respect to a Newtonian mass, but the principle, the relationship of the continuum to consistently maintain its geometric and energy relationships. Wherever and whenever you are, you find there dimensions for space, and energy is conserved. Space-time has a consistent pattern, structure.

There is 1. That which doesn't change over space & time (Truth, physical laws, such as G=8piT) and 2. That which changes such as geometry, forces, field-values, details.

Scott

Post 57

Monday, January 30, 2006 - 7:40pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
I've been busy lately and regret not being able to continue the discussion. I do want to reply to Cal and Ellen, and will do so shortly, when I get the opportunity. Just wanted to say that I'm still around and haven't dropped out.

Just briefly, I don't equate mind-brain interaction with the concept of a living organism as "an integrate" or an integrated entity. The mind and the brain do not interact with each other, as I argued previously, any more than one's physical eyes interact with one's visual experiences. You could say that different parts of the body interact with each other -- that the mind/brain interacts with the heart and lungs as, for example, when a perception of danger causes one's heart to beat faster and one's breathing to increase. The interaction there is not between the mind and the brain, but between the mind/brain (as a single organ) and the heart and lungs.

The mind is real, but it is simply a manifestation of the brain's activity; one thinks with one's brain. If the mind were separate and distinct from the brain, one could think and be aware without using the brain, which is impossible. This is not to say that the mind is ruled by the brain any more than that the brain is ruled by the mind. It is not to say that conscious direction and control are illusory (which, as I understand it, is the doctrine of epiphenomenalism), for that implies that there is a metaphysical dichotomy between the mind and the brain and that mind is at the behest of the brain, which is the wrong way to view it. The brain no more directs and controls the mind than the mind directs and controls the brain. We do, of course, consciously direct and control our actions, but that conscious control is simultaneously brain control. When the mind acts, it is a certain part of the brain that is acting. The brain is the organ through which one thinks and becomes aware -- i.e., through which the mind exists and functions.

All 4 now.

- Bill

Post 58

Tuesday, January 31, 2006 - 3:48pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Ellen quoted the following passage from Dennett's Consciousness Explained:

And the trouble with brains, it seems, is that when you look in them, you discover that *there's nobody home*. No part of the brain is the thinker that does the thinking or the feeler that does the feeling, and the whole brain appears to be no better a candidate for that very special role. This is a slippery topic. Do brains think? Do eyes see? Or do people see with their eyes and think with their brains? Is there a difference? Is this just a trivial point of 'grammar' or does it reveal a major source of confusion? The idea that a *self* (or a person, or, for that matter, a soul) is distinct from a brain or a body is deeply rooted in our ways of speaking, and hence in our ways of thinking.

I have a brain.

This seems to be a perfectly uncontroversial thing to say. And it does not seem to mean just

This body has a brain (and a heart, and two lungs, etc.).

or

This brain has itself.

It is quite natural to think of 'the self and its brain' (Popper and Eccles, 1977) as two distinct things, with different properties, no matter how closely they depend on each other.

The point that I have been making is that the self or the I refers to the total person, not simply to some part of the person. In other words, it does not refer simply to the mind and/or the brain.

Dennett asks what it means to say, "I have a brain." He says that it does not seem to mean that the body has a brain. But that's because of the mind-body dichotomy; it's because people typically think of the mind as something separate and distinct from the body, when in reality, the mind is a part of the body. Therefore, you could indeed say that the statement "I have a brain" means, "This body has a brain, etc," as long as you recognize that "this body" includes the mind -- that we are not talking about a mindless body. And of course, the statement does not mean, "This brain has itself," since again, the self is not synonymous with the mind and/or the brain.

Perhaps, an analogy will help. Suppose I said, "My car has an engine." Do I simply mean, "My car's engine has itself"? No, I mean that the whole car has as an engine. Similarly, when I say that "I have a brain," I mean that the whole person has a brain.

There is a sense in which you could say that a certain part of the brain (the cerebrum) thinks, just as you could say that legs run or that hands write, but all you're really saying is that it is the person who does these things with his or her brain, legs or hands. Just as there is no such thing as disembodied legs and hands performing actions, neither is there such a thing as a disembodied mind or brain performing them. It is the entity itself that performs the actions via its parts, organs and faculties.

- Bill


Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Sanction: 5, No Sanction: 0
Post 59

Tuesday, January 31, 2006 - 6:30pmSanction this postReply
Bookmark
Link
Edit
Well put, Bill.

Ed


Post to this threadBack one pagePage 0Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Forward one pageLast Page


User ID Password or create a free account.