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Inherently Dishonest Ideas
Like any philosophy, Objectivism has begun to fragment into various schools of thought, each with its own interpretation of Objectivism, and with each school convinced that its particular interpretation is the correct version. This fragmentation has been accompanied by tremendous bitterness and character assassination. Probably nowhere has this bitterness reached such heights as over the subject of inherently dishonest ideas.
Currently, the two main schools of Objectivist thought are headed by Dr. Leonard Peikoff and Dr. David Kelley. Peikoff is supported by the Ayn Rand Institute (ARI), while Kelley is supported by the Institute For Objectivist Studies (IOS). Dr. Peikoff considers Dr. Kelley to be a dishonest renegade; a dangerous man who has abandoned and betrayed the fundamental principles of Objectivism, but who nevertheless continues to claim that he is an Objectivist, and falsely claims to be spreading the ideas of Objectivism. Dr. Kelley mostly ignores Dr. Peikoff, having written Peikoff off as a hopeless intrinsicist. Meanwhile, the supporters of Kelley and Peikoff wage constant, never- ending electronic war with each other on the humanities.philosophy.objectivism newsgroup on the Internet, and to a lesser extent on private mailing lists.
David Kelley was kicked out of the ARI when he disagreed with Peikoff over the proper way to judge a man's ideas. However, unlike so many others in the Objectivist movement who had met similar fates in the past, Dr. Kelley did not simply vanish into obscurity. As a professional philosopher, he founded the IOS and began promoting his own interpretation of Objectivism which has attracted many supporters (including myself).
What exactly are Peikoff and Kelley arguing over? What has caused yet another bitter split in the ranks of Objectivism? A great deal has been written and argued by both sides, but the fundamental point of contention concerns the judging of the intellectual honesty of people. In other words, when someone espouses a false idea, how do we determine if he has merely made an 'honest error,' or is actually guilty of 'evasion,' i.e., refusal to think? The difference is one of crucial importance. Under Objectivism, one does not morally condemn a man for making an honest error in his thinking, however one never forgives (or fails to morally condemn) a dishonest evader, because Objectivism considers evasion to be the root of all evil.
Concerning the question of judging the intellectual honesty of others, Peikoff and Kelley give two very different answers. Peikoff puts forth his position in his essay, "Fact and Value". According to Peikoff:
"Just as every 'is' implies an 'ought,' so every identification of an idea's truth or falsehood implies a moral evaluation of the idea and of its advocates."
In other words, according to Peikoff, as soon as we identify an idea as true or false, this immediately implies a moral judgment of the person who is advocating the idea. In this context, 'moral judgment' means we are trying to determine if this person is being honest, or dishonest. If the idea is true, we assume that he has sought the truth. However if the idea is false, then we must decide if he has committed an honest error, or has engaged in evasion. In other words, we must determine the person's state of mind. Peikoff offers a simple test to make this determination:
"The general principle here is: truth implies as its cause a virtuous mental process; falsehood, beyond a certain point, implies a process of vice."
In other words, if your idea is false, and the falsehood goes beyond a 'certain point,' then you cannot simply be guilty of an honest error in your thinking. Rather, you must have engaged in evasion, which is the root of all evil.
By claiming that false ideas are the result of evasion (at least beyond a certain point), Peikoff gives rise to the concept of inherently dishonest ideas. Peikoff never gives a useful definition of inherently dishonest ideas. In his entire Fact & Value essay, there are only two places where Peikoff makes an effort to provide a definition of inherently dishonest ideas. In the first case, he states that inherently dishonest ideas are an "explicit rebellion against reason and reality." Later on, he talks about ideas that are "openly at war with reason and reality." So the two 'definitions' we have are:
1. Explicit rebellion against reason and reality.
2. Openly at war with reason and reality.
Needless to say, neither of these statements are definitions, except in an extremely limited, technical sense. As Peikoff uses them, they are subjective rhetoric, little more than figures of speech. They are not precise, and they are not objective. A false idea is one that in some way contradicts reason and reality. That's what it means to be false. In that sense, any false idea could be described as an "explicit rebellion against reason and reality," or said to be "openly at war with reason and reality." This is why such 'definitions' are largely useless.
On the other hand, if we take Peikoff's definitions literally, then an inherently dishonest idea could only be an idea that explicitly comes out against reason and reality; one that says specifically, "I'm against reason. I'm against reality." Nihilism might qualify in this regard, but Communism, egalitariansism, non-objective art, or channelers, certainly would not. Nowhere do these ideologies explicitly state, "Down with reason! Down with reality!" Yet Peikoff claims that such ideologies are inherently dishonest.
In short, Peikoff's definitions of inherently dishonest ideas are so vague and subjective as to be worthless, except to dogmatic moralizers who can use such definitions to declare any idea to be inherently dishonest.
Peikoff does give some examples of inherently dishonest ideas, such as Nazism, Communism, non-objective art, non-Aristotelian logic, egalitarianism, nihilism, the pragmatist cult of compromise, and channelers. As Peikoff puts it:
"In all such cases, the ideas are not merely false; in one form or another, they represent an explicit rebellion against reason and reality (and therefore, against man and values). The originators, leaders and intellectual spokesmen of all such movements are necessarily evaders on a major scale; they are not merely mistaken, but are crusading irrationalists. The mass base of such movements are not evaders of the same kind; but most of the followers are dishonest in their own passive way. They are unthinking, intellectually irresponsible ballast, unconcerned with logic or truth."
From the above, one would conclude that an inherently dishonest idea is an idea that cannot be held as a result of honest error. In other words, an academic Marxist must be holding his Marxism as a result of evasion. He cannot be holding it as a result of honest error.
Needless to say, this notion of 'inherently dishonest' ideas is not philosophy; it is simply Peikoff's personal evaluation of Nazism, Communism, etc. Of course Peikoff is entitled to his opinion, but he is not entitled to present it as a philosophical principle. It is okay to say, "I have met many academic Marxists over the years, and all of them turned out to be dishonest evaders." However it is wrong to conclude that all academic Marxists are dishonest evaders. This is a false argument. No matter how many dishonest academic Marxists a man might personally have met, this can never be used to prove that all academic Marxists are inherently dishonest. Human beings simply aren't that predictable.
Even if we could somehow demonstrate that most academic Marxists do, in fact, hold their Marxism as a result of evasion, this still would not prove that all academic Marxists must hold their Marxism as a result of evasion. Because human beings have free will, and can make enormous mistakes on the conceptual level, there is always the possibility that a particular academic Marxist is holding his ideas honestly. In such a case, it would be a monstrous injustice to morally condemn such a man, solely on the basis of the ideas he holds. There can be no greater injustice than to morally condemn a man, solely because the other members of his group are known to be dishonest. Obviously Peikoff's 'certain point' at which an idea becomes inherently dishonest, is critically important. If we know that a man is holding his false idea as the result of evasion, then we can immediately morally condemn him. Unfortunately, Peikoff never tells us where this 'certain point' is, nor how to determine it. This means that every Objectivist is free to determine, on his own, the location of that 'certain point.'
What this means, in actuality, is that every Objectivist uses his own internal standard of reasonableness, and his own knowledge of human psychology, to determine the location of that 'certain point.' He asks himself, "Do I think it's possible to hold such an idea as the result of honest error?" Needless to say, one would expect different individuals to have wildly different answers to such a question. What this does, in effect, is to make the process of judgment, in the realm of ideas, totally subjective. One merely hauls out one's own guess, or estimate, based on one's own limited observations (or feelings). There is no fact of reality on which one can reliably base such an estimate. Such a process is about as 'objective' as Trial By Ordeal.
What does the concept of inherently dishonest ideas mean in practice? According to Peikoff, there can be no such thing as an honest academic Marxist. To become an academic Marxist, a man "must have" engaged in evasion. How does Peikoff know this? He will tell you that the evidence of the falsity of Marxism is simply overwhelming, and no honest adult could be aware of this mountain of evidence and still honestly advocate Marxism. In other words, this is simply Peikoff's psychological guess. It is not proof of any sort. Yet on such shaky grounds, Peikoff (and many of his supporters) are willing to morally condemn human beings, and declare that such people are dishonest evaders.
David Kelley's position is just the opposite of Peikoff's. Writing in his monograph, Truth & Toleration, Kelley states:
"Can we tell from the truth or falsity of an idea, and from its consequences, whether those who accept it are rational or irrational? This is the central issue on which Peikoff and I disagree."
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