RoR: Forum

Daniel,

Rick writes:
>Since a concept refers to all the entities of a particular type it is complete. What can most likely never be complete is our knowledge of those entities themselves....Combining the last two, the concept doesn't change since it continues to refer to the same set of entities but our knowledge of those entities themselves does change.

Now there's the rub!

You're saying a *concept* is complete.

But you're also saying our *knowledge* of that concept is, however, always *incomplete*.

Now Daniel. I took ten seconds to read his post, and it's clear that his notion of a complete concept is exactly the same as my "definite", and his "incomplete" is the same as my "open-ended (in the knowledge sense)." It's a real shame that he used contrary terms to describe these aspects, but they aren't referring to the same property of concepts.

(Although, Rick, I do have to object somewhat to your presentation here, since it seems to require that the "completeness" (as you would say) of concepts does not come from explicitly knowing every unit, but instead being able to unambiguously determine whether a given existent is a unit of the concept or not.)

But the problem with this position which you may not have noticed is that according to Objectivism, *concepts are supposed to be how humans know things in the first place*!!!!! They *are* human knowledge!!! So when you say concepts are complete, yet *human knowledge* of them is never likely to be complete, you've unintentionally contradicted yourself (not to mention leaving a rather funky Platonic implication dangling...).

Now this is pure equivocation, and you know it Daniel. He's using "complete" in a very specific sense as a property of concepts, and you've used it as a delimiter on all of human knowledge to derive your contradiction.

See what I mean? It simply doesn't make sense. Now, you could avoid all this by simply saying our concepts are incomplete because human knowledge is incomplete, and then it's all hunky dory.

This doesn't follow. We don't have to know everything to know something.

Nate

Post 221

Wednesday, January 12, 2005 - 8:50pm

Nate wrote:
>As for #4, I'm not even sure what this is supposed to mean-- where exactly did either Rick or I (or any other Objectivist, for that matter) say that?

Actually Rodney Rawlings, who I understand has been giving you the odd pointer in this debate, came up with that one a while back. He has an excellent grasp of Objectivism as far as I am aware. And now Rick has now also come up with much the same thing, the underlying problem with which I have pointed out above.

And yes, I'm not sure what it is supposed to mean either....;-)

As regards #3, it appears Rick regards concepts as discardable or overthrowable - such as phlogiston - yet you did not think they could be. As I say, you will have to take that up with him...;-). I of course have no problem with this. It is perfectly reasonable.

(And of course #3 suffers from the same problem that I've pointed out above - that human knowledge can change, but concepts can't - but human knowledge and concepts are, according to Objectivism, *the same thing!* Human knowledge is conceptual! So you end up with just the situation I describe in #3.)

Nate writes:
>We are all well aware of what you think of IOE.� I don't know what this opinion is adding to the discussion, other than to poison the well.

I'm just showing that ideas have consequences which you don't always see at the start. Once you adopt them, you have to keep a careful eye on where they lead. If if they consistently lead you into problematic places, this is a sign that the idea is likely to be wrong. (And indeed, Ayn Rand would certainly agree with this) No "well poisoning" intended.

- Daniel

Post 222

Wednesday, January 12, 2005 - 10:49pm

Daniel,

Nate wrote:
>As for #4, I'm not even sure what this is supposed to mean-- where exactly did either Rick or I (or any other Objectivist, for that matter) say that?

Actually Rodney Rawlings, who I understand has been giving you the odd pointer in this debate, came up with that one a while back. He has an excellent grasp of Objectivism as far as I am aware. And now Rick has now also come up with much the same thing, the underlying problem with which I have pointed out above.

And yes, I'm not sure what it is supposed to mean either....;-)

Very well, I'm caught in an awkward moment. Nonetheless, I'm sure he gave the exact same elaborations that Rick and I have given you about definite vs. open-ended concepts, and your having no idea about what it means is a less than upright declaration.

As regards #3, it appears Rick regards concepts as discardable or overthrowable - such as phlogiston - yet you did not think they could be. As I say, you will have to take that up with him...;-). I of course have no problem with this. It is perfectly reasonable.

I believe (and he will have to let me know) that there is no essential difference between our positions. While the phlogiston is not referred to in science anymore as an explanation of heat phenomena since it has been so thoroughly discredited, the concept still has uses in other contexts like, say, a debate over epistemology. ;-)

Also, don't take my examples of Newton's Laws and Einstein's Theory of Relativity as an indication that we ought to keep every scientific theory that has ever been conceived. Scientists were right to discard the notion of phlogiston as a serious scientific idea, just as they were right to discard the ether.

(And of course #3 suffers from the same problem that I've pointed out above - that human knowledge can change, but concepts can't - but human knowledge and concepts are, according to Objectivism, *the same thing!* Human knowledge is conceptual! So you end up with just the situation I describe in #3.)

That's right-- if you substitute "complete" for "unchanging" and "incomplete" for "changing", your argument is formally the same. However, it still fallacious on the grounds of equivocation.

Nate writes:
>We are all well aware of what you think of IOE. I don't know what this opinion is adding to the discussion, other than to poison the well.

I'm just showing that ideas have consequences which you don't always see at the start. Once you adopt them, you have to keep a careful eye on where they lead. If if they consistently lead you into problematic places, this is a sign that the idea is likely to be wrong. (And indeed, Ayn Rand would certainly agree with this) No "well poisoning" intended.

I agree with your caution about checking your premises, as any Objectivist would. However, I hardly see how repeating "IOE is poorly written, Rand is confused" in every one of your posts illuminates the consequences of our views that might be harmful-- a well thought out objection to Rand's epistemological theories is sufficient to do that job.

Nate

Post 223

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 12:03am

Nate writes:
>Now this is pure equivocation, and you know it Daniel.� He's using "complete" in a very specific sense as a property of concepts, and you've used it as a delimiter on all of human knowledge to derive your contradiction.

Nate, I don't believe I'm being equivocal (which means to use terms in a way likely to confuse or mislead). My terms don't require any "very specific sense" in which to operate - in fact, it is usually via these "special meanings" that equivocaters do their wriggling ("Ah! But when I say so-and-so I mean something quite different from what you would normally think...etc etc" ). I try to make sure you can understand what I'm saying straight off the bat, with as little appeal to any jargon, specialised meanings or unstated prior concepts you might not know as possible. I hope you agree that I have been doing that throughout this debate.

In fact, I would say that the use of "complete" that you cite above is a classic example of equivocation, though I think it is entirely innocent on Rick's part. I tend to think the "very specific sense" you mention simply doesn't exist. For if completeness is a "property of concepts", and concepts are just another name for human knowledge, therefore "completeness" is a property of human knowledge. But he's said that human knowledge is "incomplete"! (I'm assuming that you're not going to argue that *some* concepts are complete and some aren't).

Now, of course one can always find ways of immunising a theory against criticism (usually by resorting to jargon or dubious "special meanings" for words). And I of course do not consider my own argument definitive - for example, you might rephrase and argue that completeness is not a property of concepts, but a property of *some certain properties* of concepts, and that might get you out of difficulty. But more importantly, think it through for yourself - try being objectively critical of your own theory, to see if it stands up. Use logic as a kind of a warning sign that lets you know if you're entering dubious territory. Fr'instance, if a non-Objectivist presented this sort of thing as a theory, would you think it very impressive?

And let's not get distracted just by these problems! I'm still waiting to find out why, if concepts can be neither true nor false as Rick claims, why we should spend time debating them - for surely the point of a debate is to try to establish truth or falsity? And *how* is it that we know about particulars then, if not by concepts?

I wrote:
>>Now, you could avoid all this by simply saying our concepts are incomplete because human knowledge is incomplete, and then it's all hunky dory.

Nate replied:
>This doesn't follow.� We don't have to know everything to know something.

It does follow! If concepts are human knowledge, and human knowledge is incomplete, concepts are incomplete. What doesn't follow about that?

My position is that human knowledge is incomplete, and is likely to remain so given the vastness that surrounds us. That doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or that we have no knowledge. Where did I say or even imply that we have to know everything to know something?

- Daniel

Post 224

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 12:05pm

Nate T writes:

I took ten seconds to read his post, and it's clear that his notion of a complete concept is exactly the same as my "definite", and his "incomplete" is the same as my "open-ended (in the knowledge sense)." It's a real shame that he used contrary terms to describe these aspects, but they aren't referring to the same property of concepts.

Context is important. I was responding to Daniel's item #4. He used the word "complete" so I wanted to respond specifically to his words. It is certainly not what I would ever have said otherwise.
(Edited by Rick Pasotto on 1/13, 12:06pm)

Post 225

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 12:19pm

Daniel Barnes writes:

I don't believe I'm being equivocal (which means to use terms in a way likely to confuse or mislead).

No it doesn't. It means to use the same term with two different meanings. Evidently I should have simply said in response to your #4 "I have no idea what a 'complete' or 'incomplete' concept is".

In fact that's probably what I should do from now on -- require you to specifically define your terms before responding to any of your posts.

You really seem uninterested in learning what Objectivism's theory of concepts is but are quite willing to poke at what you do not understand. I have put significant information in my posts, information that I'm quite sure you have never encountered before, but you have just skipped over it and continued to post your misunderstandings.

Let me know when you decide you want to understand.

Post 226

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 1:10pm

Daniel,

Rick does a good job explaining what equivocation is, and why your arguments are equivocal. On to your post:

But more importantly, think it through for yourself - try being objectively critical of your own theory, to see if it stands up. Use logic as a kind of a warning sign that lets you know if you're entering dubious territory.

I'd love to take your advice, but if concepts really are what you say they are, nothing more than vague ideas ("family resemblances," perhaps?) I doubt such a critical method is possible.

It does follow! If concepts are human knowledge, and human knowledge is incomplete, concepts are incomplete. What doesn't follow about that?

Concepts are complete in the sense that you can determine whether any existent is a unit of the concept. Human knowledge is incomplete in the sense that no one is omniscient. Now your argument becomes the following:

"Concepts form the basis of human knowledge. We can determine whether an existent is a unit of that concept. No one knows everything about the referents of a concept. Therefore, we don't know to what in reality concepts refer. This is absurd."

Going from claim 3 to claim 4 is a non sequitur. As I've mentioned before, the meaning of a concept and the knowledge of its units are two different things.

Daniel, I know why you're arguing this point. It's because you don't want a group of people to redefine words in order to abuse the human language, like the old Soviet regime used to try to do. But your solution to this problem is this: "Since I don't want people to infuse words with meanings other than those I intend, I'll deny that words have meanings." You throw out the baby with the bathwater.

Nate

Post 227

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 10:44am

Nate writes:
>That's right-- if you substitute "complete" for "unchanging" and "incomplete" for "changing", your argument is formally the same.� However, it still fallacious on the grounds of equivocation.

As I say, I don't think it's me who's equivocating.

Teacher: "Johnny, your homework is incomplete".
Johnny: "But sir, it is complete!"
Teacher: "What do you mean, lad?"
Johnny: "It's complete in the very specific sense of the word that I use!"

*That* is equivocating. However I think unlike Johnny, Rick is doing it unwittingly.(This is one of the problems with specialised meanings and jargon - it can confuse the user too! That's why it's a good intellectual discipline to try and avoid them as much as possible)

Nate:
>I hardly see how repeating "IOE is poorly written, Rand is confused" in every one of your posts illuminates the consequences of our views...

As a general principle, I'd rather assume the responsibility for problems rests with higher authorities, rather than the lower ones! But OK, I'll assume you've got my view on that one...;-)

>Nonetheless, I'm sure he gave the exact same elaborations that Rick and I have given you about definite vs. open-ended concepts, and your having no idea about what it means is a less than upright declaration.

Without wanting to recycle that debate, Rodney took a somewhat different position. From memory, Rodney argued that *neither* of the terms "complete" nor "incomplete" could be applied to concepts - that they were completely irrelevant. I admit I still do not understand what he meant by this.

His argument seemed to be that by calling human knowledge (or concepts) "incomplete" I was judging it by an allegedly humanly impossible standard. (This argument is very easily rebutted however, as all we need to do is apply a *hypothetical* standard, and humans produce hypotheses all the time!)

Anyway, I mention this not to rekindle that debate, but to answer your accusation that I am being "less that upright". As with the charge of "equivocation", I hope you can see this is not the case.

- Daniel

Post 228

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 12:50pm

Rick would seem to be wasting his time pointing out to Daniel the definition of equivocation, since Daniel thinks definitions are not important in intellectual debates. His whole epistemology consists in using words in a confusing way--but I don't call it equivocation, I call it World 3 thinking gone wild.

Daniel, be aware that while your four-point summation may seem from your deeply-engrained premises to show at a glance the illogic and emptiness of Objectivism, from our deeply-engrained premises it shows at a glance the lack of depth in your thought.

Post 229

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 2:21pm

Nate: �It's not so much that you "find" the referents in the sense that you're actively seeking them out, since that would suggest that you know what you are looking for already. The existents which will be the referents are available to you as knowledge��

The existents are available to us as objects, surely. If they were available as knowledge, we could simply �read them off� directly without having to go through a process of concept formation.

��you begin the concept-formation process by noting similarities and differences.�

Similarity and difference � and not just among perceived objects -- obviously has a role to play in the acquisition of knowledge. But on the perceptual level, the environment is bombarding us with a massive amount of stimuli every second of the day. Why do we �observe� some perceptual similarities and differences, and not others?

The options are: 1) We choose to direct our attention at certain perceptual stimuli and ignore others; 2) Certain perceptual stimuli �impress� themselves upon our minds, while others remain passive and inert. I don�t believe the second option is at all persuasive, but that�s the option for the blank slate.

Brendan

Post 230

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 2:26pm

Rick: �Combining the last two, the concept doesn't change since it continues to refer to the same set of entities but our knowledge of those entities themselves does change.�

Hi Rick. You seem to be making a distinction here between concepts and knowledge. I think there�s a problem with this. A concept is usually regarded as a mental abstraction that embodies a general idea. In that case, the concept just is knowledge, while the word is a term that stands for the concept.

If the concept is not equivalent to knowledge, it becomes empty of content, no more than a label or name. This amounts to extreme nominalism on universals. On the other hand, if the concept never changes, it becomes some type of eternal, immutable non-material object, reminiscent of Plato�s forms, which amounts to extreme realism on universals.

This is a very odd coupling. Among other things it divorces concepts from knowledge, whereas I�m sure that Rand claims that all knowledge is conceptual.

Brendan

Post 231

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 3:20pm

Hi Brendan,

Similarity and difference � and not just among perceived objects -- obviously has a role to play in the acquisition of knowledge. But on the perceptual level, the environment is bombarding us with a massive amount of stimuli every second of the day. Why do we �observe� some perceptual similarities and differences, and not others?

One uses one's volition to focus on one aspect of reality. Put more simply, we will to understand the world around us, and we do that a little bit at a time, since humans aren't all-seeing.

The options are: 1) We choose to direct our attention at certain perceptual stimuli and ignore others; 2) Certain perceptual stimuli �impress� themselves upon our minds, while others remain passive and inert. I don�t believe the second option is at all persuasive, but that�s the option for the blank slate.

(1) is correct.

Nate

Post 232

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 3:58pm

Brendan writes:

You seem to be making a distinction here between concepts and knowledge. I think there�s a problem with this.

Of course concepts and knowledge are not the same thing.

A concept is usually regarded as a mental abstraction that embodies a general idea.

And that is one of the errors, one of the false definitions, that Rand corrected.

If the concept is not equivalent to knowledge, it becomes empty of content, no more than a label or name.

Nonsense. I suggest you read Introduction to Objectivism Epistemology. Concepts are man's means of making knowledge possible by integrating the incomprehensibly huge amount of data available to him into manageable units.

If the concept is not equivalent to knowledge, it becomes empty of content, no more than a label or name. This amounts to extreme nominalism on universals. On the other hand, if the concept never changes, it becomes some type of eternal, immutable non-material object, reminiscent of Plato�s forms, which amounts to extreme realism on universals.

What you are missing is that concepts are epistemological devices, creations of man and necessitated by the way his consciousness works. A concept is a grouping of certain existents according to a specific definition. If you claim to be changing the members of that group then what you really have is a different group, ie, a different concept. Both concepts are now available but often the reason for the new concept is that the old one was found to be defective or not really useful and therefore is no longer used.

I�m sure that Rand claims that all knowledge is conceptual.

That's correct if you restrict knowledge to "a mental grasp of the facts of reality" as she does. The "muscle memory" of athletes is often referred to as a kind of knowledge but it is really a different concept and is not conceptual.

Post 233

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 4:54pm

I wrote:
>I don't believe I'm being equivocal (which means to use terms in a way likely to confuse or mislead).

Rick replied:
>No it doesn't. It means to use the same term with two different meanings.

Good grief.Talk about hair-splitting! But if you insist:

From Dictionary.com:
equivocal:
1. Open to two or more interpretations and often intended to mislead; ambiguous.

Rick continues:
>In fact that's probably what I should do from now on -- require you to specifically define your terms before responding to any of your posts.

Save yourself - and me - the trouble! Just go to Dictionary.com if you want to know what I mean by a particular word. Pull me up if you think I'm committing some egregious misinterpretation, but *please* don't split hairs as you are trying to do above.

Rick:
>I have put significant information in my posts, information that I'm quite sure you have never encountered before, but you have just skipped over it and continued to post your misunderstandings.

I'm sorry I can't reply to everything, and I'm sorry you don't agree with my criticisms. I do appreciate your time in arguing with me. If you don't want to continue that is up to you.

But you've been doing a bit of skipping too, and if you have time could you briefly clarify your positions on these questions I put to you earlier:

1) If particular entities *cannot* be concepts, then...what the Sam Hill are they?
2) If man's knowledge is conceptual, but particulars are not concepts, *how can we know anything about them*?
3) Finally, if concepts can be neither true nor false, why shoud we spend time debating about them?

Nate writes:
>Rick does a good job explaining what equivocation is, and why your arguments are equivocal.

Nate, I'm puzzled by this. Could you do me a favour and briefly list what you consider to be my equivocal arguments?

- Daniel

Post 234

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 10:10pm

Hi Daniel,

Nate, I'm puzzled by this. Could you do me a favour and briefly list what you consider to be my equivocal arguments?

First, you try to peg "definite" and "open-ended" as contraries when they are not by citing two hand-picked senses of the word out of the dictionary, leading to either of the following arguments, which are both specious and are two sides of the same coin:

Concepts are definite, so that means that you know every unit subsumed under the concept. But they are also open-ended, which means they do not refer to a fixed number of units. Concepts are both definite and open-ended, so this is absurd.

or

Concepts are open-ended, so that means that you don't quite know whether a given existent is subsumed under it. But you also said that concepts are definite, which means you do know which concepts are subsumed under it. Concepts are both definite and open-ended, so that is absurd.

Both of these arguments equivocate the colloquial meaning of definite and open-ended with the specialized definition when applied to concepts. Another such argument:

... according to Objectivism, *concepts are supposed to be how humans know things in the first place*!!!!! They *are* human knowledge!!! So when you say concepts are complete, yet *human knowledge* of them is never likely to be complete, you've unintentionally contradicted yourself...

Here, you equivocate on the word "complete." It has two senses in this argument: (1) A concept is "complete" if you can determine whether a given existent is a referent of the concept. (2) Human knowledge is "complete" if humans know everything. Therefore, human knowledge is incomplete means that there are things that humans don't know. So your argument, paraphrased to include the proper sense of the terms, goes as follows:

Concepts are the foundation of human knowledge. You can determine whether any given existent is a unit of any given concept. However, humans don't know everything. This is a contradiction.

All this talk about definitions has me thinking. You're fond of telling us that we are using colloquial terms in an unorthodox way when applying it to concepts, which you feel is an attempt to cover our shoddy epistemology. Now I went to dictionary.com and looked up every accepted definition of every sense of the word "definite." Here's what I got:

Having distinct limits.
Indisputable; certain.
Clearly defined; explicitly precise.
Limiting or Particularizing.
Precise; explicit and clearly defined.
Known for certain.

Now there's quite a large amount of variety in what the term "definite" means used without a surrounding context. How do you get the idea that "definite" means the first sense of the word when applied to concepts? That's just how it should be, maybe? Why not the fifth sense, which is what I've been using this whole time?

Nate

Post 235

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 5:09pm

I N Rand:
>Rick would seem to be wasting his time pointing out to Daniel the definition of equivocation, since Daniel thinks definitions are not important in intellectual debates.

Yes, definitions are of minimal importance. That's why we should just use standard ones that everyone is likely to understand. If everyone understands them, they are less likely to be confusing, and our arguments will be - hopefully - more productive! (I really do not see what is so outrageous in this suggestion)

Trying to do otherwise just makes you look something of a hairsplitter, as it did with Rick.

>His whole epistemology consists in using words in a confusing way--

What, you mean using them in the standard dictionary-type way that everyone understands is....*confusing*?! Now you be talkin' Crazy Talk!

>...but I don't call it equivocation, I call it World 3 thinking gone wild.

Are you actually familiar with Popper's theory? I'm happy to discuss it if you like.

>Daniel, be aware that while your four-point summation may seem from your deeply-engrained premises to show at a glance the illogic and emptiness of Objectivism, from our deeply-engrained premises it shows at a glance the lack of depth in your thought.

Well, you may be right and I may be wrong, but together we may get closer to the truth.

- Daniel

Post 236

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 5:37pm

Nate writes:
>...but if concepts really are what you say they are, nothing more than vague ideas ("family resemblances," perhaps?) I doubt such a critical method is possible.

You may doubt it...but you'd be wrong!

For concepts can be used as tools in the construction of more easily criticised items: that is...you know what I'm going to say next, don't you...;-)

These can be criticised more effectively, as they are easier to find true or false.

In fact, if Rick is correct, and concepts can be neither true nor false, exactly how is *your* critical method possible? What are you going to criticise about them?

>Going from claim 3 to claim 4 is a non sequitur.

Yes, but it's your non-sequitur, not mine! I would put it roughly:

No one knows everything (our knowledge is incomplete).�But we don't need to know everything to know something - incomplete knowledge is perfectly useful ( a rough map is better than none!).�So we learn more, so our concepts change with our knowledge - we find out stars are balls of gas, not angels - and we replace our mistaken ideas - like phlogiston - with better ones. So what?

Nate writes:
>Daniel, I know why you're arguing this point.� It's because you don't want a group of people to redefine words in order to abuse the human language, like the old Soviet regime used to try to do.�

I appreciate your generous interpretation of my motives. And you are right, although the argument goes considerably deeper in to the causes of irrationalism. But I will out line this a little more later.

Nate:
>But your solution to this problem is this: "Since I don't want people to infuse words with meanings other than those I intend, I'll deny that words have meanings."� You throw out the baby with the bathwater.

Nate, this is your solution, not mine. My solution is not to *deny that words have meanings*! I've never said that! Why would I bother with dictionaries *at all* if that was the case! My solution - or Popper's - is to move the emphasis in intellectual argument *away* from debates over the meanings of words (which a dictionary can settle usefully enough anyway) and over to debates over the truth or falsity of statements, theories etc. I know this is a break with a ancient intellectual prejudice, but I believe Popper is correct.

- Daniel

Post 237

Thursday, January 13, 2005 - 10:52pm

Daniel,

Nate, this is your solution, not mine. My solution is not to *deny that words have meanings*! I've never said that!

Right. You've only implied it with every sentence you've written.

Why would I bother with dictionaries *at all* if that was the case!

It seems like you don't, other than as a reductio ad absurdum against the Objectivist position. The only reason that you used one in the first place was to give a specific sense of "definite" stipulated to refute my argument, and you're accusing me of playing with words?

My solution - or Popper's - is to move the emphasis in intellectual argument *away* from debates over the meanings of words (which a dictionary can settle usefully enough anyway) and over to debates over the truth or falsity of statements, theories etc.

This method of analyzing theories did not work so well when we tried to analyze the truth or falsehood of the statement: "concepts are definite."

Nate

Post 238

Friday, January 14, 2005 - 7:36am

Daniel writes:

Rick continues:
>In fact that's probably what I should do from now on -- require you to specifically define your terms before responding to any of your posts.

Save yourself - and me - the trouble! Just go to Dictionary.com if you want to know what I mean by a particular word. Pull me up if you think I'm committing some egregious misinterpretation, but *please* don't split hairs as you are trying to do above.

Words are labels we give to concepts. Often the same word refers to multiple different concepts. Dictionaries (at best) simply list those concepts. If I ask you to define your terms I asking you to specify which of those concepts you are referring to when you use the word. It makes no sense for me to consult the dictionary since I would have no way of knowing which of the definitions you meant.

1) If particular entities *cannot* be concepts, then...what the Sam Hill are they?

They are particular entities! The purpose of a concept is to create a new particular, a new single entity, that we can then use to refer to all the particular entities defined by the concept. A particular entity is already a particular (duh!).

2) If man's knowledge is conceptual, but particulars are not concepts, *how can we know anything about them*?

As I pointed out before, all our knowledge is of particulars. Particulars are not (cannot be made into) concepts but concepts are particulars. See my response above to your #1.

3) Finally, if concepts can be neither true nor false, why shoud we spend time debating about them?

Another of your equivocations.

Are you talking about debating the nature of concepts and concept formation or the definition of particular concepts?

I have been doing the first since you clearly do not understand what a concept is. To remedy that I suggest you re-read, nay, study, ITOE.

As for a concept's being true or false, the question makes no sense to me. Concepts simply are. The set of items designated by the concept is that set of items. Period. Only statements we make using concepts can be either true or false.

Post 239

Friday, January 14, 2005 - 7:41am